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The World Community: A Planetary Social Process*

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*W. Michael Reisman****
*Andrew R. Willard*****

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This Article is part of a work-in-progress entitled *The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision; International Law in Comprehensive Community Context*. It has grown from work commenced with our late colleague, Harold D. Lasswell, who will be listed as co-author of the more comprehensive study.

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INTRODUCTION

The specialized process of interaction commonly designated international law is part of a larger world social process that comprehends all the interpenetrating and interstimulating communities on the planet. In the aggregate, these lesser communities comprise a planetary community.¹ We use the expression "world community" here not in a meta-

¹ Biologists and ecologists have long understood the interactive character of all communities, including the planetary community.

A biological, or natural, community consists of all of the organisms that live together in a given environment and, in various ways, affect one another. Thus, a forest, with its trees providing food, shelter, and shade for animals, its undergrowth plants, its many animals feeding on the different

phoric or wistfully aspirational sense but as a descriptive term.² "Community" designates interactions in which interdetermination or interdependence in the shaping and sharing of all values attain an intensity at which participants in pursuit of their own objectives must regularly take account of the activities and demands of others.³ It is this

plant species and on one another, and its soil bacteria and fungi, constitutes a biological community. . . .

Several kinds of subdivisions can be recognized within a natural community. Distinctive groups of organisms, such as those in a rotting log or in a water-filled hole at the base of a tree, are microcommunities, occupying microhabitats. . . .

Communities can also be grouped into larger systems. In a given land area there may be a pattern of different kinds of forests, ranging from valleys to dry slopes of hills. This pattern of communities and their habitats (of which man and his effects may be part) is a landscape. In a pond or lake the plankton community, plus the shore community and the bottom organisms, together are all parts of the pond or lake ecosystem. On a still higher level, all the organisms of the Earth's surface form a world community, or biosphere. The biosphere, together with its water, soil, and air environment, is a world ecosystem, or ecosphere, though many authors also use the term biosphere in this larger sense, meaning a world ecosystem.

THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, *Community, Biological*, in 4 MACROPAEDIA 1027 (15th ed. 1974).

² Comparable usage is found in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences:

A community, in the sense in which the term will be used here, is a territorially bounded social system or set of interlocking or integrated functional subsystems (economic, political, religious, ethical, educational, legal, socializing, reproductive, etc.) serving a resident population, plus the material culture or physical plant through which the subsystems operate. The community concept does not include such characteristics as harmony, love, "we-feeling," or intimacy, which are sometimes nostalgically imputed to idealized preindustrial communities . . . , but it does include a minimum of consensus.

Bernard, *Community Disorganization*, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 163 (D. Sills ed. 1968) [hereafter INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA]. For a concise survey, see Friedrich, *The Concept of Community in the History of Political and Legal Philosophy*, in NOMOS II, COMMUNITY (C. Friedrich ed. 1959).

³ That the issue is fundamentally interdetermination among participating individuals and associations is stated concisely in the following passage:

The problem of setting boundaries on the community is, perhaps, ultimately insoluble except by arbitrary means, because it is freely conceded that *externally* made decisions may have a significant impact on the allocation of values and on important private and public decisions *within* the

"taking into account" which generates claims perforce resolved by decision processes.

A community does not presuppose that its members operate with reciprocally amiable perspectives. Certainly large numbers of the world's population view their counterparts with fear and, in many instances, with hatred. Nor does community assume that all participants operate with overt recognition of community. Indeed many members of the world community, as of less inclusive communities, betray little understanding of the impact their behavior has on others and that of others' has on them. There is, thus, no necessary correlation between the facts of interdetermination and the perception of that interdetermination, including a recognition of the necessity for the clarification of common interest. When community as a fact is more clearly perceived, the observer is more likely to find that participants actively seek to clarify common interests with other community members and make more explicit demands for the establishment or improvement of authoritative decision processes. It is the perception of interdependence in community process that leads participants to appreciate the relevance of pursuing common interests and motivates them to clarify it.⁴

community, however defined. And it is the description of the shaping and sharing of these values and decisions that is the central concern . . .

Polsby, *The Study of Community Power*, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, *supra* note 2.

⁴ The perception and fact of interdependences on a planetary scale is distinctive of the contemporary situation. The scope and domain of interdependence is the novel development, not the fact of interdependence. Realizations of interdependences have always lead, and continue to animate, people to clarify common interests and to develop institutions for their achievement. For example, the United States Constitution and the first ten amendments (the "Bill of Rights") are expressions of a clarified common interest. The establishment of the United Nations and the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are more recent expressions. Commentators have projected their conceptions as well. For efforts aspiring toward comprehensiveness, see R. FALK, *A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS* (1975); S. KIM, *THE QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER* (1984); M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY* (1980); *ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER, PREFERRED WORLDS FOR THE 1990's* (S. Mendlovitz ed. 1975).

Developing procedures for inquiry into the empirical referents of "common interest" and determining the common interest in particular contexts are tasks that inevitably confront community decision makers and students. Scholarly expositions include H. BAKER, *THE DIGNITY OF MAN, STUDIES IN THE PERSISTENCE OF AN IDEA* (1947); F. OPPENHEIM, *THE DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM: AN ANALYSIS* (1961); NOMOS V, *THE PUBLIC INTEREST* (C. Friedrich ed. 1962); Lasswell, *To Verify Universal Values* (Book Review), *Saturday Rev.*, June 20, 1959, at 14 (reviewing A. BRECHT, *POLITICAL THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT*

It is the fact of an interdependent world community that makes some system of international law inescapable. It is, further, this most comprehensive social process that comprises the events which give rise to claims to authoritative decision; which affects the kind of authoritative decisions taken; and upon which authoritative decision has impact. Effective power in community process builds upon many other values and authoritative decision is a component of effective power. Without adequate orientation in this largest community process, both rational decision and realistic inquiry about decision are impossible. Without careful location in the facts that give rise to decision, influence decision, and are affected by decision, both decision and inquiry become random and anecdotal. Hence, the need for a refined perception and map of the world community process.

Legal process and social process are not comprehensively identical or rationally congruent. If a theory *about* international law is to be helpful, it must, of course, show how to identify the legal process in terms that enable the scientific observer or the active participant to isolate it for separate consideration. The legal process is but a detail, though an important detail, of the world community process as a whole.⁵ If we fail to discriminate decision outcomes from other outcomes, or if we are unable to distinguish authoritative and controlling decisions from those that are nonauthoritative or noncontrolling, it will be impossible to cope with the questions that arise in the making and application, or even the realistic understanding, of international law.⁶ But a treatment which takes "law" as a closed system, intermittently disturbed by "independ-

(1959)); see also H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, especially part III, chapter 1, *The Clarification of Values* (forthcoming, 1989).

⁵ For further discussion, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, *The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision*, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1969), reprinted in M. MCDUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981); see also *The Relation of Law to Its Larger Community Context*, in H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4. See generally Lasswell & McDougal, *The Relation of Law to Social Process: Trends in Theory About Law*, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 465 (1976), reprinted in H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at ch. 3.

⁶ See generally Lasswell & McDougal, *Trends in Theories About Law: Maintaining Observational Standpoint and Delimiting the Focus of Inquiry*, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 23-50 (1976); Lasswell & McDougal, *Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions of Constitutive Process*, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972). Both articles will be re-issued in H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, in part I.

dent" naked power variables, is hardly conducive to appraising the value effects of decision or recommending structural improvements. A viable theory about international law must provide a comprehensive and realistic map of the world community process as a whole in order to offer the fullest assistance to scholars and decision makers either in effectively delimiting particular problems or in bringing to bear all the various intellectual skills relevant to the solution of such problems. As in other intellectual endeavors, some understanding of the whole frame of reference is indispensable to the realistic study of its interrelated parts.

In an earlier study, we took note of the wide variation among jurisprudential approaches, when examined and appraised according to their success both in identifying the distinctive frame of reference of international law and in relating such law to its largest community context.⁷ Our survey of the various historic jurisprudential emphases revealed diverse imperfections in their conception of, and focus upon, world social processes. Thus, the early "natural" law approach, though sometimes cognizant of the larger community of humankind, more often adopted partial and unevaluated conceptions of that community and did not develop the notion of interpenetrating community processes embracing all peoples. The historicist approach was distinctly regressive in its astigmatic, parochial emphases upon the internal processes of particular territorial communities, largely located in Christian Europe, and exhibited little interest in identifying a *volksgeist* on a global scale. The Marxist version of the historicist approach was outstanding for its insistence on the interdependence of law and society; but the Marxist writers placed so much stress on the dynamics of a single sector of the social process — wealth — that they sacrificed the realism of a multifactor analysis. They excelled in a rhetoric of realism but have never inspired a workable map of world community. The positivist or analytical conception, dominated by its emphasis upon law as autonomous commands or rules, has long been that of a community of sovereign, independent states, and not of the whole of humankind, interacting as individuals and groups. The difficulties which the positivist conception causes in accounting for the interrelations of "international" and "national" law still obscure discussions of this important subject in most major treatises upon international law. Unfortunately, the sociological approach to the study of law has been more concerned with national

⁷ See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, *Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence*, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 189 (1968), reprinted in M. McDougal & W. Reisman, *supra* note 5.

than transnational contexts and, when concerned with transnational contexts, has commonly assumed simply a community of states, without considering or exploring other important transnational interdeterminations. It is perhaps with the contemporary "limited factor" or "system" theorists, despite their emphasis upon the isolation of key variables and the refraction of social process, that we begin to get the recommendations and employment of more inclusive, and hence more viable, conceptions of world community; however, this approach only rarely attempts to identify the phenomena of international law in this largest community.

Given the sheer scale and complexity of the planetary social process, even an effort toward detailed description could overwhelm utility. Scholars as well as decision makers need to develop a comprehensive, yet convenient and economic, method that permits them to make adequate particular reference to the global community process in order to discharge effectively the intellectual tasks of inquiry and decision.⁸ In formulating and working with particular problems, they must be able to describe, with some economy, trends in decisions raising comparable

⁸ Professor Shils described this problem, primarily with the scholar's perspective in mind, and enunciated, in general, the required conceptual orientation:

It is obviously necessary to ascertain the unique features of societies and polities. These are already so apparent that their detection as such will not cause us any great difficulty. Indeed, the likelihood that their particularity will overwhelm us is, rather, the greater danger. Our task in this regard is to find the categories within which the unique may be described, and in which its differences with respect to other situations may be presented in a way that raises scientifically significant problems. Orderly comparison is one necessary step in the process of systematic explanation. The alternative to comparative description and explanation is *ad hoc* description that uses categories usually drawn from more or less contemporary experience. This might satisfy the mind momentarily, but when an effort is made to go more deeply and to be more consistent, this procedure reveals that it is a superficial makeshift. Cumulative knowledge, the transfer of insights gained in one inquiry into another context, is greatly hampered.

. . . To go beyond *ad hoc* explanations — however truthful and revealing these might be — demands the stabilization of concepts or categories; but to stabilize often imposes only a deadening rigidity, an application of concepts improvised in some other intellectual context. Stable concepts are helpful only if they are applicable. They will be applicable only if they are of sufficient scope and if they contain sufficient potentiality for logical extension.

Shils, *On the Comparative Study of the New States*, in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* 15-16 (C. Geertz ed. 1963) [hereafter *OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES*].

policies, identify conditions that account for those trends, and make provisional projections of likely future trends in decision, preparatory to evaluating outcomes and determining whether it is necessary to invent alternative methods for achieving goals.

The more comprehensive model of the world community which we propose, and will develop, is an expansion of the generalized image of social process as a continuing flow of interaction in which *people* strive to maximize *values* employing *institutions* affecting *resources*.⁹ The method we employ here is the now familiar phase analysis, by which any social process may be described by using six or seven terms or categories.¹⁰ We refer to the principal categories of "participation," and describe the most important "perspectives" that animate and give direction and intelligibility to interaction. We further distinguish "situations" by the spatial, temporal, institutional, and crisis character in which significant interactions occur. Consideration is given to the "base values" available to the several categories of participants, and to the "strategies" that participants employ to manage the base values to maximize (or optimize) value outcomes. These "outcomes" are the culminating events of "increasing" or "decreasing" power, wealth, or other values. "Effects," which are sometimes treated with outcomes, are the longer-term consequences of a specific decision, or aggregate of decisions, or choices for the rank ordering of values, the degree of value

⁹ This model is articulated in H. LASSWELL & M. McDUGAL, *supra* note 4, especially at part II, *The Social Process Context*; see also H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *POWER AND SOCIETY, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY* (1950).

¹⁰ This method has been employed in a wide range of studies. See, e.g., M. ARSANJANI, *INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNAL RESOURCES: A STUDY OF LAW AND POLICY* (1981); D. JOHNSTON, *THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-ORIENTED INQUIRIES* (1965, 1987 with new introductory essay); M. McDUGAL & ASSOCIATES, *STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER* (1960, 1987 with new introduction); M. McDUGAL & W. BURKE, *THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA* (1962, 1987 with new introductory essay); M. McDUGAL & F. FELICIANO, *LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION* (1961); M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4; M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, *THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE* (1967); M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, *LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE* (1963); B. MURTY, *PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION* (1968); W. REISMAN, *NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS* (1971). These studies are being re-issued with new introductions as part of New Haven Studies in International Law and World Public Order.

realization, or the innovation, diffusion or restriction of institutional practices.

The culminating outcome of the process whereby power is shaped and shared is decision, which includes the giving and receiving of support for particular choices, for the prescription of more general policies about the shaping and sharing of values, and for maintenance or change in the institutions of decision. Enlightenment is the giving or receiving of information, and wealth is the maintenance and exchange of claims to the services of values or resources. Well-being is the giving or receiving of safety, health, and comfort. In the case of skill, the culminating outcome is the acquisition or attainment of some level of proficiency in technical performance. Affection is the giving or receiving of positive sentiments and involves intimacy with individuals and loyalty to groups. Respect is interchange of recognition and the honoring of reciprocal freedom of choice. Rectitude is participation in setting standards of responsible conduct and the application of such standards. In the shaping and sharing of values, a participant may be indulged or deprived in varying degree. Terms such as powerless, uninformed, poor, ill, untrained, unloved, dishonored, and immoral suggest deprivation.

The map and abbreviated description of the world community process that follow have a dual objective. The first is methodological: given the rapidity of change in the contemporary community, a synchronic "snapshot" is likely to become quaint in key aspects very quickly. Hence, it is important to achieve a theory and tools to constantly update the details of the world community process, or to develop richer detail as particular controversies may require. At the same time, there is substantial value in attempting to summarize some of the major trends in world community process, the conditions that account for the trends, and likely future trends. Summarizing these trends will orient the scholar and decision maker in the flow of events affecting all particular problems, and perhaps suggest the potentialities of such an orientation to observers who may remain dubious of the existence and operation of a world community process. When relevant, we try to indicate possible future trends by using a variety of projection and prediction techniques. For the student and maker of policy, it is the future that is the operational target: the past is relevant for contextual orientation, identification of relevant processes, prior goals and their approximation and decision, and conditioning factors affecting them. In the pages that follow we consider seriatim the categories that may be used to describe the phenomena which comprise every phase of interaction.

I. PARTICIPATION

An accurate description and assessment of any social process requires that initial attention be given to individuals and group participants.¹¹ In many scholarly endeavors, unstated presuppositions operate to narrow the aperture of observation and, hence, present a very limited spectrum of actual participation. International relations specialists may present as the only relevant community, one composed of nation states, power isolates regarded as impermeably sealed and somehow existing independently of the perspectives and operations of the individual human beings who constitute them. Historians, especially those who work with an implicit elite theory of decision, focus on monarchs, dictators, generals, and the like to the exclusion of human beings in other critical strata. Economic historians, in contrast, focus on those elites specializing in the production and distribution of wealth. Popular historians may eschew those extremes, but themselves fall prey to the assumption that it is only in the folk culture of the people that one can describe reality. Obviously, all the particular groups selected by these diverse specialists participate with varying effectiveness. What is important, both for scholar and decision maker, is a comprehensive delineation which permits the observer, with minimal preconception, to identify all those who are *in fact* actors in each context.¹²

¹¹ Anthropologists and sociologists have explored this issue. For overviews, see *THE CRAFT OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY* (A. Epstein ed. 1967); *HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY* (H. Triandis ed. 1980); *A HANDBOOK OF METHOD IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY* (R. Naroll & R. Cohen eds. 1970); *HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY* (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds. 3d ed. 1985).

¹² The first step is to provide the observer with a "checklist" that covers the various conceivable "forms" of interaction in the world community. Otherwise, significant modes of participation may be overlooked. The great variety of practices that comprise the planetary social process, therefore, encourages the responsible observer to use a more general delineation or taxonomy in the initial phases of any survey. Once a provisional list of participants is developed, those who are critical actors can be identified, again on a tentative basis, by their apparent impact on the pattern of value shaping and sharing in the situation under scrutiny.

Although concerned with the study of "new state polities," Geertz's description of methodological implications pertains to inquiry about the world community.

But it is the recalcitrance of primordial issues that, among other things, keeps the process of incessant political, and even constitutional, innovation going, and gives to any attempt at systematic classification of new state polities a radically provisional, if not simply premature, quality.

An attempt to order the various governmental arrangements now emerging in the new states as means for coping with problems arising from linguistic, racial, and so on, heterogeneity must begin, therefore, with a simple empirical review of a number of such arrangements, a mere set-

A fundamental distinction is between individuals acting on their own behalf and individuals acting collectively. Ascertaining on whose behalf individuals believe they are operating is important in order to make this distinction. This is no easy task.¹³ It is in the nature of complex organizations and, in particular, bureaucracies, that individuals fulfilling carefully prescribed roles do not always appreciate for whom they are working or who is the beneficiary of their activities.¹⁴ But the observer must be sensitive to the various factors that condition the act and validity of self-characterization.¹⁵ The final determination is the observer's responsibility.

For some conceptual purposes groups are divided into the organized and the unorganized, the territorial and the functional or pluralized,

ting out in model form of existing experiments. From such a review it should be possible to derive a sense of at least the *ranges* of variation involved, a notion of the general dimensions of the social field within which these arrangements are taking shape. Typologizing becomes, in this approach, a matter, not of devising constructed types, ideal or otherwise, which will isolate fundamental constancies of structure amid the confusion of phenomenal variation, but of determining the limits with which such variation takes place, the domain over which it plays. . . .

Geertz, *The Integrative Revolution*, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES, *supra* note 8, at 129.

¹³ This can become quite complicated as personality is shaped and expressed in roles that require or encourage conflicting practices. This situation is explored with reference to bribery within and among the diverse cultures and functional organizations that comprise world community in W. REISMAN, *FOLDED LIES, BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS* 119-49 (1979).

¹⁴ A relevant portrayal is DANILO KIS, *A TOMB FOR BORIS DAVIDOVICH: A NOVEL* (D. Mikić-Mitchell trans. 1978). See also H. GUETZKOW, *MULTIPLE LOYALTIES: THEORETICAL APPROACH TO A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* (1955). It is misleading to suggest that the empirical phenomena of concern is of recent origin. See *CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES AND DISCUSSIONS* (R. MacIver ed. 1952) [hereafter *CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES*], especially at the Introduction, *An Ancient Tale Retold*.

¹⁵ Interviewing may not lessen the difficulty of the task. For further discussion, see S. BROWN, *POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY: APPLICATIONS OF Q METHODOLOGY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE* (1980); F. FOWLER, JR., *SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS* (1984); H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part III, chapter 3, *The Scientific Examination of Conditions*; C. OSGOOD, W. MAY & M. MIRON, *CROSS-CULTURAL UNIVERSALS OF AFFECTIVE MEANING* (1975); H. TRIANDIS, *THE ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE CULTURE* (1972); *THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY* (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds. 3d ed. 1985); see also S. ARORA & H. LASSWELL, *POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, THE PUBLIC LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL ELITES IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES* (1969); Brunner, *Key Political Symbols: The Dissociation Process*, 20 POL. SCI. 53 (1987); Lasswell, *Language of Politics*, in *LANGUAGE: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS MEANING AND FUNCTION* (R. Anshen ed. 1957).

depending on the degree to which their members behave in coordinated practices, are localized or dispersed, or specialized to particular values. While each individual or group is to a degree unavoidably involved in both the shaping and sharing of values, a major separation is between participants whose primary role in a given context is value shaping and those whose role is value sharing.

A. *Individual Human Beings*

It is individual human beings, interacting both separately and as the ultimate actors in all groups, who comprise the global community, as well as its lesser component communities and various functional associations.¹⁶

It is individual human beings, whatever the group form and modality, who shape and share the interdetermination and interdependence that characterize community.¹⁷ Transcending an indispensable role in

¹⁶ The following passage written in 1940 by the anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown elucidates our perspective in this regard:

In writings on political institutions there is a good deal of discussion about the nature and the origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity over and above the human individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attributes something called "sovereignty", and sometimes spoken of as having a will (law being often defined as the will of the State) or as issuing commands. The State, in this sense, does not exist in the phenomenal world; it is a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an organization, i.e., a collection of individual human beings connected by a complex system of relations. Within that organization different individuals have different roles, and some are in possession of special power or authority, as chiefs or elders capable of giving commands which will be obeyed, as legislators or judges, and so on. There is no such thing as the power of the State; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals — kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters.

AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS xxiii (M. Fortes & E. Evans-Pritchard eds. 1940).

Catlin was terse when he made the same point 13 years earlier: "The subject matter of politics is the acts of individuals, not of states; the individual will is the political unit." G. CATLIN, *SCIENCE AND METHOD OF POLITICS* 141-42 (1927); *see also* H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 3-15, 29-51.

¹⁷ However, the subtle and potent interplay between the development of the individual and society should not be overlooked. George Herbert Mead concluded:

In short, all organized human society — even in its most complex and highly developed forms — is in a sense merely an extension and ramification of those simple and basic socio-physiological relations among its individual members (relations between the sexes resulting from their physiological differentiation, and relations between parents and children) upon which it is founded, and from which it originates.

creation and management of groups, the individual increasingly operates in ways that have transnational consequences. This becomes evident when we examine the impact of conspicuous leaders, such as Napoleon, Lincoln, Lenin, Stalin, Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, Mao, Ghandi, Khomeini or, going beyond the specialized institutions of power, when we examine the influence of a wealthy tycoon in finance, shipping or petroleum, or of a supremely innovative scientist like Einstein, a dedicated nurse like Florence Nightingale, a creative artist like Michelangelo, a beloved actor like Charlie Chaplin, a respected descendant of a historic figure like Confucius, or a religious innovator like Guatama Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, Luther, Joseph Smith, Mary Baker Eddy, or Bahulalah. On a less grandiose scale are millions of human beings who make their own decisions regarding participation in war, or who travel, communicate and collaborate transnationally in pursuit of enlightenment, health, wealth, skill, affection, respect or moral and religious wholeness (rectitude). Finally, millions of people live their lives in rural or urban villages, never venturing beyond childhood haunts, nor gaining insight into the world community and its impact on their daily affairs.

B. Territorial Communities: Nation States

Since the emergence of nation states in the wake of feudalism and the vanished Roman Empire of the West, the politics of Western Europe

G. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORALIST 229 (C. Morris ed. 1934) [hereafter MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY]. Mead went on to elaborate a conception of "basic socio-physiological relations":

Human society, we have insisted, does not merely stamp the pattern of its organized social behavior upon any one of its individual members, so that this pattern becomes likewise the pattern of the individual's self; it also, at the same time, gives him a mind, as the means or ability of consciously conversing with himself in terms of the social attitudes which constitute the structure of his self and which embody the pattern of human society's organized behavior as reflected in that structure. And his mind enables him in turn to stamp the pattern of his further developing self (further developing through his mental activity) upon the structure or organization of human society, and thus in a degree to reconstruct and modify in terms of his self the general pattern of social or group behavior in terms of which his self was originally constituted.

Id. at 263 n.10; see also H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part II, chapter 3, *The Dynamics of Personality*; G. MEAD, ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: SELECTED PAPERS (A. Strauss rev. ed. 1964); G. MEAD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT (C. Morris ed. 1938); PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (C. Kluckhohn & H. Murray eds. rev. 2d ed. 1953).

have been dominated by the conflicts and accommodations of the nation-state system.¹⁸ An expanding Europe, improvements in transportation and communication, and marginal advantages in military organization and weapons technology, transformed Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, France, and other powers into multicontinental empires able to impose themselves on peoples of alien culture. However, factors of marginally more efficient techniques of mass mobilization, social organization, and access to superior weapons and military technology in particular, though often guarded as national resources, were often acquired by subjugated peoples if their elites were not obliterated or they themselves were not effectively absorbed into the metropolitan identification system.¹⁹ Hence, the factors that made for the coincidence between culture and power diffused and ultimately led to the eventual decline of European colonialism and the extension of nation states on a worldwide scale.²⁰ With the rapid fragmentation of bodies politic that has taken place since World War II, the nation state, frequently with a scanty resource base, often more closely resembles the land-poor city state of an earlier epoch than a large-scale national unit. Nonetheless, the nation state has come to be viewed as the dominant category of participation in the world community.²¹

It need scarcely be said that the congruence of political boundaries with kinship, linguistic, economic, regional, religious, customary, and other boundaries is the exception rather than the rule.²² This lack of

¹⁸ See F. HINSLEY, *POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES* (1963); E. MORSE, *MODERNIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (1976); *THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE* (C. Tilly ed. 1975).

¹⁹ This theme is summarized in W. MCNEILL, *THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY* 762 (1963). Detailed exposition is available in the 12-volume work, A. TOYNBEE, *A STUDY OF HISTORY* (1934-61). See also S. EISENSTADT, *THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF EMPIRES* (1963); W. MCNEILL, *A WORLD HISTORY* (3d ed. 1979).

²⁰ The number of nation states has grown from 72 to 168 since World War II. The proliferation is displayed graphically in M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *THE NEW STATE OF THE WORLD ATLAS* Map 1 (1984). This book provides many maps pertinent to this Article. The text that accompanies each map adds qualification and the list of references at the close of the book is brief and valuable.

²¹ The significance of the nation state is explored in J. STRAYER, *ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE* (1970); see also R. EMERSON, *FROM EMPIRE TO NATION: THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES* (1960); R. LOWIE, *THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE* (1927); R. MACIVER, *THE MODERN STATE* (1926); *THE STATE* (S. Graubard ed. 1981).

²² For historical treatment, see A. BOZEMAN, *POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY* (1960). Contemporary contexts are explored, for example, in C.

congruence is perhaps most obvious in Southeast Asia, throughout Africa, and in parts of the Middle East. But there is no contemporary nation state that exists independently of these primordial boundaries or affiliations. The institution of the nation state and its vocabulary originated in what is now called Western Europe and even there the consolidation of identifications into a national "self" is uneven. In the course of its sometimes violent diffusion, the cultures adapting its symbolism and language have done so by modifying, to the extent possible, its principal features to local practices rather than vice versa. In many contexts the nation state is virtually a superficial organization, sometimes used deliberately to conceal the loci and channels of effective loyalties which control the flow of indulgences and deprivations. These loyalties or sentimentalized identifications may be based on many factors, including familial, cultural, tribal, language, dialect, or kinship ties. In settings where the shaping and sharing of values is controlled, and especially authoritatively controlled by practices exercised through channels policed by these primordial affiliations, the hold of elites primarily identified with the nation state can be particularly tenuous.²³

YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM (1976); NONSTATE NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, COMPARATIVE SYSTEM ANALYSES (J. Bertelsen ed. 1977); see also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 27, *Languages of Rule*, Map 28, *Religions of Rule*, and Map 57, *The State Under Pressure*, and text accompanying each map.

²³ Geertz notes that this situation poses a fundamental problem, particularly for secular "modernizers."

The network of primordial alliance and opposition is a dense, intricate, but yet precisely articulated one, the product, in most cases, of centuries of gradual crystallization. The unfamiliar civil state, born yesterday from the meager remains of an exhausted colonial regime, is superimposed upon this fine-spun and lovingly conserved texture of pride and suspicion and must somehow contrive to weave it into the fabric of modern politics.

OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES, *supra* note 8, at 119. Efforts to deal with this dilemma are numerous and ongoing. Students of "development" have generated a vast literature that attempts to describe, analyze, evaluate, and propose strategies for furthering the integration of indigenous cultures with modern scientific and technological practices. See, e.g., D. APTER, THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION (1965); W. ASCHER, SCHEMING FOR THE POOR, THE POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION IN LATIN AMERICA (1984); H. BARNETT, INNOVATION: THE BASIS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1953); C. BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE HISTORY (1967); S. EISENSTADT, MODERNIZATION: PROTEST AND CHANGE (1966); S. EISENSTADT, TRADITION, CHANGE AND MODERNITY (1973); G. FOSTER, TRADITIONAL CULTURES AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1962); D. GOULET, THE CRUEL CHOICE, A NEW CONCEPT IN THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT (1973); INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (B. Hoselitz & W. Moore eds. 1968); A. INKELES & D. SMITH, BECOMING MODERN, INDIVIDUAL CHANGE IN SIX

C. Intergovernmental and Transnational Organizations

Under the pressures generated by interdependence, nation state elites have found it expedient to establish and maintain a network of official transnational organizations to accomplish a range of specific objectives.²⁴ These organizations have often been handicapped by the acute concern of the most influential elements, in particular nation states, to avoid either a formal or effective surrender of control.²⁵ At least in the beginning, the objectives of these structures often were strictly circumscribed. The most inclusive structures were launched at the end of World War I (the League of Nations) and World War II (the United Nations and associated institutions).²⁶

The number of specialized agencies, giving expression on a planetary scale to every value process, has increased throughout the twentieth century.²⁷ Despite their primary locus of activity being functionally limited to particular value processes, geographical sectors, or regionally

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1974); D. LERNER, *THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: MODERNIZING THE MIDDLE EAST* (1958); *POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT* (R. Braibanti ed. 1969); *POLITICAL CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT* (S. Eisenstadt & R. Lemarchand eds. 1981); *THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPING AREAS* (G. Almond & J. Coleman eds. 1960); E. ROGERS, *DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION* (1963); *TRADITION, VALUES, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* (R. Braibanti & J. Spengler eds. 1961); *see also* sources cited *supra* note 22; *infra* note 56.

²⁴ For further discussion, see I. CLAUDE, *SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* (1956); H. JACOBSON, *NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM* (1979); M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, *THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* (1961); *see also* D. ARMSTRONG, *THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY* (1982).

²⁵ The dynamics of organizational behavior are examined with reference to the International Telecommunication Union, International Labor Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in R. COX & H. JACOBSON, *THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* (1973).

²⁶ On the League, see F. WALTERS, *A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS* (1952). On the United Nations, see E. LUARD, *A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS* (1982); *see also* sources cited *supra* note 24. A comprehensive listing of the United Nations and related organizations is available in J. WINTER, K. ZIMMER, *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION, ANNOTATED BASIC DOCUMENTS AND DESCRIPTIVE DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS* I.A. & I.B. (2d ed. rev. 1982).

²⁷ *See* sources cited *infra* notes 32-33.

bound by local elites, these organizations reflect and contribute to the fact and awareness of global community by focusing attention and energy on the inextricably transnational nature of the problems which they confront.

D. *Transnational Political Parties and Orders*

Whatever the degree of their formal authority in traditional international law, it is undeniable that transnational political parties and orders play important roles in shaping programs and politics with respect to power and other values. Communist, socialist, republican, monarchist, anarchist, and many other organizations act together across nation-state boundaries to influence elections and decisions on particular issues. They also promote comprehensive images of the past and future which orient their members and help them interpret the continuous flow of information and events. Regardless of the degree of realism of their images, these organizations provide significant opportunities for shaping and sharing power, wealth, respect, affection, and rectitude.²⁸

The distinction drawn between a political party and a political order is not a conventional difference embedded in the everyday terminology of power. Rather, it is a functional distinction drawn to serve the needs of scientific observers who recognize the importance of avoiding confusion.²⁹ A political party commits itself to a variety of public issues and relies principally on strategies of persuasion to obtain acceptance for the candidates and programs that it presents in its own name. On the contrary, a political order enjoys a monopoly of legality in some states, and therefore is in a position to use state coercion to exclude competi-

²⁸ See generally M. DUVERGER, *POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE* (B. North & R. North trans. 1954); K. JANDA, *POLITICAL PARTIES: A CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY* (1980); V. KEY, *POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS* (5th ed. 1964); R. MICHELS, *POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY* (E. Paul & C. Paul trans. 1915); S. ROKKAN, A. CAMPBELL, P. TORSVIK & H. VALEN, *CITIZENS, ELECTIONS, PARTIES; APPROACHES TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT* (1970); *PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES* (S. Lipset & S. Rokkan eds. 1967); *POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* (J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner eds. 1966); *POLITICAL PARTIES; CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND IDEAS* (R. Macridis ed. 1967); *POLITICAL PARTIES; DEVELOPMENT AND DECAY* (L. Maisel & J. Cooper eds. 1978); *POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE WORLD* (A. Day & H. Degenhardt comps. 1980); *TRANSNATIONAL PARTIES: ORGANIZING THE WORLD'S PRECINCTS* (R. Goldman ed. 1983); *THE WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND PARTIES* (G. DeLury ed. 1983).

²⁹ See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 169-73.

tors (save, perhaps "mini-parties") from an arena. If the political order forms a political party in a country beyond its primary base, it does so as a matter of expediency that does not necessarily affect its belief in and grasp of its coercive monopoly at home.

E. Transnational Pressure Groups and Gangs

Many transnational organizations lack a comprehensive program or refrain from naming their own candidates. Nevertheless, these organizations often play a decisive role in the policies of parties, governments, and intergovernmental organizations.³⁰ The variety of pressure groups and the intensity of their commitments is a function of context and, in particular, of the perspectives that provide the motivation for their establishment. The popularity of this mode of participation can be expected to increase as long as the demand for access to those arenas where decisions that influence the distribution of all values are made is perceived to be effective. Pressure organizations have left their mark in the struggle against slavery, prostitution, illegal drugs, ecological degradation, and scores of other targets in every process of value shaping and sharing.

A gang is parallel to a "political order" in the sense that it relies chiefly on coercion rather than persuasion.³¹ Gangs are the "enforcers" in many transnational branches of organized crime, and may coopt or be coopted by governmental and other nongovernmental actors.

F. Transnational Private (or Official) Associations Oriented Toward Values Other Than Power

Many transnational associations, primarily designed for the cultivation of values other than power, are actively implicated in the global

³⁰ For a partial and extensive listing of such organizations, see 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS* at ch. 9 (K. Gruber & K. Koek 20th ed. 1986). See also W. FELD, *NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS: A STUDY OF BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICAL GROUPS* (1972); R. MANSBACH & Y. FERGUSON, *THE WEB OF WORLD POLITICS: NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM* (1976); *PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTATED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS* (P. Willetts ed. 1982).

³¹ Thrasher described the phenomena of "gangs." Thrasher, *Gangs*, 6 *THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES* 564 (1931); see also E. HOBBSAWM, *BANDITS* (1969). See generally Reisman, *Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision*, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973), reprinted in M. McDUGAL & W. REISMAN, *supra* note 5.

community process.³² The point applies to mass enlightenment, for example, and includes the huge world net of scientific societies and of associations for obtaining and disseminating newsworthy information. Included in this category are transnational corporations and associations that operate in information, finance, transportation, communication, mining, fishing, agriculture, manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing, and in every other branch of economic life.

It is also useful to include here the transnational networks specialized to safety, health and comfort, which, among other activities, operate custodial and therapeutic facilities in the fields of physical or mental health, accident prevention, athletics, and health insurance. Involved groups include transnational educational and training associations concerned with vocational, professional, or artistic skills. This category covers the transnational operations of tribes, clans, families, or fraternal organizations. Included also are transnational social class, rank, and caste associations that seek to perpetuate or to break up discrimination, or organizations that extend honors to recipients. Transnational ecclesiastical and ethical associations are also important.³³

The effect of these types of associations on value shaping and sharing will probably increase, especially if the transnational variety, mode, and number of channels for communication continue to multiply and remain accessible to individuals with diverse and parallel perspectives. It is through such channels, whether they be public or private, or whether they employ electronic modes of transmission or more elementary means like word of mouth, that latent predispositions are stimulated, existing ones are solidified, and collaborative activities, in addition to the act of communication itself, are arranged. Whatever the particular value of interest, all transnational associations rely on communication for their establishment and development.

Both private and official organizations may come within the scope of this classification. A large number of transnational operations are com-

³² FELD, *supra* note 30, examined the growth — in terms of their number — of governmental and nongovernmental international organizations from 1860 to 1960. For background and historical treatment of nongovernmental organizations, see L. WHITE, *INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; THEIR PURPOSES, METHODS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS* (1951); see also J. LADOR-LEDERER, *INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES: A STUDY IN AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION AND Ius Gentium* (1963); E. MORSE, *supra* note 18, at 163; R. SMART, *THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY* (1968).

³³ For a voluminous listing that provides an indication of the world net of transnational public and private organizations see 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS* *supra* note 30.

posed of units from socialist and non-socialist societies so that membership is mixed. In socialist states, as in other states, a distinction can be drawn between official structures which are specialized to the allocation of public authority and control, or to other decisions. The former are sometimes called the "inherent functions" of the state or government; they are "power decisions about power" or, as we label them when they are authoritative and controlling, "constitutive" decisions.

In value-institution sectors other than power, pluralistic rather than territorial organization may be more significant. For example, scientists who contribute to enlightenment, and who obtain enlightenment from one another, are often scarcely organized, nor when organized are they territorial, save as an incidental convenience (or inconvenience). Regardless of the degree and type of organization, all associations, whatever the value involved, establish policy making and executing processes. Speaking strictly, the "pure type" organization that is devoted to science does not have sanctions at its disposal comparable in severity to the sanctions of international law. However, some policy choices made by a scientific body are enforceable by the use of measures available to scientists, and in this context such measures may be perceived as substantial. Inter-organizational relations are comparable to inter-governmental relations in the political arena. There may also be approximate counterparts of political parties and pressure groups within scientific societies and these can operate across several associations. For example, scientists may differ on policy questions such as their responsibility for public enlightenment or the extent of their cooperation with those who represent traditional learning or different methodological criteria.³⁴ Parallel analyses can be made of the transnational networks of organized business, recreation, education, fraternities, social ranks, ecclesiastical establishments, and so on.

Since many of the policy questions with which international law is concerned relate to value shaping and sharing in institutions other than power, it is pertinent to provide a reminder, however abbreviated, of the participatory roles in each of the eight value sectors. Although the separation is not explicitly made in this outline, it should be understood that value sharing has positive and negative dimensions and may be deprivational as well as value indulgent.

³⁴ See generally B. BARBER, *SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER* (rev. ed. 1962); F. MACHLUP, *THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES* (1962); D. PRICE, *THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE* (1965); *SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE* (I. Spiegel-Rösing & D. de Solla Price eds. 1977).

Value-shaping and value-sharing roles, with some examples.

Table 1

Power-shapers	= officials, leaders
Power-sharers	= participants in a domain
Enlightenment-shapers	= reporters, researchers, forecasters, storers (librarians, etc.)
Enlightenment-sharers	= learners (of basic maps of knowledge), viewers, readers, or listeners to news
Wealth-shapers	= producers (controllers of production factors)
Wealth-sharers	= income receivers, consumers
Well-being shapers	= caretakers, therapists, preventers, destroyers
Well-being sharers	= experiencers of safety, health and comfort
Skill-shapers	= practitioners in occupations, professions and the arts (levels of training and experience, of performance), apprentices, masters (trainers)
Skill-sharers	= evaluators (critics, connoisseurs)
Affection-shapers	= projectors of affection (friends, parents, family partners, loyalty models)
Affection-sharers	= experiencers of love and loyalty (of indifference, dislike)
Respect-shapers	= formulators of standards of recognition and appliers (etiquette models)
Respect-sharers	= recipients of recognition (or discrimination)
Rectitude-shapers	= formulators and appliers of religious and ethical standards and justification of responsibility
Rectitude-sharers	= recipients of evaluation

To some extent every participant functions both as a shaper and sharer of every value. If we examine the value distribution at any cross-section in time, participants in any social context can be classified by

each value, or in terms of all values, as elite, mid-elite, rank and file, or in any convenient number of classes (or castes).³⁵

The classification of certain activities as being primarily identified with a particular value is provisional. It is a commonplace of scientific inquiry on a cross-cultural scale to find that conventional institutions, when functionally considered, play roles that differ from the traditional label.³⁶ Private monopolists of land, for instance, may belong to the power and respect elite, not only to the elite of wealth. At first, "medicine men" and their activities may be assigned to the category of well-being. However, in the end, some of these persons and their practices may be reassigned to power or respect, as it becomes clear that they are deeply involved in the making of community-wide decisions which are supported by the use of what are recognized to be severe sanctions. The family, while primarily providing affection and well-being for the young, may create the fundamental character struts that support the child's future orientation to the shaping and sharing of all values.

G. Civilizations and Folk Cultures

The preceding discussion addressed the participants in the world community according to their roles in the several processes of value shaping and sharing. In addition, it is possible to distinguish among groups according to the character of their culture.³⁷ If we compare the institutions in historical and contemporary populations, they fall ap-

³⁵ For a provocative study of social stratification in different value processes in various cultures, see Fallers, *Equality, Modernity, and Democracy in the New States*, in *OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES*, *supra* note 8. See also T. BOTTOMORE, *CLASSES IN MODERN SOCIETY* (1966); *CLASS, STATUS AND POWER: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE* (R. Bendix & S. Lipset 2d ed. 1966); M. WEBER, *FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY* (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1947). Twentieth-century students of those elites dedicated primarily to the pursuit and exercise of power include, among others, Mosca, Michels, Pareto, Lasswell, Mills, Wittfogel, Meisel, Sereno, and Dahl. See K. WITTFOGEL, *ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER* (1957); *POLITICAL ELITES IN A DEMOCRACY* (P. Bachrach ed. 1971); Lasswell, *Agenda for the Study of Political Elites*, in *POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS* (D. Marvick ed. 1961); see also sources cited *infra* note 325.

³⁶ See sources cited *supra* note 11, especially A *HANDBOOK OF METHOD IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY*.

³⁷ Empirical referents of the term "culture" are the subject of continuing debate. See *Culture*, in 3 *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA* 527, *supra* note 2; see also T. DOBZHANSKY & E. BOESIGER, *HUMAN CULTURE: A MOMENT IN EVOLUTION* (1983); H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 47-51; R. LINTON, *THE TREE OF CULTURE* (1955); *THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS* (R. Linton ed. 1945), especially *The Concept of Culture* by Kluckhohn & Kelly.

proximately into two categories: the civilizations and the folk cultures.³⁸

The tribes, clans, and bands of primitive society are the oldest human social formations.³⁹ Beginning about the fifth or sixth millennium B.C. a rapid transformation seems to have occurred in at least three river valleys: the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus. Civilizations arose.⁴⁰ A civilization is distinguished from a folk culture by its highly differentiated urban-centered structure. Owing to the development and refinement of agriculture and to specialization, gross aggregate wealth reached new levels and helped to create the precondition for monumental public building and for the accentuation of income inequalities. At a certain moment, perhaps related to the level of social complexity, increasingly refined techniques for collective memory and retrieval became necessary. The development of some writing system is usually found at this point.⁴¹ With the invention of literacy, records were kept, facilitating mobilization and control. Additionally, the accumulation of knowledge accelerated. As specialized roles of science, learning, and teaching developed, and then became more distinctive, the intellectual classes began to play a more decisive role. It is no accident that great philosophers in these early periods of recorded history, such as Aristotle, Plato, and Confucius, devoted substantial thought to the organization of the constitutive process and the optimum use of

³⁸ Background on this distinction is available with supplementary studies and essays in *Community-Society Continua*, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 174, *supra* note 2; *Urban Revolution*, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 200, *supra* note 2.

³⁹ Archaeologists and paleontologists try to infer the character of ancient human social organization from the residue of human activity and existence. Anthropologists and occasionally sociologists examine contemporary tribes and bands. Relatively comprehensive coverage of the early elaboration in human development is provided in J. PFEIFFER, *THE EMERGENCE OF MAN* (1969).

A differing though compatible review of many developments to date, with an explicit theoretical orientation, is found in G. LENSKI & J. LENSKI, *HUMAN SOCIETIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO MACROSOCIOLOGY* (3d ed. 1978).

⁴⁰ Historians, anthropologists, and essayists study the establishment, maintenance, and termination of "civilization" and its component processes. See, e.g., V. CHILDE, *THE DAWN OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION* (5th rev. ed. 1958); V. CHILDE, *WHAT HAPPENED IN HISTORY* (rev. ed. 1954); H. FRANKFORT, *THE BIRTH OF CIVILIZATION IN THE NEAR EAST* (1954); A. KROEBER, *CONFIGURATIONS OF CULTURE GROWTH* (1969); W. MCNEILL, *THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY* (1963); L. MUMFORD, *THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE: TECHNICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT* (1967); L. MUMFORD, *THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF MAN* (1956); A. TOYNBEE, *supra* note 19.

⁴¹ For an overview, see E. HAVELOCK, *THE MUSE LEARNS TO WRITE: REFLECTIONS ON ORALITY AND LITERACY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT* (1986).

power.⁴² In many cases, the same philosophers were engaged as private tutors for the official elite. As the territorial empire began to challenge traditional obligations of kinship, legislation became a recognized part of the decision process. With the expansion of tax gathering, public works, and other governmental activities, bureaucracies came into being. Where a literary culture existed, local religions were synthesized into comprehensive religions that provided an ideological instrument of imperial rule.

Since civilizations first appeared, they have been rivalrous with one another as well as with traditional folk cultures. Although most members of a particular civilization were organized at some time in a single body politic, this is not necessarily the case as the histories of Western European, Islamic, and Chinese civilizations amply show.⁴³ Within or among the great civilizations, we see that sub-cultures are erected or resurrected whose members may demand an independent political structure. This phenomenon, so conspicuous in contemporary social processes, is often called "nationalism."⁴⁴ The great civilizations, currently characterized by certain common perspectives among members but not by ongoing conjoint operations (the absence of which renders them inappropriate as a category of participant in world public order), continue to exert an influence in politics as in all other sectors of the world community. The role of unorganized groups of this kind is not ignored in our analysis, since we consider them to the degree that they operate as factors that condition the domain, weight, and scope of decision.

⁴² For a related discussion, see G. CATLIN, *THE STORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS* (1939).

⁴³ See sources cited *supra* note 19.

⁴⁴ On the perspectives of nationalism, see E. CARR, *NATIONALISM AND AFTER* (1945); K. DEUTSCH, *NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES* (1969); K. DEUTSCH, *NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY* (1953); L. DOOB, *PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM, THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS* (1976); C. HAYES, *ESSAYS ON NATIONALISM* (1926); F. HINSLEY, *NATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM* (1973); H. KOHN, *A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN THE EAST* (1929); H. KOHN, *THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM* (1944); H. KOHN, *NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION* (1933); B. SHAFER, *FACES OF NATIONALISM: NEW REALITIES AND OLD MYTHS* (1972). Nationalism can provide a base of power for consolidation of previously fragmented and relatively ineffectual authority. See L. SNYDER, *GLOBAL MINI-NATIONALISMS: AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE* (1982); L. SNYDER, *MACRO-NATIONALISMS, A HISTORY OF THE PAN-MOVEMENTS* (1984); L. SNYDER, *VARIETIES OF NATIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY* (1976).

H. Trends in Participation

In the international community, several participation trends are conspicuous. First is the extraordinary demographic explosion that has proceeded relentlessly from the fifteenth century.⁴⁵ Because the planet is more crowded and individuals live in increasingly denser conglomerations, there is increased interdetermination or interdependence and, less frequently, increased popular perception of it. Ortega was wrong in assuming that the facts of interdetermination yielded per se a deeper and more realistic perception of such interdetermination.⁴⁶ The gross increase in the planet's population has been matched by an increase in elite awareness of the existence of other territorial elites based in every habitable ecological niche on the planet. More recently, non-governmental and non-territorially based elites have increased in number and kind.⁴⁷

Matching the population growth is an increasing internationalization of the composition of the diverse groups that participate in the world community process.⁴⁸ A group, of course, is an aggregate of individuals sharing certain common expectations of past and future, common identifications, and common demands. Because of limited ability to travel about the planet and the limited possibilities for communication, most groups have tended historically to have fixed territorial bases. The few exceptions, for example, the nomadic peoples of east Asia, the Jews in Europe, the Near East and Central Asia, and gypsies in central and eastern Europe, were viewed, precisely because of their cosmopolitanism, as aliens and threats. In the twentieth century, thanks to the ex-

⁴⁵ See E. MORSE, *supra* note 18, at 6 (providing dramatic illustration of this growth); see also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 2, *The State by Population* (displaying an intriguing map of nation states in which the size of each state is determined by its population rather than by its political boundary); J. McHALE, *THE FUTURE OF THE FUTURE* 154 (1969) (disaggregating historical data by continent and making projections to the year 2000); T. McKEOWN, *THE MODERN RISE OF POPULATION* (1976).

⁴⁶ See J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, *AN INTERPRETATION OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY* (M. Adams trans. 1973); J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, *TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY* (1941); see also *infra* note 85 and accompanying text.

⁴⁷ See E. MORSE, *supra* note 18 (illustrating increase in number); 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*, *supra* note 30 (demonstrating the scope of elite interest in establishing international institutions).

⁴⁸ 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*, *supra* note 30, provides a rough indication of the composition of each international organization. The data include the location of the organization's headquarters, the official languages spoken among members, the organization's purpose and structure, its publications, its meeting times, and other information.

plosion in the technology of transportation and communication, groups form with less regard to political boundary. Many of the inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, pressure groups, and private associations which are major actors in the world community process are composed of individuals recruited from many territorial communities.

This diversification accompanies another phenomenon which may be called the irredenticization of participation. An irredentum is a group whose practices have more in common with a group territorially based elsewhere than with the inhabitants of the territorial community in which the irredentum is physically located. The irredentum is physically separated from the main group of subjective affiliation but continues to discharge loyalty to it.⁴⁹ Irredenta may pose major political and legal problems for the elite of a territorial community in certain external confrontations. But given the growth and diversification of composition of non-territorial groups, irredenta have ceased to be only a feature of territorial systems; irredentism is increasingly transformed into a general feature of the contemporary community process.

⁴⁹ In the following passage, Geertz identifies the phenomena and suggests its importance.

Initially, a useful analytic distinction can be made with respect to this matter of classification between those allegiances that operate more or less wholly within the confines of a single civil state and those that do not but which run across them. Or, put somewhat differently, one can contrast those cases in which the racial, tribal, linguistic, and so on, reference group that is charged with a "corporate sentiment of oneness" is smaller than the existing civil state, and those where it is larger, or at least transgresses its borders in some fashion. In the first instance primordial discontent arises from a sense of political suffocation; in the second, from a sense of political dismemberment. Karen separatism in Burma, Ashanti in Ghana, or Baganda in Uganda are examples of the former; pan-Arabism, greater Somaliism, pan-Africanism, of the latter.

Many of the new states are plagued by both these sorts of problems at once. . . . In all . . . cases, there is — or there may develop — both a desire to escape the established civil state and a longing to reunite a politically divided primordial community.

. . . .

But whether the relevant attachments outrun state boundaries or not, most of the major primordial battles are for the moment being fought within them. A certain amount of international conflict focusing around, or at least animated by, primordial issues does exist among the new states As the new states solidify politically, such disputes may well grow both more frequent and more intense.

OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES, *supra* note 8, at 114-16 (footnote omitted); *see also* sources cited *supra* note 22.

Irredenticization has varied consequences. Like interdependence, it increases a perception of the implications of a community in which many different groups must survive; this highlights the need to clarify common interests. On the other hand, irredenticization can exacerbate tensions among those participants who sense that it will tend either to erode or buttress their aggregate value position.

II. PERSPECTIVES

The subjectivities of individual human beings are among the variables that most importantly influence the direction, intensity, and duration of transnational activities.⁵⁰ Both the fact and perception of world community are affected by critical changes in the perspectives of individuals. The relevant features of such subjectivities may be described in terms of demands, identification patterns, and expectations of past and future.⁵¹ A most significant trend in the contemporary world community is toward the creation and wider distribution of increasingly common perspectives. This occurs in part because of the unceasing homogenization of a global culture that tends to shape, within its domain, essentially similar conceptions of past and future, and of human possibility, remarkably similar value demands and, in a more limited fashion, awareness of and identification with an inclusive environmental system.⁵²

A. Demands

The demands people make for preferred events in the contemporary world relate to all values, whatever the particular characterizations employed, and embrace every variety of nuance in institutional practice in the shaping and sharing of values.⁵³ In chosen modality, demands may vary from the most manifest and explicit to the latent and covert. The different demands that are made for values are sometimes inclusive; they affect many people, and are linked with expectations of reciprocity

⁵⁰ For further discussion of the empirical reference of the term "perspective," see H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 16-28; H. LASSWELL & M. McDOUGAL *supra* note 4, at part II, chapter 1, *The Social Process as a Whole*.

⁵¹ Many procedures are available for exploring perspectives. *See, e.g.*, sources cited *supra* note 15; sources cited *infra* note 62; *see also* C. EVANS, *LANDSCAPES OF THE NIGHT: HOW AND WHY WE DREAM* (P. Evans ed. 1984); S. Freud, *THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS* (A. Brill trans. 1913).

⁵² An important early study is *THE WORLD COMMUNITY* (Q. Wright ed. 1948).

⁵³ A comprehensive, contemporary, and future-oriented discussion with documentation is M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4.

for all who are comparably situated. Sometimes demands are exclusive; they are made on behalf of rather limited identities and actually affect very few participants in world social process. On occasion demands may be special rather than common; they are made against common interest, without regard for the value consequences for others. Similarly, demands may be constructive and expansionist, designed to increase aggregate values for all, or defensive, intended to protect existing values, whether of all or of relatively exclusive groups.⁵⁴

In the contemporary world community, there appears to be an overriding insistence, transcending most cultures and climes, upon the greater production and wider distribution of all values. This insistence is accompanied by increasing recognition that wide differences in the specific practices by which values are shaped and shared can be tolerated, so long as all demands and practices are effectively appraised and accommodated in terms of common interest.⁵⁵ For example, the universalizing civilization of science and technology highlights and intensifies the demand in all communities for skill acquisition, exercise, and reward, in terms of both respect and income. On the other hand, the spreading techno-scientific net provokes demands for respect for the traditional ways of life and identity that are challenged by the newer frame of reference. The demands to participate in and benefit from the modern scientific culture and yet to respect and preserve older practices is a fundamental dilemma.⁵⁶

The growth of interdependence has made it increasingly obvious to human beings that if their values are to be realized at all they must be

⁵⁴ H. LASSWELL, *WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY* 57-104 (1935, 1965 with a new introduction) (exploring fundamental demands in the world community in the now classic study).

⁵⁵ See M. MCDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4. Important precursors include Lasswell, *The Interrelations of World Organization and Society*, 55 *YALE L.J.* 889 (1946); M. MCDUGAL & G. LEIGHTON, *The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action*, 14 *L. CONTEM. PROB.* 490 (1949), reprinted in 59 *YALE L.J.* 60 (1949) and M. MCDUGAL & ASSOCIATES, *supra* note 10; *Environment and Society in Transition: World Priorities*, 261 *ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.* (B. Pregel, H. Lasswell & J. McHale eds. 1975) [hereafter *Environment and Society in Transition*].

⁵⁶ See *supra* note 23 for a range of studies that explore and elaborate this theme. See also *APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT* (A. Robinson ed. 1979); E. HAGEN, *ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE, HOW ECONOMIC GROWTH BEGINS* (1962); *TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE* (S. Rosenblatt ed. 1979); cf. F. DENG, *TRADITION AND MODERNIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR LAW AMONG THE DINKA OF THE SUDAN* (2d ed. 1986) (containing specific case study); C. FRIEDRICH, *TRADITION AND AUTHORITY* (1972); E. SHILS, *TRADITION* (1981).

achieved on a transnational scale.⁵⁷ Physical well-being, for instance, is contingent on the efficiency of health services in spotting the origin of epidemics and preventing their spread along land, sea, and air routes. The economic welfare of the peasant, farmer, factory worker, and every category of producer is affected by the fluctuating level of prices at the principal trading centers and especially by the rise or fall of whatever is the effective unit of valuation in the context, be it the dollar, pound, mark, yen, or ruble. Families are widely dispersed across boundary lines for purposes of work, travel, and study; the continuity of the family unit is influenced by speed of communication and visitation. No scientific or advanced educational enterprise can maintain its integrity without keeping in touch with the transnational network of laboratories, periodicals, and books. To the devout Muslim, the pilgrimage to Mecca remains the crowning experience of this life. For the class-conscious member of traditional aristocracies, the annual agenda of migration crosses national frontiers. The elite newspapers, radio, and television programs regularly cover all world capitals. It is apparent that the power of every participant is profoundly influenced and limited by changing levels of internal and external discontent in the emerging nations as well as in the "internal proletariat" of the historic powers.

A notable feature of global history is the relatively recent upsurge of common demands for the effective realization of human rights in all public and civic orders. Individual human beings have probably demanded the achievement of most or all values since the dawn of unrecorded history. What appears novel is the transformation of these demands into claims to authority on a global scale. In this regard, there is little difficulty in establishing the trends, however fluctuating, of the last two hundred years.⁵⁸ When we look further back and undertake to penetrate to the masses of society, the situation is murky in the extreme. Through history the most numerous strata of the population were born and went to their deaths without leaving written records of their demands, expectations, or identities.⁵⁹ The literate priests or offi-

⁵⁷ We document this growth in detail in the discussion of "Outcomes" below.

⁵⁸ These trends are described below in the discussion of "Future Perspectives."

⁵⁹ Social history and histories concerned with values other than power are critical for illumination in this regard. *See, e.g.,* F. BRAUDEL, *STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE: THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE* (1982); F. BRAUDEL, *THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE* (1983); F. BRAUDEL, *THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE WORLD* (1984) (constituting a three-volume series entitled *CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH TO 18TH CENTURY*); *see also* Roberts, Book Review, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1213 (1985) (reviewing F. BRAUDEL, *THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE WORLD*). An important earlier work is H.

cials who sometimes reported the externalities of the lives of the poor occasionally recorded the popular songs and the folk wisdom of the anonymous many. The critical historian is far from certain that the haphazard residues of popular culture are dependable samples of the whole. Possibly they are erratic selections by idiosyncratic monks and scribes.

Nevertheless, historians are aware of the existence at different times and places of huge reservoirs of latent discontent which erupted from time to time in peasant revolts or urban mobs.⁶⁰ Difficulties of interpretation persist because of the speed with which order was usually restored and the disaffected populace reverted to its customary acquiescence.⁶¹

When the inquiry is pushed more deeply in a quest for causal connections, uncertainties multiply.⁶² In the absence of satisfactory information it is difficult to account for either the expressions of demand for human rights or for the ensuing failure of the public or civic order to take the steps required to give effect to these demands.

Clues are found in the complicated set of factors that, taken together, confer distinctiveness on city culture. Since cities emerged they have

MULLER, *THE USES OF THE PAST: PROFILES OF FORMER SOCIETIES* (1952).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., P. ZAGORIN, *REBELS AND RULERS: 1500-1660* (1982); see also G. RUDÉ, *THE CROWD IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION* (1959); *THE CROWD IN HISTORY: A STUDY OF POPULAR DISTURBANCES IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND, 1730-1848* (1964). See generally J. BILLINGTON, *FIRE IN THE MINDS OF MEN: ORIGINS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FAITH* (1980); E. CANETTI, *CROWDS AND POWER* (C. Stewart trans. 1962); T. GURR, *WHY MEN REBEL* (1970); *IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT* (D. Apter ed. 1964); *PROTEST, REFORM, REVOLT: A READER IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS* (J. Gusfield ed. 1970); R. ROBERTS & R. KLOSS, *SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: BETWEEN THE BALCONY AND THE BARRICADE* (1974);

⁶¹ But see J. SCOTT, *WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE* (1985).

⁶² The question of "causality" remains a central concern for methodologist and decisionmaker alike. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, *CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH* (1964); *CAUSE AND EFFECT* (D. Lerner ed. 1965); R. MACIVER, *SOCIAL CAUSATION* (1942); G. VON WRIGHT, *CAUSALITY AND DETERMINISM* (1974); *EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE* (D. Lerner ed. 1959). Historians can be quite concerned with the deliberate and unconscious application of causal thinking as it informs their conclusions. Carr touched on this point as well as many others in one provocative essay. See E. CARR, *WHAT IS HISTORY?* (1961); see also R. NEUSTADT & E. MAY, *THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS* (1986); *THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN OUR TIME: AN ANTHOLOGY* (H. Meyerhoff ed. 1959). For the authors' approach, see H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part III, chapter 3, *The Scientific Examination of Conditions*.

been the dynamic innovators in history.⁶³ The record of civilization has become, in increasing degree, the history of competition and conflict between civilizations and surviving tribes and among civilizations based on different regions and continents. One consequence of these competitive and conflicting relationships has been a gradual and irregular process of universalizing group demands for the rights of their members. In terms of human rights, the culmination has been the modern conjoining of aspiration with faltering, yet substantial, levels of attainment.⁶⁴

The contemporary trend in the demand for human rights indicates that whether derived from older cultural and religious traditions or postulated in a secular and existential manner, the key principle is the dignity of the individual.⁶⁵ Nineteenth-century philosophical radicalism and twentieth-century liberalism were content to view the organized community's responsibility to the individual's dignity as merely limited to the provision of civil and political rights.⁶⁶ The current international consensus is that international responsibility extends beyond the political realm to economic, cultural, and even ecological rights.⁶⁷ In addition

⁶³ A more detailed exploration of the city is presented below under the discussion of "Situations."

⁶⁴ Ascertaining levels of achievement is a critical and complicated matter. On methods, see Lasswell & Holmberg, *Toward a General Theory of Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional Development*, in *COMPARATIVE THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE* 12 (H. Peter ed. 1966), reprinted in *POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT* 354 (R. Braibanti ed. 1969); Snyder, Hermann & Lasswell, *A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity*, 20 *INT'L STUD. Q.* 221 (1976). On the realization of goals, see H. LASSWELL & M. McDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part III, chapter 2, *The Description of Trend*.

⁶⁵ Merriam's formulation in 1945 remains apt.

It was a great day for the human race — the new day of Creation — when the idea dawned that every man is a human being, an end in himself, with a claim for the development of his own personality, and that human beings had a dignity and a worth, respect for which is the firm basis of human association.

C. MERRIAM, *SYSTEMATIC POLITICS* 59 (1945); see also H. LASSWELL & M. McDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part III, chapter 1, *The Clarification of Values*.

⁶⁶ Some organizations, like the American Civil Liberties Union and Amnesty International, remain dedicated primarily to the affirmation and realization of these more traditional concerns. World-wide coverage is provided each year by Raymond Gastil in *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*.

⁶⁷ See M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4; see also S. KIM, *supra* note 4, especially at part II, *The State of the Human Condition*; UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, *FREEDOM AND CULTURE* (1951) (especially Huxley, *Introduction*); *Environment and Society in Transition*, *supra* note 55; McDougal, *Legal Bases for Securing the Integrity of the Earth-Space Environment*, 184 *ANNALS. N.Y. ACAD. SCI.* 375 (P. Albertson & M. Barnet

to political rights, we demand that political systems provide their citizens abundance and opportunity in wealth, education, the acquisition of skill, affection, respect, health and life expectancy. It has become common to refer to these as the welfare functions of the state, and they may be described in terms of all the components of a world public order. The aggregate of human rights demands and prescriptions are crystallizing into a conception that this international welfare system is a minimum standard of acceptable government.⁶⁸

eds. 1971). Although not always articulated in terms of human rights, the following studies are animated by concern for the continuing confirmation and achievement of the greatest possible production and distribution of all values: H. BROWN, *THE CHALLENGE OF MAN'S FUTURE: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF MAN DURING THE YEARS THAT LIE AHEAD* (1954); L. BROWN ET AL., *STATE OF THE WORLD: A WORLD WATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY* (annual); L. BROWN, *WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS* (1972); A. DOLMAN, *RESOURCES, REGIMES, WORLD ORDER* (1981) (includes extensive bibliography); R. FALK, *THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL* (1971); M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20; GLOBAL PLANNING AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL DECISIONMAKING IN A DIVIDED WORLD (A. Dolman ed. 1980); *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE: RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE NEW CENTURY* (R. Repetto ed. 1985) [hereafter *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE*]; *PARTNERS IN TOMORROW: STRATEGIES FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER* (A. Dolman & J. van Ettinger eds. 1978); R. REPETTO, *WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT* (1986); *SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BIOSPHERE: MANAGING INTERACTIONS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT* (W. Clark & R. Munn eds. 1985); *see also* W. BRANDT, *NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL* (1980). *But see* *TOWARDS ONE WORLD?: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE BRANDT REPORT* (Friedrich Ebert Foundation ed. 1981); Strange, *Reactions to Brandt, Popular Acclaim and Academic Attack*, 25 INT'L STUD. Q. 328 (1981):

⁶⁸ *See* G. MOWER, *INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC SOCIAL RIGHTS* (1985); *HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW BIBLIOGRAPHY* (J. Friedman & M. Sherman comps. 1985); K. VASEK, *THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS* (P. Alston ed. 1982).

A sizeable literature on human rights has developed. *See* Donnelly, *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, 34 WORLD POL. 574 (1982); Johansen, *Human Rights in the 1980s: Revolutionary Growth or Unanticipated Erosion?*, 35 WORLD POL. 286 (1983); *see also* Bail, *The Child's Right to a Best Interests Psychological Development Under the Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Policy Science Reflections on International Law, Psychological Well-Being and World Peace*, 2 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 19 (1984).

B. Expectations

Expectations are perspectives about facts or putative facts. Their manifest content is descriptive, whatever their degree of accuracy, rather than preferential or volitional, as in the case of value demands. Expectations therefore include projections of the possible and probable course of future events, and assumptions about past trends and conditions.⁶⁹ The optimalization postulate provides a guide to the formation of hypotheses that account for the crucial role that expectations play in stabilizing or altering the value demands of world community participants. The postulate affirms that a participant who is confronted by a set of policy alternatives will choose the policy that is expected to yield the greatest net value advantage.⁷⁰

The postulate posits motivation but not necessarily rationality or even consciousness. In a specific situation individuals may deliberately seek to estimate the relevance of one or all categories of values. However, they may be so absorbed with the significance of a specific action, for example, their corporation's immediate economic position, that they ignore the longer-term economic implications of policy proposals, or the immediate and long-term consequences for the corporation's prestige, power, and other value dimensions. Changes in expectations — perhaps precipitated by more selective or more accurate reporting — may mobilize latent concern for a wider range of values than wealth. Although public statements do not change, analysis may show that private communications import a change, or deeper study of key policy person-

⁶⁹ A brief elaboration of the concept of "expectations" is in H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 21-22.

⁷⁰ Observers must consider the impact of all values on decision making in order to determine how the postulate was and will be applied in differing contexts. A thorough exploration is in C. CHURCHMAN, *PREDICTION AND OPTIMAL DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES OF A SCIENCE OF VALUES* (1961). The literature on decision making and on what is often called "policy analysis" has grown dramatically in recent decades. For continuing coverage, see *POL'Y SCI.* (quarterly). Specific studies include G. BREWER & P. DELEON, *THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY ANALYSIS* (1983); C. SCHULTZE, *THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST* (1977); E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, *A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS* (1978); A. WILDAVSKY, *SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS* (1979). For a critical review of some of this work, see Landy, *Policy Analysis as a Vocation*, 33 *WORLD POL.* 468 (1981). See also J. MARCH & J. OLSEN, *AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS* (2d ed. 1979); Cohen, March, & Olsen, *A Garbage Can Model of Organization Choice*, 17 *ADMIN. SCI. Q.* 1 (1972).

For a collection of descriptive and prescriptive articles concerned with decision making in a context of competing and conflicting demands, see *MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION MAKING* (J. Cochrane & M. Zeleny eds. 1973).

nel may indicate that unmentioned value demands are important.

These examples suggest that expectations affect the priority and intensity with which values are pursued and the specific objectives and strategies by which they are sought. Conversely, value orientations influence the attention to, and acceptance of, expectations pertinent to transnational policy. Hence, participants in the larger community process frequently have difficulty in clarifying their common interests. Accustomed to focus on a limited range of causes and consequences, both governmental and private participants may thus be oblivious to their genuine common interests.

The matter-of-fact assumptions about the past and the future, accompanied by fundamental images of the potentiality of human agency, are critical subjective features that deeply affect the degree to which people can attain their demanded values. The contemporary global community is marked by an increasing tendency toward homogenization of these expectations among virtually all people who participate in the industrial and science-based civilization.⁷¹ But in sectors of folk culture or in resistant strata within urban civilizations more traditional perspectives can still be found.

Intimately bound up with the recognition of interdependence is the revolution of "rising expectations" and its frequent corollary, "rising frustrations."⁷² A fundamental fact about the modern world-view — an expectation that sets it apart from traditional societies — is the assumption that within ever widening limits, it is possible for people to control their destiny and to improve their aggregate value position.⁷³ In large measure this is a result of the initially gradual and presently explosive expansion of scientific knowledge. It is now trite to list humankind's traditional scourges that no longer occur — or, what is politically unsettling, *need* not occur. Part of this changing map is the realization

⁷¹ Self-orientation was a major concern for Tibor Mende who wrote of the "maps" in our minds. See T. MENDE, *WORLD POWER IN THE BALANCE* (1953); see also H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54; Lasswell, *Emerging International Culture*, in *INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND PROBLEMS OF TRANSFER AND ADOPTION*, 10 *SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT* (1963), reprinted in *THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE* (R. Ward ed. 1967); Mead, *World Culture*, in *THE WORLD COMMUNITY*, *supra* note 52; Mumford, *World Culture*, in *THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF MAN* (1956); Potter, *World Institutions*, in *THE WORLD COMMUNITY*, *supra* note 52. But see A. BOZEMAN & C. YOUNG, *supra* note 22 (for qualification).

⁷² See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56.

⁷³ Lasswell, *The Changing Image of Human Nature, The Socio-Cultural Aspect: Future-Oriented Man*, 26 *AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS* 157 (1966) (describing this phenomenon and exploring many of its implications). See also I. CLARKE, *THE PATTERN OF EXPECTATION 1644-2001* (1979); H. MULLER, *USES OF THE FUTURE* (1974).

that historic inequalities have no anchorage in an immutable decree of nature. Hence, the middle and lower strata in terms of value accumulation and enjoyment, like the remote or undeveloped nation, are stirred by a spark of hope fanned by a sense of injustice at their traditional predicament.

The awareness of world community and interdependence helps to establish or reveal common expectations. When a shared global field of attention develops with sufficient force a common map of expectations forms.⁷⁴ This is evident in the universal convergence among elites — in every value process — in their understanding of the characteristics of a situation which constitute the shaping and sharing of each value; and, to a lesser extent, in their mode of interpreting the significance of such characteristics. Even within a homogeneous scientific civilization with a common frame of reference, there are innumerable possibilities for misperception and misconstruction. A smile may indicate affection, but it may also betray a sense of nervousness or revulsion. A handshake or bow may demonstrate mutual respect, but if performed in a certain fashion, they could imply the exact opposite. The principal point, however, is that most elites know which acts engage which values. A universal frame of reference for such matter-of-fact assumptions is developing, but not to the degree that interpretations of acts can be expected to be shared completely.

In general, an increasing degree of realism marks contemporary expectations, thanks to the greater abundance of accurate information available and distributed, albeit differentially, through the communications nerve network and to the perhaps transient dominance of secularism, which permits appraisals of social phenomena to be made in terms of the complexities of empirically verifiable cause and effect.⁷⁵ But counter trends of varying vigor must also be noted. Expectations and demands are closely related to identities. Under pressure to expand the boundaries of the self to include more and more hitherto alien elements, violent reactions may occur, re-establishing fidelity to older symbol systems which may be reinterpreted by the new “conservatory” elite.⁷⁶ The phenomena of resurgence of fundamental Islam, fundamentalist

⁷⁴ For a related study with pertinent elaboration, see Lasswell, *Attention Structure and Social Structure*, in *THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS, A SERIES OF ADDRESSES* (L. Bryson ed. 1948).

⁷⁵ An excellent, representative collection is *Environment and Society in Transition*, 184 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. (P. Albertson & M. Barnet eds. 1971).

⁷⁶ For further discussion and documentation see E. ZIMMERMAN, *POLITICAL VIOLENCE, CRISES, AND REVOLUTIONS: THEORIES AND RESEARCH* (1983).

Christianity in North America, and in parts of industrial South America and Western Europe, Hinduism, and Orthodox Judaism all involve a vigorous assertion of a set of expectations inconsistent in many ways with those underpinning the emerging global system of science and technology.⁷⁷ Where conservatory elites achieve power, they quickly install education and propaganda systems that instill their values and, in particular, their expectations of past and future. Not surprisingly, competing frames of reference are suppressed, sometimes quite ruthlessly.⁷⁸

C. Identities

Changing perspectives of demand and the facts and expectations about context may bring about changes in conceptions of the self. The self-system of each of us is composed of the primary ego symbol (the "I," "me") and the symbols of reference singly or collectively of those egos included in a common "we."⁷⁹ Analysis of any self-system in terms of value-institution categories typically shows symbols of identity that refer to groups in every category. For example, we Americans (power), we readers of the *New York Times* (enlightenment), we investors (wealth), we vigorous young people (well-being), we lawyers (skill), we family members (affection), we members of the middle class (respect), or we Judeo-Christians (rectitude). The self-system also includes symbols that identify the "not-self other," such as members of other nation states, or other groupings.

The bundle of interests — demands supported by expectations — in the individual are not fixed and can be acted upon in deliberate fashion. Adroit manipulators, for example, frequently seek to shape new configurations in the self-system as a way of creating an identity that can facilitate the fulfillment of their own purposes.⁸⁰ Hence, American

⁷⁷ M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, propose methods for accommodation: e.g., chapter 11, *Claims Relating to Freedom from Religious Discrimination*; chapter 13, *Claims for Freedom from Discrimination in Choice of Language*. See also sources cited *supra* note 23 for studies of varying detail that bear on this theme.

⁷⁸ See generally A. STINCHCOMBE, *CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES* (1968).

⁷⁹ See generally sources cited *supra* note 17; H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 10-28; H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54, at 23-39; G. MEAD, *MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY*, *supra* note 17.

⁸⁰ A monumental collection is *PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY* (H. Lasswell, D. Lerner & H. Speier eds. 1980). See also W. DAVISON, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION* (1965); W. KORNHAUSER, *THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY* (1959); E. ROGERS, *MODERNIZATION AMONG PEAS-*

society witnesses a constantly changing gallery of "new" identities: ethnics, sex groups, moral majoritarians, silent majoritarians, yuppies, yumpies, and so on and so forth. Obviously, these are not so much new functional groups as attempts to establish identities which may be manipulated to achieve specific outcomes.⁸¹

The self-system also includes, as indicated, value demands and expectations for each component element or for the whole. Obviously, this complexity of structure gives rise to possible confusion, conflict, and accommodation within the personality of each member of the world community.⁸² It is, in fact, by such internal adjustments that the boundaries of the self-system are subjected to change.⁸³ Consider, for instance, the significance of exposure to a new transnational situation. Individuals who reside in a foreign country often modify their map of reality to include expectations of common advantage from joining in activities with citizens of that country. Hence, in the new situation their business becomes transnational; their sources of news and interpretive comment become transnational; their physicians are transnational; their children go to transnational schools; their friends and relatives become transnational; their social status is transnational; and their religious affiliations are transnational. Thus the symbols that enlarge the boundaries of

ANTS: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION (1969); W. SCHRAMM, MASS MEDIA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1964); B. SMITH, H. LASSWELL & R. CASEY, PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC OPINION (1946); Bowman & Anderson, *Concerning the Role of Education in Development*, and LeVine, *Political Socialization and Culture Change*, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES, *supra* note 8.

Advertising is a common practice of manipulating consumer demand for all values. See S. FOX, THE MIRROR MAKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING AND ITS CREATORS (1984); N. JOHNSON, HOW TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET (1970); V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957); V. PACKARD, THE PEOPLE SHAPERS (1977); H. SCHILLER, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE (1969); H. SCHILLER, WHO KNOWS: INFORMATION IN THE AGE OF THE FORTUNE 500 (1981); E. TURNER, THE SHOCKING HISTORY OF ADVERTISING (1953).

⁸¹ The possibilities in this regard are enormous. As we point out in a forthcoming study:

There is in principle no limit to the number of particularized demands and identifications that may emerge in the social process since the true unit of participation is not the biological human being, but a shared perspective; and the number of perspectives may outrun the "bodies."

H. LASSWELL & M. McDUGAL, *supra* note 4.

⁸² See H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54; sources cited *supra* notes 13, 14 & 23.

⁸³ For a thorough and brief discussion of identity dynamics, see Lasswell, *Future Systems of Identity in the World Community*, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).

their earlier self are related to value gratifications (economic, etc.). Their identity is redefined as a consequence of the net value indulgences expected and realized.

The sequence does not always conform to the scenario outlined in the previous paragraph. Exposure to a different environment is not invariably perceived as yielding value advantages. Business opportunities may not open up; difficulties of physical adaptation to the routines of an unfamiliar climate may take the fun out of life; one may stay as far out of touch with local sources of information as possible and wait for the *New York Times*; the children may do badly in school and regard the schools as inferior; acquaintances may be indifferent or hostile; neighbors may belong to a social class that withholds respect from businessmen; no religious community opens the door. In short, exposure to an enlarged environment may involve net deprivations rather than net indulgences and lead to intense reaffirmation of the previous identity.⁸⁴

In general, it is important to bear in mind the psychological mechanisms that have operated in the past to inhibit the growth of an active identity inclusive of humanity. We refer, for example, to the self-reference effect.⁸⁵ What happens when people are first exposed to a larger or different environment or culture, either by travel or communicated images? Their focus of attention is altered and to some extent this alters the cognitive map. But exposure does not necessarily or even typically produce an expansion of the boundaries of the self to take in the new phenomena. It is worth noting that an early manifestation of the self-reference effect is to increase the amount of preoccupation with the original self.⁸⁶ Consider the standard tourist: he or she sees the chopsticks of China, the sarongs of Southern Asia, or the mosques of the Near East in terms of their familiar self-image, whether the reference frame is Iowa, Provence, or the Hokkaido. Hence, it is typical to find a quantitative (if not a relative) increase in self-references. In fact, the self-reference effect is part of the learning process, since it comprehends the new by noting likeness with or difference from the familiar. This is the sense in which waves of increased parochialism are to be predicted when a population is first exposed to a wider environment. This mechanism helps to explain why our increasingly interactive and interdependent world can be described up to the present as exhibiting less localism without, however, achieving an intense and universal identity.

An intriguing and unsettled question is whether individuals are rear-

⁸⁴ A valuable, early examination is H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54, at 125-40.

⁸⁵ See Lasswell, *supra* note 83.

⁸⁶ See R. WILKEN, *THE CHRISTIANS AS THE ROMANS SAW THEM* (1984).

ranging their larger-group loyalties to the disadvantage of the nation state. At first glance, the stress upon nationalism so apparent in the recently emancipated "colonial" areas would seem to refute the hypothesis that national loyalties are declining. But the continuing world crisis is a chronic reminder that the effective decision entities in the modern world are big; and in the case of the Soviet world, the inclusive unit is multinational. Attempts to build more powerful counter-weights are visible in the progress, slow as it sometimes seems, to hammer out a united Western Europe. Similarly, the non-Soviet world, recognizing the rapid rise of the Soviet challenge, grudgingly agreed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other forms of collaboration.⁸⁷

If, on the one hand, sentiments crystallize around more inclusive symbols of unity, there is evidence of a countering withdrawal from general commitments into a restricted family life and friendship. This perhaps is mediated by loyalty to functional units standing between the small group and the nation-state or the transnational order.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ See generally *EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM* (W. Fox & W. Schilling eds. 1973).

⁸⁸ Challenges to the nation-states' hold on loyalty are explored in S. BROWN, *NEW FORCES IN WORLD POLITICS* (1974), at part II, *Challenges to the Nation-State System*, and part III, *Prognosis and Prescription*; W. FRIEDMANN, *THE CRISIS OF THE NATIONAL STATE* (1943); M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 57, *The State Under Pressure*; E. MORSE, *supra* note 18, at 178-94; Lasswell, *World Loyalty*, in *THE WORLD COMMUNITY*, *supra* note 52. An earlier generation explored many comparable issues in the wake of World War II. See, e.g., *FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL APPRAISAL* (L. Bryson ed. 1952); *INSTITUTE FOR RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL STUDIES, WORLD ORDER: ITS INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS* (F. Johnson ed. 1945); *SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES, HUMAN NATURE AND ENDURING PEACE* (G. Murphy ed. 1945); *TOWARDS WORLD COMMUNITY* (J. Nef ed. 1968).

Challenges that threaten to eclipse loyalty to the nation state occur simultaneously with practices that may tend to erode or undermine loyalty to the same symbol. See, e.g., S. EISENSTADT, *FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION: AGE GROUPS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE* (1956, 1971); *YOUTH: CHANGE AND CHALLENGE* (E. Erikson ed. 1963); see also sources cited *supra* notes 22, 23 & 56. But beneficiaries of sentimentalized identification with the nation state symbol try constantly to bolster the symbol's valence. See, e.g., D. EASTON & J. DENNIS, *CHILDREN IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: ORIGINS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY* (1969); H. HYMAN, *POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR* (1959); C. MERRIAM, *THE MAKING OF CITIZENS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF METHODS OF CIVIC TRAINING* (1931); *NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORLD SYSTEM: EDUCATIONAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 1950-1970* (J. Meyer & M. Hannan eds. 1979); see also F. GREENSTEIN, *CHILDREN AND POLITICS* (1965); Sears, *Political Socialization*, in 2 *HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE* (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975). An intriguing outlook is presented in P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, *CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT*

The trend in identity systems throughout the globe can be summarized in terms of degrees of enlargement or contraction of the self. With the multiplication of common transnational activities in many areas, notably in science and health, the number of persons who are deeply identified with the fate of humankind, rather than with a small percentage of human beings, has increased.⁸⁹ Yet the development of universal identifications lags behind the process of homogenization of expectations and demands considered earlier. While the process of irredenticization creates an increasingly reticulate network of transnational identifications, the claims individuals reciprocally make upon each other, effectively policed by territorial or primordial elites, continue in large measure to be jealous and exclusive. Hence, the pattern of inclusive identifications oscillates between greater inclusivity and exclusivity.

D. Aggregated Perspectives

The role of perspectives in the world community is especially evident when we examine the myths that are components of the value-institution processes dispersed throughout the world community. A myth is a stable pattern of perspective. Hence, it is expressed in doctrines, which are the high-level abstractions that define value objectives. It is also expressed in the formula, which includes the prescriptive norms (in contingent circumstances, with severe or mild sanctions), and the *miranda*, or popular idols and lore.⁹⁰

We referred above to the permeating impact of scientific knowledge on modern expectations. The scientific myth is specialized to the shaping and sharing of enlightenment. Its map of reality is subject to the self-corrective consequences of empirical research and theoretical reformulation.⁹¹ The world view of Western science rose in a context of

CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).

⁸⁹ Ascertaining the intensity of any commitment is difficult and likely to be context specific. However, the investment of resources required to establish and maintain transnational organizations is a partial indication of expanding commitments. See 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*, *supra* note 30, for a list of transnational organizations.

⁹⁰ The concept of "myth" is elaborated with reference to power in H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 116-33.

⁹¹ For background, see S. MASON, *A HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES* (rev. ed. 1962); G. SARTON, *A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE: A FIRST GUIDE FOR THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, WITH INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS ON SCIENCE AND TRADITION* (1952), each of which includes an excellent bibliography. See also W. DAMPIER, *A HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION WITH PHILOSOPHY AND RE-*

perpetual conflict with religious specialists who insisted upon dogmatic adherence to a cosmology whose tenets could be integrated with empirical data only if great latitude was permitted in the treatment of its language as metaphor.⁹² This freedom was gradually achieved in European society, and it was a theoretical possibility elsewhere if reinterpretations were made of the philosophical and religious traditions of the reviving civilizations where Buddhist, Hindu, or the Islamic doctrines were current. However, the specialized elites of rectitude (notably monks, holy men, mullahs, and judges) often followed the path of their European counterparts in rejecting scientific versions of the galaxies, earth, life, and the social process.

In tribal societies the shock of contact with science and technology was usually more profound since tribal cultures lack a literate tradition that might have eased the intellectual challenge of discovering "equivalent" conceptions of nature and people. To the sophisticated master of language the task of cross-cultural communication is facilitated if counterpart conceptions exist and are explicit.⁹³ The principal contacts between carriers of the scientific civilization of Western Europe and primitive tribesmen were not conducive to such exercises in understanding. Contacts were further aggravated by the political dimensions of enlightenment.⁹⁴ To unfrock a rectitude elite by introducing a more efficacious magic meant their removal from the power pro-

LIGION (4th ed. 1961), and sources cited *infra* notes 288 & 290 for important documentation and discussion. Thomas Kuhn generated much controversy with his attempt to apply "evolutionary" theory to the development of science. See T. KUHN, *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS* (2d ed. 1970). Reactions to Kuhn's first edition are numerous. See, e.g., *CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE* (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1974). For a critique with an alternative, see P. FEYERABAND, *AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE* (1974) [hereafter *AGAINST METHOD*]; P. FEYERABAND, 1 *PHILOSOPHIC PAPERS: Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method* (1981); 2 *PHILOSOPHIC PAPERS: Problems of Empiricism* (1981).

⁹² For an early but still provocative study, see A. WHITE, *A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM* (1896). But see A. FUNKENSTEIN, *THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY* (1986).

⁹³ For further discussion, see J. GREENBERG, *LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION: ESSAYS BY JOSEPH H. GREENBERG* (1971); E. HALL, *BEYOND CULTURE* (1976); *LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: SELECTED READINGS* (P. Giglioli ed. 1972); C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, *THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM* (10th ed. 1949); *SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPIR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY* (D. Mandelbaum ed. 1949); see also sources cited *infra* note 166.

⁹⁴ See, e.g., H. CORTÉS, *LETTERS FROM MEXICO* (A. Pagden ed. & trans. 1986).

cess and replacement with a Westerner.⁹⁵ The parallels between conceptions of mind and body or energy and mass, were found, if at all, too late to expedite the smooth incorporation of medicine men into a scientific world view. In fact, it is a recent achievement to find books by European and American writers that deal comprehensively with the "psychiatrists" and the "psychiatry" of a tribal society or with any other profession corresponding to a recognized specialization in the "West."⁹⁶

The relentless diffusion of Western science-based perspectives and operations has suppressed (at least for the moment) many ancient and deeply held images of the past and future. In societies and cultures throughout the planet the instrumental means for achieving demanded values is recast in Western light. For example, teaching modern science in publicly financed institutions is now common in all communities. Revivals, sometimes violent, of "sacred" doctrine and formula may occur with increasing frequency, especially wherever disaffected or disposed elites seek to check the power of the elite who work closely with foreign or distant secular forces. Nonetheless, equating and operationalizing the means of realizing values with the Western science-based approach is a worldwide phenomenon and is a major aspect of the homogenization of practices on a global scale. The impact of this trend on personality and social structure in all communities will become clearer as observers orient themselves in the flow of events and monitor developments.⁹⁷

In addition to the myths of rectitude and enlightenment, myths have been differentiated in Western society with reference to the production and distribution of wealth, the shaping and sharing of power, the conditions of well-being, the proper content and procedure of education, the obligations of kinship, and the organization of social status. Since Western society is undergoing rapid and often costly internal change, largely as a result of the cumulative impact of science and technology, the myth-structure of the West is full of confusions and contradictions

⁹⁵ Intense reactions from the displaced are to be expected. *See, e.g.,* B. WILSON, *MAGIC AND THE MILLENNIUM: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF PROTEST AMONG TRIBAL AND THIRD-WORLD PEOPLE* (1973).

⁹⁶ *See, e.g.,* F. BOAS, *THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN* (rev. ed. 1938, with new foreword by M. Herskovits, 1963); F. HSU, *PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: APPROACHES TO CULTURE AND PERSONALITY* (1961); *CULTURE AND MENTAL HEALTH* (M. Opler ed. 1959).

⁹⁷ For discussion and comparable outlook, see Geertz, in *OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES*, *supra* note 12; *see also* *MAN AND CIVILIZATION: CONTROL OF THE MIND: A SYMPOSIUM* (S. Farber & R. Wilson eds. 1961).

that mark distortions of past conflict.⁹⁸ The overwhelming impact of the West in contemporary life on traditional ideologies has been connected with the fundamental shift in expectation that was referred to above: the image of humans as creators of their culture with most of their achievements lying in the future.

III. SITUATIONS

We use the word "situations" to refer to the spatial, temporal, institutional, and crisis dimensions of particular interactions. The fundamental dimensions of the social process set the parameters within which the shaping and sharing of values must proceed.⁹⁹ These parameters are not immutable, but in constant change. Even the ecological constraints that affect life on this planet are in flux. Further dynamism is introduced by changes in the temporal sequences and geographic juxtapositions of interactive factors.

Using each of these four dimensions to identify, describe, and analyze a particular configuration of social events, an observer can draw a complete and detailed picture of the interaction that comprises the events under scrutiny. The spatial dimension locates *where* the events take place; the temporal identifies *when*; the institutional dimension indicates *what* values are at stake in the events under examination and *how* (by what practices) they are shaped and shared. *Crisis* is included as a separate dimension because its presence and intensity tend to alter how participants and observers perceive the other dimensions. This perception in turn influences, often in a profound manner, the participants' behavior and the ongoing flow of value indulgence and deprivation. The composite impression generated by employing these dimensions creates a picture that we refer to as a "situation." Situations can be characterized along each dimension. We need hardly remind the reader that "situation" is a construct of the observer; in many cases, the disengaged observer will appreciate that the parameters of the situation are quite different from those perceived by participants. Indeed, the absence of a realistic conception of situations, that is, of larger contexts, can

⁹⁸ Mumford deals provocatively with the implications of changing technology on myth and perspective in many historical contexts. See L. MUMFORD, *THE CONDITION OF MAN* (1944); see also L. MUMFORD, *supra* note 40.

⁹⁹ Situations may be specialized to the shaping and sharing of particular values and characterized as such. For further discussion, see H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 4-5, 72 (listing, among other items, the terms employed to describe situations according to the value at stake and the orientation of observers); see also G. MEAD, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT*, *supra* note 17.

undermine the effectiveness of both inquiry and manipulative behavior.

A. *Spatial-Temporal Dimensions*

The transnational world community is an intricate matrix of situations whose spatial dimensions are beginning to transcend the earth's traditional habitat and include other components of the solar system.¹⁰⁰ Our astronomers are increasingly alert to the possibility that some of the phenomena that originate outside our solar system, or even our galaxy, will contain messages from other beings. The plausibility of this conjecture rests not only on the remarkable homogeneity of the metals which compose dense celestial objects, but on the billions of environments, not drastically dissimilar to our own, in which the molecules essential to life may, on probability grounds, have also occurred. In any case, the perspectives of significant scientific elites have lost much of the parochial outlook that characterized a civilization long limited by tribal inheritances. From another standpoint, however, contemporary scientists can be said to be in a process of recovering a sense of oneness with the universe that the advent of science imperiled, as its initial successes demonstrated the mechanics of objects.¹⁰¹ Primitive peoples presumably drew no sharp lines between the state of being alive and the state of death, or the subjectivities experienced by the human being and the imputed subjectivities of animals, plants, and rocks. As the universe is resolved into macro-objects and micro-objects among which lines are difficult to draw, the equivalence of mass and energy is perceived to include more and more of the hypothetically total manifold of events. Meanwhile, despite the advances of mass-energy studies, subjective

¹⁰⁰ The range of spatial environments to which humans have gained access since the close of World War II is startling. J. McHALE, *supra* note 45, at 69, provides a suggestive illustration. Certain potential developments are discussed in T. HEPPENHEIMER, *COLONIES IN SPACE* (1977); Lasswell, *Men in Space*, 72 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 180 (1958); G. O'NEILL, *THE HIGH FRONTIER: HUMAN COLONIES IN SPACE* (1977). See also W. HARTMAN, R. MILLER & P. LEE, *OUT OF THE CRADLE: EXPLORING THE FRONTIERS BEYOND EARTH* (1984); F. HOYLE & C. WICKRAMASINGHE, *DISEASES FROM SPACE* (1979); *OUTER SPACE — A NEW DIMENSION OF THE ARMS RACE* (B. Jasani ed. 1982).

¹⁰¹ Representative of this movement is the work of Fritjof Capra. See F. CAPRA, *THE TAO OF PHYSICS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE PARALLELS BETWEEN MODERN PHYSICS AND EASTERN MYSTICISM* (1975); F. CAPRA, *THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE RISING CULTURE* (1982); see also B. LOVELL, *EMERGING COSMOLOGY* (1981); I. PRIGOGINE & I. STENGERS, *ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAN'S NEW DIALOGUE WITH NATURE* (1984); E. WILSON, *BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND TO OTHER SPECIES* (1984).

events continue to provide the immediate human experience and to function as the locus of the policy processes that appear to perform a guiding role in relation to future events.¹⁰²

The time-space dimensions of a situation define the territorial distribution of those who interact with at least a minimum frequency during a given period. Scientific observers of social interaction serve their own convenience, which is dictated by the problems on which they are engaged, when they choose the minimum frequencies that delimit a situation.

It is not required that the interactions composing a situation should be restricted to friendly or hostile exchanges. The critical point is whether policy choices and decisions take into account the other participants. It is not necessary for each participant to think of all the other participants; but it is pertinent for those who make important decisions to do so. In the 1960s, for example, even though the mainland Chinese did not belong to the United Nations, no U.N. member could fail to recognize the implications for their national security of Beijing's possession of nuclear weapons. Although transnational trade and investment were discouraged among various blocs, there was no lack of awareness of the potential importance of economic intercourse. Similar examples are readily available from other value processes.

A relevant feature of the larger community of humankind is the state of global simultaneity within which it operates. Thanks to the extension of a complex communications system whose technological refinement is so rapid that it may seem rudimentary a decade hence, both the elite and rank and file in urban centers are aware almost simultan-

¹⁰² Biologists as well as physicists are doing their best to undermine fundamental expectations. For example, one eminent biologist stated recently:

A good case can be made for our nonexistence as entities. We are not made up, as we had always supposed, of successfully enriched packets of our own parts. We are shared, rented, occupied. At the interior of our cells, driving them, providing the oxidative energy that sends us out for the improvement of each shining day, are the mitochondria, and in a strict sense they are not ours. They turn out to be little separate creatures, the colonial posterity of migrant prokaryocytes, probably primitive bacteria that swam into ancestral precursors of our eukaryotic cells and stayed there. Ever since, they have maintained themselves and their ways, replicating in their own fashion, privately, with their own DNA and RNA quite different from ours. They are as much symbionts as the rhizobial bacteria in the roots of beans. Without them, we would not move a muscle, drum a finger, think a thought.

L. THOMAS, *THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 2* (1974); see also J. BLEIBTREU, *THE PARABLE OF THE BEAST* (1968).

eously of developments elsewhere on the planet as well as in areas of outer space.¹⁰³ This development, in conjunction with changes in the technology of transporting people and goods (in contrast to the transport of information), may indeed be the most characteristic aspect of contemporary world community. In its light, virtually all problems are viewed as transnational whether they are matters of local economy, education, accreditation and protection of skill, health, and so on.¹⁰⁴ This simultaneity has changed the grid of time and space that once served to separate human beings and experience.¹⁰⁵ In the contemporary community neither time nor space acts as an effective barrier.¹⁰⁶ These trends are underlined in periods of crisis, situations in which there is a heightened perception of a threat to critical values. Precisely because of the high integration of social process on a global scale, crises increasingly tend to be transnational and inclusive (and pervasive). They know neither temporal nor geographical bounds and tend, moreover, to be

¹⁰³ This is explored in relation to written media in A. SMITH, *GOODBYE GUTENBERG: THE NEWSPAPER REVOLUTION OF THE 1980s* (1980). The impact on perspectives is explored in M. LEWIS, *LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY: THE LINGUISTIC REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE* (1948). See also M. McLuhan, *UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN* (1964); M. McLuhan & Q. Fiore, *THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE* (1967); *Print Culture and Video Culture*, 111 DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. (S. Graubard ed. 1982). On television in the United States, see D. MARC, *DEMOGRAPHIC VISTAS: TELEVISION IN AMERICAN CULTURE* (1984).

¹⁰⁴ Implications of this trend are explored in such works as M. McLuhan & Q. Fiore, *WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE* (1968); T. von Laue, *THE GLOBAL CITY: FREEDOM, POWER, AND NECESSITY IN THE AGE OF WORLD REVOLUTIONS* (1969). See also *supra* note 71; J. McHale, *supra* note 45.

¹⁰⁵ McHale summarized the trend graphically. See J. McHale, *supra* note 45, at 58. He provided different detail when he highlighted the technological developments that conditioned and continue to shape the trend. *Id.* at 269.

An indication of the historical importance of space and time in shaping social process is provided in D. Meinig, 1 *THE SHAPING OF AMERICA, A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON 500 YEARS OF HISTORY* (1986).

¹⁰⁶ The capacity to manipulate time and space in the pursuit of demanded values has increased. The significance of spatial and temporal modulation has long been known to artists and engineers. See, e.g., S. Giedion, *SPACE, TIME AND ARCHITECTURE: THE GROWTH OF A NEW TRADITION* (5th rev. ed. 1967); M. Girouard, *CITIES AND PEOPLE: A SOCIAL AND ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY* (1985); E. Hall, *supra* note 93; W. MacDonald, 2 *THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE: AN URBAN APPRAISAL* (1986); D. Olsen, *THE CITY AS A WORK OF ART: LONDON, PARIS, VIENNA* (1986); H. Proshansky et al., *ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: PEOPLE AND THEIR PHYSICAL SETTING* (2d ed. 1976); *THE INTERPRETATION OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES: GEOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS* (D. Meinig ed. 1979).

value-agglutinative, that is, while starting within a single value process they quickly incorporate all other values.¹⁰⁷

B. Institutionalization

An institution is a recurring and coordinated pattern of thought and behavior which human beings establish to maximize what they perceive to be their own interests. Institutions are identified with those features of social process that are specialized to the shaping and sharing of particular values. For example, certain perspectives and operations are distinctively engaged in the shaping and sharing of respect and differ from those engaged in the wealth process. The characterization of a particular process as being primarily dedicated to a specific value may require a difficult empirical judgment.¹⁰⁸

The most pervasive experience within an institutional process is, of course, the expectation of stability: the general belief held by a significant number of participants within that institutional process that it will continue through time, indeed, that it is "real." Based on this expectation, regular value investments are made: people buy, sell, and save; educate their children; seek certain enjoyments and shun or defer others. The expectation of continuous stability is one of the critical struts on which the institutional process rests. From a broader, disengaged perspective, however, the seeming inner stability of a process gives way to a picture of major institutional changes. Consider the nation-state, the archetypical institution of the first half of this century. If one indicated in heavy lines on a Mercator's projection the political boundaries of states, stacked these maps at ten-year intervals and then flipped through them quickly, the cinematographic effect would produce lines of almost erotic sensuality. If the ideologies of each state were indicated by color equivalents, the chromatic whirl of changes would suggest a psychedelic experience. Stability, to paraphrase Heraclitus, rests by changing.

All institutional processes are in continuous interaction. As the intensity of contact increases in space and time, institutional changes and changes in the modalities of organization are initiated, diffused, or restricted to protect or extend the value position of participants. This occurrence on a global scale is one of the hallmarks of planetary interdependence and helps to explain why the institutionalization dimension of

¹⁰⁷ Crises are discussed below in greater detail. See *infra* notes 130-42 and accompanying text.

¹⁰⁸ For brief elaboration, see H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 46-47.

situations reflects the trend toward inclusivity in the world community.¹⁰⁹

In addition to interdependence, the trend toward institutional inclusivity is evident in what can be called parallel developments: the tendency to pursue demanded values through increasingly similar practices throughout the world.¹¹⁰ However, similarity of social structure does not necessarily carry with it either uniformity of myth or perspective. This is obvious when one considers the myths of power and wealth that prevail in similar urban structures such as Moscow and New York. The degree of identification or loyalty to an urban center may vary as well. To a dedicated Parisian, Paris may appear as the center of the universe. On the other hand, a third generation resident of New Delhi may consider his or her stay in the urban environment as necessary, unfortunate, and transitory. Parallel developments also include the complex of practices that comprise the employment of modern science and technology throughout the planet.

Urbanization is a parallel development that substantially conditions the shaping and sharing of all values, is closely related to the spatial and temporal dimensions of situations, and influences the life of virtually every human being. Urbanization historically occurred when agricultural production was able to support a sizable population not directly involved in agriculture.¹¹¹ In the past, the city was a participant in larger processes in its own right. But its position in social process has been eclipsed, perhaps only momentarily, by other institutions,

¹⁰⁹ In the discussion of "Outcomes" below, we demonstrate the interdependence of all value processes in the world community. See *infra* notes 218-403 and accompanying text.

¹¹⁰ See Lasswell, *supra* note 71, for discussion of "parallel developments." Also relevant is the contemporaneous discovery of new concepts or technical applications in different places around the planet. This phenomenon has been referred to as "Multiple Simultaneous Independent Discovery." See R. Merton, *THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS* 343-82 (N. Storer ed. 1973). Parallel developments are not necessarily a recent occurrence. See C. OXNARD, *THE ORDER OF MAN* (1984) for prehistoric evidence.

¹¹¹ For background, see *City* in 2 *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA*, *supra* note 2. See also V. CHILDE, *MAN MAKES HIMSELF* (1951); E. GUTKIND, 8 *INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF CITY DEVELOPMENT* (1964-1972); J. JACOBS, *CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC LIFE* (1984); L. MUMFORD, *CITY DEVELOPMENT* (1945); L. MUMFORD, *THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS* (1961), (including a valuable bibliography); J. PFEIFFER, *THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIETY: A PRE-HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT* (1977) (extending and refining his articulation of his book cited *supra* note 39); G. SJOBERG, *THE PREINDUSTRIAL CITY, PAST AND PRESENT* (1960); *THE STUDY OF URBANIZATION* (P. Hauser & L. Schnore eds. 1965). A brief look to the future is in *CITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY* (G. Gappert & R. Knight eds. 1982).

most notably the nation-state. Nonetheless, in conjunction with its continuing growth through time, across space and in terms of inhabitants, the city generates a characteristic complex of perspectives and operations that conditions the development and behavior of residents and those who live beyond its confines but who orient themselves to the city's rhythm and style. In many ways the city remains the locus of much of humankind's activity, providing a common context that is recognized by people the world over.¹¹²

The interdependence of the inhabitants of a particular urban environment is obvious enough, whether it is a question of traffic, water, garbage, or more subtle matters. Intra-city interdependence depends, for instance, on the position of the urban aggregates in the arenas of war, diplomacy, propaganda, and trade. Internal and external shifts in the power balancing process generate coalitions of varying size and composition. If the ruling elite is divided among clashing factions and individuals, contending elements reach out to middle and lower strata in search of support. But an expanded coalition is not necessarily permanent. An older faction may seize effective control once more and restore the temporarily suspended curbs on freedom of access to equal opportunity. But customary arrangements, once abandoned, are not likely to be permanently restored because the factors that favor more general participation in the shaping and sharing of values continue to affect what happens.

The significant interplay among coalitions is not restricted to intra-city affairs. The competing and conflicting leaders of cities and empires seek to divide the ruling class of opposing states and to drive a wedge between rulers and ruled. But this does not necessarily bring the rank and file into a permanently enlarged sphere of political and social participation. Although elite elements may struggle against one another, when lower social formations step beyond their traditional limits, diverse elite factions may perceive a common threat and join to protect the tacit prescriptions that keep the "great game of politics" an elite privilege. Despite the cultivated proclivities of self-perpetuation of

¹¹² See B. BERRY, *THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION: DIVERGENT PATHS IN THE URBAN EXPERIENCE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (1973); P. HALL, *THE WORLD CITIES* (1966); D. MILLER, *INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURES: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF FOUR WORLD CITIES* (1970); L. MUMFORD, *THE CULTURE OF CITIES* (1938); L. STRAUSS, *THE CITY AND MAN* (1964); A. TOYNBEE, *CITIES ON THE MOVE* (1970); *AN URBAN WORLD* (C. Tilly ed. 1974); see also M. GIROUARD, *supra* note 106; *IMAGE AND ENVIRONMENT: COGNITIVE MAPPING AND SPATIAL BEHAVIOR* (R. Downs & D. Stea eds. 1973); W. MACDONALD, *supra* note 106; H. PROSHANSKY ET AL., *supra* note 106.

every system to protect the predominance of a few, the trend of much modern history has been to multiply the relative numbers of those who seek permanent equality of opportunity, and who join in active if erratic coalitions on behalf of institutional changes that harmonize with this popular demand.

Many components of the urban complex continue to strengthen and to widen and intensify zones of interaction. Among these components, we recognize the changing social relations connected, for instance, with the expansion of commerce, industry, money and credit, transportation, communication, sanitation and medical care, elementary and advanced education, and scientific and technological research. Interacting with these changes has been "the respect revolution," which has cumulatively extended to the common person the patterns of self-confidence that were the traditional prerogatives of monarchs, feudal lords, high ecclesiastics, wealthy merchants, and famous physicians.¹¹³ The division of labor in urban society has originated new skill differentiations to replace older modes of production. To a point, human beings become "upgraded" as a productive resource; in the past, this carried with it greater bargaining power and self-esteem among the middle and lower classes.¹¹⁴

Cities also have been associated with a broader personal liberty than is available in other forms of social organization.¹¹⁵ The comparatively anonymous circumstances that urban conglomeration provides may protect liberty and contribute to the richness of civilization by offering opportunities for experimenting with private life styles. Hence, greater diversity of life styles and comparative tolerance of deviation are found in cities rather than towns. Indeed, Weber notes that the cities from earliest times were places of refuge for those fleeing a variety of authoritative decisions.¹¹⁶

The spread of urbanization and, even in thinly populated areas, the dissemination of urban values tends to accelerate the installation of a

¹¹³ The "respect revolution" and its potential consequences are explored and developed in M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4.

¹¹⁴ Urbanization in poor countries and communities has had a distinctively profound and unsettling effect. See, e.g., M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 46, *Urban Blight*; Hardoy & Satterthwaite, *Third World Cities and the Environment of Poverty*, in *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE*, *supra* note 67; Hauser, *The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization*, in *INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE*, *supra* note 23.

¹¹⁵ See L. MUMFORD, *supra* notes 111-12.

¹¹⁶ See A. WEBER, *THE GROWTH OF CITIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A STUDY IN STATISTICS* (1899, 1963).

global civilization.¹¹⁷ Ordinarily, one would assume that this would provide a conditioning factor which enhances possibilities for liberty as urban settings have done in the past. However, contemporary urbanization synergizes with a variety of other technological developments which are associated with advanced industrial and science-based civilization. These may, ironically, militate against the liberty and possibility of private experience previously available in the city.

Foremost among these new developments is electronic surveillance available to elites. These techniques permit elites to monitor and maintain close control over individual behavior often in a comparatively inobtrusive fashion.¹¹⁸ At the most mundane level, transactions in an in-

¹¹⁷ People are moving to cities in increasing numbers the world over. This is most marked in communities where the infrastructure required to support immigrants is lacking. Recent trends with projections are provided by Hardoy and Satterthwaite, *supra* note 114, at 174. See also Hauser, *supra* note 114; M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *THE STATE OF THE WORLD ATLAS* (1981), at Map 49, *The Swelling Cities* and text accompanying map. On the volume and movement of refugees, most of whom attempt to settle in cities, see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 26, *A Sort of Survival*, and text accompanying map. On demographic and urbanization trends more generally, see K. DAVIS, *WORLD URBANIZATION 1950-1970* (1969 & 1972) (2 volumes); see also sources cited *supra* notes 38, 111, and 112. For a long-term perspective, see I. ROUSE, *MIGRATIONS IN PREHISTORY: INFERRING POPULATION MOVEMENT FROM CULTURAL REMAINS* (1986).

¹¹⁸ Elite interest in such monitoring is not new. Informants are an ancient expression of elite vigilance and paranoia. Concern with increasing technical competence and compelling political justification for surveillance has intensified. For related studies, see B. BAGDIKIAN, *THE INFORMATION MACHINES: THEIR IMPACT ON MEN AND THE MEDIA* (1971); D. BURNHAM, *THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE* (1983); W. DIZARD, *THE COMING INFORMATION AGE: AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS* (1982); F. DONNER, *THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM* (1980); *HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN FREEDOM* (L. Lapham ed. 1985); M. McLuhan, *THE GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN* (1962); D. SCHILLER, *TELEMATICS AND GOVERNMENT* (1982); A. SMITH, *supra* note 103; I. DE SOLA POOL, *TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM* (1983).

Concern is global. See INTERNATIONAL COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS (MacBride Commission Report), *MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD: TOWARDS A MORE JUST AND MORE EFFICIENT WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER* (1980) [hereafter MacBride Commission Report]; J. POWELL, *INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BY SATELLITE: ISSUES OF REGULATION, BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATION* (1985); A. SMITH, *THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: HOW WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD* (1980); *TOWARD A LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS* (A. Branscomb ed. 1986); Addis, *The New World Information and Communication Order: The Attempt to Restructure the International Communication Process* (Ph.D. diss., Yale Law School, 1987); Chen, *Human Rights and the Free Flow of Information*, in *POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW, ESSAYS*

creasingly moneyless society are effected through checks and credit cards, as well as a variety of other forms. One of the features of these transactions is that they leave "tracks." A purchase in a cash economy is known only to buyer and seller and the likelihood of the seller recalling the transaction decreases the more fungible the product and massive the distribution. But in a money-equivalent society a clear and relatively indelible record is made no matter how trivial the transaction. When this development is linked to cybernetic advances that permit the storage and rapid retrieval of information about such transactions, it presents a detailed picture of how individuals spend money and how they enjoy leisure time. The picture's precision probably exceeds the folk surveillance and gossip network of small towns and villages. A variety of nongovernmental agencies already use this information to make credit appraisals.¹¹⁹ The use of surveillance, initially by private operatives and ultimately by official elites, may transform the urban freedom into a village-like or town-like authoritarianism.

It is significant that Marshall McLuhan, a prophet of the communications revolution and a man rivaling George Orwell in his perspicacious vision of the future, referred to his vision of the emerging planetary system not as a global city but rather as a "global village."¹²⁰ Intentional or otherwise, the description he chose is extraordinarily appropriate. The net result of these developments could be to transform the cosmopolis, formerly available in the major urban conglomerations about the planet, into a more homogeneous global village with many consequences on future creativity and variety. Orwell's gift was to perceive the concatenation of many of these developments and their impact on personal liberty with the most uncanny precision.

Regardless of the mutability of Orwell's prediction, one forecast is fairly certain: the life styles of the world's elite will continue to converge. Top managers, engineers, scientists, and public figures will demand prompt access for themselves and their families to the "best" medical care; they will use their influence to arrange adequate facilities in their locality; and when emergencies occur will travel to the best centers. No matter how variegated their life styles may be, the elite classes will insist on sharing the "in" arts, sports, fashions, and manners of their opposite numbers in the most prestigious places. Even to-

IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1985).

¹¹⁹ See, e.g., H. SCHILLER, WHO KNOWS: INFORMATION IN THE AGE OF THE FORTUNE 500 (1981).

¹²⁰ See M. McLuhan & Q. Fiore, *supra* note 104. On Orwell, see GEORGE ORWELL AND MODERN VIEWS OF THE FUTURE (R. Waldron ed. 1986).

day it is possible to travel around the globe from capital to capital — national or provincial — a guest of the local elite, or a paying guest at the Hilton (or sub-Hilton), without a drastic change in eating, sleeping, or toilet habits.

In technologically differentiated societies public and private activities have become highly complex. Organizational complexity in government, the corporate world, and other sectors of life is subjecting people to intense pressure.¹²¹ They respond by feeling like cogs in a machine, or as simple accessories to the technology and organization. Their autonomy, integrity, and spontaneity as human beings are in jeopardy as participants in big organizations seem to fall prey to a familiar logic. Stressing the purposes and efficiency of the organization as paramount, the elite in such organizations tend to adopt a purely instrumental view of the human beings at their disposal. In extreme cases, they practically possess their members lives, directing their basic political orientation, controlling the information that reaches them, and decisively influencing their opportunities for work and livelihood, education, health, recreation, recognition, friendship, family activities, and religious observances.¹²²

The psychological impacts of large-scale organizations are compounded by the tensions that have been generated by changes in the

¹²¹ Mayo provided an analysis of the situation in the United States. See E. MAYO, *THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION* (1933); see also *infra* notes 177, 180. The insights of C. BARNARD, *THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE* (1946) and M. FOLLETT, *DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF MARY PARKER FOLLETT* (E. Fox & L. Urwick 2d ed. 1973), have lost none of their original luster and relevance. A recent collection is *PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR* (A. Van de Ven & W. Joyce eds. 1981).

¹²² Examples can be drawn from many cultures and states. On the United States, see W. WHYTE, *THE ORGANIZATION MAN* (1956); see also R. PRESTHUS, *THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY* (1962). The longstanding antagonism between "management" and "labor" is pertinent. See R. BENDIX, *WORK AND AUTHORITY: IDEOLOGIES OF MANAGEMENT IN THE COURSE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION* (1956); A. CHANDLER, JR., *THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS* (1977); R. EDWARDS, *CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (1979); D. MONTGOMERY, *WORKER'S CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES* (1980); Duboff & Herman, *Alfred Chandler's New Business History: A Review* 10 *POL. & SOC.* 87 (1980); see also the work of Frederick Taylor and Herbert Gutman. On the relation between ownership and management, see the now classic study by A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, *THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY* (rev. ed. 1968). For the Japanese experience, see, for example, M. MORISHIMA, *WHY HAS JAPAN 'SUCCEEDED'? WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS* (1982).

relations between the public and private sectors of society. Analysis suggests that every large-scale society gives expression to dynamic factors that pull in opposite directions, and strike unstable equilibrium positions during any given period of time. There is tension between *centralization* and *decentralization*. When decisions continue to collect at the center and the system becomes overloaded, decentralizing practices probably will be tolerated. Closely connected with territorial relations is the balance between *pluralization* and *singularization*, that is, between the tendency to give self-direction to transportation, manufacturing and other industries, to managers, technicians and semi-skilled workers, trade unions and professional associations; and to restrict the scope of these functional operations by strictly subordinating them to the party or departmental hierarchies.

Intertwined with these processes are the tensions at all decision levels (federal, regional) between structures that share responsibility. This is the dynamic tension between *concentration* and *deconcentration*. At the federal level, for instance, the party machinery may give relatively more leeway to the general staff and the officers corps, to the production planners, or to the administrators of the various technical services. Or, on the contrary, the party may grab the reins again and take up the slack.

There is a to-and-fro between *regimentation* and *individuation*. When regimentation increases, individuals are commandeered for all kinds of community services: road building, harvesting, political indoctrination, medical assistance, and so on. When regimentation declines, individuals have more time for themselves, their families, and friends.

We must not overlook the subtle interplay between *democracy* and *despotism*. As a people becomes more literate and skilled, it is likely to grow more self-assertive and require more rational grounds for consent to social policy. This creates factors potentially favorable to democracy but not necessarily over short periods. As individuals become more assertive, they may become more aware of special interests that tie them with one set of groups against another. Hence, instead of a "general will," there may be a great aggregate of grasping special interest groups struggling with one another, and easily pitted against one another by a central elite.

In an interdependent, divided, and militarized world in which high expectations of violence persist, there has been a persistent parallel trend in many national contexts toward greater governmentalization,

centralization, concentration, bureaucratization, and regimentation.¹²³ Governments multiply functions in response to intensifying demands upon public authorities. All value processes are implicated in this trend which has been referred to as the politicization of society.¹²⁴ This tendency accelerates even in societies which traditionally have been resistant to "encroachment" by the state. Within nation-states centralized decisions are made and implemented at the top level of highly concentrated processes of authority and control.

This trend does not imply that a similar trend exists to centralize decisions in a world-inclusive political organization. Since effective power in the global arena is monopolized in the hands of nation states, vested and sentimental interests oppose further centralization that would involve supranational entities.

The concentration of authority and control in the hands of a few officials or structures at a given level varies between entities. The most concentrated structure in a political arena is a hierarchy in which effective decisions are made by one person and a limited number of advisors. When there is a relatively low circulation of officials through a hierarchy, we speak of bureaucracy. Governmentalizing, centralizing, and concentrating tendencies foster hierarchy; and the stabilization of large hierarchies is almost certain to spell bureaucracy.¹²⁵ Bureaucratization can be followed by regimentation; the state seeks to restrict all areas of private, individual, and organized choice by using measures that depend on varying degrees of coerciveness. The trend toward governmentaliza-

¹²³ Lasswell explored these trends, likely developments, and possible responses in H. LASSWELL, *NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM* (1950); Lasswell, *Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?* 275 *ANNALS* III (1951); Lasswell, *The Garrison State*, 46 *AM. J. SOC.* 455 (1941); Lasswell, *The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today*, in *CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS* 51 (S. Huntington ed. 1962); Lasswell, *The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence*, in *ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR* (1948); Lasswell, *Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State*, 11 *CHINA Q.* 643 (1937); Lasswell, *The Threat to Privacy*, in *CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES*, *supra* note 14. *But see* Aron, *Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State'*, 5 *ARMED FORCES SOC'Y* 347 (1979).

¹²⁴ For further discussion, see the diverse essays in *THE POLITICIZATION OF SOCIETY* (K. Templeton, Jr. ed. 1979). *See also* G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, *THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS* (1963); *THE CIVIC CULTURE REVISITED: AN ANALYTIC STUDY* (G. Almond & S. Verba eds. 1980).

¹²⁵ *See generally* P. BLAU & M. MEYER, *BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY* (2d ed. 1971); *BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* (J. LaPalombara 2d ed. 1967); M. CROZIER, *THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON* (1964); H. JACOBY, *THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD* (E. Kaner trans. 1973); Weber, *Bureaucracy*, in *MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY* (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1958).

tion, which is sustained by the associated syndromes of centralization, concentration, bureaucratization, and regimentation, has upset the traditional balance between the public and the private sector, and the change is largely at the expense of civic order and personal autonomy.¹²⁶ In the extreme case, such as a totalitarian regime, society is practically swallowed up by government.¹²⁷

Confronted with the frontal assaults of large-scale organization and of expanding governmentalization (with its associated syndromes), various countermovements are set in motion.¹²⁸ Popular demands are for less governmentalization, bureaucratization, and regimentation, and for more decentralization and deconcentration, spontaneity, and personal autonomy. Through various strategies, people demand more widespread and effective participation in power and other value processes intended to make government responsive and responsible. When traditions of social diversity fortify private organizations, the drift toward "big government" is rather successfully opposed by vigorous private organizations. Whenever the established political perspective favors decentralization within government — as in a federal system — any fun-

¹²⁶ See H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 123; M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at chapter 16, *The Aggregate Interest in Shared Respect and Human Rights: The Harmonization of Public Order and Civic Order*; R. NISBET, *Twilight of Authority* (1975).

¹²⁷ See H. ARENDT, *THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM* (new edition with added preface 1973); *AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY: THE DYNAMICS OF ESTABLISHED ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS* (S. Huntington & C. Moore eds. 1970); H. BUCHHEIM, *TOTALITARIAN RULE: ITS NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS* (R. Hein trans. 1968); C. FRIEDRICH & Z. BRZEZINSKI, *TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY* (2d ed. rev. 1965); A. MILLER, *DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL* (1981); B. MOORE, *SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD* (1966); F. NEUMANN, *BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1933-1944* (2d ed. 1963); S. NEUMANN, *PERMANENT REVOLUTION: TOTALITARIANISM IN PERSPECTIVE: THREE VIEWS* (1969); W. REICH, *THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM* (1946); J. REVEL, *HOW DEMOCRACIES PERISH* (1984); E. SAGAN, *AT THE DAWN OF TYRANNY: THE ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUALISM, POLITICAL OPPRESSION, AND THE STATE* (1985); J. TALMON, *THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY* (1960); *TOTALITARIANISM* (C. Friedrich ed. 1964); Bracher, *Totalitarianism*, in 4 *DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS* (P. Weiner ed. 1973); *Totalitarianism*, in 16 *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA*, *supra* note 2; see also T. ADORNO ET AL., *THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY* (1950); M. ROKEACH, *THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS AND PERSONALITY SYSTEMS* (1960); *STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE "AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY"* (R. Christie & M. Jahoda eds. 1954).

¹²⁸ See, e.g., J. OGILVY, *MANY DIMENSIONAL MAN: DECENTRALIZING SELF, SOCIETY AND THE SACRED* (1977).

damental change in the structural balance is achieved with difficulty. In consequence, the tension between the public and private sector persists; the balance between the two is fluid, dynamic, and shifting.¹²⁹

C. *Level of Crisis*

We think of "crisis" as a collective situation in which the stress toward action is high.¹³⁰ This is obvious when value deprivations are precipitated by epidemics, invasions, famines, and similar catastrophes. But crises may be positive as well as negative, stimulated by visions of great gain or prevented loss. A rush to occupy newly available farmland or to mine precious metals is a crisis of value indulgence.

The direction and rapidity of institutional changes are tightly bound to the spread and intensity of the crises that accompany the evolution of an interdependent world. The tempo and depth of change constitutes a continuing source of crisis.¹³¹ Old religious, ethnic, and class loyalties are plowed under as the great centers of industry take shape, and as the older forms of peasant culture are put into the melting pot of collective agriculture. When millions of people lose old ties that bind them to fixed patterns of conduct, vast susceptibilities are created to crowd behavior. "Crowd behavior" means an excited collective action; crowds become mobs or dissolve in panic. A "crowd" is generated by simultaneous exposure to a common focus. Because the "communications revolution" has created a world network that reaches millions rather than the thousands, transnational and even global crowds may resonate to the same crisis.

In a world of instantaneous communication, the mass media gener-

¹²⁹ Within the Soviet world, on the other hand, while the stated elite doctrine has remained tenaciously in favor of the formal principle of civilian supremacy, the Party continues to be the major ladder up the authority and control pyramid. Within the Party, of course, it is the specialist on the political-police function who has a distinct advantage, because central power elements look to the police to protect them from the challenges that arise in a totalitarian system. Established elites in such a system typically perceive themselves as threatened by demands for decentralization, deconcentration, democratization, pluralization, and deregimentation. Studies performed during the "Cold War" can be especially revealing. See M. FAINSD, *SMOLENSK UNDER SOVIET RULE* (1958); N. LEITES & E. BERNAUT, *RITUAL OF LIQUIDATION: THE CASE OF THE MOSCOW TRIALS* (1954); B. MEISSNER & J. RESHETAR, *THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION* (1956); *THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE* (S. Wolin & R. Slusser eds. 1957).

¹³⁰ See generally H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 242-45.

¹³¹ No community is immune. For an examination concerned primarily with American society, see A. TOFFLER, *FUTURE SHOCK* (1970).

ates crises through sensationalism or over-reporting.¹³² While genuine crises may positively affect the mobilization of public support and collective action, the perpetual pseudo-crises that a hyperactive mass media fabricates may become so routine that it interferes with the future capacity of the media to arouse attention. Audiences may be so overwhelmed by sensational trivialization that they become numb, apathetic, impotent, and immobilized, or simply develop a quotidian appetite for these latter day circuses. They then lose a legitimate sense of outrage, withdrawing from effective identity with the larger self, and may remain unresponsive in times of genuine crisis.¹³³

In security crises all values are critically at stake. Obviously, the growing world militarization has pervasive and far-reaching impacts upon the fulfillment and nonfulfillment of every value. It is commonplace to acknowledge that humankind lives in the shadow of nuclear war and the possible annihilation of humanity and civilization.¹³⁴ Reflective minds recognize that the lamentably mundane character of this perception should not dull the sense of the reality of danger. A partial consequence of the delicate balance of nuclear terror is that limited violence by private armies and private groups has increased tremendously. Nor is the destructive potentiality of chemical and biological weapons

¹³² Boorstin has characterized this as "a flood of pseudo-events." See D. BOORSTIN, *THE IMAGE: OR WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN DREAM* 7-44 (1962). Cf. Tannenbaum & Lynch, *Sensationalism: The Concept and Its Measurement*, 37 JOURNALISM Q. 381 (1960).

¹³³ Given the complexities of contemporary life and the media overload, people, including the educated, may become so bewildered as to be indifferent and lose the capacity for outrage and commitment in the face of massive atrocities and deprivations. This state of affairs is in turn apt for exploitation by ruling elites. Similarly, there is danger, amidst abiding parochialism, of contributing to the strength of a local development by magnifying its significance, and hence enhancing its appeal to other local elements who share nothing more tangible than a generalized resentment against outsiders, and the assumption that whatever worries the foreigners deserves support.

¹³⁴ Lasswell explored the more elemental phenomena that predate but which are intensified by nuclear weapons in *The Balancing of Power: The Expectation of Violence*, in H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54. See also H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 250-68. On the advent of nuclear weapons and conjecture on their impact in the global arena, see G. BEST, *HUMANITY IN WARFARE* (1980); B. BRODIE ET AL., *THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON* (1946); M. MANDELBAUM, *THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: THE UNITED STATES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 1946-76* (1979); T. ROPP, *WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD* (1959); B. RUSSETT, *THE PRISONERS OF INSECURITY: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL* (1983); STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI), *WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MILITARY IMPACT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT* (1980).

to be discounted in this regard.¹³⁵ A yet to be understood consequence of this situation is its impact on children.¹³⁶ Preliminary indications suggest that the military crises of the atomic age shape expectations at the most subliminal level.¹³⁷

Some elite members perceive crises as long and protracted, such as the crisis of disunity that began with the Protestant Reformation and continues to this day. The imbalance of food and population would also be a long-term crisis.¹³⁸ In advanced industrial societies, we hear of the "age gap," alienation between young and old, and, of course, among social classes. Tension persists between the originators of modern science and technology, and the nations whose peoples have not mastered an institutional matrix of such design. The intense application of science and technology to resources to increase the material conditions of all human beings has stressed the ecological balance of our planet

¹³⁵ J. COOKSON & J. NOTTINGHAM, A SURVEY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1969); CBW — CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (S. ROSE & D. PAVETT eds. 1969); DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE; UNITED NATIONS, CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND THE EFFECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE (1969); LARSON, *Biological Warfare: Model 1967*, 46 MIL. REV. 31 (1966); MESELSON, *Chemical and Biological Weapons*, SCI. AM., 15-25 (1970); *International Regulation of Chemical and Biological Warfare Symposium*, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1165-1280 (1982).

¹³⁶ See N. GUENTHER, CHILDREN AND THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1985).

¹³⁷ Lifton illuminated a particularly disorienting and disturbing thought when he wrote, "But the truth that increasingly penetrates our consciousness is that everything else — including even nature — is a 'paper tiger' in the jungle of nuclear destructiveness." Lifton, *The Psychic Toll of the Nuclear Age*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, § 6 (Magazine) at 64. See generally R. LIFTON, DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA (1967); R. LIFTON & R. FALK, INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS, THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE AGAINST NUCLEARISM (1982); J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982); J. SCHELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSION (1976); P. WYDEN, DAY ONE, BEFORE HIROSHIMA AND AFTER (1984); THE FINAL EPIDEMIC, PHYSICIANS AND SCIENTISTS ON NUCLEAR WAR (R. ADAMS & S. CULLEN eds. 1981); HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI: THE PHYSICAL, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS (Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs 1981); LAST AID: THE MEDICAL DIMENSIONS OF NUCLEAR WAR (E. & S. CHIVIAN eds. 1982); THE LONG DARKNESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WINTER (L. GRINSPOON ed. 1986); see also sources cited *supra* note 134.

¹³⁸ A review of the situation is presented in E. ECKHOLM, LOSING GROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS AND WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS (1976); see also THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT (R. SINHA & G. DRABEK eds. 1978). See sources cited *supra* note 45 for an indication of trends in population.

which, though imperfectly understood, may portend grave long-term consequences.¹³⁹ Because pollution and, more generally, environmental deterioration are not severable evils that can be exorcised, but are inevitable by-products of intense and otherwise desirable resource uses, remedies cannot be implemented without massive social and economic dislocations. The transnational nature of these problems demands multinational and international cooperation for their resolution.¹⁴⁰ This in turn reinforces both the fact and the awareness of planetary interdependence.

The graver crises of the contemporary world can be conveniently arranged in terms of the value they most seriously affect:¹⁴¹

Crises of power: war, internal violence, breakdown in internal order; obsolete structures of authority and control;

¹³⁹ Such stresses include the loss of genetic diversity and increasing toxicity throughout the environment, with potential impact on plant and animal health and fertility, increasing concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide, possible depletion of ozone, loss of topsoil, and depletion and pollution of ground water. See C. CAUFIELD, *IN THE RAINFOREST* (1985); M. EISENBUD, *ENVIRONMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND HEALTH: HUMAN ECOLOGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE* (1978); W. KELLOGG & R. SCHWARTZ, *CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY: CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE* (1981); S. SCHNEIDER & R. LONDER, *THE COEVOLUTION OF CLIMATE AND LIFE* (1984); see also *INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION* (T. Schelling ed. 1983); *ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM-SOLVING: CONCEPTS AND CASE STUDIES* (Committee on the Applications of Ecological Theory to Environmental Problems, Commission on Life Sciences, National Research Council 1986). For further discussion and orientation, a number of overview studies, with documentation, appear in *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE*, *supra* note 67; M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at map 45, *Fouling the Nest*, and text accompanying map; see also R. Falk, *supra* note 67; L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67.

¹⁴⁰ See R. BOARDMAN, *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE* (1981); E. SKOLNIKOFF, *THE INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES OF TECHNOLOGY: TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM* (1972); *ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION* (D. Kay & H. Jacobson eds. 1983); *WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS* (V. Nanda ed. 1983).

¹⁴¹ Writers tend to focus on particular types of crises. During the last 20 years, interdependence and perception of its significance have stimulated a variety of relatively comprehensive studies that present crises in many if not all value processes. This trend continues to develop with increasing scope and domain, with awareness of the interstimulation of events within and among value processes. An early but still important work is H. BROWN, *supra* note 67. More recent discussions include H. BLANEY, *GLOBAL CHALLENGES: A WORLD AT RISK* (1979); H. BROWN, *THE HUMAN FUTURE REVISITED: THE WORLD PREDICAMENT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS* (1978); L. BROWN, *WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS* (1972); M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20; L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67; R. REPETTO, *supra* note 67.

Crises of wealth: depression, speculative booms, rampant inflation, acute and widespread poverty; uneven distribution of metals, nonmetals and mineral fuels; acute shortage of food, arable land, clean water and other goods;

Crises of well-being: war and violence, epidemics, famines, pollution and the threat of their occurrence, other natural disasters; stress created by unemployment, underemployment, overcrowding and uncertainty; and dangers associated with modern technology;

Crises of enlightenment: the communications revolution, exposing many people to the stress of new maps of human beings, environment and nature; large-scale breakdown in communication; systematic manipulation of information;

Crises of skill: the rapid obsolescence of skill because of the technical revolution, excessive automation and sudden displacement, critical shortages in educational facilities and manpower, the brain drain;

Crises of affection: the massive dislocations of the family caused by spasmodic movements of refugees and by mass migration from rural to urban areas; vast increases in unwanted children precipitated by the disintegration of the family; changing criteria of occupational selection that tends to erode family solidarity and break familial continuity;

Crises of respect: confrontations between castes, classes, and ethnic groups; collective defamation;

Crises of rectitude: conflicts between the church and the state; conflicts between different religions; between messianic movements and existing institutions.¹⁴²

Although a crisis may appear to originate in a specific location and to involve a particular value, all crises can be expected to diffuse geographically (with differing pace and impact), and eventually to implicate most, if not all values (to a greater or lesser degree). For example, the smoldering antagonism among various religious sects can erupt into violence, destroying lives, property, and entire social structures. In this instance, the crisis may have begun in the rectitude process or, when questions of loyalty to God were invoked, the affection process may have been implicated. Well-being, wealth, and power also were engaged during subsequent events. In another example, a banking failure is followed by a stock market crash. Investors from all over the planet suffer losses, some commit suicide. At the insistence of financial industry leaders, governmental action is taken after much arguing and debate. Numerous policies are instituted, although with "bated breath,"

¹⁴² For a profound inquiry, see G. SCHOLEM, *SABBATAI SEVI: THE MYSTICAL MESSIAH, 1626-1676* (R. Werblowsky trans. 1973).

for they are inspired by previously untested economic theories. One feature of the new policies makes it more difficult for foreign governments to borrow money to finance the construction of desperately needed sanitation facilities and water treatment plants. In this illustration, the crisis is first "spotted" in the wealth process. Well-being, power, and enlightenment are engaged. If the policies are successful, different criteria for identifying a skilled economist and for according economists respect may develop.

In the contemporary world, the accelerated rate and scale of interaction generates crisis waves of varying intensity. Millions of human beings are exposed to contrasting life styles, which are coupled with the possibility of obtaining at least short-range advantages by experimenting with variations from the cultural norms in which they were socialized. Subcultures of mutual approbation spring into ephemeral and excited existence, to recluster around a new and equally transitory model. Thousands of individuals move from one religion to another (Judaism to Catholicism, Buddhism to Methodism, for example) or from one secular ideology to another (liberalism to communism to racism, for instance). Millions have been soldiers, bandits, refugees, prisoners, and drifters. Millions have been unemployed, forced out of jobs by technological change, converted to new and imperfectly understood or completely uncomprehended tasks, dislodged from homes and shelters, jammed into crowded vehicles and moved in and out of confinement. The weapons of the nuclear age contribute to the threat of death that is permanently symbolized by the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima.

IV. BASE VALUES

Base values refer to the assets available to participants in the continuous pursuit of demanded values ("scope" values).¹⁴³ Assets involve subjectivities and capabilities in fact. For example, two elemental assets are the expectation of control and control in fact over access to and deployment of people, institutions, values, and resources. The shared expectation among participants in any process of value shaping and sharing that an individual or group has the authority to perform certain functions or rituals is an enduring asset of great importance for the collectivity under consideration as well as for the authorized individu-

¹⁴³ The concept of "base values" is explored briefly in H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at 83-84; see also H. LASSWELL & M. McDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part II, chapter 1, Section 1, *Scope and Base Values*.

als. For instance, those who are authorized to make decisions on behalf of a community, association, or group have a special asset and responsibility. Every value is used as an asset or base value for the accumulation or enjoyment of all values, although many participants may be unaware of the role that specific values play in particular contexts; and, of course, an asset or base value in one context may be a liability in a different setting.

In the ongoing "who gets what" of world politics, elites use base values to get what others have or keep what is in their possession. Hence, any study of the world power process or the world constitutive process must precisely inventory those values capable of being manipulated in ways that influence outcomes. Not surprisingly, elites constantly try to refine the realism of their own perception of what can be used for strategic manipulation. This results in the ongoing study of all value processes to determine what is useful and what may become useful for military or more general political manipulation.

In conjunction with strategic instruments, base values bear significantly on all future outcomes since they are the means by which the goals or policy aims of every group or individual must be sought. The important question is what assets and liabilities the various categories of participants possess to influence value shaping and sharing at any cross-section in time. Base values are categorized by each value and its actuating institutional process. Additionally, we find it useful to distinguish individual human beings, whose behavior comprises and animates all institutional activity, and resources as among the primary categories of base values.

A. Resources

Resources are the features of the physical environment assessed according to their value potential. Hence, resources are perpetually changing: they increase or decrease in terms of their physical characteristics and technological developments; they expand or contract according to their perceived relevance.¹⁴⁴ Tribal societies lived for millennia on wildlife and domesticated animals and plants of the natural environment. They adapted to a wide range of climates, including moderate

¹⁴⁴ The study of the environment, however broadly or narrowly conceived, is central for ascertaining many of the factors and interrelationships that condition the viability and quality of life. *See generally* E. KORMONDY, *CONCEPTS OF ECOLOGY* (1969); E. ODUM, *FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY* (3d ed. 1971); R. SMITH, *ECOLOGY AND FIELD BIOLOGY* (3d ed. 1980). For a policy orientation, see W. BURCH, JR. & D. DeLUCA, *MEASURING THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF NATURAL RESOURCE POLICIES* (1984).

and extreme temperature patterns and precipitation. These resource environments include many types of natural vegetation, soils, and minerals.¹⁴⁵

The universalizing pattern of science and technology has a double impact: it prodigiously adds to the known stock of resources, as in the case of silicon (for computer "chips"), deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), low grade ore, the electromagnetic spectrum (as used, for example, with lasers and fiber optics), and the geosynchronous orbit,¹⁴⁶ while at the same time exhausting some of the natural assets that it has learned to use.¹⁴⁷ A characteristic cycle in the civilization of science and technology is the alternation between sanguine estimates of the abundance of a given resource followed by pessimistic forecasts of scarcity or exhaustion. These are succeeded by another burst of optimism based on new discoveries of raw material or the development of new technologies of exploitation.¹⁴⁸

Fortified by the revolutionary upsurge of science and particularly by phenomenal advances in nuclear physics, some persons believe that the resource base will always be adequate if humans allocate enough assets

¹⁴⁵ See generally HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (J. Honigmann ed. 1973); D. HARDESTY, ECOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1977). E. MORAN, HUMAN ADAPTABILITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1979). A seminal study with a focus on agriculture is C. SAUER, AGRICULTURAL ORIGINS AND DISPERSALS (1952). See also W. BERRY, THE GIFT OF GOOD LAND: FURTHER ESSAYS CULTURAL AND AGRICULTURAL (1981); GEOLOGICAL FACTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF PLANTS (B. Tiffney ed. 1985); C. PRESCOTT-ALLEN & R. PRESCOTT-ALLEN, THE FIRST RESOURCE: WILD SPECIES IN THE NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMY (1986); L. WATSON, HEAVEN'S BREATH, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE WIND (1985);

¹⁴⁶ On the development of technology, see T. DERRY & T. WILLIAMS, A SHORT HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO A.D. 1900 (1960); A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (C. Singer, E. Holmyard & A. Hall eds. 1958); L. MUMFORD, *supra* note 40; L. MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION (1934, 1963); O. SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (C. Atkinson trans. 1926-28); L. WHITE, MEDIEVAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1962). McHale summarized a great deal of this information. See J. McHALE, *supra* note 45, at 93, 100; see also, U. ECO & G. ZORZOL, THE PICTURE HISTORY OF INVENTION: FROM PLOUGH TO POLARIS (1963).

¹⁴⁷ For a valuable perspective and analysis, see R. REPETTO, *supra* note 67.

¹⁴⁸ Ascher explored the ways in which forecasts are made, emphasizing forecasts about population, economy, energy, transportation, and technology, in his invaluable study, FORECASTING: AN APPRAISAL FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND PLANNERS (1978). As the pace of technical change accelerates, swings between optimism and pessimism become more acute and frequent. Among many problems, long-term investments in all value processes may become increasingly difficult to establish and maintain.

to marshal the skill and facilities necessary to solve the problem. Over short periods of time, the situation may present serious difficulties in view of the competition among problems that require research and development. However, when technologically proven methods are available, implementing them is often complex, especially when people with entrenched interests and influence anticipate that the application of a new technology will erode their aggregate value position. There are, of course, situations in which no technological solution is currently possible; a sustained drought, for example, condemns millions to a marginal life at best. But even here, promise may lie in the capability to modify habits of cultivation; to modify the weather; to discover previously unexploited sources of food through genetic engineering or more conventional forms of husbandry; or to implement a more rational planetary distribution system.¹⁴⁹

An industrial civilization makes intensive use of all aspects of the environment. As a result of its world-wide diffusion and interdependence, virtually all communities experience a deterioration or transformation of parts of the environment.¹⁵⁰ Happily, there is a growing perception of the planetary unity of the environment.¹⁵¹ However, the

¹⁴⁹ See J. DOYLE, *ALTERED HARVEST: AGRICULTURE, GENETICS, AND THE FATE OF THE WORLD'S FOOD SUPPLY* (1985); see also E. ECKHOLM, *supra* note 138; R. REPETTO, *supra* note 67; L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67.

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., A. GOUDIE, *THE HUMAN IMPACT: MAN'S ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE* (1981); *LAND AND LIFE: A SELECTION FROM THE WRITINGS OF CARL ORTWIN SAUER* (J. Leighly ed. 1963); *MAN'S ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH* (W. Thomas, Jr., C. Sauer, M. Bates & L. Mumford eds. 1955). Specific studies with a North American focus include W. CRONON, *CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND* (1983) (including a valuable bibliographical essay); N. HUNDLEY, JR., *WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST* (1975); J. MALIN, *THE GRASSLAND OF NORTH AMERICA: PROLEGNA TO ITS HISTORY* (1947); M. REISNER, *CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER* (1986); D. WORSTER, *RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST* (1985). For a recent presentation of deterioration, see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 45, *Fouling the Nest*, Map 46, *Urban Blight*, Map 47, *The Dying Earth*, and Map 48, *Protection and Extinction*, and text accompanying each map.

¹⁵¹ Among academics, this perception permeates disciplinary boundaries. See, e.g., C. BEITZ, *POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (1979); E. MORSE, *supra* note 18; D. PIRAGES, *THE NEW CONTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GLOBAL ECOPOLITICS* (1978); H. SPROUT & M. SPROUT, *TOWARD A POLITICS OF THE PLANET EARTH* (1971); C. WADDINGTON, *THE NATURE OF LIFE* (1962); T. WIEGELE, *BIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: AN EMERGING REVOLUTION* (1982); T. WIEGELE, *BIOPOLITICS: SEARCH FOR A MORE HUMAN POLITICAL SCIENCE*

"environment" no longer has an exclusively planetary reference. Humans have now learned how to escape from the narrow biosphere in which they could hitherto obtain the oxygen, and enjoy other critical conditions for sustaining human life.¹⁵² By learning how to take a small replication of our essential environment into orbit and beyond, we may be able to plan and implement vast programs of reclamation or modification that adapt at least some celestial bodies to our needs.¹⁵³ Robots may play an increasingly prominent role in submarine, terrestrial, interplanetary, stellar, and possibly galactic affairs.¹⁵⁴

Until now, the human genetic code has served as a limit on human adaptability. However, the discovery of the "double helix" opens the path to control of the heredity mechanism through genetic code manipulation, which permits messages of conscious human design to be transmitted from one generation to its biological successor.¹⁵⁵ Hence, it be-

(1979); *see also* sources cited *supra* note 4 (providing comparable perspectives among analysts of international law); *supra* note 67 (providing current expression of this perception).

¹⁵² McHale provides graphic illustration of our heretofore narrow confines. *See* J. McHALE, *supra* note 45, at 70. The special biochemical characteristics of the earth that support life were described earlier in L. HENDERSON, *THE FITNESS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPERTIES OF MATTER* (1913).

¹⁵³ Germane policy-oriented studies include S. BROWN, *REGIMES FOR THE OCEAN, OUTER SPACE, AND WEATHER* (1977); M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, *supra* note 10; McDougal, *supra* note 67. *see also* sources cited *supra* note 100.

¹⁵⁴ On robots, *see* T. LOGSDON, *THE ROBOT REVOLUTION* (1984); MICROPROCESSORS, MANPOWER AND SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE, CROSS-NATIONAL APPROACH (M. Warner ed. 1984); R. WARRING, *ROBOTS AND ROBOTOLGY* (1983); *Robotics: Future Factories, Future Workers*, 470 *ANNALS* (Miller ed. 1983). Older studies include L. VON BERTALANFFY, *ROBOTS, MEN AND MINDS; PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MODERN WORLD* (1967); R. BRADY, *ORGANIZATION, AUTOMATION, AND SOCIETY: THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION IN INDUSTRY* (1961); S. GIEDION, *MECHANIZATION TAKES COMMAND, A CONTRIBUTION TO ANONYMOUS HISTORY* (1948); H. HATFIELD, *AUTOMATION, OR THE FUTURE OF THE MECHANICAL MAN* (1928); *see also infra* note 211.

¹⁵⁵ Humans manipulated the genetic makeup of plants and animals for millennia with distinctive results, apparently without understanding the underlying mechanisms of change. *See, e.g.*, C. SAUER, *supra* note 145. On human genetics, *see* J. WATSON, *MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE* (2d ed. 1970); H. WHITEHOUSE, *TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MECHANISM OF HEREDITY* (2d ed. 1969); Watson & Crick, *Genetical Implications of the Structure of Deoxyribonucleic Acid*, 177 *NATURE* 964 (1953). On recombinant DNA research (or, in its more popular parlance, "genetic engineering"), *see generally* BIOTECHNOLOGY, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE (H. Rehm & G. Reed eds. 1981). *See also* I. CARMEN, *CLONING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION*

comes feasible to think in terms of human self-modifications in ways that increase environmental range, and which therefore augment the features of the universe that may be considered resources.

B. People

With few exceptions, human beings have always relied on one another to attain their objectives. The project might be grandiose as when a dam, bridge, or pyramid is built. But humans require assistance in much more routine settings. No one survives birth without nourishment and care. No one to date develops personal skills and standards without human mentors and "role models," nor exercises those skills without support from other people. As adults, people constantly interact at home, at work, in meeting halls, at recreational events, on the road, and in the air. They seek friendship, wealth, knowledge, influence, and respect from other human beings. With the development of communication technology, people can depend on individuals they rarely see to achieve their demanded values. The fact and perception of planetary interdependence increasingly suggests that in order to realize their objectives, cooperation among the entire species is especially urgent.

Human characteristics are so profoundly affected by social institutions that it is not profitable to deal at length with biological traits.¹⁵⁶ There is, however, one trait or complex of traits, that plays a partly unifying, although ultimately divisive role in the world community. The allusion is to "race."¹⁵⁷ Some biological traits such as skin color are

(1985); *THE CONTROL OF HUMAN HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION* (T. Sonneborn ed. 1965); S. KRIMSKY, *GENETIC ALCHEMY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY* (1982); J. LEDERBERG, *MAN AND HIS FUTURE* (1963).

¹⁵⁶ This is not to deny the importance of genetic and other biological predispositions. For balanced discussion with a biological orientation and emphasis, see T. DOBZHANSKY, *MANKIND EVOLVING: THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN SPECIES* (1962) (including an excellent bibliography); I. LERNER, *HEREDITY, EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY* (1968); *see also* R. PETTMAN, *BIOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL VALUES: INVESTIGATING LIBERAL NORMS* (1981); E. WILSON, *ON HUMAN NATURE* (1978).

¹⁵⁷ The term "race" is used in comparative biology to refer to the next classificatory category below the species, whether or not the species is human. A race is defined as a population or a group of populations whose distinctive biological traits are attributable to one or more genes. The genes are inherited capacities to achieve traits. A human individual receives twenty-three chromosomes from each parent, and each chromosome contains the genes for a yet undetermined number of traits. A somewhat distinctive pattern eventually emerges in geographically or socially isolated populations. Thousands of races, developed in the more than half a million years since the species appeared, have disappeared. There is no means of inferring from present distributions the traits of the earliest forms. More to the point for the future is that local races that

so conspicuous that they are used as positive or negative symbols of group identification. The inference is that these visible features are linked with culturally significant predispositions, so that it is possible to assert that under comparable environmental conditions, the group with, for example, a specific pattern of pigmentation or hair texture will show high or low competences in cultural innovation or incorporation.

Scientific research has cumulatively demonstrated the untrustworthiness of visible differences as predictors of cultural achievement once the influence of extraneous factors is considered.¹⁵⁸ There are no grounds for popular images of biologically rooted "superior-inferior" characteristics that correlate with skin pigments nor with "Aryan" and "non-Aryan." Nevertheless, world community participants who fit into a locally held stereotype will discover that their physical facade is an enormous asset in one place and a disastrous liability in another.

The impact of rival groups in the world community depends in part on their numerical strength. However, in the contemporary world the immediate significance of raw numbers has been considerably deflated as a consequence of science-based technology. In fact, huge numbers may be liabilities rather than assets, as in India. Yet no one denies that if populous societies do succeed in acquiring modern technology, great numbers may be to their advantage. Curiously, population growth has decreased among precisely those people most familiar with modern technology.¹⁵⁹ Decisions to use technologies of contraception are critical

depend on territorial isolation will no longer appear, and that some inconsequential physical traits may soon be modifiable at will. As indicated before, genetic engineering may greatly diversify the human landscape. For further discussion, see T. DOBZHANSKY, *supra*, note 156, at chapter 10, *Race*; J. KING, *THE BIOLOGY OF RACE* (1971). An important early study is A. KROEBER, *ANTHROPOLOGY: RACE, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, PRE-HISTORY* (rev. ed. 1948).

¹⁵⁸ See M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at chapter 9, *Claims Relating to Racial Discrimination* (including sources there cited). On the irrelevance of sex, see *id.* at chapter 10, *The Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination*. The roles of women and men may be undergoing profound and enduring change in many communities. See, e.g., R. ROSENBERG, *BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF MODERN FEMINISM* (1982); B. SOLOMON, *IN THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA* (1985).

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 2, *The State by Population*, and text accompanying map. See generally the UNITED NATIONS DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK (annual). For specific studies, see PATTERNS OF POLICY: COMPARATIVE AND LONGITUDINAL STUDIES OF POPULATION EVENTS (J. Montgomery, H. Lasswell & J. Migdal eds. 1979); POPULATION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (R. Easterlin ed. 1980).

in shaping this development.¹⁶⁰ How this trend diffuses, if at all, throughout the entire human species depends on many factors. For the moment, turbulent struggle over procreation ethics is under way in areas where technology diffusion permits relatively inexpensive contraception and abortion.

C. Values and Institutions

Biological predispositions are modified by the institutions that comprise the civilizations, the surviving folk cultures, and the varied processes of value shaping and sharing.¹⁶¹ Whether participants who operate within the matrix of a particular institution have an asset or a liability depends on the aims that they pursue and the contours of the situation. The relevance of the different values as bases in the pursuit of other values in comprehensive, ongoing community processes may be demonstrated by cryptic reference to the structure of practices with respect to a number of values.¹⁶²

Consider the limited opportunities open to individuals whose principal instrument of *enlightenment* is a language spoken or written by a small number of people. Contrast their linguistic assets with people whose mother tongue is a world language like English. Sometimes an initial deprivation is overcome or even becomes an asset as a result of concern with the importance of overcoming the isolation of a dialect or an obscure tongue. A community divided by language may encourage its members to become bilingual or multilingual in order to obtain ready access to world markets, arenas, and other situations. There are approximately 3000 known languages that take their name from the geographical area or the society with which they are identified.¹⁶³ To

¹⁶⁰ For historical background, see N. HIMES, *MEDICAL HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION* (1936).

¹⁶¹ Mead was aware of the interplay. See G. MEAD, *supra* note 79, at part IV, *Society*. Many writers have examined what has been unhappily termed the nature versus nurture debate. An overview with documentation is provided in T. DOBZHANSKY, *supra* note 156, at chapter 1, *Biology and Culture in Human Evolution*, and chapter 3, *Environmentalism Thesis and Hereditarian Antithesis*. See also PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE, *supra* note 17; J. MARMOR, *PSYCHIATRY IN TRANSITION: SELECTED PAPERS* (1974) (especially chapter 1, *The Role of Instinct in Human Behavior*).

¹⁶² The most complete discussion of what is entailed in the study of value shaping and sharing is H. LASSWELL & M. McDOUGAL, *supra* note 4, especially at part II, chapter 2, *Particular Value-Institution Processes*.

¹⁶³ The historic development of ancient and contemporary language is often displayed graphically on the endsheets of a dictionary. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE

some extent the task of acquiring a new language is facilitated by structural similarity.¹⁶⁴

Modern linguists have rejected the layperson's assumption that the structure of some languages prevents them from expressing important scientific and philosophical ideas.¹⁶⁵ It appears that the layperson confuses an impoverished vocabulary with inherent limitations. This is not to assert that the modes of thought and expression emphasized in a given language are totally devoid of influence.¹⁶⁶ Many western languages are rich in dichotomies, such as good/bad, strong/weak, true/false. The inference is that extremes of behavior are correlated with the stress on extremes in words.

It is often argued that an artificial language such as Esperanto should be universally learned as a second language and used as Latin was once employed by intellectual Europe and French by modern diplomats. Of the natural languages, Russian has been handicapped as a contender for universal adoption and adaptation by its association with written characters derived from Greek, and Chinese has suffered from its failure to develop a phonetic alphabet. The television revolution (along with the communications satellite) provides a means of achieving universal bi- or tri-lingualism, with English currently in the lead as the second language.

Because world community members depend in large measure on the communication media for their image of reality, whoever controls the media controls an important base for obtaining more enlightenment or for affecting any other value.¹⁶⁷ An interesting question is the degree to which the gathering and disseminating of information is in the hands of those who are primarily concerned with accuracy and timeliness, or

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabridged ed. 1973).

¹⁶⁴ For background, see O. JESPERSEN, *LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND ORIGIN* (1924); M. PEI, *THE STORY OF LANGUAGE* (1949); see also *supra* note 93.

¹⁶⁵ The collection of essays in *LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS MEANING AND FUNCTION* (R. Anshen ed. 1957) remains a valuable source of ideas.

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., B. WHORF, *LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS* (1956). Whorf discusses how each language is informed by and expresses, by its very structure, a distinctive metaphysical world view. See also M. BLACK, *MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY* (1962); E. HALL, *supra* note 93; K. NAYAK, *CULTURAL RELATIVITY: A UNIFIED THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE* (1982).

¹⁶⁷ A method for describing and appraising the contemporary situation is presented and applied in B. MURTY, *supra* note 10. See also *PUBLIC OPINION AND WORLD-POLITICS* (Q. Wright ed. 1933); W. RIVERS, *THE OPINIONMAKERS* (1967); sources cited *supra* notes 80, 97, 118.

who see the media as "just another business," or as an instrument of influence in politics and other fields.

The media are frequently heavily controlled for the sake of valued outcomes other than the giving and receiving of enlightenment.¹⁶⁸ Communists and socialists emphasize the alleged prostitution of the press by the private economic interests of owners and advertisers. The critics of a government monopoly of the news assert that the media are inevitably prostituted to the service of the political elite. Similar charges are directed at the religious press or at the media whose effective management is in the hands of any other group.

There are a few examples of newspapers that are owned and run by journalists, often as a result of a bequest. It is a researchable question whether this degree of self-direction appreciably affects the content of the news. If the pressure of advertisers or government agencies imposes a veto on capable and impartial reporting, the nominal control of journalists may have no significance. A potent source of distortion, regardless of the formalities of ownership and management, is the system of ideological biases that journalists and their audiences acquired growing up in their culture.¹⁶⁹

The interconnectedness of the world community in terms of subjectivities and policy processes is made more explicit when we consider what information is available to elites. Decision makers depend on a limited number of public, in addition to more private, media of communication for current news and comment.¹⁷⁰ An elite press is the house organ of the influential. It is taken for granted that the individual elite member is informed of the principal news or editorial columns of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *The London Times*, *Pravda*, and *Izvestia*, or their counterparts. The top elite of government or business, at least, have staff members read the journals and spot the issues that concern them.

The role of the elite media in a differentiated modern society is not difficult to identify. These media are means of stimulating and di-

¹⁶⁸ See *supra* note 80 for relevant studies; see also Chen, *supra* note 118.

¹⁶⁹ A seminal collection in this regard is COMMUNICATIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY (W. Schramm ed. 1948). See also J. DeVITO, COMMUNICATION: CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES (rev. ed. 1976); J. MERRILL & R. LOWENSTEIN, MEDIA, MESSAGES AND MEN: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNICATION (1971); Lasswell, *The Structure and Function of Communication in Society*, in THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS, A SERIES OF ADDRESSES (L. Bryson ed. 1948).

¹⁷⁰ See J. MERRILL, THE ELITE PRESS: GREAT NEWSPAPERS OF THE WORLD (1968); INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION: MEDIA, CHANNELS, FUNCTIONS (H. Fisher & J. Merrill eds. 1970).

recting collective action. Scanning the internal and external environment, they report common threats and opportunities that affect the value position of elites. In the contemporary world, the principal news associations provide global coverage even though dissemination may be blocked or modified to harmonize with editorial conceptions of elite advantage. Despite conflicting frames of reference, research indicates a considerable overlap in the events offered as the focus of attention in the elite press.¹⁷¹ As indicated in the discussion of perspectives, the "factual" picture seems to affect the mobilization of demands and identities. It is little wonder this is so; preferences and loyalties must maintain realistic contact with the environment if they are to remain rational.

An important inquiry is to what extent is the pursuit and dissemination of scientific knowledge under the control of scientists who are genuinely committed to the advancement of knowledge. "Science is transnational" in a deeper sense than that scientific information is shared across national boundaries. Presumably the empirical study of astronomy or physics will not produce a "Russian" or a "Chinese" or an "American" version of the solar system or the table of elements.¹⁷² An observer of human affairs might suppose that scientists are members of an all-inclusive society devoted solely to the advancement of knowledge and the clarification of ways to improve the world community. Such an observer indeed would be innocent. The laboratories and other facilities essential to the scientific enterprise are usually supplied by governmental or private groups who expect to obtain military, economic, or other advantages, often at the expense of other components of humankind.¹⁷³

If we turn from enlightenment to *wealth*, it appears that economic activities are often in the hands of those who are concerned with capital accumulation. A fundamental feature of any economy is the rate of capital expansion (or contraction), and the institutional mechanisms by which the rate is achieved. Three systems have been publicized: enterprise capitalism, socialism, and consumer cooperation.¹⁷⁴ Despite its apparent simplicity and democracy, the latter system is not as widely employed as the other two. In enterprise capitalism, private entrepreneurs

¹⁷¹ Content analysis is the analytic tool. See, e.g., I. DE SOLA POOL, *THE PRESTIGE PRESS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL SYMBOLS* (1970); see also H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 74.

¹⁷² But see sources cited *supra* note 166.

¹⁷³ See sources cited *supra* note 34.

¹⁷⁴ See generally J. HOOT & W. LOUCKS, *COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, FACISM, COOPERATION* (4th ed. 1952). Compare *id.* with R. HEILBRONER & L. THUROW, *THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM* (4th ed. 1975) (identifying three types of economies: traditional, command, and market).

and individuals who save or invest part of their disposable income make the most conspicuous choices that affect the scale of economic activity. A socialist economy may leave these choices to public enterprise managers and government securities purchasers. In a consumers cooperative the choices are made by the managers and the consumers, the latter deciding about the rate at which they withdraw earnings.

Self-identified capitalist, socialist, or cooperative institutions do not necessarily, or even typically, live up to the theoretical blueprints drawn by their ideological protagonists. The major allocations of economic resources may not be made by enterprisers or investors, but by government officials, party politicians, and voters; and the dominant goal value may be national power. The choices in a socialist economy may be similarly modified. Effective decisions in a cooperative system may be made by managers whose methods of accounting and reporting obscure the issues to the consumer-members.

Well-being (safety, health, and comfort) is a base value that affects the potential effectiveness of participants in any situation.¹⁷⁵ Islands and small nations, in particular, are sometimes affected by disaster or disease to a dramatic degree. But large nations may also lose the full contribution of millions who suffer from malaria, tuberculosis, hookworm, bilharzia, and the like.¹⁷⁶ There is evidence that the pressures of life in a crowded and complex urban environment have differential impacts on the population, especially in the form of stroke, cancer, and ulcers.¹⁷⁷

Mental illness or defect may have an organic basis in neurological structure or in glandular dysfunction, but it would appear that a larger

¹⁷⁵ The contemporary distribution of well-being in the world community is displayed graphically and, by necessity, impressionistically in M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 39, *Our Daily Bread*, (indicating relative caloric intake per capita), and Map 40, *Without Due Care and Attention*, and the text accompanying each map. Comparable data are available in Food and Agricultural Organization and United Nations publications. See also THE WORLD BANK, *WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT* (ANNUAL); THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE, *supra* note 67; sources cited *supra* note 138.

¹⁷⁶ For an overview, see F. BROCKINGTON, *WORLD HEALTH* (3d ed. 1975). See also A. BERG & A. MUSCAT, *THE NUTRITION FACTOR; ITS ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT* (1973); J. BRYANT, *HEALTH AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD* (1969); E. ECKHOLM, *THE PICTURE OF HEALTH: ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES OF DISEASE* (1977); J. MAY, *STUDIES IN DISEASE ECOLOGY* (1961); W. MCNEILL, *PLAGUES AND PEOPLES* (1976); H. SIGERIST, *CIVILIZATION AND DISEASE* (1943).

¹⁷⁷ See N. ASHFORD, *CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION* (1976); E. ECKHOLM, *supra* note 176; *ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE* (W. McKee ed. 1974); *Occupational Carcinogenesis*, 271 *ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI.* (U. Saffiotti & J. Wagoner eds. 1976).

proportion of sufferers are victims of internal conflicts whose genesis is faulty socialization in childhood and youth.¹⁷⁸ Whatever the evidence may be about the therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalysis, Freud's theory of the origin of many neurotic and psychotic illnesses in unresolved conflict is widely accepted in the West.¹⁷⁹ The lack of resolution of these early conflicts may be a failure to achieve the total repression of some tendencies through the rechanneling of impulses, or by their harmless discharge (that is, catharsis), or by failing to address the conditions that create the tendencies or that block the development of anxiety-free modes of expression. The family environments in which socialization generally occurs may be somewhat disorganized as a result of the rejection of old parental conduct norms, and uncertainty about the new norms. Hence, parents may unwittingly interfere with the satisfactory resolution of conflicts which they helped to generate.

The implication is that a large part of the stress and strain in the contemporary world — its "discontents" — is provoked by a universalizing civilization in conflict with traditional cultures and as yet un-

¹⁷⁸ Lasswell explored socialization and its relation to politics in *Political Constitution and Character*, 46 *PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC REV.* 3 (1959), reprinted in *HAROLD D. LASSWELL ON POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY* (D. Marvick ed. 1977). See generally R. BENEDICT, *PATTERNS OF CULTURE* (1934); J. BERRY, *HUMAN ECOLOGY AND COGNITIVE STYLE*, *COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION* (1976); R. BROWN, *SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY* (1965); *CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY READINGS* (R. LeVine ed. 1974); G. MEAD, *MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY*, *supra* note 17; G. MEAD, *THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL SELF: UNPUBLISHED WORK OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD* (D. Miller ed. 1982); *PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY AND CULTURE*, *supra* note 17; *PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS* (N. Smelser & W. Smelser eds. 1963); *SOCIALIZATION AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT* (E. Zigler & I. Child eds. 1973); P. SOROKIN, *SOCIETY, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: THEIR STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS: A SYSTEM OF GENERAL SOCIOLOGY* (1947); A. WHEELIS, *THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY* (1958); Parsons, *Social Structure and the Development of Personality: Freud's Contribution to the Integration of Psychology and Sociology*, 21 *PSYCHIATRY* 321 (1958); see also J. MARMOR, *supra* note 161, at chapter 2, *Toward an Integrative Conception of Mental Disorder* (with E. Pumpian-Mindlin); *BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN DELINQUENCY AND MENTAL DISORDER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIBLIOGRAPHY* (D. Denno & R. Schwarz comps. 1985).

¹⁷⁹ See S. FREUD, *THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD* (J. Strachey ed. 1953-1974); S. FREUD, *NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS* (New York, 1933); see also O. FENICHEL, *THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS* (1945); A. FREUD, *THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE* (1937); K. HORNEY, *NEW WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS* (1939); K. HORNEY, *THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY OF OUR TIME* (1937); J. MARMOR, *supra* note 161; W. REICH, *CHARACTER-ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE FOR PSYCHOANALYSTS IN PRACTICE AND TRAINING* (2d ed. 1945).

adapted to the needs of the human beings exposed to it;¹⁸⁰ hence, the phenomena of alienation among the young and exacerbated intergroup tension throughout the world community.

Apart from mental illness, changing patterns of technology give rise to threats to safety and health. Radioactivity and chemical waste pollute the air, groundwater, inland waters, oceans, and soil.¹⁸¹ Industrial accidents spurt before they subside; and the automobile adds its casualties to the total. War and violence cannot be overlooked in this regard. The expectation of violence and the continual refinement of destruction technologies routinely assault the psychological and somatic integrity of some individuals the world over.¹⁸² The vitality of well-being as a base value is undermined except insofar as the threat to it provides a base of control for certain elites.

The universalizing civilization of science and technology carries a *skill* revolution in its train. Millennia-old arts and crafts are relegated to the status of minor hobbies as the new age of chemistry, electricity, nuclear energy, and electronics takes command. So rapid is the rate of obsolescence that programs of retraining and remotivation are spreading through every institutional sector in every community.¹⁸³ These pro-

¹⁸⁰ For studies focused in those societies at some remove from the centers from which innovations have diffused in the recent past, see sources cited *infra* note 208. The discontents of the "West" are a vast resource from which scholars draw. See, e.g., R. DUBOS, *MIRAGE OF HEALTH: UTOPIAS, PROGRESS AND BIOLOGICAL CHANGE* (1959); I. JANIS, *PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF SURGICAL PATIENTS* (1958); H. MARCUSE, *ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN* (1966); H. MULLER, *FREEDOM IN THE MODERN WORLD* (1966); L. MUMFORD, *supra* note 98; D. RIESMAN, *THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER* (1950). For an alternative, see J. OGILVY, *supra* note 128.

¹⁸¹ M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 45, *Fouling the Nest*, and text accompanying map (providing an overview); see also L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67; M. EISENBUD, *supra* note 139. The World Health Organization and United Nations Environment Programme are other sources of information.

¹⁸² See H. LASSWELL, *WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY* (1935, 1965 with a new introduction); *THE WAR SYSTEM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH* (R. Falk & S. Kim eds. 1980); *WAR: STUDIES FROM PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY* (L. Bramson & G. Goethals rev. ed. 1968); sources cited *supra* note 137. The extent, frequency, and characteristics of post-World War II war are presented with documentation in M. KIDRON & D. SMITH, *THE WAR ATLAS, ARMED CONFLICT-ARMED PEACE* (1983). See also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 10, *War in Our Time*, and text accompanying map.

¹⁸³ McHale indicated the startling decrease in the time required to translate a discovery into an applied technology. The narrowing of this aperture is what makes for the continual obsolescing of skill. See J. MCHALE, *supra* note 45, at 60. See also sources cited *infra* note 211.

grams, already part of the established business routine, are moving rapidly into education, where millions of teachers need retooling, and into the home, where the modern kitchen is transforming modes of food preparation that were invented when humankind domesticated fire, dogs, and cereals.¹⁸⁴

Although we have referred to the central role played by the diffusion of science-based technology in conditioning the tempo and character of change in the global community, it is important to highlight the fact that the pace, direction, viscosity, and consequences of the diffusion are, in part, a function of decisions taken by elites. Skill in designing, constructing, and applying technology is intensely demanded throughout the world.¹⁸⁵ Elites are acutely aware that skill in manipulating technology often is requisite for operating effectively in any context. In the power process, in particular, technological capabilities are appraised

¹⁸⁴ This is not meant to imply that primitive technology lacks complexity; clearly, it emerges from and sustains a distinctive constellation of subjectivities. *See, e.g.*, G. CLARK, *PREHISTORIC EUROPE: THE ECONOMIC BASIS* (1952); H. HARRISON, *THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOMESTIC ARTS* (1925); J. HARRISON, *ANCIENT ART AND RITUAL* (1913); J. PFEIFFER, *THE CREATIVE EXPLOSION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF ART AND RELIGION* (1982).

¹⁸⁵ Demands for a "New International Economic Order" and "New Information Order" are contemporary expressions of this impulse. *See, e.g.*, *BEYOND DEPENDENCY: THE DEVELOPING WORLD SPEAKS OUT* (G. Erb & V. Kallab eds. 1975); H. CHENERY ET AL., *REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH* (1974); M. HAQ, *THE POVERTY CURTAIN: CHOICES FOR THE THIRD WORLD* (1976); E. LASZLO ET AL., *THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER* (1978); R. MEAGHER, *AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES* (1979); *see also* J. BARANSON, *NORTH-SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, FINANCING AND INSTITUTION BUILDING* (1981); D. GOULET, *THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE: VALUE CONFLICTS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER* (1977); *LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* (G. Meier 3d ed. 1976); F. STEWART, *TECHNOLOGY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT* (1977); H. WALLENDER, *TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPANY CASES AND POLICY ANALYSES IN BRAZIL, KENYA, KOREA, PERU, AND TANZANIA* (1979); Krasner, *Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why*, 25 INT'L STUD. Q. 119 (1981); Reisman, *Trade Helps the Traders, The Third World's Fading Dream*, THE NATION, June 12, 1976, at 716-20; sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56, 118.

The "Dependencia" school of thought is also influential. *See* F. CARDOSO & E. FALETTO, *DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA* (1979); A. FRANK, *DEVELOPMENT ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT* (1979); A. FRANK, *WORLD ACCUMULATION 1492-1789* (1978); C. FURTADO, *DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT* (1964); C. FURTADO, *THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA: A SURVEY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE CUBAN REVOLUTION* (1970). *But see* Smith, *The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited*, 35 INT'L ORG. 755 (1981).

continuously; as such, the development of technological skill has become a base value that is cultivated deliberately by most participants aspiring to competent performance in the world community.¹⁸⁶ The ongoing applications of these skills are the fountains from which science-based technology flows.

The skill patterns of industrial society have undergone major transformation as the emphasis has moved from heavy industry to light manufacturing, and more recently to the service industries.¹⁸⁷ The trend can be summarized as a change from skills involved directly with the manipulation of resources to skills that are specialized to the manipulation of signs and symbols.¹⁸⁸ Among all people the trend is indicated by the increasing multitudes who have developed or who need to develop analytic, arithmetic, literary, and verbal competence.¹⁸⁹ At the top level, the shift is evidenced by the withdrawal of management from physical operations closely associated with obtaining and processing raw material (such as iron ore, wood, or petroleum) to operations relevant to market promotion, financial administration, legal and governmental re-

¹⁸⁶ The distribution of technological competence is difficult to ascertain, but M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 20, *Science Power*, and M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 117, at Map 20, *Technological Power*, and the maps' accompanying text, provide balanced pictures. Relevant data can also be found in the International Labor Organization Yearbook, the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, the United Nations Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization Statistical Yearbook, and certain Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development publications.

¹⁸⁷ See W. DIZARD, *supra* note 118; A. EDELSTEIN, J. BOWES & S. HARSEL, *INFORMATION SOCIETIES: COMPARING THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES* (1978); *THE INFORMATION AGE: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT* (D. Hammer ed. 1976); J. NAISBITT, *MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES* (1982); see also, D. BELL, *THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING* (1973).

¹⁸⁸ But this observation requires some qualification. First, even though the industrial era is well over 200 years old, most workers remain in agriculture. See M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 34, *The Labour Force*, and text accompanying map. Second, signs and symbols have played central roles in the lives of agricultural and rural peoples. See E. TYLOR, *PRIMITIVE CULTURE: RESEARCHES INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MYTHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, ART AND CUSTOM* (7th ed. 1924); E. TYLOR, *RESEARCHES INTO THE EARLY HISTORY OF MANKIND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION* (P. Bohannan ed. 1964). See generally 1 E. CASSIRER, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS* (R. Manheim trans. 1953); S. LANGER, *PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF REASON, RITE, AND ART* (1942).

¹⁸⁹ But see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 41, *The Right to Learn* (providing a sobering reminder of continuing deprivation). For data on education and literacy, see generally the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Yearbooks.

lations, public relations, and the like. This transformation is expressed in the rise of the office as the socio-architectural form best adapted to the needs of white-collar workers and professional or managerial personnel. The key activity is communication, either in pairs or in conference, rather than collaboration, defined as joint operations in which physical resources are shaped directly. Typical of the new order is the removal of the generals from the field of battle. From sitting on horses in the vicinity of the action, the generals now sit on chairs and look at maps and charts, or view the action on television. In science, the transformation is emphatic. The modern research engineer, for example, operates primarily with equations and computers, sometimes to the exclusion of handling and experimenting directly with the physical objects and processes to which the equations refer. Scientists and engineers are rapidly perfecting transnational networks for the storage, retrieval, and transmission of information pertinent to a specific or a generalized operational problem.

That the primary components of base values in the world community are symbols and signs rather than resources is evident in regard to *affection*, which includes positive or negative sentiments of reference to individuals, groups, or institutions. To speak of loyalty or disloyalty, of friendship or indifference and hostility, alludes to a dimension of human affairs in which inferences are made about latent propensities for behavior. Obviously, a friendly predisposition toward France will not necessarily express itself in diplomatic overtures, or in the purchase of French wine, the reading of French science, or marriage with a French person. Particular behavioral outcomes are a result of many factors. It is evident, however, that world community participants benefit if they are the recipients of the warm feelings typically directed toward an ally, whether the ally is located in the arena of power or in some other situation.¹⁹⁰

The pursuit of congenial personal relationships is most obvious in connection with family and friendship. Some families cross many national lines, not only the "marrying Hapsburgs," but families engaged in economic, missionary, recreational, informational, artistic, or other transnational undertakings.

Social position is a *respect* value that affects the orientation and alignment of members of social classes transnationally as well as nationally. This is especially clear during crises of social revolution when, for example, the upper classes of other countries give support to their

¹⁹⁰ The importance of loyalty is evident in the intensity of continuing efforts to secure and maintain it. See sources cited *supra* note 88.

equivalents abroad. All elites who share a common civilization have much in common since they perceive one another to be fellow members of an aristocracy of position or merit. Hence, the globe is girdled with honorary societies or honor awarding establishments in art and science and many other domains.¹⁹¹

For all people genuine participation in each value process can be accorded and is often sustained by reciprocal deference or respect about such participation. Many of the contemporary demands for human rights are, in part, assertions for the authoritative establishment and protection of respect — founded not on culture, class, personality, race, or merit, but on the more elemental condition of existence itself — as a sufficient ground for empowering individuals to participate in the shaping and sharing of all values.¹⁹²

For ecclesiastical and ethical associations the cultivation of *rectitude* is both a scope and a base value.¹⁹³ The localities that contain a sacred place possess a remarkable asset unless, as in the case of Israel, several sacred sites are in such close proximity to one another that problems of adjusting incompatible claims precipitate dangerous conflict. In the Western world the fragmentation of Christendom that the Protestant Reformation accelerated has continued until recent times.¹⁹⁴ With the advent of communism in Russia, the anticlerical, antireligious manifestations of earlier revolutionary movements gained new strength. Threatened by these secularizing developments, ecclesiastical establishments have mobilized their assets through varying modes of coopera-

¹⁹¹ For a partial listing, see 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*, *supra* note 30, especially at chapter 6, *Cultural Organizations*.

¹⁹² For a more ample discussion of respect in the contemporary world community, see M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4.

¹⁹³ See R. LOWIE, *PRIMITIVE RELIGION* (new ed. 1970) (elaborating enduring perspectives and relationships); see also P. BERGER, *THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION* (1967); M. HALBWACHS, *SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT* (J. Spaulding trans. 1962); W. JAMES, *THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE; A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE* (1902); J. WACH, *SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION* (1944); J. WACH, *THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION* (1958); M. WEBER, *THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION* (E. Fischoff trans. 1963); B. WILSON, *RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE* (1982). For a North American study, see D. MOBERG, *THE CHURCH AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION: THE SOCIOLOGY OF AMERICAN RELIGION* (1962).

¹⁹⁴ See A. BOZEMAN, *supra* note 22; G. COULTON, *MEDIEVAL PANORAMA: THE ENGLISH SCENE FROM CONQUEST TO REFORMATION* (1939); J. STRAYER, *supra* note 21; G. SWANSON, *RELIGION AND REGIME: A SOCIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE REFORMATION* (1967); sources cited *supra* note 19; see also T. PARKER, *CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY* (1955); T. PARKER, *THE MINISTRY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE* (R. Niebuhr & D. Williams eds. 1956).

tion, alliance, and consolidation.¹⁹⁵ We note that the world religions' elite are reconsidering their position, seeking especially to penetrate societies in which they are currently weak, but in which dormant predispositions may provide latent assets of some magnitude in the future.

Concomitant with the expansion of science and technology is a complex process of rejecting or modifying the traditional norms of responsible conduct.¹⁹⁶ Thus, in the ascription of civil liability, the burden of pain for accidents has shifted rather dramatically from a party identifiable as the accident's responsible agent to the party most able to pay for the loss. In many areas, public policy has prescribed that liability is "absolute" for certain injuries without regard to the tortfeasor's actual responsibility.¹⁹⁷ In ethics the reality of a mass society radically transformed conceptions of personal responsibility.¹⁹⁸ Earlier conceptions

¹⁹⁵ For background and a general overview, see T. LUCKMANN, *THE INVISIBLE RELIGION: THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY* (1967). The interaction between power and rectitude is complex and subtle. See S. BARON, *MODERN NATIONALISM AND RELIGION* (1960); H. KRAEMER, *WORLD CULTURES AND WORLD RELIGIONS: THE COMING DIALOGUE* (1960); sources cited *infra* note 376. For discussion of some contemporary trends in non-Western contexts, see D. BALLY, *MULTITUDES IN THE VALLEY: CHURCH AND CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST* (1957); *RELIGION, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD: A SOURCEBOOK* (D. Smith ed. 1971); Apter, *Political Religion in the New Nations*, in *OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES*, *supra* note 8, at 57; Baly, *The Sanction of Religion in the New Societies*, 16 J. INT'L AFF. 156 (1962). For a participant's perspective, see G. NASSER, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION* (1959).

¹⁹⁶ See, e.g., Lasswell & Donnelly, *The Continuing Debate over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction*, 68 YALE L.J. 869 (1959). For a broader perspective, see *THE ETHIC OF POWER: THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITICS* (H. Lasswell & H. Cleveland eds. 1962).

¹⁹⁷ Many of the pertinent issues are discussed in P. SCHUCK, *AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS* (1986).

¹⁹⁸ The environmental movement provides one of the clearest expressions of this trend. The movement developed in part as a response to the realization that the application of technology in contemporary society has consequences which could extend indefinitely across space and through time. The unleashing of atomic power is a most vivid example. The impact of the application of technology is seen as the responsibility of both appliers and beneficiaries of application. For influential early studies, see H. BROWN, *supra* note 67; R. CARSON, *SILENT SPRING* (1962); F. OSBORN, *OUR PLUNDERED PLANET* (1948); see also R. NASH, *WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND* (3d ed. 1982). A classic formulation was the concept of "planetary stewardship." See A. LEOPOLD, *A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC* (1949). For a recent overview, see Shrader-Frechette, *Environmental Ethics and Global Imperatives*, in *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE*, *supra* note 67. A more extreme perspective is presented in B. DEVALL & G. SESSIONS, *DEEP ECOLOGY* (1984) and *DEEP ECOLOGY* (M. Tobias ed. 1984). Critical review is available in S. FOX, *THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY* (1981); H. McCloskey, *ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS* (1983);

largely were shaped for face-to-face situations. New conceptions are based on considerations of macro-interventions to remedy widespread deviations from an acceptable standard of life that are no longer amenable to private charity. In some cases, newer ethics extend to attempts to reconstruct society so that the circumstances that give rise to those deprivations through time can be terminated.¹⁹⁹

Trends with regard to base values emphasize the movement toward a world community in fact as well as the wider perception of its existence. The key factors accounting for this are the rise of an industrial and science-based civilization that requires enormous energy resources as well as the subject matter of transformation, and the random, almost capricious, distribution of resources about the planet.²⁰⁰ Because of this civilization's needs and the randomness of the distribution of resources, it has been necessary to establish complex structures and normative arrangements of global reach to provide stable access to vital resources. Within any single community, it is clear that the mobilization of base values is increasingly and ineluctably transnational.²⁰¹ In terms of resources, transnationalization is a process that will certainly continue until some method for providing substitutes is created. But this will require a radical diminution of the cost per unit of energy production. It is a development which would appear as yet far off. Even with the development of substitutes the process may continue if participants conclude that its continuation is advantageous.

The development of world community does not proceed without what appear to be noteworthy countertrends. In all value processes the ex-

W. TUCKER, *PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM* (1982). See generally *THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN SOCIETY* (W. Goode ed. 1966); *ETHICS AND BIGNESS: SCIENTIFIC, ACADEMIC, RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY* (H. Cleveland & H. Lasswell eds. 1962).

¹⁹⁹ Lasswell first discussed the idea of a "Politics of Prevention" in his *PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS* (1930, 1960 with afterthoughts). See also R. ARENS & H. LASSWELL, *IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER; THE EMERGING FIELD OF SANCTION LAW* (1961); Lasswell, *Legislative Policy, Conformity and Psychiatry*, 42 *PROC. AM. PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL ASS'N* 13 (1953), reprinted in *PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW* (1955). The consequences of reconstruction may not be beneficial. See, e.g., A. MEERLOO, *THE RAPE OF THE MIND* (1956).

²⁰⁰ See M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 11, *Mineral Power*, Map 13, *Oil Power*, and the maps' accompanying text; see also *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE*, *supra* note 67 (for a thorough overview); L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67 (continuing evaluation of the situation).

²⁰¹ See *infra* text accompanying notes 218-403 (discussing *values* and *institutions*, and, by implication, *people*, and providing meaning for, and giving direction to, the empirical phenomena to which the first two prior terms refer.

pectation of authority is a crucial base value. For example, individuals authorized to establish and apply religious standards or the criteria that determine entry into particular occupations are imbued with a significant asset referred to as authoritative control. The resurrection of traditional systems of authority in many communities, especially in regard to how enlightenment, respect, rectitude, and affection are shaped and shared, is in part a way of restricting the scope of the universalizing civilization of science and technology. Certain aspects of the modern frame of reference will be incorporated into local practice, some aspects will be rejected.²⁰² This process, with variations in nuance and intensity, takes place as well among the people who comprise the communities from which the modern complex originated. At least in its initial moment, the consolidation of world community generates a reaffirmation of more exclusive authority systems that is both a response to and a reminder of continuing crisis.

V. STRATEGIES

The methods by which participants engage each other and apply their base values to realize their goals include all the contemporary policy instruments. These instruments or types of strategy may be conveniently categorized according to the distinctive means employed (negotiation, ideas, goods, or arms) and the degree to which their administration relies upon the management of symbols or material resources. The resulting categories permit distinction among the diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military instruments.²⁰³ Each instrument or strategy can be used in the pursuit of demanded values in varying combination and sequence and with constantly changing degrees of intensity.

Diplomacy depends primarily upon symbols, verbal or non-verbal, in the making of offers, counteroffers, and agreements. Ideological strategy commonly involves the selective manipulation and circulation of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, calculated to alter the patterns of identifications, demands, and expectations of mass audiences and thereby to induce or stimulate significant attitudes and behavior. Economic strategy seeks to affect all phases — production, conservation, distribution, consumption — of wealth processes. It is concerned with methods of and facilities for managing a flow of capital, goods, and services. Military

²⁰² See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56.

²⁰³ See H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part II, *Particular Value-Institution Processes*.

strategy aims at affecting the intentions and capabilities of participants by the management of manpower and other instrumentalities specialized to the application of violence.

No strategy, however, is restricted to its most distinctive modality. Similarly, any participant primarily dedicated to one instrument finds it expedient to make use of all. For example, in connection with the analysis of the pattern of the base value skill, it became clear that contemporary resource processing for every value involved a progressively greater degree of reliance on signs and symbols and perforce facility in their manipulation. Conversely, ecclesiastical organizations have often found it expedient to turn their churches or monasteries into fortified strong points. Generally, wars are fought through a coordinated use of all strategies.

Some violence is done to ordinary usage when one speaks of the diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military strategies of some participants whom we have identified in the world community. The most obvious "discrepancies" are in reference to the strategies of an individual. We do not usually think of individuals as negotiating when they are bargaining on their own behalf. Negotiation, of course, is only one facet of diplomacy. In fact, most human interaction is diplomatic, whether it be greeting a neighbor, addressing a group of relatives, discussing a serious setback or opportunity with a sibling, or flirting nonverbally. Nor do we speak of an individual's use of propaganda to advance a private project as an example of "ideological" policy. However, all people make choices that routinely engage the ideological instrument. Transistor radios are found in the village as well as the metropolis. They are played to provide pleasure, entertainment, information, and companionship. However, the content is limited to whatever it is that those who control this medium decide to transmit. The same situation applies to television. It is more in tune with everyday discourse to assess someone's private "economic" policies. Moreover, the term "military" seems to overstate the degree of control that individuals exercise over destructive instruments employed for private purposes. Even small scale strategies, when multiplied, may, however, be relevant. The contemporary fear of the spread of handguns in some Western societies may not appear ludicrous in retrospect if the militarization of societies continues and the knowledge necessary for constructing instruments of wider and less discriminating destruction becomes increasingly commonplace. The point to underline is that strategies operate with the same values as bases whether the objectives sought are identified with

the "primary ego" or with the larger self shared in many different collectivities.²⁰⁴

Another important distinction can be made among strategies. They are in varying degree persuasive or coercive depending on the freedom of choice open to the target. Missionary propaganda is usually thought of as persuasive even when the unbeliever is threatened with hellfire. But in many circumstances the atmosphere of terror produced by the presence of illness or the approach of death transforms the message of the missionary into a seeming avenue of escape from calamity. An offer of diplomatic support may be proffered under conditions in which the failure to agree to offsetting concessions seems to court isolation and disaster. The economic instrument may be used coercively, as when seriously needed aid is contingent on an agreement to purchase equipment from the grantor despite a disadvantageous price differential. The military instrument is coercively used when an organized gang holds family members as hostages.

An analysis of the operations required to transform an initial stock of latent assets into an advantageous final result calls for a distinction between strategies of assembling and processing. In both instances base values are sought and mobilized as people establish and apply institutions to resources and seek cooperative or coerced arrangements with other individuals. Before the mass media required for ideological or utopian purposes can be made effective, the funds procured from private or official sources must be utilized to secure the transmission facilities and the specialized personnel capable of planning and executing programs. A parallel point applies to diplomacy, which on a large-scale usually requires offices, residences, staff, and other instrumentalities. The capacity to telephone from Los Angeles to New Delhi or to arrange a teleconference with individuals from Africa, Asia, and Europe depends on an elaborate normative and technical infrastructure that entails ongoing maintenance and refinement. An economic assistance strategy may require shipping, warehousing, and other fixed capital outlays on a substantial scale; so, too, military programs.

Whatever the degree of complexity involved, the actual employment and impact of a strategic operation depends on the balance of relevant value indulgence or deprivation perceived by individual or group targets, their actual and perceived stock of base values, and their willingness to use them. The relevant perceptions are those on which estimates of net advantage depend in accepting the demands of the initiat-

²⁰⁴ Historical illustration is ubiquitous. See, e.g., M. BLOCH, *FEUDAL SOCIETY* (1961); F. BRAUDEL, *THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE WORLD*, *supra* note 59; *PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY*, *supra* note 80.

ing strategist.²⁰⁵ In the case of an ideology of friendship, for instance, a campaign may be regarded as successful if the persons in charge of target media join in spreading stories and appearing friendly to a given group or project. These responses may depend on nothing more significant than the advantages that editors and program managers perceive in using timely material. Yet the chain of responses may be a long one, and come only after months of negotiation, boycott, or intimidating maneuvers.

A strategic choice for participants is the degree to which they operate alone or with others to obtain a specific outcome, or a range of outcomes. The question is when isolation or coalition pays. This determi-

²⁰⁵ Students of administrative and organizational behavior were among the first to describe and analyze how perceptions influence choice of strategy and the resolution of events when values other than power are at stake. In the twentieth century, Mary Parker Follett identified and clarified a particular type of behavior in, and outcome to, a conflictual situation which she termed "integration." Integration is distinguished from dominance and compromise. The latter two terms apply to what have been more recently considered by decision theorists as zero-sum situations, whereas integration refers to both non-zero-sum contexts and to those zero-sum situations which are amenable to transformation, by rearrangement of features of the context. See M. FOLLETT, *CREATIVE EXPERIENCE* (1924); sources cited *supra* note 121; see also R. AXELROD, *CONFLICT OF INTEREST: A THEORY OF DIVERGENT GOALS WITH APPLICATIONS TO POLITICS* (1970); R. AXELROD, *THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION* (1984); C. BARNARD, *supra* note 121; C. CHURCHMAN, *supra* note 70; A. HIRSCHMAN, *EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES* (1970); H. LEIBENSTEIN, *BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR MICROECONOMICS* (1976); J. MARCH & J. OLSEN, *AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS* (2d ed. 1979); M. OLSON, *THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS* (1965); J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, *INQUIRY AND DECISION, A METHODOLOGY FOR MANAGEMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES* (1973); T. SCHELLING, *MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR* (1978); W. SCOTT, *ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS* (1981); A. SEN, *CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT* (1982); H. SIMON, *ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION* (1947); H. SIMON, *MODELS OF THOUGHT* (1979); *UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST* (J. Smart & B. Williams eds. 1973). On game theory, see R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, *GAMES AND DECISIONS* (1957); J. VON NEUMANN & O. MORGENSTERN, *THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR* (1947); M. SHUBIK, *GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS* (1982); J. WILLIAMS, *THE COMPLETE STRATEGIST: BEING A PRIMER ON THE THEORY OF GAMES OF STRATEGY* (1954); *GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SELECTIONS* (M. Shubik ed. 1964).

A vast array of manuals are now available which offer strategic advice designed to manipulate perceptions and behavior. The continuing demand for these "how to" books, which tend to focus on methods for obtaining particular values, may be an indication of their long-term utility.

nation is extraordinarily complicated because of the transnationality of virtually all strategies. As a result of dramatic technological developments that bear on the use and efficacy of each strategic instrument, the formation of transnational publics and their integration on a global scale, and increasing interdependence, the use of any strategy within a particular community precipitates many more impacts beyond its boundaries.²⁰⁶ The degree of interdependence also affects how strategies are used. When interdependence is relatively low, strategies may be thought of as unidirectional; to secure desired changes in *B*'s behavior, *A* does something (indulgent or deprivational) to *B*. When interdependence is high, strategic instruments frequently have undesired reflexive effects.²⁰⁷ For example, *A* bombs *B*, but fallout drops on *A*'s territory; *A* embargoes *B*, but *A*'s farmers, *B*'s traditional vendors, suffer; scientists from *A* are not permitted to attend a series of conferences for fear that they might reveal important information, but the rank and file of *A* suffer because the scientists, by missing the conference, fail to become familiar with insights that bear on the enhancement of human nutrition and urban sanitation. From this, it is no surprise that any strategy is increasingly viewed as an international strategy and its use, or even contemplated use, tends to reinforce the sense of global community.

The effectiveness of any strategic program depends on the character of the social context within which it is introduced. In the global community, this observation can be elaborated by examining recent efforts to stimulate economic growth in communities that were resistant or only recently exposed to modern scientific practices and industrial organization.²⁰⁸

One characteristic feature of modern technology (whether associated with capitalism or socialism) is the *repetition of design*. By repeating

²⁰⁶ It is this inescapable, reciprocal, transnational impact that makes some form of international law necessary. As more people become aware of this interdependence and as it intensifies, the need to clarify and secure common interests on a transnational and global scale will become increasingly urgent.

²⁰⁷ As such, interdependence increases the occasions for, and complexity of, applying strategy; hence, the need for a comprehensive map of social process in order to minimize the likelihood of overlooking significant relationships that may influence or be influenced by strategic decision.

²⁰⁸ For excellent discussion and documentation, see *supra* notes 23, 56. Strategies for facilitating change are explored in many publications. See, e.g., *APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY: READINGS IN THE USES OF THE SCIENCE OF MAN* (J. Clifton ed. 1970); G. FOSTER, *APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY* (1969); *PEASANTS, POWER AND APPLIED SOCIAL CHANGE: VICOS AS A MODEL* (H. Dobyns, P. Doughty & H. Lasswell eds. 1971); J. ROTHMAN, *PLANNING AND ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE; ACTION PRINCIPLES FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH* (1974).

the design of a chair, shirt, or pencil, the economies of large-scale production are obtained at the technical level. This requirement is contrary to the artisan's interest in variety. From all over the world come variations on the classical theme of the craftsman who wanted to charge more for making a second chair like the first because it was tedious to repeat himself.²⁰⁹

Not only designs but *operations* must be repeated if the advantages of large-scale production are to be realized. By dividing the process of production into a sequence of steps and assigning individuals and machines to specialize in each step, output is increased at a markedly lower cost of unit production. But this involves the dissolution of recognized methods of production; artisans whose base value is thus depreciated are usually hostile to the disintegration of recognized skills. Here again, however, it is easy to adopt a one-sided view and to exaggerate the lack of subdivided operations in various cultures. An analysis of hunting, fishing, dancing, harvesting, herding, or building activities, for example, will often reveal a complex meshing of specialized roles.²¹⁰ The new factor is not specialization, but obsolescence.²¹¹

Another general pattern relating to modern technology is repetition *in time*.²¹² In part, this is a matter of working on a regular schedule suitable to the starting and stopping of mechanical processes. The casu-

²⁰⁹ Actually this is somewhat exaggerated, since in many cultures there are patterns whose potency as magic depends upon the precise repetition of visual or aural pattern.

²¹⁰ For further discussion, see the many valuable studies by cultural anthropologists. An important early work is R. BENEDICT, *supra* note 178. For an illuminating and provocative overview, see A. KROEBER, *supra* note 40. See also E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, *THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETY* (1954); A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN & A. REGINALD, *STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES* (1952).

²¹¹ This phenomenon is not limited to foreign, exotic, or "primitive" cultures. See, e.g., A. TOFFLER, *supra* note 131. Automation permits and exacerbates the situation. See AUTOMATION, ALIENATION, AND ANOMIE (S. Marcson ed. 1970); G. FRIEDMANN, *INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: THE EMERGENCE OF THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AUTOMATION* (1955); H. HUNT, *HUMAN RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS* (1983); L. HUNTER, G. REID & D. BODDY, *LABOUR PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE* (1970); B. SELIGMAN, *MOST NOTORIOUS VICTORY: MAN IN AN AGE OF AUTOMATION* (1966); J. SHEPARD, *AUTOMATION AND ALIENATION: A STUDY OF OFFICE AND FACTORY WORKERS* (1971); see also sources cited *supra* note 154.

²¹² The development of the "mechanical" clock is central. For excellent and suggestive studies, see D. LANDES, *REVOLUTION IN TIME: CLOCKS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD* (1983); L. MUMFORD, *supra* note 146; J. NEEDHAM, W. LING, & D. DE Solla PRICE, *HEAVENLY CLOCKWORK: THE GREAT ASTRONOMICAL CLOCKS OF MEDIEVAL CHINA* (1960). See also L. DOOB, *PATTERNING OF TIME* (1971).

alness of many societies about time is one of the most frequent remarks made by members of clock-bound civilizations. Repetition in time covers much more than work hours. Production relies upon the delivery of materials in the quantities and at the dates agreed upon.²¹³ Hence, systems of production are interdependent, relying upon contractual agreements. More important than damages for failure to perform is the requirement of specific fulfillment. Perhaps again we should note that societies often display precise synchronization of their activities with the cycle of the heavens, or with some other sequence that nature shaped.²¹⁴ Furthermore, an elaborate system of explicit promises may be entered into for ceremonial and other activities.

Among the repetitions requiring mention is *regular record making*. Bookkeeping came into the modern world as an active influence among the commercial cities of Italy.²¹⁵ We hear from businessmen and government officials everywhere about the struggles to "break in" a new community to keeping ample and accurate records. Even when marks are made on paper — and when the marks are numerical — it cannot be taken for granted that any dependable relationship exists to a "referent."²¹⁶

Record making is part of a more comprehensive pattern that may be called *impersonal assessment* of people and things. The appraisals are in engineering units: output per hour, repair costs per working interval, and so on. Besides engineering measures, economic calculations are continually present: money cost per output unit, fixed and variable charges, gross income per product sold, net profit per dollar invested, and so on. The world is screened according to the total marketing situa-

²¹³ Greenwich Mean Time as a universal mode of organization and coordination contributes to the stability of expectations about world commerce and interaction in general.

²¹⁴ On biological rhythms, which may not coincide with the temporal demands of industry, see M. MOORE-EDE, F. SULZMAN & C. FULLER, *THE CLOCKS THAT TIME US: PHYSIOLOGY OF THE CIRCADIAN TIMING SYSTEM* (1982); *THE RHYTHMS OF LIFE* (E. Ayensu & P. Whitfield eds. 1982). Relations among physiological, institutional, ecological, planetary, stellar, galactic, and universal phenomena remain unclear. For related discussion, see G. SZAMOSI, *THE TWIN DIMENSIONS: INVENTING TIME AND SPACE* (1986).

²¹⁵ For background, see *MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD* (R. Lopez & I. Raymond trans. 1961); M. POSTAN, *MEDIEVAL TRADE AND FINANCE* (1973). For a brief discussion, see A. BOZEMAN, *supra* note 22, at chapter 12, *The Mediterranean Elites and the Furtherance of Cultural Affinities*.

²¹⁶ See H. WALLENDER, *supra* note 185; see also J. BENSMAN & R. LILIENTHAL, *CRAFT AND CONSCIOUSNESS: OCCUPATIONAL TECHNIQUE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD IMAGES* (1973).

tion of the firm, the industry, or the economy as a whole. It need hardly be emphasized that these cultural practices are abstract, quantitative, and relatively incompatible with the outlook of many societies.

The aggregate pattern formed by the outcomes of strategic decisions in the world community can be described according to polarity among groupings that appear and their turnover rate.²¹⁷ In some regions, a single religion may achieve an overwhelming primacy, which is a unipolar pattern. In the larger global setting, a few religious faiths are predominant, which conforms to a pluripolar pattern; but in addition, there are a multitude of smaller religious groups (a multipolar pattern). Some markets are monopolized in the hands of a single producer, or bipolarized between two cartels. For many years, one British news service (Reuters) had a predominant position in the world community. Eventually, the rise of the Associated Press, the United Press, and Tass modified the picture. The International Olympic Committee provides an instance of an association with unitary authority in one field of well-being and skill. For years, a private publication, *The Almanach de Gotha*, helped to crystallize judgment about the hierarchy of social respect among families in the dominant part of the world. If the contemporary ascendancy of the modern scientific and technological frame of reference in shaping global practices spreads even further and is sustained, it may approximate unipolarity in certain aspects of enlightenment and skill.

VI. OUTCOMES

The outcomes of the global process of interaction, the major features of which have been described above, are in the continuing flows of fulfillment and deprivation for various participants with regard to all values, as manifested in varying patterns of value creation, accumulation, and distribution. From long-term historical perspectives, a universalizing science and technology appear to have combined to establish a continuously greater production and wider sharing of all values among different participants, though many individuals, functional groups, and territorial communities remain disadvantaged.

Difficulties in measuring outcomes in value shaping and sharing are notorious.²¹⁸ The culminating events in the world social process affect

²¹⁷ See H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part II (elaborating the concept of "polarity").

²¹⁸ Lasswell summarized the predicament, explained why it is not an insurmountable problem, and articulated an approach appropriate to the task in H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, *supra* note 9, at xvii, xx, xxi.

the value position of each participant and therefore may modify the aggregate pattern of all values. During a given period each participant obtains a gross value input from which the net income can be calculated by subtracting value outlays. Although modern scientific observers are experienced in describing economic change, they are relatively unaccustomed to dealing with other values.²¹⁹ The flow of claims to wealth are relatively easy to sum up, thanks to the institution of price (claims to money are relinquished in return for claims to goods and services). Thus, the stream of transactions in a given interval can be recorded as alterations in exchange ratios of goods, services, and money.

Power outcomes are often in the form of open or secret voting, but the typical record of these culminating transactions does not directly register the exchanges that are the agreements to give support in exchange for some answering degree of support. Most participants do not perceive transnational exchanges of art and culture as involving or implying quantitative units. Nevertheless, in many instances transnational exchanges are regulated by quotas of visitors, students, and teachers. Similarly, those most concerned with transnational operations in religious and ethics spheres may find it distasteful to think in terms of measuring units. Yet mutual penetrations by missionaries may be adjusted to a quota system. Acts of disrespect (discrimination) are perhaps more commonly perceived in terms of symmetry or nonsymmetry, so that discriminatory treatment on one side of a line may be met by retaliatory discriminations of equal or greater magnitude. Spontaneous friendship does not lead participants to calculate a standard unit of affection. Yet in group relations, it is not unusual to see that speeches and other expressions of cordiality by one group are matched, or even outmatched, by the target group. Even interchanges involving scientific enlightenment are not exempt from a tacit calculus. If a transnational scientific body does not exchange its own publications for those that it receives the source may diminish. Many culminating events do not enter the field of attention of participants since scientific knowledge and procedures often are prerequisites of recognition. For example, the exchange of negative, or even beneficial, micro-organisms is not apparent to those affected even though their well-being is significantly at stake.

Longer term outcomes can be described by the magnitude of value accumulation and the equality or inequality of value distribution. Ef-

²¹⁹ A comprehensive method for describing and analyzing changes in all value processes is proposed in H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part II, ch. 2, *Particular Value-Institution Processes*. See also Lasswell & Holmberg, *supra* note 64.

fects can be summarized for particular participants or aggregates.²²⁰ In addition to value consequences, the entire flow of interaction can be appraised according to the innovation, diffusion, and restriction of institutions in the world community.²²¹

We have referred to the net outcome changes during a selected period of time. When those are added to or subtracted from the value magnitude at the beginning of the period, the value status at the end is summarized and the role of value-production may be calculated. Various measures of dispersion are available to characterize the changed patterns of value distribution. The outline that follows provides a brief indication of what is involved in a comprehensive inventory of value accumulation.

Table 2

Accumulation:

power	(P)	= initial support of preferred constitutive pattern sought + net outcome
enlightenment	(E)	= initial level of preferred knowledge stored, of reporting, of forecasting, of exposure to media, of exposure to educational presentations + net outcome
wealth	(W)	= initial level of preferred assets (reproducible tangibles) for production, usable land (surface), net foreign balance, consumers' semidurables and perishables, subsoil, and pattern of income distribution + net outcome (in terms of resource characteristics) and pattern of aggregate disposable income expenditures

²²⁰ For methodological considerations, see Lasswell & Holmberg, *supra* note 64.

²²¹ See McDougal & Lasswell, *The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order*, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959); see also Lasswell, *Toward Continuing Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society*, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 645 (1967); Snyder, Hermann & Lasswell, *supra* note 64.

well-being	(B)	= initial level of preferred population and vigor (expectation of death, injury, illness, defect, anxiety, discomfort), care, and destructiveness + net outcome (expectations at terminal date)
skill	(S)	= initial level of preferred training and experience + net outcome
affection	(A)	= initial level of preferred patterns of individual congeniality, of loyalty, of collective congeniality + net outcome
respect	(R)	= initial level of preferred patterns of recognition and discrimination, individual and collective + net outcome
rectitude	(D)	= initial level of preferred patterns of responsible conduct + net outcome

It may be useful to offer a few additional comments about the assessment of power and other values. The power of certain participants can be evaluated by examining their predispositions and the resource capabilities at their disposal. If intergovernmental organizations become stronger, for example, this would be reflected in greater intensities of identification with them on the part of politically relevant actors. The analysis of the outcomes during a selected period may show, for instance, that intergovernmental organizations are involved in an increasing number of controversies among states. Hence, it may be inferred that intergovernmental organizations are gaining subjective support and that money, men, and materials are potentially available in greater degree.

The question whether power is more or less widely shared can be answered in part by examining the degree to which the authoritative structures of world public order are universal. Are there more participants? Another question concerns the internal decision processes of the members of the world arena. Are they becoming more or less democratic, oligarchic, or monocratic?

Enlightenment outcomes in the world community are perhaps less difficult to assess than changes in power. The same point probably ap-

plies to wealth, well-being, and skill. Net changes in the other values have not been studied as well.²²²

Whatever the difficulties of achieving precise and accurate descriptions of value shaping and sharing, it is not difficult to establish the existence of a global or earth-space community with ineradicable interdeterminations or interdependences with respect to all values. These interdependences may be described as of two different kinds: first, the interdependences of participants transnationally *within* any particular value process; and second, the interdependences of participants everywhere *between* different value processes. It is these interdependences that establish the facts of common interest: the degree to which participants in the global process are able to achieve their values over time is dependent upon the degree to which other participants comparably situated elsewhere are able to achieve their values; claims to decision, authoritative or other, must, thus, be made with promise of reciprocity and mutuality and in an effort to clarify genuine common interest. Sustained earth-space interaction renders the quality of life, even the survival of every individual, dependent upon factors beyond all geographic

²²² Attempts to propose and specify indices for identifying and measuring values are undermined whenever indices are presented conclusively as the definitive referent for a particular value. Many efforts have been mounted. See, e.g., E. ALLARDT, *A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR SELECTING SOCIAL INDICATORS* (1972); A. BANKS, *POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD* (1976); A. BANKS & R. TEXTOR, *A CROSS-POLITY SURVEY* (1963); M. CARLEY, *SOCIAL MEASUREMENT AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: ISSUES OF POLICY AND THEORY* (1981); *COMPARING NATIONS: THE USE OF QUANTITATIVE DATA IN CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH* (R. Merritt & S. Rokkan eds. 1966); O. DUNCAN, *TOWARD SOCIAL REPORTING: NEXT STEPS* (1969); *INDICATORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE: CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENTS* (E. Sheldon & W. Moore eds. 1968); D. JODICE, C. TAYLOR & K. DEUTSCH, *CUMULATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA ARCHIVING: A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TWO WORLD HANDBOOKS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS* (1980); J. ROTHENBERG, *THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE* (1961); B. RUSSETT ET AL., *WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS* (1964); *SOCIAL GOALS AND INDICATORS FOR AMERICAN SOCIETY* (B. Gross ed. 1967); *SOCIAL INDICATORS* (R. Bauer ed. 1966); C. TAYLOR & M. HUDSON, *WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS* (2d ed. 1972); L. WILCOX ET AL., *SOCIAL INDICATORS AND SOCIETAL MONITORING: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY* (1972).

More general concerns are explored in *COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION* (E. Rosch & B. Lloyd eds. 1978); P. SNEATH & R. SOKAL, *NUMERICAL TAXONOMY: THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NUMERICAL CLASSIFICATION* (1973). Brunner has dealt with the problems of trying to use data configured by variables taken out of context. See Brunner, *Case-wise Policy Information Systems: Redefining Poverty*, 19 *POL'Y SCI.* 201 (1986); Brunner, *Integrating Knowledge and Action*, 17 *POL'Y SCI.* 3 (1984); see also Brunner, *The Policy Sciences as Science*, 15 *POL'Y SCI.* 115 (1982).

and functional boundaries and, hence, as being affected by the quality of life that other individuals can achieve.²²³

The ever intensifying transnational interdependences *within* particular value processes are fully matched and sustained by interdependences of peoples everywhere *between* different value processes. In constant interaction with all other processes, each particular process affects and is affected by the others. It is not difficult to demonstrate these interrelationships in every sphere. Power interacts with power throughout the global arena, and with wealth, respect, and every other value. Wealth, in turn, interacts with wealth and with all other values, and so on throughout the entire social process. We document in detail.

A. Power

The most decisive value process in the world community is the world *power* process in which the state is still the predominant participant.²²⁴ How power is structured internally in a state — how the individual human being is related to centrally organized coercion — affects how that state exercises power in the world arena, whether by violent or peaceful procedures. In an earth-space arena in which mass destruction intimidates and threatens humankind, and in which state elites are so obsessed by expectations of impending violence that they calculate every proposed measure of cooperation about wealth, enlightenment, or other values by the possible effects on fighting power and defense capability, it takes no great insight to know that no one is fully secure unless all people are secure.²²⁵

²²³ Nearly two centuries ago, in what has become a prophetic passage, Kant wrote: "The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it." I. KANT, *PERPETUAL PEACE* 142 (M. Smith trans. 1903).

In the words of Bloomfield and Bloomfield:

What is interdependence? What do we mean when we use that word? Usually the emphasis is on economic relationships. But interdependence exists in other relationships as well — political, strategic, military, environmental and cultural. Indeed, some of the most difficult problems of our age are posed by the linkages between or among these relationships.

L. BLOOMFIELD & I. BLOOMFIELD, *THE U.S., INTERDEPENDENCE AND WORLD ORDER* 10 (1975) (Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 228).

²²⁴ An excellent overview of the varied bases of national power remains *FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL POWER: READINGS ON WORLD POLITICS AND AMERICAN SECURITY* (H. Sprout & M. Sprout 2d ed. 1951).

²²⁵ The planetary power process is treated in detail in McDougal, Reisman & Willard, *The World Process of Effective Power: The Global War System*, in *POWER*

Occasionally people who interact with one another are included in a single body politic or in a "universal empire" of such overwhelming strength that the "external" balance of power is eliminated and a domestic rather than an external arena is the frame within which significant decisions are made. This state of affairs prevailed during the great periods of unity in Chinese history.²²⁶ The rulers of the empire were masters of all they surveyed; their domain embraced the "known world." At the apex of its career Rome approximated such a universal empire, although it was more aware than the Chinese of the existence and strength of the peripheral peoples.²²⁷ Some contemporary American and other politicians apparently operate with comparable assumptions. Strictly speaking, of course, the "universal empires" were not inclusive, even of the "known world," and the expectation of violence was present in the relationship between the empire and marginal peoples. In this sense a permanent structural characteristic of world affairs is the expectation that large-scale violence is probable (whether in the form of war, rebellion, or revolution).

If the world community was a single domestic arena, an all-inclusive organization such as a strengthened United Nations would exercise a predominant voice in the peaceful settlement of differences. Because the two strongest powers have rarely worked together since World War II, the United Nations is unable to win the confidence of leaders or masses in its efficacy on behalf of peace.²²⁸ Hence, a continuing sense of world crisis dominates the practices that condition the world balancing process

AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW 353 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1985).

²²⁶ See generally J. NEEDHAM, *SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA* (1954-1984). But see 9 A. TOYNBEE, *supra* note 19, at 342-47.

²²⁷ For further discussion, see M. LEVI, *POLITICAL POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD* (G. Weidenfeld trans. 1965). See generally 6 A. TOYNBEE, *supra* note 19, at Table 1.

²²⁸ But there are exceptions to the general trend. See S. BAILEY, *HOW WARS END: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 1946-1965* (1982); *THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER* (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1969-1972); E. HAAS, R. BUTTERWORTH, & J. NYE, *CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS* (1972); R. HIGGINS, *UNITED NATIONS: PEACEKEEPING DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY* (1969-1981); J. MURPHY, *THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS* (1982); O. YOUNG, *THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS* (1967); Brecher & Wilkenfeld, *Crisis in World Politics*, 34 *WORLD POL.* 380 (1982); Butterworth, *Organizing Collective Security: The U.N. Charters' Chapter VIII in Practice*, 28 *WORLD POL.* 197 (1976); see generally W. REISMAN, *NULLITY AND REVISION, THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS* 674-779 (1971).

and affects the power position of every participant.

The *power* of any participant is influenced by levels of physical and mental *well-being* prevailing in its own community and in other communities.²²⁹ Effective action in the sphere of power presupposes the prevention of any serious breakdown of health among those essential for the operation. In the tropics, development remains limited by the degree of control over endemic diseases such as malaria and dysentery. The expansion of nineteenth century British colonialism was facilitated by the relatively advanced state of British medicine.²³⁰ Russia, on the contrary, was handicapped by the low state of the medical arts. In the Franco-Prussian War smallpox ravaged an unvaccinated French army while leaving its vaccinated opponent largely unscathed. Frostbite hastened the defeat of both the Napoleonic and the Nazi armies in Russia; seasickness medications contributed to the success of Allied landings in Normandy.

Since rational decision making is unattainable without access to a flow of comprehensive, dependable, and pertinent knowledge including information about demands, identifications, and expectations, and a clear understanding of worldwide interdependences, the dependence of *power* upon the production and distribution of *enlightenment* is evident, especially in reference to the intelligence function.²³¹ Government and private intelligence gathering agencies operate overtly and covertly; their accuracy, completeness, and interpretive skill influence military, diplomatic, economic, and ideological policies adopted in the power bal-

²²⁹ For background and ample illustration, see the discussion of "Well-Being" in the section on "Base Values"; *supra* notes 175-82 and accompanying text.

²³⁰ See generally A. CROSBY, *ECOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM: THE BIOLOGICAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE, 900-1900* (1986).

²³¹ This is ancient wisdom. See G. CATLIN, *supra* note 42; see generally such classics as M. DE CALLIÈRES, *ON THE MANNER OF NEGOTIATING WITH PRINCES* (A. Whyte trans. 1919); CLAUSEWITZ, *ON WAR* (M. Howard & P. Paret eds. & trans. 1976); KAUTILYA, *ARTHAŚASTRA* (R. Shamasastri trans. 4th ed. 1951); N. MACHIAVELLI, *THE PRINCE* (H. Mansfield, Jr. trans. 1985); NIZAM AL-MULK, *THE BOOK OF GOVERNMENT; or, RULES FOR KINGS* (H. Darke trans. 1960); SUN TZU, *THE ART OF WAR* (L. Giles trans. 1944). On the intelligence function, in particular, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, *The Intelligence Function and World Public Order*, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973), reprinted in M. McDougal & W. REISMAN, *supra* note 5; see also H. PARKE & D. WORMEL, *A HISTORY OF THE DELPHIC ORACLE* (1956). For contemporary illustration, see E. HAAS, M. WILLIAMS & D. BABAI, *SCIENTISTS AND WORLD ORDER: THE USES OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS* (1978); HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, U.S. CONGRESS: AN EXTENDED STUDY OF THE INTERACTIONS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WITH UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1977).

ancing process. At any given time, decision makers evaluate available intelligence information in light of their own predispositions; these depend for their adequacy upon training experiences and selection methods prevailing in a given body politic. In particular we are concerned with the nature and degree of enlightenment with which decision makers assess the intelligence to which they are exposed.²³²

Remarkable examples exist of the failure of intelligence services to report, or to assess properly, developments of great potential importance for power. This has a greater effect than the failure to learn about an enemy's new weapons, although this often has occurred.²³³ The tank and poison gas scored tactical surprises in World War I. In World War II the stupendous development of the atomic bomb was not anticipated in detail. The Normandy invasion was masked successfully, as was the German attack on the Soviet Union. In the latter cases, the intelligence services frequently made the correct reports and forecasts, and important decision makers realistically appraised the course of future events. However, correct statements were buried in a welter of contradictory reports and interpretations so that they could not be taken as true anticipations.

In many ways the most impressive cases of poor intelligence gathering or interpretation involve the systematic over- or underestimation of nations. The vast manpower and extent of Russia were overestimated in post-Napoleonic and industrializing Europe. The sudden emergence of Japan as a world power was incorrectly evaluated by the Russians, and by the overwhelming consensus of expert judgment. The weakness

²³² An early assessment of the effects of public opinion research on decision is Lasswell, *The Impact of Public Opinion Research On Our Society*, 21 PUB. OPINION Q. 33 (1957).

²³³ See R. JERVIS, *PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* (1976). On the predispositions of decision makers, see G. HOPPLE, *POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOPOLITICS: ASSESSING AND PREDICTING ELITE BEHAVIOR IN FOREIGN POLICY CRISES* (1980) (including bibliography); *STRUCTURE OF DECISION: THE COGNITIVE MAPS OF POLITICAL ELITES* (R. Axelrod ed. 1976). See generally H. LASSWELL, *PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS* (1930, 1960 with afterthoughts); H. LASSWELL, *POWER AND PERSONALITY* (1948); sources cited *supra* note 127.

The implications of changing maps of expectation, changing technology, and changes in enlightenment are difficult to forecast and are often overlooked. On Darwin, see D. OLDROYD, *DARWINIAN IMPACTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTION* (1980). On the potential of Einstein's impact, see, for example, P. JOHNSON, *MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE EIGHTIES* (1983). See generally W. DAMPIER, *supra* note 91; R. MERTON, *supra* note 110; *SCIENCE IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE* (B. Barnes & D. Edge eds. 1982); sources cited *infra* note 290.

of France was insufficiently realized, even among important elements in the German General Staff. Germany's underestimation of the United States was fatal in two world wars.

Without providing further examples, some factors that distort the intelligence process may be emphasized.²³⁴ Societies more familiar with agrarian economics and feudal tradition grossly underestimated new modes of production. "Inferior" ethnic groups were drastically misinterpreted by "superior" peoples who had been for a time in positions of power.

Mass communication provides news and comment reflecting the perspectives of the business, governmental, partisan, or other social elements in control of policy. In a relatively free society the diversity of control increases the likelihood that "truth will out" as to significant world trends; in many cases the initiative for bringing about a considerable re-estimation of power relations is taken by some of the private media. The proponents of air power in the United States became frustrated by Army and Navy officers and took their case to the public between the wars, and were of at least some importance in changing the older evaluation. The dependence of the United States press upon British news gathering and transmitting services before World War I contributed to the fact that Americans tended to follow the British outlook on world affairs: hating Russia because it was Great Britain's number one enemy and veering against Germany as the differences between Great Britain and Germany took center stage.²³⁵

Changing roles of industrialism and the allocation of resources in the contemporary world indicate the influence of *wealth* on *power*.²³⁶ When

²³⁴ See G. BLAINEY, *THE CAUSES OF WAR* (1973); A. GEORGE, *PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE* (1980); *HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS* (K. Knorr ed. 1976); I. JANIS, *GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES* (1982); B. POSEN, *THE SOURCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE: FRANCE, BRITAIN AND GERMANY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS* (1984).

²³⁵ See H. LASSWELL, *PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR* (1927); see also I. DE SOLA POOL ET AL., *supra* note 171.

²³⁶ It is also evident in the intensity with which political elites pursue wealth. See, e.g., D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, *THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS* (1976); N. CHOUCRI, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF PETROLEUM* (1976); *ECONOMIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY* (K. Knorr & F. Trager eds. 1977); *GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL* (D. Yergin & M. Hillenbrand eds. 1982); C. KINDLEBERGER, *POWER AND MONEY: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS* (1970); K. KNORR, *POWER AND WEALTH: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL POWER* (1973); J. SPERO, *THE*

the steam engine was applied to the revolutionizing of ocean and land navigation (the steamship and the railroad) and to manufacturing, the tempo of industrial development greatly accelerated. At first these changes were subordinated to the existing pattern of the world arena, resulting in great consolidations of the national core of Great Britain, France, Prussia, and other countries. The advantage of a large resource basin of unprocessed materials and of human beings soon encouraged the industrializing powers' expansionist tendencies. The struggle for colonies led to the "carving up" of the globe among the principal industrial powers.²³⁷ But the expansionist potentialities of production under the new technoscientific conditions were increasing. The vast continental basins of the United States and the Soviet Union seemed more appropriate to the new epoch than the domains of smaller nations. Germany took the initiative to accomplish by force what it might possibly have been permitted to achieve by peaceful trade and investment. In this, Germany lost twice, creating a situation in which the Soviet Union became the polar center opposing the United States. The productive opportunities, which were originally subordinated to the structure of the power arena, created a situation in which the fundamental structure of the arena was drastically altered. The consequences for the larger power process of the dramatic upsurge in influence of petroleum producing and exporting countries in the wake of the global energy crisis have not included any change in the basically bipolar configuration prevailing since World War II.

The postwar movements of decolonization and nation building cogently demonstrate the impact of *respect* on *power*.²³⁸ The breakdown

POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1977); M. WILLRICH, ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS (1975). Demands to change the wealth institutions of the world community are steady and occasionally acute. See sources cited *supra* note 185.

Some writers have suggested alternatives. See H. HENDERSON, THE POLITICS OF THE SOLAR AGE: ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMICS (1981); E. MISHAN, TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH, THE PRICE WE PAY (1969); E. SHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1973).

²³⁷ See N. CHOUCRI & R. NORTH, NATIONS IN CONFLICT: NATIONAL GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE (1975); see also H. FEIS, EUROPE, THE WORLD'S BANKER, 1870-1914: AN ACCOUNT OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE CONNECTION OF WORLD FINANCE WITH DIPLOMACY BEFORE WORLD WAR I (1965).

²³⁸ See R. BENDIX, NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP: STUDIES OF OUR CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER (1964); BUILDING STATES AND NATIONS (S. Eisenstadt & S. Rokkan eds. 1973); ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING: COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (W. Bell & W. Freeman eds. 1974); C. MERRIAM, THE MAKING OF CITIZENS (1931); NATION BUILDING (K. Deutsch & W.

of traditional systems of society has upset former respect relationships and engendered the respect revolution of our time. Intense demands for equality (not merely for nondiscrimination, but also for effective opportunities in the shaping and sharing of values) are widely distributed throughout the world community.²³⁹ Demands for individual fulfillment are particularly pronounced whenever conditions favoring social mobility are found. Today they are found on an immense scale.

The effect of *skill* on *power* is occasionally determinative, and always significant.²⁴⁰ In seeking to account for the success of some empires in consolidating and maintaining their power, the late Brooks Adams presented the hypothesis that administrative skill is the crucial factor. In *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, Adams wrote that consolidation implies equivalent capacity for administration.²⁴¹ Since adaptation to changing environmental demands is beyond the capabilities of minds that grow fixed and rigid, disintegration begins when the administrative aptitudes of a governing class are exhausted.²⁴² Whether "administrative capacity" can be accurately estimated or not, the observation often is made that the dissolution of empires is accompanied, and to some degree accelerated, by administrative breakdowns. We know that the spectacular conquests of many conquerors (in Africa and Asia, for instance) soon were lost through failure to recruit an accomplished apparatus to look after defense, revenues, communication, and justice. On the other hand, leaders from the "desert" were able to establish a dy-

Foltz eds. 1963); S. ROKKAN, A. CAMPBELL, P. TORSVIK & H. VALEN, *CITIZENS, ELECTIONS, PARTIES: APPROACHES TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT* (1970); Connor, *Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?*, 24 *WORLD POL.* 319 (1972). For specific studies, see E. BOATENG, *INDEPENDENCE AND NATION BUILDING IN AFRICA* (1973); R. BRAIBANTI ET AL., *ASIAN BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS EMERGENT FROM THE BRITISH IMPERIAL TRADITION* (1966); L. PYE, *POLITICS, PERSONALITY AND NATION-BUILDING: BURMA'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY* (1962).

²³⁹ See M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4 for extended overview.

²⁴⁰ The demand for technical competence is not limited to the "have-nots." See, e.g., D. ERNST, *THE GLOBAL RACE IN MICROELECTRONICS: INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES IN A PERIOD OF CRISIS* (1983).

²⁴¹ B. ADAMS, *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS* (1913).

²⁴² Stimulating administrative inclinations and developing commensurate skill appear to be key tasks in sustaining durable political integration. For further discussion, see *supra* notes 23, 56. See also M. LEVY, *MODERNIZATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES: A SETTING FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS* (1966); *MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH* (M. Weiner ed. 1966); L. PYE, *ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* (1966); C. YOUNG, *supra* note 22.

nasty, and even to unify China, by re-employing the scholarly bureaucrats who were already available in the country.²⁴³

In changing polities, the dissolution of traditional authority and control patterns creates vast audiences of conflict-ridden persons eager to find a new world-view.²⁴⁴ Hence, the orator and the writer come into their own, exploiting their propaganda skills on behalf of nationalism, proletarianism, and other rival ideologies. Contemporary technology, in conjunction with the global administrative infrastructure of the mass communication industry, amplifies the range and power of these traditional occupations.²⁴⁵

Similarly, *power* is affected by patterns of *affection* and *loyalty*. It is generally recognized that the component groupings in society are often in conflict for the control of the individual's sentiments.²⁴⁶ Family loyalty may dictate caution rather than heroism, whereas fidelity to public service may undermine concern for the family, farm, or business. Excessive family or tribal loyalty, coupled with preoccupation with fulfill-

²⁴³ See T. METZGER, *THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CH'ING BUREAUCRACY; LEGAL, NORMATIVE, AND COMMUNICATION ASPECTS* (1973); see also J. SPENCE, *THE GATE OF HEAVENLY PEACE; THE CHINESE AND THEIR REVOLUTION 1895-1980* (1981).

²⁴⁴ This phenomenon may be most pronounced in those communities least familiar with the modern scientific and technological complex. See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56. But no polity is immune. For references that express and explore the theme in "Western" contexts, see *supra* note 180. Marx, of course, provided a penetrating and appealing analysis, the symbolic value of which has not diminished.

²⁴⁵ For most people, the radio remains the primary source of information beyond the locale. See M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, Map 42, *The Longer Reach*. The importance of the flow of communication is indicated in contemporary demands for a "New Information Order." See sources cited *supra* notes 80, 118; see also B. MURTY, *supra* note 10.

²⁴⁶ Merriam's hypotheticals may help to clarify:

What happens when the family is called upon to surrender the son who is a fugitive from justice? Will they protect the mores of the family or those of the state? What happens when the friend or the neighbor is called upon to testify against his friend and neighbor? What happens when the union orders one thing and the state the other in time of industrial disturbance? What happens in the conflict between the possible profit of the merchant and the law of the state of which he is a part?

C. MERRIAM, *supra* note 88, at 319; see also H. GUETZKOW, *supra* note 14; CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES, *supra* note 14. For related studies, see INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (H. Kelman ed. 1965); O. KLINEBERG, *THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (1964); H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54; PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF PEACE AND WAR (T. Pear ed. 1950); R. PETTMAN, *HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND WORLD POLITICS* (1975).

ment of family or tribal obligations, is a frequent barrier to modernization and national development.²⁴⁷

In Chinese civilization, for instance, family obligations frequently stood in direct opposition to impersonal administration.²⁴⁸ The son who was financed by the family to study for examinations was expected to "pay off" when he received his official appointment. During periods of disorganization, new power units were built up from the uprooted — from the peasant survivors of local famines, for example — who supplied "bandits," "war lords," and even emperors to the country. As a rule, the uprooted soon struck root again, sometimes by recovering contact with the extended family, or being otherwise reabsorbed into the family system. Modern nationalistic and proletarian movements gain strength from similar sources, including students in contact with the Western pattern, who transfer their sentiments from the traditional objects of loyalty to parties and ideologies taken over from the West.

Power is modified by effective conceptions of *rectitude*.²⁴⁹ A most potent component of Western civilization is Christianity and Christian missions. A consciousness of unassailable rectitude characterized the carriers of the Gospel throughout the globe. The impact of Christian missions on the Islamic or the Buddhist world has been slight, if measured in percentage of converts, or in the modification of basic doctrines and rites. But we must rate the mission movement as one of the most effective factors in breaking up and reorganizing traditional culture. The missionaries transmitted many of the key skills and viewpoints of the West, especially through the schools they founded.

²⁴⁷ See, e.g., L. PYE, *supra* note 238; see also OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES, *supra* note 8.

²⁴⁸ See T. METZGER, *ESCAPE FROM PREDICAMENT: NEO-CONFUCIANISM AND CHINA'S EVOLVING POLITICAL CULTURE* (1977); see also sources cited *supra* note 243.

²⁴⁹ The sense of righteousness and its expression in decision is common whenever expectations are infused with intense and sentimental conceptions of what constitutes appropriate conduct. Such conceptions may be justified on theological, metaphysical, or empirical grounds. For example, see the impact of Christianity on the Roman Empire, and its subsequent impact during the Crusades, Inquisition and Reformation. See, e.g., R. MACMULLEN, *CHRISTIANIZING THE ROMAN EMPIRE: A.D. 100-400* (1984); see also sources cited *supra* note 194. Other organized religions have shaped the exercise of power as well. See *THE ETHIC OF POWER: THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITICS*, *supra* note 196 (providing important overview).

Of course, rectitude also emerges as a factor in power processes when a sense of indignation based on alleged violations of secular notions of proper methods of government is mobilized through slogans like "Taxation without Representation." More recently, public discussion of many issues in terms of human rights and entitlements reveals a prominent strain of rectitude.

The next great wave of missionaries from the West was indeed secular, carrying the doctrines of socialism and bolshevism to "colonial" peoples. These propagandists also possessed an overwhelming sense of rectitude even when they spoke in the name of "science." Hence, they had the energy and courage to proselytize with a vigor that was rarely matched by the modern missionaries of Christendom.

Recent events make it clear that confrontations and confusions in rectitude standards (e.g., whether waging a particular war is morally just or unjust) can frustrate the fighting will and capability of a great power to conduct a war.²⁵⁰ Indeed, much armed conflict about the world today exhibits a deep religious motivation. The ecumenical movement, with its zigs and zags, is global in scope.²⁵¹

B. Well-Being

In many ways the most striking evidence of interdependences affecting *well-being* is the spread and control of contagious diseases. Endemic areas of physical infection always have tended to spread contagion throughout zones of human contact. Examples are numerous.²⁵² Plague, initiated in seemingly isolated areas, swept through the Roman world on many occasions between the second and fifth centuries. A plague outbreak in Egypt in 540 A.D. was transmitted to Byzantium where, at its height, 10,000 people died each day.²⁵³ The lightning penetration of the Black Death in 1350 throughout Europe resulted in the death of an estimated 25,000,000 people, or a quarter of the existing population.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ The movement against the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War is a case in point. For the ambiguities of the legal, moral, and other issues involved, see *THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW* (R. Falk ed. 1968-1976). See also R. HULL & J. NOVOGROD, *LAW AND VIETNAM* (1968); J. MOORE, *LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR* (1972). In general, efforts undertaken to change the global war system are often animated by subjectivities associated with rectitude.

²⁵¹ See generally M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 28, *Religions of Rule*; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at ch. 11, *Claims Relating to Freedom from Religious Discrimination*; B. WILSON, *supra* note 95; sources cited *supra* note 195.

²⁵² See A. CROSBY, JR., *THE COLUMBIA EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF 1492* (1972); H. ZINSSER, *RATS, LICE AND HISTORY* (1934); see also sources cited *supra* note 176.

²⁵³ See H. ZINSSER, *supra* note 252, at 145-46.

²⁵⁴ The "Black Death" is probably the most studied of the historic plagues. Estimates of the actual number of deaths vary considerably. See T. ALLBUTT, *ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, PRESENTED TO KARL SUDHOFF ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1923* (C. Singer & H. Sigerist eds. 1924); R. GOTTFRIED, *THE BLACK DEATH, NATURAL AND HUMAN DISASTER IN*

Modern times are replete with similar evidence of the universal transmissibility of disease nurtured in endemic centers.²⁵⁵ In the nineteenth century five separate cholera outbreaks in unsanitary Egyptian population centers swept into Europe causing large-scale havoc. The Western colonial expansion through the East made malaria increasingly familiar in the Occident. At the conclusion of World War I, an influenza epidemic broke out amidst the debris and rehabilitation of Western Europe that ultimately ravaged both the old and new worlds.²⁵⁶ The Russian famine of 1922 fostered diseases that swept across national boundaries to the West.

The peril of contagious disease has led to the formation of transnational agencies.²⁵⁷ Agency records confirm the hypotheses that in the absence of collective measures, increasing contact among peoples intensifies epidemics; in the presence of collective measures, the contact is compatible with the successful control of epidemics.²⁵⁸ Increasing navigational contacts, initiated by Christopher Columbus at a time of negligible sanitary cooperation, resulted in the spread of syphilis from the first infected European sailors through the length and breadth of the known world.²⁵⁹ Despite the phenomenal growth of land, sea, and air contacts, it has been possible to improve sanitary cooperation (under the auspices of contemporary world organizations) to check the spread and reduce the incidence of syphilis.

Similarly, the growth of world commerce during the nineteenth century (an era of haphazard sanitary cooperation) spread outbreaks of

MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1983) (includes an annotated bibliography); G. TWIGG, *THE BLACK DEATH, A BIOLOGICAL REAPPRAISAL* (1985).

²⁵⁵ See, e.g., C. GREGG, *PLAGUE, AN ANCIENT DISEASE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (rev. ed. 1985); W. MCNEILL, *supra* note 176; see also *INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AFRICA: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THEIR DISTRIBUTION AND CONSEQUENCES* (K. Patterson comp. 1979).

²⁵⁶ For further discussion, see R. COLLIER, *THE PLAGUE OF THE SPANISH LADY, THE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918-1919* (1974); A. CROSBY, JR., *EPIDEMIC AND PEACE*, 1918 (1976).

²⁵⁷ The most prominent, of course, is the World Health Organization. Its many publications include *World Health Statistics (Annual): Epidemiological and Vital Statistics Report (Monthly)*; *Sixth Report on the World Health Situation, 1973-1977* (1980) (including bibliographical references, a global analysis, and review by country and region). For studies of the Organization, see R. BERKOV, *THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, A STUDY IN DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION* (1957); F. HOOLE, *POLITICS AND BUDGETING IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION* (1976).

²⁵⁸ A pertinent study is *WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, VECTOR CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL HEALTH* (J. Smith & R. Pal eds. 1972). See also the periodic publications cited *supra* note 257.

²⁵⁹ See A. CROSBY, JR., *supra* note 252.

cholera throughout Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe. By 1947 the cooperation of sanitary services under the auspices of world organization was sufficiently advanced to "contain" the Egyptian cholera epidemics.²⁶⁰

The modern rise and fall of malarial infections, to take a final example, reveals a similar pattern. Infection rose as commercial contacts were established with the "colonies." The decline of malaria occurred when these contacts had grown to include the unrestricted distribution of quinine, atabrine, and DDT.²⁶¹ Thus, the interdependence of physical health is not demonstrated exclusively by the international incidence of disease in the face of inadequate international preventive or therapeutic action; it is as forcibly demonstrated by the degree to which disease is localized or reduced by international cooperation.

Statistical corroboration is provided by a study of the last large-scale smallpox epidemic in Europe and America. Absence of compulsory vaccination accounted for a severe epidemic of smallpox in Paris during the Franco-Prussian War. Diffusion of the disease was assured by the French flight to countries similarly devoid of immunity, notably England and the United States. Within months smallpox epidemics raged in London and New York. A similar rate of enforcement of vaccination practiced in both cities resulted in a similar rate of increase and decline of the disease.

To demonstrate further the global repercussions of all manifestations of health or illness is to pile Ossa on Pelion. The conclusion is inescapable: To one formulation, "Therefore send ye not to know for whom the bell tolls . . .," J.B.S. Haldane answers: "Every Rumanian infected with infantile paralysis, every Indian with smallpox, every rat with plague, diminishes the probable length of my life."²⁶² In the twentieth century, all plagues can command mechanized transportation facilities in pursuit of victims. To this extent technological progress enhances international vulnerability by reducing the time available to prepare for plague. If, as was once observed, "a rat, infected with the bubonic plague which climbs on board a ship at Calcutta may carry the

²⁶⁰ According to McNeill, "[B]y the end of the nineteenth century, scientific medicine had discovered effective means to counter the dread disease." W. McNEILL, *supra* note 176, at 278.

²⁶¹ The unintended consequences of liberal application of DDT, including the development of DDT-resistant strains of mosquitos, require mention. These have thus far been dealt with by developing new lethal compounds, but to quote McNeill again, "the long-range ecological consequences of this chemical warfare between humans and insects is by no means clear." W. McNEILL, *supra* note 176, at 282.

²⁶² Taken from studies by Harold D. Lasswell.

disease to Liverpool" in a matter of weeks, today that same rat, boarding an airplane, could achieve identical results in hours.

Power factors obviously influence the level of mental and physical *well-being*. Aside from the direct effect of destructive weapons, wars and other political crises have human consequences that impact upon the equilibrium of individual personalities.²⁶³ Personal equilibrium may be expressed in increases or decreases in anxiety, which may be modified by the flow of gratifications received from other human beings.

Almost uniformly, wars have brought a decrease in national suicide rates.²⁶⁴ In England and Wales during World War I, suicide rates declined from 10.0 per 100,000 in 1914 to 7.5 per 100,000 in 1918, thereafter rising to the "normal" prewar rate of 10.0 in 1922. In Germany suicide rates declined from 21.2 per 100,000 in 1914 to 15.3 in 1918, thereafter rising above the "normal" prewar rate to 21.3 in 1920. A similar decline characterized suicide rates for World War II. Despite the severity of the operations, neither war saw a sharp increase in chronic psychiatric disorders, alcoholism, or drug addiction in belligerent countries. However, from the psychosomatic investigations of World War II, evidence shows that modern war generates a growing number of sufficiently sustained anxieties to permit their conversion into somatic disease. During World War II, for example, England, France, Germany, and Russia each reported an increased incidence of peptic ulcers. In the same war coronary symptoms, menstrual disorders, and neurodermatitis followed in the wake of air attacks.

Postwar periods correspond with an increase in suicide rates. Internal political crises have reverse results. Halbwachs established that throughout the nineteenth century French political crises consistently brought about a decline in the national suicide rate.²⁶⁵ Using the Dreyfus Affaire for detailed analysis, Halbwachs showed a significant decline in the suicide rate with each major dramatic development of the case.

Wealth influences health in the form of national and world economic practices and conditions. A striking demonstration of the effect of eco-

²⁶³ See, e.g., C. LIMPKIN, *THE BATTLE OF BOGSIDE* (1972); W. VAN VORIS, *VIOLENCE IN ULSTER* (1975). The impact may not appear dramatically, but rather cumulatively. For example, the consequences of maintaining nuclear weapons in continuing poise is only dimly understood. See sources cited *supra* notes 136-37; see also sources cited *supra* notes 175-80.

²⁶⁴ See M. HALBWACHS, *THE CAUSES OF SUICIDE* (H. Goldblatt trans. 1978); see generally A. PRENTICE, *SUICIDE: A SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF OVER 2,200 ITEMS* (1974).

²⁶⁵ M. HALBWACHS, *supra* note 264, at 216-30.

conomic fluctuations (which are linked in world-wide movements) and health is the relation between prosperity, depression, and suicide. There are direct correlations between high unemployment and depression and the incidence of mental problems and suicide.²⁶⁶

Transnational economic activity or practices with transnational consequences may have deleterious effects on health, the mitigation of which requires international collaboration. For example, the effective control of narcotics cannot be achieved merely by tight border surveillance and other internal measures; it requires transnational coordination and cooperation to deal with the associated problems, including illicit production, manufacture, transport, sale, and use.²⁶⁷ Polluted air and water, and drought for that matter, know no national boundary; remedial efforts that do not rely on a genuine international consensus are less likely to have long-term success.²⁶⁸

Health is also affected by the world distribution of *enlightenment*.²⁶⁹ Modern efforts to control epidemics frequently have encountered local beliefs that prevented immediate success. The "germ theory," for instance, is implausible to people who are not familiar with both the mi-

²⁶⁶ See E. DURKHEIM, *SUICIDE, A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY* (J. Spaulding & G. Simpson trans., G. Simpson ed. 1951); *POVERTY AND HEALTH: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS* (J. Kosa & I. Zola eds. rev. ed. 1975); R. HURLEY, *POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION: A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP* (1970); *POVERTY AND MENTAL HEALTH* (M. Greenblatt, P. Emery & B. Glueck, Jr. eds. 1967).

²⁶⁷ See generally P. LOWES, *THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL* (1966).

²⁶⁸ See generally L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67; E. ECKHOLM, *supra* note 138; M. EISENBUD, *supra* note 139; *THE GLOBAL POSSIBLE*, *supra* note 67; M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 45, *Fouling the Nest*; E. MACH, *PLANNING THE FINANCES OF THE HEALTH SECTOR: A MANUAL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* (1983); *THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT*, *supra* note 138; sources cited *supra* note 140.

²⁶⁹ A deceptively simple and comprehensive presentation of contemporary knowledge about health and its enhancement and degradation is the five volume "Self-Instructional Course" published by the Association of American Medical Colleges. See *INTERNATIONAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES: AN INTRODUCTION IN FIVE VOLUMES* (W. Waddell, R. Pierleoni & E. Suter eds. 1977).

Of special moment are the rapidly developing insights about how human activities alter the environment, from the molecular to the global, and the awareness of how these changes influence health. See, e.g., *Proceedings of the International Symposium of the Prevention of Occupational Cancer*, Helsinki, 21-24 (Apr. 1981) (a symposium in Helsinki, Finland, organized by the Institute of Occupational Health, in collaboration with the International Labour Office, the World Health Organization, and the International Agency for Research on Cancer); see also sources cited *supra* notes 144, 268. See generally G. ZILBOORG, *MIND, MEDICINE, AND MAN* (1943).

croscope and the scientific thinking of Western industrial societies.²⁷⁰

Health is likewise influenced by patterns of *respect*. A re-analysis of suicide data emphasizes that deprivations of respect lead individuals to turn their destructive tendencies against themselves.²⁷¹ It is true that many of those who fail in business or lose their jobs may suffer from acute anxieties connected with fear of starvation or dislike of the physical discomforts of adapting to a simpler living standard. But it is likely that the humiliation of failure is a critical factor. This is suggested by the values of a highly competitive society in which "strive and succeed" is the maxim, and in which respect is accorded or withheld on the basis of success or failure. In Japanese civilization suicide is a well-established escape from situations in which honor is imperiled or lost.²⁷²

The world distribution of *skills* also directly affects health.²⁷³ This is

²⁷⁰ See A. CHASE, *MAGIC SHOTS: A HUMAN AND SCIENTIFIC ACCOUNT OF THE LONG AND CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO ERADICATE INFECTIOUS DISEASES BY VACCINATION* (1982); see also C. GREGG, *supra* note 255. Efforts are made for adjustment. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, *INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE STUDY OF MEDICAL CARE UTILIZATION* (R. Kohn & K. White eds. 1976).

²⁷¹ See sources cited *supra* note 266; see also H. HENDIN, *SUICIDE IN AMERICA* (1982); A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, *SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A COMMUNITY STUDY* (1958); J. MYERS & L. BEAN, *A DECADE LATER: A FOLLOW-UP OF SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS* (1968); *SUICIDE IN ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST* (L. Headley ed. 1983); *SUICIDE AMONG CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS AND STUDENTS: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY* (J. McIntosh comp. 1981); *SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES* (N. Farberow ed. 1975); *SUICIDE AMONG THE ELDERLY: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY* (J. McIntosh comp. 1981); *SUICIDE IN THE YOUNG* (H. Sudak, A. Ford & N. Rushforth eds. 1984).

²⁷² See R. BENEDICT, *THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE CULTURE* (1946).

²⁷³ Technical competence is increasingly in demand. For example, developments in noninvasive diagnostic techniques, such as Computerized Axial Tomography (CAT scanning), or Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR), another imaging technique, may be only the beginning.

Changes in perspective also influence how well-being is maintained. The awareness that health is conditioned by the entire social context has begun to influence "Western" medical practice. See, e.g., M. REISER, *MIND, BRAIN, BODY: TOWARD A CONVERGENCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROBIOLOGY* (1984); M. REISER & H. LEIGH, *THE PATIENT: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE* (1980); H. SPIRO, *DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND PLACEBOS* (1986); see generally T. ALLBUTT, *supra* note 254; T. McKEOWN, *THE ROLE OF MEDICINE: DREAM, MIRAGE OR NEMESIS?* (1979); H. WAIN, *A HISTORY OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE* (1970).

This awareness is particularly important in precisely those communities where life expectancy has increased dramatically. Of course, life expectancy varies considerably around the planet. For an overview, see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 40, *Without Due Care and Attention*. People have changed their use of time as

particularly obvious among peoples who lack medical and sanitation experts.²⁷⁴ Health is influenced by the skill in human relations of those who try to aid other people, especially people from nonindustrial cultures. The modern social anthropologist or social scientist approach to health improvement in nonindustrial cultures is very different from the traditional approach. The trained investigator now is accustomed to search for equivalences of meaning in folk culture and industrial civilization.

The dependence of human beings on the continuing exchange of *affection* in intimate groups is a matter of fundamental importance for health. World-wide conditions have a gigantic impact upon the continuity of families, neighborhoods, and friendly cliques of all kinds. The profound effect of all major wars upon the disorganization of primary human relations is recurrent. The spread of modern industrialism which increases the movement of people in space and in the social structure has destructive impact upon primary circles as well as enhanced individual opportunity, but the trends are asynchronous. Millions of human beings are exposed to the continuous task of seeking to maintain or to reconstitute intimate circles. Data from the psychosomatic field of medicine indicate that the stresses connected with affectional adjustments are of deep significance for health.²⁷⁵

Health is affected by the world distribution of *rectitude* standards.²⁷⁶

they have lived longer and expected to do so. J. McHALE, *supra* note 45, at 282. The sheer increase in life expectancy is due in large measure to developments in skill and enlightenment, some of which McHale presents. *See id.* at 165. Maintaining a vigorous life and robust attitude over the course of a longer life may prove to be even more complicated than has been the long process of increasing our life span. It seems likely that the quality of the relationship between the individual human being and the enveloping social context will become increasingly the subject of concern for those interested in enhancing health.

²⁷⁴ Cities are often the scene of the worst problems. For a contemporary overview, see sources cited *supra* note 114. *See also* T. McKEOWN, *supra* note 45; J. WARFORD & R. SAUNDERS, *VILLAGE WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS AND POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD* (1976).

²⁷⁵ *See generally* S. JACKSON, *MELANCHOLIA AND DEPRESSION: FROM HIPPOCRATIC TIMES TO MODERN TIMES* (1986); A. KLEINMAN, *SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DISTRESS AND DISEASE: DEPRESSION, NEURASTHENIA, AND PAIN IN MODERN CHINA* (1986); A. SIMEONS, *MAN'S PRESUMPTUOUS BRAIN: AN EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF PSYCHOSOMATIC DISEASE* (1962); *THE PSYCHOSOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND PSYCHOSOMATIC DISEASES: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIUM HELD IN STOCKHOLM, APRIL 1970* (L. Levi ed. 1971); sources cited *supra* note 180. For a discussion of therapeutic implications, see *PSYCHONEUROIMMUNOLOGY* (R. Ader ed. 1981).

²⁷⁶ Pilgrims have historically contributed to the spread of contagious disease. *See W.*

One striking result of modern research on psychosomatic disorders is the discovery of the frequent correlation between illness and guilt.²⁷⁷ When individuals suffer from "guilt feelings" parts of their personality are in conflict. The self makes adverse evaluations of the self; and these evaluations are in terms of conscious conceptions of right and wrong. To the extent that conceptions of rectitude are in great flux in both modern and traditional cultures, conflicts may express themselves in deprivations of well-being.

C. *Enlightenment*

A worldwide forum of public *enlightenment* challenges preoccupation with local affairs. One consequence of the technological revolution is the growth of cheap and fast means of communication that connect the principal global centers. As a result, the focus of attention of many individuals gradually has become less parochial, and "world publics" have grown up in many fields of human interest (politics, business, music, films, and so on).²⁷⁸ Counter-measures taken by intermediate groups have blocked the growth of "universal publics" in many fields and confined the distribution of public attention and opinion to "half world" or regional areas.

Worldwide forums also challenge local versions of history.²⁷⁹ As a result increased attention is paid to local variations of past events. Several studies have been made of school textbooks.²⁸⁰ The Shakespearean

MCNEILL, *supra* note 176; H. ZINSSER, *supra* note 252. Gottfried notes that the failure of existing authorities to control the Black Death prompted the stirrings of modern medicine. R. GOTTFRIED, *supra* note 254. *See generally* W. RIVERS, *MEDICINE, MAGIC AND RELIGION* (1924).

²⁷⁷ *See generally* sources cited *infra* note 355.

²⁷⁸ The growth in international nongovernmental organizations is a partial reflection of this trend. *See* 4 *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*, *supra* note 30 (providing a thorough listing of organizations). On the relationship between the self-system and exposure to novel stimuli, whether through primary or secondary contact, see Lasswell, *supra* notes 74, 83. For an earlier exposition, see H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54, at 125-57. *See also* sources cited *supra* notes 52, 71 (discussing the development of world culture).

²⁷⁹ Worldwide forums also permit the wide dispersal of "universal" histories, assuming that there are potential readers and that they are fluent in the author's language. *See, e.g.*, A. TOYNBEE, *supra* note 19. Less ambitious but also relevant are A. BOZEMAN, *supra* note 22; W. MCNEILL, *supra* note 19.

²⁸⁰ For a recent summary, with bibliography organized by country or region, see M. FERRO, *THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY; OR HOW THE PAST IS TAUGHT* (1984). For a perspective on American schoolbooks, see F. FITZGERALD, *AMERICA REVISED, HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (1979). On historic graphy

glorification of the English soldiery in the Hundred Year's War is reflected in the majority of English textbooks. A less enthusiastic view of English military exploits in that conflict, however, is taken by their French counterparts.

A trenchant summary of the emerging contrast is furnished by an English study:

English school children would not recognize in the French school books' pictures of village-burners, assassins, butchers, and ravagers, the noble heroes of Poitiers and Agincourt, whom they have been taught to admire. In the same Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) the French books tell of an incident in which a French gallant jumps from his deathbed to kill seven of the English soldier would-be murderers, and to frighten away five more. Needless to say, the English chronicler overlooked any such incident!²⁸¹

Similarly, one may note how English and American schoolbooks differ in the portrayal of the events leading to what is called the American Rebellion in the English texts and the American Revolution in the American counterparts — or in their respective assessment of the outcome of the War of 1812. An especially insightful example is the difference between French and German schoolbooks in their description of the outbreak of World War I. With no mention of the incidence of French preoccupation with the thought of *revanche* for 1870, the typical French schoolbook pictures France as pacifist and unprepared and readily ascribes "sole guilt" to Germany. The typical German schoolbook, in turn, pictures an identical German purity of purpose and ascribes "sole guilt" just as readily to "implacable enemies," surrounding a peaceful fatherland.

Just as significant as the clashing assertions of historical facts in national schoolbooks are the omissions of embarrassing national episodes. Since no country is to be seen in ignominy, large-scale omissions be-

and history in general, see E. CARR, *supra* note 62; D. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970); THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (P. Gardiner ed. 1974); THEORIES OF HISTORY: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SOURCES (P. Gardiner ed. 1959); P. GEYL, DEBATES WITH HISTORIANS (1958); P. GEYL, USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY (1955); G. GOOCH, HISTORY AND HISTORIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2d ed. 1952); H. MULLER, *supra* note 59; THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN OUR TIME: AN ANTHOLOGY, *supra* note 62; J. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF HISTORICAL WRITING (1942). For extended discussions of historiography and history, see 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, *supra* note 2. See also Fogel, *Scientific History and Traditional History*, 104 STUD. LOGIC & FOUND. MATHEMATICS (1982) (proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Hannover, 1979).

²⁸¹ Taken from studies by Harold D. Lasswell.

come inevitable. Thus British schoolbooks succeed in glossing over the Opium Wars by scanty reference or total omissions; American schoolbooks rarely give detailed statements concerning the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, and none acknowledge atrocities by its armies. Although extreme localism has been challenged, counteractions have successfully imposed the dominant power pattern (pluripolar, bipolar) upon the historical accounts available to youth throughout the world.²⁸²

A world-wide forum offers a challenge to local interpretations of the future. Widening global contact has resulted in confronting many conflicting versions of the future with one another.²⁸³ The "cult of progress" dominated the Western outlook during the period of rapid expansion.²⁸⁴ In many parts of the world this conception was at variance with the basic perspectives of the indigenous civilization. The cosmological

²⁸² Education and indoctrination remain the prerogative of national elites. See N. HANS, *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION: A STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL FACTORS AND TRADITIONS* (1949); sources cited *supra* note 88. Efforts to change the focus of education recur. See F. BOECKEL, *BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: A HANDBOOK FOR PEACE WORKERS 15-70* (1928); J. HARLEY, *INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING: AGENCIES EDUCATING FOR A NEW WORLD* (1931); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION, LEAGUE OF NATIONS; SCHOOL TEXT-BOOK REVISION AND INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING (2d ed. rev. 1933); D. PRESCOTT, *EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (1930); UNESCO, *THE ECONOMICS OF NEW EDUCATION MEDIA: PRESENT STATUS OF RESEARCH AND TRENDS* (1977); UNESCO, *A HANDBOOK FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF TEXTBOOKS AND TEACHING MATERIALS AS AIDS TO INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING* (1949); UNESCO, *EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING: EXAMPLES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CLASS-ROOM USE* (1959); see also Lasswell, *The Prospects of a World University*, in *THE PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS*, Nobel Symposium Proc. 14 (A. Tiseliuss & S. Nilsson eds. 1971). For an indication of alternatives at levels of institutionalized education beyond high school, see *Declaration of the World University of the World Academy of Art and Science*.

²⁸³ Concern with the future and a belief that people can shape it generate a perspective distinguishable only in contemporary times. See *supra* note 73 and accompanying text. In part, reactions against "Western" penetration relate to the lack of deference shown by many of its carriers toward tradition. See S. EISENSTADT, *MODERNIZATION: PROTEST AND CHANGE* (1966); sources cited *supra* note 56.

²⁸⁴ "Progress" has had various empirical referents. See, e.g., L. BRITOL, *SOCIAL ADAPTATION: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ADAPTATION AS A THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS* (1915); L. HOBHOUSE, *DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE: AN ESSAY TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION* (1913); the works of Karl Marx. But see F. FERRAROTTI, *THE MYTH OF INEVITABLE PROGRESS* (1985); M. GINSBERG, *THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, A REVALUATION* (1953); J. NEEDHAM, *INTEGRATIVE LEVELS: A REVALUATION OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS* (1941); E. SHILS, *TRADITION* (1981); G. SOREL, *THE ILLUSIONS OF PROGRESS* (J. Stanley & C. Stanley trans. 1969).

theories that dominate classical Chinese thought, for instance, center around sequences of "order-disorder-order," rather than "progressive change."²⁸⁵ The religious vision common to the Buddhist world covers eons and dwarfs the significance of the immediate future.²⁸⁶ The idea that people can improve whole societies or the whole of humanity in rather short periods occurs from time to time and is particularly central in Western thought.²⁸⁷

Further, a world-wide forum is a continuing challenge to local interpretations of factors that condition human affairs. The scientific outlook of Western civilization, although containing many elements comparable to other cultures, is a distinctive world-view.²⁸⁸ It comes in conflict with

²⁸⁵ See generally L. MOU-SHÊNG, *MEN AND IDEAS, AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT* (1942); *THE WISDOM OF CONFUCIUS* (L. Yutang ed. & trans. 1938). See also J. NEEDHAM, *supra* note 226. For a perspective on the West, see G. TROMPF, *THE IDEA OF HISTORICAL RECURRENCE IN WESTERN THOUGHT: FROM ANTIQUITY TO REFORMATION* (1979).

²⁸⁶ See generally E. CONZE, *THIRTY YEARS OF BUDDHIST STUDIES: SELECTED ESSAYS* (1967); E. CONZE, *BUDDHISM: ITS ESSENCE AND DEVELOPMENT* (1951).

²⁸⁷ See J. BAILLIE, *THE BELIEF IN PROGRESS* (1951); J. BURY, *THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH* (1932); C. DAWSON, *PROGRESS AND RELIGION: AN HISTORICAL ENQUIRY* (1929); L. EDELSTEIN, *THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY* (1967); B. KNAPP, *THE PROMETHEUS SYNDROME* (1979); D. MARCEL, *PROGRESS AND PRAGMATISM: JAMES, DEWEY, BEARD, AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN ESSAY ON THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION* (1974); J. NEF, *WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS* (1950); R. NISBET, *HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS* (1980); F. TUCKER, *THE FRONTIER SPIRIT AND PROGRESS* (1980); see also E. NAGEL, *TELEOLOGY REVISITED AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE* (1979); sources cited *supra* note 73.

²⁸⁸ For elaboration, see *SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND* (H. Boyko ed. 1961); R. BRAITHWAITE, *SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A STUDY OF THE FUNCTION OF THEORY, PROBABILITY AND LAW IN SCIENCE* (1953); P. BRIDGMAN, *THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS* (1928); R. CARNAP, *THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD: PSEUDOPROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY* (R. George trans. 1967); W. DAMPIER, *supra* note 233; B. EIDUSON, *SCIENTISTS: THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL WORLD* (1962); A. EINSTEIN & L. INFELD, *THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS: THE GROWTH OF IDEAS FROM EARLY CONCEPTS TO RELATIVITY AND QUANTA* (1938); E. NAGEL, *LOGIC WITHOUT METAPHYSICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE* (1956); E. NAGEL, *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE, PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION* (1961); G. SANTAYANA, *THE LIFE OF REASON; OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS* (1905-1906); *SCIENCE AND MAN* (R. Anshen ed. 1942); A. STINCHCOMBE, *CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES* (1968); C. WADDINGTON, *THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE* (1941); C. VON WEIZSÄCKER, *THE WORLD VIEW OF PHYSICS* (M. Grene trans. 1952); A. WHITEHEAD, *SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD* (1926); A. WHITEHEAD, *PROCESS AND REALITY, AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY* (1929); see also *SCIENCE AS A CAREER CHOICE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES* (B. Eiduson & L. Beckman eds. 1973); *The Philosophy of Science, The Sociology of Science*, in 14 INTERNATIONAL

systems of explanation that do not permit doubts to be expressed about validity. The scientific outlook not only tolerates the cultivation of doubt, but requires doubt as the preliminary to "hypothesis," which may be described as a state of suspended judgment on a specific possibility. Another feature of the scientific outlook is the search for "operational" indices of whatever variables are employed in the formulation of hypotheses. To be operational an index must be selected that is empirical; that is, capable of being applied by an observer possessed of normal perceptions. Without describing "science" in any further detail, it is clear that "dogmatism," "occultism," "animism," and the like are alien to its character. Hence, conflicts are found at various degrees of intensity between science and "religion," "superstition," or "magic."²⁸⁹

The cultivation, maintenance, refinement, and erosion of basic maps of reality can occur under the auspices of particular, identifiable biases and interests.²⁹⁰ The providers of beneficence may view their support as predicated on the expectation that the research will "pay off" by en-

ENCYCLOPEDIA, *supra* note 2; sources cited *infra* note 290. But see F. BOAS, *supra* note 96; CULTURE IN HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL RADIN (S. Diamond ed. 1960) (especially the essays by Count and Hallowell); H. FRANKFURT, J. WILSON, T. JACOBSEN & W. IRWIN, THE INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE OF ANCIENT MAN: AN ESSAY ON SPECULATIVE THOUGHT IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST (1946); R. REDFIELD, THE PRIMITIVE WORLD AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS (1953). For related provocative discussion, see sources cited *supra* note 166.

²⁸⁹ Better known works include W. DAMPIER, *supra* note 233; J. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION (abr. ed. 1942); B. MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION AND OTHER CASES (1948); C. SINGER, FROM MAGIC TO SCIENCE: ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC TWILIGHT (1928); A. WHITE, *supra* note 92. See also A. FUNKENSTEIN, *supra* note 92; H. RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (F. Powicke & A. Emden eds. 1936).

²⁹⁰ Usually this is not the case in the long run. In reference to the development of modern science, see T. KUHN, *supra* note 91; S. MASON, *supra* note 91; R. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (2d ed. 1985); D. DE SOLLA PRICE, SCIENCE SINCE BABYLON (enl. ed. 1975); G. SARTON, *supra* note 91; C. SINGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENCE TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1941); L. THORNDIKE, A HISTORY OF MAGIC AND EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE (1923-1958); *The History of Science*, in 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, *supra* note 2; sources cited *supra* note 233. For alternate perspectives, see F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT, *supra* note 101; P. FEYERABAND, AGAINST METHOD, *supra* note 91; E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985); M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958); G. VICO, THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO (T. Berlin & M. Fisch trans. 1744 3d ed. 1948). For a different orientation, see E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS (R. Manheim trans. 1957); T. HULME, SPECULATIONS: ESSAYS ON HUMANISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART (1924); S. LANGER, *supra* note 188; L. MUMFORD, *supra* note 40; E. NEUMANN, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1954).

hancing their aggregate value position or the position of those with whom they identify. Perhaps the accumulation of specific values like respect, wealth, or power is of primary concern.²⁹¹ The point is that the benefactor's perspective can guide, subtly or blatantly, the focus of attention, the method of interpreting data, the conclusions reached and, in a word, the development of maps of reality.²⁹²

Enlightenment is affected by *power*. When the gathering, processing, and disseminating of information are in the hands of governments and political parties, the content of the stream is decisively affected by power calculations.²⁹³ For example, the tight control exercised by the Soviet elite over all forms of communication made it possible to conceal from most Russians and the outside world the true scope of the 1932-33 famine. Rumors could not be confirmed because of restrictions upon

²⁹¹ Recent concern in the United States regarding the source of funding and provision of facilities for conducting research is well-founded. However, the issue is confused when assertions are made that researchers may become captive to the interests of their providers. There is no reason to assume that researchers are more likely to be "bought" by corporate interests than by the interests of governments or foundations. The focus of short-term research may change, but the process whereby maps of reality are established, maintained, and changed is not sufficiently understood for observers to conclude categorically that one type of beneficence leads to a particular type of map. On relations with government, see L. COLE, *POLITICS AND THE RESTRAINT OF SCIENCE* (1983); *KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: ESSAYS ON SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT* (S. Lakoff ed. 1966); D. PRICE, *GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY* (1962); *Science: Science-Government Relations*, in 14 *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA*, *supra* note 2. On other current trends, see M. CURTI & R. NASH, *PHILANTHROPY IN THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION* (1965); M. KENNY, *BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX* (1986); R. ROSENZWEIG & B. TURLINGTON, *THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR PATRONS* (1982). For a good summary, see *The Impact of University-Industry Arrangements on the University*, 40 *BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI.* 7 (1987). See also R. STORY, *THE FORGING OF AN ARISTOCRACY: HARVARD AND THE BOSTON UPPER CLASS, 1900-1970* (1980); sources cited *supra* note 34.

²⁹² Of course, this may not be a rational, deliberate, or conscious process. In addition, the degree to which perspectives of researchers and providers are congruent prior to collaboration lessens the impact of the provider on the outcome of research and may in fact form a critical basis for a working arrangement in the first place. See Lasswell, *Must Science Serve Political Power?*, 25 *AM. PSYCHOLOGIST* 117 (1970).

²⁹³ See sources cited *supra* note 127; see also *PRESS CONTROL AROUND THE WORLD* (J. Curry & J. Dassin eds. 1982). On censorship in the United States, see R. CIRINO, *DON'T BLAME THE PEOPLE, HOW THE NEWS MEDIA USES BIAS, DISTORTION AND CENSORSHIP TO MANIPULATE PUBLIC OPINION* (1971); L. HURWITZ, *HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CENSORSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES* (1985); P. KELLOUGH, *CABLE TELEVISION AND CENSORSHIP: A BIBLIOGRAPHY* (1985); M. SPITZER, *SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST* (1986).

freedom of movement inside the Soviet Union. Foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow could not hold their posts if they attempted to send dispatches at variance with Soviet policy. To smuggle such reports from the country subjected correspondents to government retaliation (withdrawal of visa and other essential privileges). Persistent filing of dispatches with censorable material simply meant that the home paper received nothing from their correspondent since the censors interfered with transmission. Hence, the home newspaper or press association was confronted by the dilemma of encouraging foreign staffs to conform to the official line or of ceasing to maintain a news contact.

Since totalitarian elites appraise every detail by its political usefulness, all press correspondents are "spies" since they may possess information objectionable to the ruling group. The conflict between this conception and the operation of a "free press" is not likely to be solved by compromise, although working concessions may be temporarily made on both sides.

Enlightenment is also influenced by *wealth*. When the media of communication are owned and operated for private profit, characteristic distortions occur.²⁹⁴ News and editorial policy are greatly influenced by calculated interest in obtaining advertisement, promoting circulation, and cutting production costs. The advertisers are usually other businessmen; and since profits depend mainly on advertising revenue, the press is likely to avoid alienating the advertisers. The result is a complex relationship between the private press and politics.

When the press is not monopolized, there is a great deal of freedom in news coverage and editorial outlook. When competitive news gathering and dissemination are possible, diversity of channel is likely to result in a realistic public image.

Respect factors affect the sources and interpretations of intelligence information. In some ways the most pervasive factor limiting intelligence processes is respect. Many have discovered that it is not always healthy to stare upward in a class pyramid. Persons reared at a given social level acquire various criteria of credibility. Lower classes may be overlooked entirely as sources of important information; in the same

²⁹⁴ See G. KENNAN ET AL., *DEMOCRACY AND THE STUDENT LEFT* 231-32 (1968); see also J. MERRILL & R. LOWENSTEIN, *MESSAGES AND MEN: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNICATION* 79-88 (1971); A. SMITH, *supra* note 118; Addis, *supra* note 118; Chen, *supra* note 118. See generally *supra* note 80 (especially the works by Turner, Packard, Johnson, Schiller, and Fox).

way contemptuous attitudes toward peoples may result in gross distortions of reality.²⁹⁵

An important factor in *enlightenment* is the pattern of *skills* for obtaining and evaluating information.²⁹⁶ When nations are accessible to journalists they make indispensable contributions to the appraisal of world affairs.²⁹⁷ The role of journalistic skill decreases, however, when "curtains" descend and shut off sources usually exploited by the accomplished reporter. New skills come into play in pursuit of clues to capability and intention. Scholarly methods of document analysis, coupled with historical and comparative knowledge, are more heavily relied upon. In Russian affairs, for instance, research institutes have become major sources for the discovery and evaluation of developments such as estimating the national income of the Soviet Union, or the significance of conciliatory tactics in the "cold war."

The shipping and trading peoples were best fitted to open up the new world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Skill in navigation and shipbuilding enabled communities and peoples situated along the

²⁹⁵ As late as 1937, for example, some American officers were so biased against the Japanese that they kept reiterating the idea that the Japanese would never make first-class airplane pilots "because of their eyes." This was reminiscent of the appraisals made on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War by Russian officers.

Conversely, respect factors may work to give added resonance to realistic evaluation of the situation. When Herman Rauschning published his disillusioned estimate of the Nazis, much of its impact on official circles in Great Britain was related to the fact that the author was no "mere journalist" or even a scholar, but a man with a substantial official career.

In all cultures, certain individuals become expert at shaping different values. Their expertise is acknowledged with respect, and when they speak on matters pertaining to their special skill, their pronouncements are assumed by many to carry greater weight than would comparable statements by a person without respect. Interestingly, the deference paid to a speaker or writer may relate more to the individual's respect, which is intimately tied to the audience's expectations of propriety and hence to their collective integrity, than to the actual knowledge or skill of the publicist.

²⁹⁶ This includes very deeply rooted conceptions of the phenomena that constitute information and of the appropriate methods whereby information is organized and assessed. Prophets may rely on computer-generated spreadsheets, crystal balls, celestial patterns, or divine revelation. Each may prove effective in context. *See generally* sources cited *supra* notes 218, 290.

²⁹⁷ The role played by the press in what became known as the Watergate Affair, which led to the end of the Nixon Presidency in the United States, provides vivid testimony. *See* C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, *ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN* (1974). *But see* P. KNIGHTLEY, *THE FIRST CASUALTY, FROM THE CRIMEA TO VIETNAM: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO, PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER* (1975). *See generally* I. CLAUDE, JR., *THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION UPON FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY* (1965); J. RESTON, *THE ARTILLERY OF THE PRESS: ITS INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY* (1967).

Atlantic Coast to take the lead over experts of inland travel and trade. More recently, deep-sea and space navigation, and satellite, rocket, and computer construction and operation are skills that shape our geography and its meaning. New discoveries produce new information to which all the values of power, wealth, and the rest can be redefined.²⁹⁸

Positive and negative sentiments (*affection*) affect sources and interpretations of information. Love, for example, distorts an image in one direction while hatred distorts in another. The inculcation of group loyalties and group enmities results in false perceptions of target objects.²⁹⁹ The classical education at English universities influenced world politics when it prepared the way for an outpouring of emotion during the Greek War of Independence. Enemies of Great Britain in foreign countries have not been recruited, as a rule, from former Rhodes scholars. Graduate students from the United States who completed their training at German universities (during the epoch before advanced studies were well established in the United States) typically retained a strong bond with Germany.

For similar reasons, students who studied in American, French, or other schools associated with a particular nation cultivated positive feelings for the nation whose civilization they learned to know, even when the school was physically located in Constantinople, Shanghai, or some other place outside the homeland of the nation. The French made a particular point of spreading the French language as a door to French civilization. The cultural propaganda of France is often credited with having acted as an important cushion to the decline of French power and wealth throughout the Middle East, Southeastern Asia, and in other parts of the world. However, no "inevitable" friendship results from opportunities of the kind described here. When hatred is crystallized on the basis of first-hand experience it is not readily shaken.

²⁹⁸ For graphic display of the expanding range of situations to which people have access and in reference to which people are clarifying their orientation, see sources cited *supra* note 100. See also sources cited *supra* note 146.

²⁹⁹ See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, *THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE* (1958); M. HERSKOVITS, *THE MYTH OF THE NEGRO PAST* (1958); J. HOCHSCHILD, *THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION* (1984); A. MONTAGU, *MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE* (5th ed. 1974); G. MYRDAL, *AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY* (1944); *infra* note 341; *PREJUDICE U.S.A.* (C. Glock & E. Siegelman eds. 1969); G. SELZNICK & S. STEINBERG, *THE TENACITY OF PREJUDICE: ANTI-SEMITISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA* (1969). In reference to affection, enlightenment, and power in the world community, see O. KLINEBERG, *supra* note 246. See also G. HOPPLE, *supra* note 233; R. JERVIS, *supra* note 233; *STRUCTURE OF DECISION: THE COGNITIVE MAPS OF POLITICAL ELITES*, *supra* note 233.

Conceptions of *rectitude* affect *enlightenment* and the stream of intelligence available in national and world affairs. Common codes of conduct affect the intelligence flow and its interpretation in many direct and indirect ways. If the world is viewed as the scene of the triumph of evil over good, the result may be extreme pessimism about the political prospects of the righteous. From deep-lying pessimism comes the surrender to tyranny.³⁰⁰

By contrast, some nations emphasize the impending triumph of good and quickly cast politics into moralizing terms. Some interpreters of American character are struck by the high frequency of moral admonition, warning, and declaration in public discourse and particularly in reference to foreign affairs. The "optimistic" and "moralizing" approach maintains a "tone" in public life in which emphasis upon difficulties or limitation are unwelcome, even if seriously proposed by competent observers.

D. Wealth

The world *wealth* process manifests a similarly high degree of interdependence. No contemporary state can achieve or sustain a desired level of economic activity as a self-sufficient unit: it needs and seeks resources, skill, labor, goods, and markets beyond its borders.³⁰¹ The

³⁰⁰ See F. HAYEK, *THE ROAD TO SERFDOM* (1950); see also sources cited *supra* note 127.

³⁰¹ On the nature and volume of the transnational flow of wealth, see generally THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, *DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK* (ANNUAL); THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, *INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK*; THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, *DIRECTION OF TRADE ANNUAL* (annual); THE WORLD BANK, *WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT* (annual). See also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 12, *Energy Power*, Map 13, *Oil Power*, Map 14, *Food Power*, Map 18, *Trade Power*, Map 19, *Dependence and Diversity*, Map 31, *Webs and Flows*, Map 32, *In Search of Work*, and the text accompanying the maps. For an important study, see W. WOYTINSKY & E. WOYTINSKY, *WORLD COMMERCE AND GOVERNMENTS, TRENDS AND OUTLOOKS* (1955). The activity documented in the preceding studies is shaped by decision and, in turn, shapes the context of subsequent decision. For further discussion, see R. COOPER, *THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY* (1968); R. COOPER, *ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD: ESSAYS IN WORLD ECONOMICS* (1986). See also D. CALLEO & B. ROWLAND, *AMERICA AND THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY: ATLANTIC DREAMS AND NATIONAL REALITIES* (1973); *BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY, FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES* (P. Katzenstein ed. 1978); K. DAM, *THE RULES OF THE GAME, REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM* (1982); *ECONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER: FROM THE 1970'S TO THE 1990'S* (J. Bhagwati ed. 1972); R. EDWARDS, JR., *INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COL-*

unsettling impact precipitated by the energy crisis continues to reverberate around the globe even after the gradual subsidence of the initial shock.³⁰² The economic cycle is global in its impact: depression or protracted recession in any significant area makes it correspondingly difficult in all other areas to maintain high levels in the production and sharing of goods and services and, hence, in the conditions under which liberty and human personality can flourish.³⁰³ The simultaneity in reaction of stock markets around the world offers the most recent documentation.

Wealth is affected by the world *power* process.³⁰⁴ The degree of concern about national security affects the armament race and the burden of armaments is reflected in the degree to which the potential standard of living of the entire population is sacrificed.³⁰⁵ The speedy universalization of modern production patterns occurs primarily because of political factors. The elites of ancient civilizations (like China and Japan) tried to block their territories from the products and the processes of the

LABORATION (1985); THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH (C. Bergsten ed. 1973); TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (R. Keohane & J. Nye, Jr., eds. 1972).

³⁰² For an indication of the concern that was generated by the "oil crisis" of 1973, see M. MCDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at 50 n.120. A development with attributes of a continuing crisis, unanticipated by many, is the massive debt which confronts many governments. See D. DELAMAIDE, *DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT CRISIS* (1984); C. PAYER, *THE DEBT TRAP: THE IMF AND THE THIRD WORLD* (1974); *INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* (G. Smith & J. Cuddington eds. 1985); see also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 51, *A Question of Terms*, and text accompanying map.

³⁰³ See, e.g., THE GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS OF U.S. MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY (S. Hewlett, H. Kaufman & P. Kenen eds. 1984); L. THUROW, *THE ZERO-SUM SOLUTION: BUILDING A WORLD CLASS AMERICAN ECONOMY* (1985); L. THUROW, *DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS* (1983); L. THUROW, *THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE* (1980). On business cycles, see A. BURNS & W. MITCHELL, *MEASURING BUSINESS CYCLES* (1946); W. MITCHELL, *BUSINESS CYCLES, THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING* (1928). For a discussion of relatively long-term cycles, see N. KONDRATIEFF, *THE LONG WAVE CYCLE* (G. Daniels trans. 1984).

³⁰⁴ See sources cited *supra* notes 185, 236.

³⁰⁵ For further discussion of the contemporary American context, see A. ENTHOVEN & K. SMITH, *HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? SHAPING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1961-1969* (1971); C. HITCH & R. MCKEAN, *THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE* (1960); S. MELMAN, *PROFITS WITHOUT PRODUCTION* (1983); S. MELMAN, *THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY, AMERICAN CAPITALISM IN DECLINE* (1974); *THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMS REDUCTION: REVERSING ECONOMIC DECAY* (L. Dumas ed. 1982); B. RUSSETT, *WHAT PRICE VIGILANCE: THE BURDENS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE* (1970).

West. But they failed, largely because the governments of Western nations stood behind their traders, miners, and planters. Superior coercive power led to the comparatively rapid spread of modern technology throughout the globe.³⁰⁶

An additional complication arose from the efforts of some European countries to enforce a limited incorporation of modern technology upon other peoples and to restrict total incorporation. The purpose was to keep permanent colonies as customers for finished products and as sources of raw material and cheap labor. Anti-imperialist movements were designed to complete the modernization of the "backward" areas by paving the way for native industry.³⁰⁷

Enlightenment is indispensable to the creation and use of modern technology and affects the continuity and levels of economic life.³⁰⁸ Before the evolution of modern communication and transportation systems, news of economic shortage did not travel swiftly enough, nor did aid move rapidly enough to relieve misery. Today the intelligence limitations are removed, and failure to obviate or alleviate disaster results from policy decisions. Not only can minimum living standards be maintained, but essential capital goods for the renewal of production can be made available, such as seed for planting, livestock, and tools.

The fluctuations of economic life were formerly dependent upon interactions that were poorly reported, hence inadequately understood. Today vast fact-gathering agencies survey crop conditions, industrial output, employment, consumption standards, saving, investment, public revenue and expenditures, and related activities whose economic character is obvious.³⁰⁹ Under these circumstances the fluctuations in economic life are more anticipated, and the effectiveness of measures of prevention and recovery can be continually appraised.³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ See, e.g., C. LIPSON, *STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES* (1985); see also A. HIRSCHMAN, *NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE* (expanded ed. 1980).

³⁰⁷ See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56.

³⁰⁸ See sources cited *supra* note 185; see also *THE BRAIN DRAIN* (W. Adams ed. 1968); *THE BRAIN DRAIN AND TAXATION: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS* (J. Bhagwati ed. 1976); sources cited *supra* note 56.

³⁰⁹ For a brief list of illustrative documents, see sources cited *supra* note 301. See also UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOKS OF INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS, NATIONAL ACCOUNT STATISTICS, AND WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS, as well as publications of the Food and Agricultural Organization.

³¹⁰ For a comprehensive discussion, see *INCOME STABILIZATION FOR A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF HIGH EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT INFLATION* (M. Millikan ed. 1953). See Lasswell, *Stabilization Technique and Patterns of Expectation*, *id.* at 625.

Respect factors influence the direction and magnitude of economic activity. The "management of consumer demand" is one of the principal functions of business in a private enterprise system.³¹¹ The competitive position of a business is affected by its price policy, by the "tested consumer acceptance" of its products, by the packaging and availability of its goods, and by advertising. One of the principal reliances of advertising in modern society is the respect appeal: if you buy this whiskey, the neighbors will know that you are a person of distinction; if you wear that suit, all men and women will spin around in awe and admiration; if you take this music course, jeers will turn into cheers when you sit down at the piano.

What is the overall impact of consumer advertising in a modern economy? There is abundant evidence that advertising is an important element in stimulating demand, and in providing incentives to join and continue as a member of the labor force.³¹² When modern business first penetrates a relatively isolated rural area or discovers a remote folk society, the person who abides by the old folkways receives respect. The function of advertising and merchandising is to spread dissatisfaction with the closed circle of the established system. In part, this is accomplished by catering to the latent rivalrousness of individuals in claiming center stage and arousing the admiring (or envious) comments of fellows. The "store hat," the box of matches, the strand of brightly colored glass beads, the bits of cloth: all these are standard beginnings of what gradually becomes a transformation in the folkways. Since money (or some acceptable item of barter) is required to obtain new gadgets, more hours may be taken away from older pursuits to work in the village, on the plantation, in the mine, or in the city. Quite apart from physical coercion, the culture of modern business spreads into the remotest communities by playing upon such universal values as respect. The value remains intact; but the practices in terms of which it is expressed and interpreted are revolutionized.

The respected folkways of a traditional society limit the spread of modern industry less by restraints imposed upon consumption than on processes of production. The individual can adopt many items of con-

³¹¹ For a brilliant exposition of the management of specific consumer demand, see J. GALBRAITH, *THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE* 198-212 (2d ed. 1971). See generally E. BURTON, *PROMISE THEM ANYTHING: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MADISON AVENUE POWER STRUGGLE* (1972); sources cited *supra* note 294.

³¹² For a contemporary discussion, with ample documentation, see Addis, *supra* note 118, at ch. 6, *Transnational Advertising and the New World Information and Communication Order: Self-Determination from Manipulation II*.

sumption with little effort. But the technology of the steam engine, gasoline motor, or dynamo is a formidable learning problem for economies based almost solely on manual effort.

In folk culture and ancient civilization traders are not unknown,³¹³ but they may be far from respected figures. Hence, it is unthinkable for the sons and daughters of good families to "go into trade." The son of the landlord may be quite willing to study law as a means of stepping into the judiciary or the upper levels of the bureaucracy. But the idea of becoming a business organizer and proprietor-manager comes much more slowly. The transition may be made by way of money lending, so that the lender is transformed into a more modern type of investor, who becomes better acquainted with the routines of industry in this way.

The inventive exuberance of modern science and technology (*skill*) has not resulted in complete self-sufficiency for even the largest powers. There is a tendency to believe that scientific research and its industrial application will reduce the necessity for international trade. Whereas determining the necessity for trade is difficult, the volume of trade, even when domestic "substitutes" have been developed and produced, has increased throughout the twentieth century.³¹⁴ A decision to curtail international trade indicates that power considerations, however well- or ill-advised, took priority over wealth considerations.³¹⁵

Affection influences *wealth* production and consumption. One notable result of research on modern industrial society is an increased understanding of the importance of congenial human relationships as a

³¹³ See M. MAUSS, *THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES* (1954).

³¹⁴ See sources cited *supra* note 301. For a related and critical discussion, see LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, *supra* note 185, at part XI, *Trade Strategy*. See also L. WELT, *TRADE WITHOUT MONEY: BARTER AND COUNTERTRADE* (1984).

³¹⁵ Import control practices are staples of all governments. For a contemporary and impressionistic overview, see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 49, *Industrial Droop*, and text accompanying map. For an analysis of such practices in light of goals for economic development, see J. BHAGWATI, *ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES* (1978). See also A. KRUEGER, *LIBERALIZATION ATTEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES* (1978). The manipulation of the economic instrument may generate unanticipated consequences. See, e.g., K. DAM, *OIL RESOURCES, WHO GETS WHAT HOW?* (1976); G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOT, *TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: THIRTY-ONE CASE STUDIES* (1986); G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT & K. ELLIOT, *ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY* (1985); S. KRASNER, *DEFENDING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, RAW MATERIALS INVESTMENTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY* (1976); W. LEVY, *OIL STRATEGY AND POLITICS, 1941-1981* (M. Conant ed. 1982).

factor affecting production.³¹⁶ In his famous experiments, Elton Mayo made convincing demonstrations of the importance of the primary group on output, as well as on job enjoyment.³¹⁷ In interpreting his findings several points stand out. The "human element" is the factor of overwhelming importance in increasing production. Such a factor did not reveal its potentialities over short periods of time, but required a protracted adjustment process to reach its ceiling. Among the "human factors" the importance of respect and affection stood out, yet could not be satisfactorily disentangled from one another.

Rectitude also influences the economic process.³¹⁸ One of the most controversial hypotheses put forward in the economic history field stresses the alleged impact of Protestantism on the evolution of modern capitalistic economies.³¹⁹ According to this conception the Protestant Reformation played a crucial role by encouraging work, thrift, and investment. In Calvinism, notably among the Calvinists of Geneva, the Huguenots of France, and the Puritans of England, many of the oldest doctrines in the Christian tradition received renewed emphasis and stimulated capital formation. Weber's view was that Calvin developed the idea of a "vocation," found in Luther, until it became a "this-worldly" asceticism in which the godly man pursued the ideal through life. Business success was identified with spiritual salvation.

Well-being has an impact on *wealth*. The deviations from health to be found in a given population put an obvious limit upon the economy's productive potential.³²⁰ In world affairs, whole districts may suffer from

³¹⁶ Important early studies explore administration with an awareness of the importance of affection in the "workplace." See C. BARNARD, *supra* note 121; M. FOLLETT, *supra* notes 121, 205; see also R. BLAUNER, *ALIENATION AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND HIS INDUSTRY* (1964); *HOUSEHOLDS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY* (J. Smith, I. Wallerstein & H. Evers eds. 1984); *MAN AGAINST WORK* (L. Zimpel ed. 1974);

³¹⁷ See E. MAYO, *supra* note 121.

³¹⁸ Cultures with diverse rectitude systems come into increasing contact as the world wealth process continues its global integration. The consequences for wealth, rectitude, and other value institutions remain unclear. For a pertinent, though circumscribed study, see W. REISMAN, *supra* note 13. For a more general example, see the contemporary crisis in South Africa.

³¹⁹ See M. WEBER, *THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM* (T. Parsons trans. 2d ed. 1976); see also R. TAWNEY, *RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A HISTORICAL STUDY* (1926). For further elaboration and critique of Weber, see G. MARSHALL, *IN SEARCH OF THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM: AN ESSAY ON MAX WEBER'S PROTESTANT ETHIC THESIS* (1982); G. POGGI, *CALVINISM AND THE CAPITALIST SPIRIT: MAX WEBER'S PROTESTANT ETHIC* (1982).

³²⁰ For a historical account, see J. HATCHER, *PLAGUE, POPULATION, AND THE ENGLISH ECONOMY, 1348-1530* (1977). Deprivations in terms of mental and emotional well-being are critical as well. See sources cited *supra* notes 121, 177, 180.

coping with relatively inhospitable environments or endemic infections that decrease worker hours and the efficiency of workers or managers.³²¹ The inhabitants of marsh lands have suffered from malaria; and the tropics are infamous for the variety of pathology found there. Differences in altitude impose barriers upon the labor force's easy migration because of the physiological difficulties of adjusting the respiratory, cardiac, and reproductive systems. Lack of physical vitality may act as a drag on the growth of new levels of aspiration for goods and services. The population may increase steadily, nevertheless, and decrease the savings available for investment and therefore for economic growth.

E. Respect

Recent scientific studies confirm the common sense notion that the degree to which individuals are treated with simple human dignity (*respect*) affects all their responses, predisposing them either to violence, war and revolution, or to their utmost exertion in the peaceful production of values.³²² A major factor in world politics today that affects every decision is the accumulated resentments of countless millions of people, and even whole nations, arising from long-endured discriminations, deprivations, and humiliations — a resentment capable of being discharged against many targets, internal and external.³²³ It may be recalled also that aggression, brutality, and violations of human dignity, such as devised by the Nazis, are as contagious as germs. Models of disrespect for human dignity can be copied everywhere. It is not too much, therefore, to say in summary that because of the deep, rising

³²¹ For background, see sources cited *supra* notes 138, 176-77. See also L. BROWN, *supra* note 67; R. REPETTO, *supra* note 67.

³²² See J. DOLLARD, *FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION* (1939); see also E. FROMM, *ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM* (1941); A. KARDINER, *THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONTIERS OF SOCIETY* (1945); H. LASSWELL, *POWER AND PERSONALITY* (1948); E. MAYO, *THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION* (1945); H. SULLIVAN, *CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY* (1947).

³²³ See P. BAUER, *EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD, AND ECONOMIC DELUSION* (1981); H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54; O. KLINEBERG, *supra* note 246; B. MOORE, JR., *INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT* (1978); R. PETTMAN, *STATE AND CLASS: A SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS* (1979); W. RUNCIMAN, *RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY ENGLAND* (1966); R. WEST, *INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY; TWO STUDIES: THE INTRUSION OF ORDER AND CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY* (1974). See generally R. DAHRENDORF, *CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY* (1959); I. KRAUSS, *STRATIFICATION, CLASS, AND CONFLICT* (1976).

demands for consideration and of all these interdependences, it is scarcely questionable whether a world social process characterized by great inequalities in all value processes can endure.³²⁴

The distribution of *respect* in any society is affected by *power* factors.³²⁵ The alteration of respect relations in the course of social revolution is a conspicuous feature of the whole process. The history of radical socialist and communist movements in modern times shows that the systematic inculcation of disrespect for the older generation, for the ruling classes, and for the law is a deliberate strategy of successful revolutionaries. After the seizure of power, active manifestations of contempt for the vestiges of the old regime are mobilized to consolidate the revolutionary order.³²⁶

The Russian revolution flouted the church, scorned religion, and heaped opprobrium upon priests and the devout. Humiliating conditions of life were imposed upon the survivors of the older ruling class (landlords, dynasty, nobility, big bankers, industrialists, merchants, civil officials, officers, and the like). Some of this vehemence had the function of enabling leaders and followers to overcome impulses to conform to requirements of the old order which was, after all, the environment in which they had grown to maturity.³²⁷

If the loss of effective power is gradual, one common response is to seek compensation by multiplying the tokens of respect demanded of the environment. The pomp and circumstance of declining dynasties has been remarked by observant contemporaries and historians. Sudden accession to power, however, characteristically brings with it something of the "show off" associated with the parvenu in politics, as in other institutions.

³²⁴ For review, see M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4.

³²⁵ See generally T. BOTTOMORE, *ELITES AND SOCIETY* (1965); B. CARTER, *CAPITALISM, CLASS CONFLICT, AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS* (1985); CLASSES, POWER AND CONFLICT: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES (A. Giddens & D. Held eds. 1982); G. LENSKI, *POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION* (1966); F. PARKIN, *CLASS INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL ORDER: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN CAPITALIST AND COMMUNIST SOCIETIES* (1971). For further discussion, see sources cited *supra* notes 35, 323. For an intriguing perspective, see A. GOULDNER, *THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS: A FRAME OF REFERENCE, THESES, CONJECTURES, ARGUMENTS, AND AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLASS CONTEST OF THE MODERN ERA* (1979).

³²⁶ See *WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES, STUDIES IN COERCIVE IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS* (H. Lasswell & D. Lerner eds. 1965) [hereafter *WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES*].

³²⁷ See generally E. CARR, 1-7 *A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA* (1950-64).

International law and diplomacy (as evolved among Western nations, for example) was initially adapted to the requirements of ruling sovereigns whose relations were eased by the formal assumption of equality. The facts of effective power were perpetually shifting, so that the great power of today might be a smaller power (or two small powers) tomorrow. By negotiating coalitions and other agreements within the framework of formal equality of respect, the system of power relations was able to smooth away (by failing to stress) the facts of a considerable loss of power on the part of a participant. By retaining a respect position opportunities were more readily available to "stay in the game" and by successful alliances to recoup one's political assets. To remain as a "recognized" member of the family of nations was to retain relatively ready access to the stream of negotiation among the powers.³²⁸

It is evident on reflection and study that *respect* relations are deeply affected by the prevailing nature and degree of *enlightenment*. The respect systems of the globe evolved under circumstances in which parochial assumptions about the past, present, and future were unchecked by broader perspectives. Many traditional biases are sustained simply because they have never been challenged by contradictory experience. Long inventories have been made of the demonstrably false assumptions that enter into local myths of innate "superiority" (or "inferiority").³²⁹ In urban centers, situated at the crossroads of regional and global traffic, parochial biases, with some egregious exceptions, are in a perpetual state of attrition. New and often more accurate images arise of the earth's inhabitants. In modern times the spread of scientific institutions and general education contributes a formidable machinery of verification to the testing of many ancient statements about people and culture.

Wealth has a profound influence on the structure of *respect* in national communities and in the world community.³³⁰ We know that in

³²⁸ For a thorough overview of "recognition," with documentation, see Reisman & Suzuki, *Recognition and Social Change in International Law: A Prologue for Decisionmaking*, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDUGAL (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976).

³²⁹ See generally M. MCDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at part III, *Trends in Decision and Conditioning Factors: Claims Relating to Respect*.

³³⁰ Recent studies include N. ABERCROMBIE, CAPITAL, LABOUR, AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES (1983); R. CROMPTON, ECONOMY AND CLASS STRUCTURE (1977); E. HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR WORK (1958); POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND CLASS STRUCTURE (D. Wedderburn ed. 1974); THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR, TECHNOLOGY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT — CONSEQUENCES FOR THE THIRD WORLD (D. Ernst ed. 1980); L. RAINWATER, WHAT MONEY BUYS: INEQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF INCOME (1974); G. SALAMAN, CLASS AND THE CORPORATION (1981).

many cultures the control of material instruments of production and consumption does not confer the highest respect; nor indeed, much respect of any kind.³³¹ It is by renouncing material ties and living from alms that the career of ascetic contemplation is fostered in some ancient civilizations. The impoverished warrior may outrank the merchant or the landlord in the respect hierarchy of various cultures.

The rise of modern methods of production, however, has placed enormous premiums upon the control of material resources. Wherever Western industrialism has gone, economic values and institutions have played a major role. In Great Britain and the United States stratification by wealth is the most applicable, although not the sole key, to the respect hierarchy.³³²

The social class structure of any society depends for its perpetuation upon the comprehensive process of value allocation, including wealth. With the revolution of modern industrialism, class systems of traditional societies have been drastically overhauled or scuttled entirely. Part of the process of complex adjustment entails the lowering of the respect received by the upper classes in the older systems. In this way some of the most pervasive controls exercised by local elites have withered away, and respect has gradually recrystallized around persons whose role is positive in introducing technological and scientific change.³³³

In some cases older societies have survived the transition and guided the modernization of life. Japan is the outstanding example. Study missions were sent to Europe to become acquainted with the new order. Members of the missions were younger members of well-established families. On their return the central government encouraged them to

³³¹ See, e.g., P. HAHM, *THE KOREAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND LAW: ESSAYS IN KOREAN LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY* (1967). See generally, Y. FUNG, *A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY* (D. Bodde trans. 1952-53).

³³² On the United States, see J. BROOKS, *SHOWING OFF IN AMERICA: FROM CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION TO PARODY DISPLAY* (1981); R. COLEMAN, L. RAINWATER & K. MCCLELLAND, *SOCIAL STANDING IN AMERICA: NEW DIMENSIONS OF CLASS* (1978); R. FRANK, *CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS* (1985); P. FUSSELL, *CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS SYSTEM* (1983); A. REISS, JR. ET AL., *OCCUPATIONS AND SOCIAL STATUS* (1961). On the United Kingdom, see *COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STRATIFICATION: MEXICO, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN* (J. Kahl ed. 1968); *ELITES AND POWER IN BRITISH SOCIETY* (P. Stanworth & A. Giddens eds. 1974); A. STEWART, K. PRANDY & R. BLACKBURN, *SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND OCCUPATIONS* (1980); See generally, A. GIDDENS, *THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE ADVANCED SOCIETIES* (1973); W. LANDECKER, *CLASS CRYSTALLIZATION* (1981).

³³³ See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56.

take responsibility for adapting foreign institutional patterns to Japanese conditions. In this way old families retained their respect position by taking the initiative to remodel Japanese civilization. New activities permitted talent to be drawn from the middle and lower strata of society, but for the most part, decisive posts in the control system remained with older families.³³⁴

Demonstrations of *skill* influence the distribution of *respect*.³³⁵ Displays of excellence in sports, music, arts, and other spheres have modified some oversimplified images of national and ethnic groups.³³⁶ These presentations in response to expanding opportunity do not carry prompt conviction when they run contrary to a well-established bias. But when the skill level of an entire group is permanently raised and great versatility is shown in the skills represented the impact on ancient respect structures is not insignificant.

Respect is subject to changes rooted in *affection*.³³⁷ In periods of rapidly expanding nationalism older structures of respect are greatly modified.³³⁸ Traditional barriers are relaxed and social intercourse is greatly simplified. The same process appears among co-revolutionists and among those who share a positive tie with collective identification symbols. Etiquette loses much of its former complexity. Differences of dress diminish. The language of public and private discourse is more direct and lacking in complication. Literature and the arts rely upon common experience rather than the esoteric lore of privileged classes.

³³⁴ For a brief overview, see M. MORISHIMA, *supra* note 122.

³³⁵ The opportunity to transform latent talent into socially recognized skill is a critical base value. The myth of meritocracy plays an important role in shaping the distribution of respected skills in many communities. See O. DUNCAN, D. FEATHERMAN & B. DUNCAN, *SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND ACHIEVEMENT* (1972); J. GARDNER, *EXCELLENCE: CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT TOO?* (rev. ed. 1984); M. LARSON, *THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS* (1977); M. YOUNG, *THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY, 1870-2033: THE NEW ELITE OF OUR SOCIAL REVOLUTION* (1958).

³³⁶ For an excellent case study, see J. TYGIEL, *BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND HIS LEGACY* (1983). See also R. GRUNEAU, *CLASS, SPORTS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT* (1983).

³³⁷ See, e.g., G. ALLAN, *FAMILY LIFE: DOMESTIC ROLES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION* (1985); D. CHAPMAN, *THE HOME AND SOCIAL STATUS* (1955).

³³⁸ See S. AMIN, *CLASS AND NATION, HISTORICALLY AND IN THE CURRENT CRISIS* (S. Kaplow trans. 1980); K. DEUTSCH, *NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY* (1953); G. GLEZERMAN, *CLASSES AND NATIONS* (D. Fidlón trans. 1979); C. VOGLER, *THE NATION STATE: THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF CLASS* (1985); see also sources cited *supra* note 22 (especially the works by Bozeman, Young and Bertelsen). See generally sources cited *supra* note 238.

Rectitude factors enter into the patterning of *respect* relationships.³³⁹ The vision of common humanity, as projected by the great religions and philosophies, is a driving force in the contemporary movement for human dignity and human rights.³⁴⁰ Of course, conceptions of rectitude generate and are used to justify what we consider regressive tendencies whenever they are employed to exalt the "superiority" or "righteousness" of one group and to demean the character and practices of others. Physiological factors are conveniently seized upon, in this regard, to justify and guide the allocation of respect to the self and others.³⁴¹ Pigmentation is a most obvious focal point.

Respect is affected by *well-being*. Among the factors that influence respect evaluations of an individual or a group must be mentioned the state of health.³⁴² The lower classes of a community are likely to present a less robust picture than the wealthy and powerful. And whole communities may be evaluated as "backward" if they are ridden with such diseases as trachoma or skin infections that result in discoloration, sores, and swellings.

F. Affection

Sentiments of love and loyalty are modified on a global scale.³⁴³ In one perspective the world can be viewed as a kaleidoscope of circles that

³³⁹ Where appropriate conduct is valued, custodians and enforcers of a group's myths can be expected to occupy privileged positions in the respect hierarchy. See, e.g., M. KOHN, *CLASS AND CONFORMITY: A STUDY IN VALUES, WITH A REASSESSMENT* (2d ed. 1977).

³⁴⁰ See generally *THE GREAT RELIGIONS OF THE MODERN WORLD* (E. Jurji ed. 1946); UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, *BIRTHRIGHT OF MAN: A SELECTION OF TEXTS* (1969).

³⁴¹ See M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at chapter 9, *Claims Relating to Racial Discrimination*; see also O. COX, *CASTE, CLASS AND RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS* (1959); E. FRAZIER, *RACE AND CULTURE CONTACTS IN THE MODERN WORLD* (1957); M. GORDON, *HUMAN NATURE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY* (1978); T. SHIBUTANI & K. KWAN, *ETHNIC STRATIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH* (1965); A. SZYMANSKI, *CLASS STRUCTURE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE* (1983); *CASTE AND RACE: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES* (A. de Reuck & J. Knight eds. 1968); On the American context, see J. HOCHSCHILD, *supra* note 299; G. MYRDAL, *supra* note 299; 6 G. MYRDAL, *CHALLENGE TO AFFLUENCE* (1963).

³⁴² See, e.g., B. DOHRENWEND & B. DOHRENWEND, *SOCIAL STATUS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER: A CASUAL INQUIRY* (1969); *CLASS AND PERSONALITY IN SOCIETY* (A. Grey ed. 1969); See also sources cited *supra* notes 179-80.

³⁴³ See, e.g., W. GOODE, *WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILY PATTERNS* (1963); *HOUSEHOLDS: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE DOMESTIC GROUP* (R. Netting, R. Wilk & E. Arnould eds. 1984); *HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE DOMESTIC*

join human beings in bands of congeniality and loyalty, or may divide them by barriers of indifference and animosity. Often the lesser circles sustain the larger, as when the love of neighborhood, city, and region reinforce national identifications. But loyalties may clash: witness the consequences of divided loyalties in the same family during times of partisan and sectional conflict.³⁴⁴

Increasingly, especially among elites in different value sectors, the friendship network (*affection*) is established transnationally, with circles of friends scattered in various parts of the globe. As life styles of the elite continue to converge, more and more people (top managers, engineers, scientists, public figures, and so on) have more major contacts in the principal cities of the world than within the territorial communities in which they have their origin.

Affection is influenced by *power* factors. The power balancing process in any arena often creates difficulties in the adjustment of loyalties and friendships to new conditions. When the balance of power was a "game" practiced by a limited circle of sovereigns and advisors it was assumed that coalitions would form and reform on the basis of expediency. Within this sophisticated framework congenial relations were quickly resumed with a former enemy who suddenly switched and became an ally. When the general public is drawn into the balancing process the "emotional" factors are less mobile. The members of the community at large do not share the expectations of the professional diplomat or officer and burn with rage at the "loved" ally who "deserts" and joins the other side. Modern methods of mass publicity are not likely to be under sufficient official control to prevent at least a considerable "lag" in public sentiment.³⁴⁵

The consequences of power for family life and friendship often have been reviewed, especially in their more tragic aspects. Military service reaches into the home and may disrupt family circles. Chinese literature has many elegant complaints composed by scholarly officials who, having received their appointment after completing the appropriate examinations, found that they were assigned to distant provinces far from friends at the capital and elsewhere. We know, of course, of the exag-

GROUP OVER THE LAST THREE CENTURIES IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, SERBIA, JAPAN AND COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA, WITH FURTHER MATERIALS FROM WESTERN EUROPE (P. Laslett & R. Wall eds. 1972); P. SOROKIN, *THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL OUTLOOK* (1941).

³⁴⁴ See sources cited *supra* note 246. For a contemporary account, see S. CHRISTIAN, *NICARAGUA, REVOLUTION IN THE FAMILY* (1985).

³⁴⁵ See I. CLAUDE, JR., *supra* note 297; K. WALTZ, *FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE* (1967).

gerated veneration of rulers, which may contribute to the perpetual complaint of those in high positions of authority and control who find themselves suffering from loneliness.³⁴⁶

Affection is influenced by the sources and content of *enlightenment*. Professional diplomats and soldiers are trained to subordinate their likes and dislikes but in practice this is a counsel of perfection. "Love is blind" in the sense that once a positive attitude has become crystallized, information that reflects against the loved object will be dismissed from the focus of attention. Once convinced of having been "misled," however, one may turn against the "betrayers," and add to the withdrawal of affection active efforts to get revenge.

The influence of information on the formation of attitudes has been studied from many points of view.³⁴⁷ The single most immediate factor that guides the sentiments of humankind is the limitations in enlightenment that are very largely a function of parochialism. It is the monopoly that the older generation exercises over the focus of attention of the young that accounts for the moulding of nationals of each country.³⁴⁸

Wealth changes the distribution of sentiment patterns. Wealth con-

³⁴⁶ For further discussion, consult H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 233; Lasswell, *Conflict and Leadership: The Process of Decision and the Nature of Authority*, in CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM ON CONFLICT IN SOCIETY (A. de Reuck & J. Knight eds. 1966). For studies focused on specific personalities, see E. ERICKSON, *YOUNG MAN LUTHER: A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HISTORY* (1958); A. GEORGE & J. GEORGE, *WOODROW WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE: A PERSONALITY STUDY* (1956). See also T. WIEGELE et al., *LEADERS UNDER STRESS: A PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES* (1985).

³⁴⁷ See generally D. CANARY & D. SEIBOLD, *ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY* (1984); J. HALLORAN, *ATTITUDE FORMATION AND CHANGE* (1967); *ATTITUDES, SELECTED READINGS* (M. Jahoda & N. Warren eds. 1966); C. KIESLER, *ATTITUDE CHANGE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES* (1969); M. ROKEACH, *THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS AND PERSONALITY SYSTEMS* (1960); M. SHERIF & C. HOVLAND, *SOCIAL JUDGMENT: ASSIMILATION AND CONTRAST EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE* (1961); H. TRIANDIS, *ATTITUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE* (1971). On persuasion, see R. PETTY & J. CACIOPPO, *ATTITUDES AND PERSUASION — CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES* (1981); *THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE: READINGS IN PERSUASION* (T. Beisecker & D. Parson eds. 1972). On public opinion, see F. CHISMAN, *ATTITUDE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION* (1976); J. LEMERT, *DOES MASS COMMUNICATION CHANGE PUBLIC OPINION AFTER ALL?: A NEW APPROACH TO EFFECTS ANALYSIS* (1981). On propaganda, important early work includes L. DOOB, *PROPAGANDA: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE* (1935); *PROPAGANDA AND PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY* (H. Lasswell, R. Casey, & B. Smith eds. 1935, 1969 with a new introduction). See also sources cited *supra* notes 80, 169.

³⁴⁸ See *supra* notes 178, 238.

siderations frequently modify sentiments in a way that is of particular importance for world affairs. When traders and merchants cannot intimidate potential customers, they may find that the cultivation of amicable relationships is good business. But when markets can be obtained by force, the calculation of economic advantage may lead to an unfriendly attitude toward commercial rivals and a positive attitude toward partners.

Economies possessing mobile capital can operate far and wide over the earth, penetrating peacefully where borrowers can be found.³⁴⁹ But other economies are limited to nearby countries, and to relatively "heavy handed" methods. The position of Russia was characterized in a fundamental way in a dispatch of the Russian charge d'affaires in Peking to his government in 1910:

Should we be sufficiently powerful economically, it would be simpler to direct all our efforts to the conclusion of an economic treaty. If, however, as I fear, we should by so doing only be of service to foreigners and ourselves be unable to secure any profits . . . then there is, in my opinion, no reason to depart from the . . . policy we have followed hitherto, that of territorial acquisition.³⁵⁰

Respect factors influence the distribution of *affection*. The narrowing effect of social class upon the permissible range of friendship and marriage are well known in all societies.³⁵¹

Skill is a factor in the distribution of friendly attitudes. The arts of congeniality are distributed differently even in the same community, as well as across community lines. Many of the skills connected with modern science and technology are developed and applied by practitioners who identify with one another and keep in close association (within politically feasible limits). They transcend at least the cruder images of a parochial kind, and are identified frequently with a conception of their profession that will free it to work directly for the good of humankind as a whole.³⁵²

³⁴⁹ That the initial contact is amicable is no guarantee that relations will remain congenial. Note the bitterness characteristic of many expropriation proceedings, debt reschedulings, foreign exchange rate or trade negotiations, and so on. Though many factors contribute to poisoning the atmosphere in such settings, a sense of betrayal can be prominent.

³⁵⁰ Taken from studies by Harold D. Lasswell.

³⁵¹ See W. GOODE, *supra* note 343.

³⁵² For further discussion, see H. LASSWELL, *The Perspectives of Revolutionary Intellectuals*, in HAROLD D. LASSWELL, *ON POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY* (D. Marvick ed. 1977); Lasswell, *The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research*, in *WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES*, *supra* note 326, at 29.

Rectitude is a factor shaping the distribution of *affection*. We have referred to the persisting impact of religion and philosophy upon appreciation of human dignity in general and upon respect appraisals in particular. Part of the effect is in terms of love and friendship. Respect relations are not necessarily warm and outgoing, since they imply a certain aloofness from invasion of privacy. Affection is a different, although closely connected, matter. The demand for affection goes beyond the barriers and reticences that separate one ego from another. Worshipping the same god, especially in the same church or temple, helps to forge a tie of affection.³⁵³

Well-being influences the distribution of *affection*.³⁵⁴ Tensions in world affairs and in more intimate human relations are affected by many neurotic, psychopathic, and even psychotic factors that operate in the lives of elites and members of the rank and file.³⁵⁵ Historically this was most apparent in the lives of certain outstanding personages. The grandiosity or the suspiciousness of a ruler or a ruling clique may bring about policies that provoke crises of such intensity that the result is disastrous. On the other hand, the "tendency to love masochistically" may carry with it an urge to give in to the aggressor; decision makers possessing such personality systems may temporize.

G. Skill

In a world of universalizing science and technology, new technologies and *skills* developed in one community may have applications far beyond its borders; skills travel with increasing tempo throughout the globe. Similarly, although recognized centers of creativity exist, no single community has a monopoly of innovative competence.³⁵⁶ In the ag-

³⁵³ See generally G. LENSKI, *THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION'S IMPACT ON POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND FAMILY LIFE* (1963).

³⁵⁴ The maintenance of a stable diet and somatic integrity often precede the capacity to cultivate affection. See A. MASLOW, *THE FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE* (1971) (providing further discussion and orientation); A. MASLOW, *TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING* (2d ed. 1968).

³⁵⁵ See generally *supra* notes 179-80. See also K. HORNEY, *OUR INNER CONFLICTS: A CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY OF NEUROSIS* (1945); R. MAY, *THE MEANING OF ANXIETY* (rev. ed. 1977); W. STEKEL, *COMPULSION AND DOUBT* (E. Guthell trans. 1949).


³⁵⁶ The first structural change that accompanied modernization, and one of the most important, was the creation of high levels of interdependence in the relationships among most societies. The growth in interdependence . . . is related, in the first place, to the cumulative effects of the application of scientific knowledge to human affairs. For the essence of cumulative knowledge is that it is inherently *transnational*. Once it is developed,

gregate, the development of skill, notably in science and technology, varies directly with the degree of access to skill in the larger community. Hence, programs for transfer of technology and skill (technical exchange or assistance) flourish.³⁵⁷

The degree to which expanding interdependence fosters skill is indicated by the record in such fields as communication, atomic energy, medicine, law, and finance. Modern technology in the field of communication has come into being during the last four centuries. The tempo of interaction among scientists and inventors was increasing throughout Europe and the British Isles; the expansion of European civilization into North America "paid off" in new inventions. Table 3 provides an indication of the international character of this enterprise.

Table 3

This chart has been abstracted from Woodbury, D.O., *Communication* (D. Woodbury, Communications 19 (1931) with national identifications added.



it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to create a national monopoly on it. "No matter where these technological and social innovations emerge," as Kuznets has argued, "the economic growth of any given nation depends upon their adoption. In that sense, whatever the national affiliation of resources used, any single nation's economic growth has its base somewhere outside its boundaries — with the single exception of the pioneering nation, and no nation remains the pioneer for long."

E. MORSE, *supra* note 18, at 9-10. See also H. BARNETT, *supra* note 23; E. ROGERS, *supra* note 23. For a provocative hypothesis on discovery and invention, see R. MERTON, *supra* note 110.

³⁵⁷ See generally sources cited *supra* note 185.

A similar process of expanding interaction lies behind the development of atomic energy, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

This diagram is based predominantly on the information furnished by J. Cockcroft, *The Development and Future of Nuclear Energy* (1950) and W. Dampier, *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy & Religion* (4th edition, revised 1949).

<p><u>Fermi and his American Associates</u> Nuclear Chain Reaction United States: 1942</p> <p>Meitner and Frisch Deduction that Hahn-Strassmann test constituted proof of atomic fissionability. Refugees from Germany in Denmark: 1939</p> <p><u>Hahn and Strassmann</u> Observation that the Fermi-type bombardment of uranium with neutrons gives rise to completely new elements. Germany: 1939</p>	<p><u>Fermi</u> Observation that uranium exposure to neutrons re- sults in transmutation. Italy: 1934</p> <p><u>Urey</u> Empirical verification of theory of neutron. Identification of deutron. United States: 1939</p> <p><u>Chadwick</u> Formulation of theory of neutrons. England: 1932</p> <p><u>Lawrence</u> Invention of the cyclotron United States: 1930</p>	<p><u>Heisenberg</u> New quantum theory within limits empirical verification. The Bohr model revised. Germany: 1925</p> <p><u>Cockroft and Walton</u> Careful laboratory systematization of the use of hydrogen projectiles against atomic nuclei. England: 1920-1939</p> <p><u>Compton</u> Studies in wave frequency. United States: 1932</p> <p><u>Aston</u> The "mass spectrograph": empirical verification of Einstein's law in its bearing on the study of nuclear energy. Isolation of isotopes. England: 1920</p>	<p><u>Bohr</u> Quantum theory of atomic structure. Application of Planck's theory to Rutherford's system. Denmark: 1913</p> <p><u>Rutherford</u> Formulation of theory of nuclear atomic structure & energy. England: 1911 (earlier work in Canada)</p> <p><u>Marsden</u> Experiments in deflection of helium projectiles fired through gold foils. England: 1909</p> <p><u>Einstein</u> Fundamental law of the equivalence of mass & energy ($E=mc^2$) Germany: 1905</p>	<p><u>Planck</u> General quantum theory Germany: 1901</p> <p><u>Lorentz</u> Identification of the electron. Netherlands: 1897</p> <p><u>Bequerel</u> Radioactivity France: 1896</p>	1895	1905	1915	1925	1935	1945
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It is difficult today to visualize a contemporary medical practice that does not rely upon such basic equipment as the stethoscope, ophthalmoscope, laryngoscope, or x-ray. The stethoscope was invented in France, the ophthalmoscope, laryngoscope, and x-ray in Germany. Facing common problems, many medical discoveries have been adopted wherever modern medicine is practiced.³⁵⁸ Immunology, for example, is a com-

³⁵⁸ See sources cited *supra* notes 268, 270, 273.

posite national creation to which Koch, Behring, and Pasteur made notable contributions, and which today is applied throughout the globe. The demand for improved surgical services spurred the international development of anesthetics in the early nineteenth century. Important experiments were made with ether (Faraday in England; Long and Godmen in the United States), nitrous oxide (Davy in England), and chloroform (Flourens in France, Simpson in England). Under improved operating conditions, surgical techniques were rapidly improved. Medical instruction not only improved, but became increasingly standardized at the principal world centers. For example, cadaver dissection has been part of universal medical training since the nineteenth century.

The diffusion and adaptation of knowledge and method has not been restricted to the physical sciences and engineering. The analytic and procedural skills incorporated in legal institutions were borrowed and amended on a vast scale. The principles made explicit in the Byzantine codification of Roman Law were absorbed by every existing legal system (with the exception of primitive societies). In continental Europe and Latin America the theoretical constructs of Roman Law were the accepted foundation of national legal development. This is true of cultures as far apart as France and the Soviet Union. The Anglo-American world has a lesser, although significant, indebtedness to Roman Law principles, directly and by way of canon law influence on both equity jurisprudence and common law.³⁵⁹

In financial relations the spread of skill has led to the invention and borrowing of many new instruments and procedures. Contemporary banking practices and corporate management owe a great deal to the English and American remodeling of patterns created by the Italian merchant cities of the Middle Ages.³⁶⁰

In regard to *skill*, *power* relations play an influential and occasionally determinative role. Power considerations have affected skill development in areas most closely related to the balancing of power: the control of energy (nuclear and other). The correlation of total power with power over energy is very close.³⁶¹ In modern times the impact of

³⁵⁹ See W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, *ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE* (F. Lawson 2d rev. ed. rev. 1965); F. MAITLAND, *ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: SIX ESSAYS* (1898).

³⁶⁰ See generally A. BOZEMAN, *supra* note 22; 2 *THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE: TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN THE MIDDLE AGES* (M. Poston & E. Rich eds. 1952); *MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD: ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS* (R. Lopez & I. Raymond eds. 1955).

³⁶¹ See W. McNEILL, *THE PURSUIT OF POWER: TECHNOLOGY, ARMED FORCES,*

war, preparation for war, and the expansion of skills associated with science and industry have been unmistakable. As armies grew larger, and weapons became more complicated, the expansion of modern techniques of production was accelerated by armament contractors. In the eighteenth century Le Blanc introduced a system for the mass production of standardized muskets in France. Shortly thereafter, Eli Whitney inaugurated a similar system of gunmaking. Within a few years the method became universal. Where private enterprise existed, war contracts were a lucrative source of capital, adapted not only to the peacetime improvement of weapons, but to the discovery of peacetime products to which the new methods of larger scale manufacture could be applied. The United States Civil War was a major episode in the expansion of United States industry. World Wars I and II had much the same significance. World War II carried the "new industrial revolution" into previously neglected fields such as the shipbuilding, housing (prefabricated), and food (dehydration) industries.

The foregoing instances show the profound impact of power upon the introduction and improvement of various skills, some of which have much wider application than to the specific tasks of fighting. Conversely, it is essential to estimate the equally profound effect of power upon the inhibition of skill development in various fields. The expectation of violence, whether in periods of relative war or peace, influences the apportionment of available resources.³⁶² Even when the state is not centralized and regimented, individuals voluntarily seek to make what they do appear significant. In practice this often means selecting "pure" as well as "applied" problems to make a contribution to the national effort. Those scientists concerned with fundamental advances in knowledge resented the time spent in perfecting an atomic bomb on scientific grounds, no matter how willingly they participated in the undertaking to enhance other values.

Power concerns also inhibit the development of particular skills in the application of knowledge. For example, censorship in the services of

AND SOCIETY SINCE A.D. 1000 (1982); J. NEF, *WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS: AN ESSAY ON THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION* (1950); see also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 12, *Energy Power*, Map 13, *Oil Power*, Map 16, *Nuclear Power*, and text accompanying maps. For an indication of the intensity of concern associated with the realization in parts of the West that the supply of petroleum is no longer reliable, see sources cited *supra* note 236; M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at 50 n.120.

³⁶² The opportunity costs required to sustain the global war system are significant. See sources cited *supra* note 305; see also M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 24, *Harmworkers and Healthworkers*.

the Nazi orthodoxy culminated in the decisive decline of German science. State withdrawal of "non-Aryan" sources of enlightenment from the main stream of scientific communication seriously impaired research in such fields as psychology and physics which were permitted to resort to Freud and Einstein only by indirection. More serious results flowed from the increasing imposition of secrecy in research. For example, Lawrence Kubie is reported to have remarked that the German scientists "never sat around tables together swapping their experiences of trials and errors, telling of how their work was going or asking each other for suggestions."³⁶³

Communist censorship has accounted for numerous examples of scientific retardation. At one time state withdrawal of "capitalist" sources of enlightenment from the main channel of scientific communication extended to rejection of Mendelian genetics in favor of genetic theories more in keeping with Soviet political orthodoxy and the refusal to engage in exchange of students and scientists with Western countries.³⁶⁴ In the German and Soviet cases the system imposed a pattern of uncommunicativeness. In each case the uncommunicativeness hampered scientific development. Censorship practices can be expected to result in extensive scientific and cultural impoverishment.³⁶⁵

Skill is affected by the state of *enlightenment*. There are striking examples of the skill deterioration that comes when parts of the world

³⁶³ See generally L. KUBIE, *NEUROTIC DISTORTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS* (1958); *SYMBOL AND NEUROSIS: SELECTED PAPERS OF LAWRENCE S. KUBIE* (H. Schlesinger ed. 1978).

³⁶⁴ See T. LYSENKO, *AGROBIOLOGY: ESSAYS ON PROBLEMS OF GENETICS, PLANT BREEDING AND SEED GROWING* (1954); T. LYSENKO, *HEREDITY AND ITS VARIABILITY* (T. Dobzhansky trans. 1946). For perspective, see J. HUXLEY, *HEREDITY EAST AND WEST: LYSENKO AND WORLD SCIENCE* (1949); D. JORAVSKY, *THE LYSENKO AFFAIR* (1970); D. LECOURT, *PROLETARIAN SCIENCE? THE CASE OF LYSENKO* (B. Brewster trans. 1977); Z. MEDVEDEV, *THE RISE AND FALL OF T.D. LYSENKO* (I. Lerner trans. 1969).

³⁶⁵ In regard to such phenomena in contemporary Russia, see H. SMITH, *THE RUSSIANS* 361-68 (1976). Smith writes:

Soviet science is hurt, they [Soviet scientists] said, by poor communications among Soviet scientists who are terribly compartmentalized. Normally it takes a year or two for new findings to get into scholarly journals, a process that in the West can be cut to weeks or days for important breakthroughs and thus speed scientific progress. The ferment and fast moving exchange of ideas prevalent in Western science, I was told, is largely absent in Soviet science.

Id. at 367. The governmentalizing and corporatizing of research in the West could stifle the openness and vigor that has characterized scientific pursuits in the West. For further discussion and documentation, see *supra* note 291.

community shut themselves off from intercourse with the whole. Lacking the challenge of new ideas, the available stock of patterns is applied and reapplied, often with great refinement of detail.³⁶⁶ But in the utilization of resources, in particular, the isolated groups are likely to fall behind others (for example, in the discovery of new sources of energy). Japan's period of exclusion from the early seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries is the standard example. During this period Japan was in command of the basic culture which it had borrowed and developed from China (and India). Jolted into intercourse by Americans and Europeans, the Japanese discovered a dramatic change in the uses of raw materials available at home and abroad. They also learned that they were unfamiliar with social organization methods appropriate to the large-scale use of physical energies and materials.

During wars (or cold wars) many industrial nations are separated from one another. However, during short periods impaired contact with outside science and technology has not always had deleterious results. Sharing the same beginning skills as the opponent, it may be possible to make progress in exploiting the common potentialities. Nations may apply their shared inheritance more promptly and imaginatively, as the Americans did (with the allies) during World War II when they won the race for an atomic bomb. But any restriction on the communication of scientific knowledge (and application) slows the tempo of advancement and typically has this effect. This is indicated by the postwar discovery by the United States (and allies) that the Germans had outdistanced them in several fields (notably in rocket research).

The result of isolation of primitive peoples was the development of skill potentials of impressive ingeniousness.³⁶⁷ The Eskimo is admired for the development of very special survival instruments. But the skills employed by the Eskimo are so highly specialized to local conditions

³⁶⁶ For an overview, see R. BENEDICT, *supra* note 178; A. KROEBER, *supra* note 40; A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN & A. REGINALD, *supra* note 210; R. SAYCE, *PRIMITIVE ARTS AND CRAFTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MATERIAL CULTURE* (1933). More specific works include C. BOWRA, *PRIMITIVE SONG* (1962); J. HARRISON, *supra* note 184. See also J. PFEIFFER, *supra* note 184; A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY, *supra* note 146; H. RASHDALL, *supra* note 289.

³⁶⁷ See generally *THE ARTIST IN TRIBAL SOCIETY* (M. Smith ed. 1961); C. CLARK & S. PIGGOTT, *PREHISTORIC SOCIETIES* (1965); G. CLARK, *supra* note 184; C. FORDE, *HABITAT, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY: A GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOLOGY* (1934); O. MASON, *THE ORIGINS OF INVENTION: A STUDY OF INDUSTRY AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES* (1895); R. REDFIELD, *THE PRIMITIVE WORLD AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS* (1953). *THE SOCIAL LIFE OF EARLY MAN* (S. Washburn ed. 1961).

that the carriers of Eskimo culture are unable to grasp many of the potentialities which are by-products of modern science and industry; and the culture patterns of the world of scientific industrialism are applicable to a far wider range of environments than were confronted by any primitive people.

Wealth affects the pattern and the pace of *skill* development. The development of a modern techno-scientific culture requires the investment of vast sums. As the division of labor grows more complex, the skills connected with science, engineering, and management become more numerous and refined. Mathematics, for instance, is divided into so many specialties that mathematicians make little effort to keep up with the entire field. The same point applies to physics, chemistry, biology, and the social sciences. Without a great economic base, it is impracticable for any community to keep pace with the evolution of the wealthier centers.³⁶⁸

In communities in which significant differences exist among occupations in terms of the financial opportunities they provide, many individuals develop and hone those skills believed most likely to yield a high paying position. In this fashion, the market structure guides the development of skill. This is especially true when wealth rewarding occupations are also the highly respected ones.

Respect factors modify the distribution of *skills*. The introduction of modern industrial society over the globe is affected by the respect patterns that prevail in many cultures and classes.³⁶⁹ It is notorious, for instance, that nomadic hunters and herders are averse to "demeaning" themselves by becoming "mere peasants" or "petty tradesmen." In pre-Communist China the scholarly official's life found no place for manual skill; hence it was difficult to give practical as well as theoretical training to engineers.³⁷⁰ The enormous prestige of passing literary examinations turned the energies of bright and ambitious young people toward sedentary reading, memorizing, and recalling. The cultivation of meditative skill has been one of the principal features of civilizations with strong "internalizing" trends. Deference has gone to the Holy Man, who is often withdrawn into the forest.

Skills are modified by the prevailing patterns of *affection*. It is a question here of the influence of larger loyalties upon the growth of

³⁶⁸ Demands for a *New International Economic Order* reflect, in part, awareness of this fact. The capacity to cultivate and apply modern technology rather than simply to purchase it is a long-term objective for most. See sources cited *supra* note 185.

³⁶⁹ See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56.

³⁷⁰ See generally J. NEEDHAM, *supra* note 226.

skills. The expansion of nationalistic sentiment has typically resulted in mobilizing the younger generation to serve the cause of liberation (if the nationality lacks independence) or modernization. And the pursuit of modernization leads to the study of the skills believed to be part of the culture of an "advanced" society. During the nineteenth century, for example, the influx of students from all over the world to Western European learning centers was one of the principal characteristics of the age.

When nationalism and democracy coincide, it results in the appearance of discernible tendencies in canons of taste.³⁷¹ In general the champions of democratic nationalism rejected the art forms of the feudal period. Instead of complexity, the accent was upon simplicity — simplicity in manner, dress, and speech. In the decorative arts the "folk" taste was cultivated. In painting and sculpture, for instance, the criteria were relatively concrete and depictive with a minimum of abstraction. Music and dance reached into the "popular" strata to provide thematic material for the composing and performing elite. In the West the style was rhythmic and melodic, and allusive to common experience. In architecture the barriers that separated the King and the nobility from the lower orders were broken down. Hence, the palaces became accessible.³⁷²

The development of *skill* (and taste) is influenced by *rectitude* factors. In every known area of human experience, the enforcement of orthodoxy or secrecy standards has been seen to be inimical to an untrammelled scientific development dependent upon a wide exchange of information.³⁷³

Medieval Christendom stifled widespread development of learning

³⁷¹ See generally G. SCOTT, *THE ARCHITECTURE OF HUMANISM: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF TASTE* (1914, 1980).

³⁷² See T. HAMLIN, *ARCHITECTURE THROUGH THE AGES* (rev. ed. 1953); see also H. LASSWELL & M. FOX, *THE SIGNATURE OF POWER: BUILDINGS, COMMUNICATION, AND POLICY* (1979); 1 W. MACDONALD, *THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY* (rev. ed. 1982). For a focus on American practices, see J. BURCHARD & A. BUSH-BROWN, *THE ARCHITECTURE OF AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY* (1961); 1 J. FITCH, *AMERICAN BUILDING, THE HISTORICAL FORCES THAT SHAPED IT* (2d ed. 1966); *THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES THAT SHAPED IT*; S. KIMBALL, *DOMESTIC ARCHITECTURE OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC* (1922); L. MUMFORD, *STICKS AND STONES: A STUDY OF AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE AND CIVILIZATION* (2d rev. ed. 1955). See generally R. MUKERJEE, *THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF ART* (1954).

³⁷³ See generally G. SARTON, *supra* note 91; S. MASON, *supra* note 91; A. WHITE, *supra* note 92; W. DAMPIER, *supra* note 233. For contemporary trends, see *supra* notes 291, 364.

under a variety of vicissitudes, not least of which was the suppression of "heresy." The reign of the Holy Inquisition did little to encourage the utilization of records of experience which diverged from the contemporary models of orthodoxy. Avicenna's and Averroes's interpretations of Aristotle were consigned to temporary oblivion; contact with the scientific achievements of the Arab world was fraught with danger; science could be equated with magic in the official mind; and scientific development languished in this atmosphere. In contrast, the neighboring Moslem civilization encouraged the unrestricted absorption of all available skill models — and witnessed a flourishing era of scientific development. For example, the result was the development of eleventh century Arab medicine to a height not reached by its European counterpart until the late Renaissance.

Church suppression of the teaching of the Copernican system as "heresy" in the case against Galileo (1616) is a well remembered example of the effect of official censorship on scientific development. As a result, the disability of Catholic scientific research was prolonged. Until the seventeenth-century publication of Newtonian physics, significantly in Protestant England, the utilization of Galileo's teaching did not become apparent.

Skill (and taste) is modified by *well-being*. The fundamental potentialities of the human organism exercise a profound impact upon the distribution of skills in a given society.³⁷⁴ The more complicated the division of labor, the more varied are the human predispositions of which it is possible to make use. In some cultures skills occur in profusion; in others, few opportunities for skill development exist. In the Western World, at least to date, women are rarely to be found among composers of music, despite the frequency with which they appear as performers.

The effect of the personality system upon taste is a topic on which little has been demonstrated.³⁷⁵ Nevertheless, it appears plausible to

³⁷⁴ See generally G. MEAD, *MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY*, *supra* note 17; J. PFEIFFER, *supra* note 39; T. DOBZHANSKY, *supra* note 156.

³⁷⁵ For noteworthy exceptions, see R. ARNHEIM, *ART AND VISUAL PERCEPTION: A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CREATIVE EYE* (1971) (including a useful bibliography); S. GIEDION, *THE ETERNAL PRESENT 2 VOLUMES* (1962-1964); S. GIEDION, *supra* note 106; E. KRIS, *PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLORATIONS IN ART* (1952); S. LANGER, *FEELING AND FORM: A THEORY OF ART DEVELOPED FROM PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY* (1953); E. SPITZ, *ART AND PSYCHE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND AESTHETICS* (1985). For sociological and anthropological perspectives, see S. BOONE, *RADIANCE FROM THE WATERS: IDEALS OF FEMININE BEAUTY IN MENDE ART* (1986); J. MAQUET, *THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE VISUAL ARTS* (1986); D. OLSEN, *supra* note 106. See also C. BURT, *A PSYCHOLOGICAL*

suggest that taste is influenced by the levels of anxiety and uncertainty that are found in the urbanizing, mechanizing, and kinetic world of industrialism. If neurotic symptoms are "socialized" to some extent in art forms, we may search for the "neurotic basis" of the "international style" that has swept the urban centers of the globe. Perhaps the demand for geometrically simple forms with a minimum of adornment is a phase of rejection of earlier patterns which were connected with older local and imperial elites, all of which became intolerable to middle and lower classes and to "colonial" peoples.

H. Rectitude

Standards of *rectitude* are continually influencing one another throughout the world community. Folk religions have endured from time immemorial, but they have failed to exercise the influence of universal faiths which have bound most of the world's peoples in a small number of religions.³⁷⁶

In modern times Western European ethical practices exercise a profound effect upon codes of conduct embraced in all parts of the world. For example, missionaries regarded the Western family system (monogamy and divorce) as the norm. This led to the undermining of polygamy, polyandry, and various forms of "child marriage," concubinage, and the like.³⁷⁷

Despite local revivals of ancient standards, a common universal code is a result of "conflicting indignations" among the self-righteous. Nonetheless, global human dignity is feasible only if people's shared perspectives of responsibility are global in scope. The search for responsibility standards has led to the growth of "human-centered" conceptions.³⁷⁸

STUDY OF TYPOGRAPHY (1959).

³⁷⁶ See M. ELIADE, *PATTERNS IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION* (1958); W. GOODE, *RELIGION AMONG THE PRIMITIVES* (1951); E. JURJI, *THE GREAT RELIGIONS OF THE MODERN WORLD*, *supra* note 340; I. LEWIS, *ECSTATIC RELIGION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF SPIRIT POSSESSION AND SHAMANISM* (1971); R. LOWIE, *supra* note 193; B. MALINOWSKI, *MYTH IN PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGY* (1926); P. RADIN, *PRIMITIVE RELIGION: ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN* (1937); *WORLD RELIGIONS: FROM ANCIENT HISTORY TO THE PRESENT* (G. Parrinder ed. 1983). See generally M. ELIADE, *THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION* (1959); H. HUBERT & M. MAUSS, *SACRIFICE: ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION* (1964); L. MUMFORD, *THE CONDITION OF MAN* (1944); A. RADCLIFFE-BROWN & A. REGINALD, *supra* note 210; see also *supra* notes 95, 193, 195.

³⁷⁷ See W. GOODE, *supra* note 343.

³⁷⁸ See generally H. BAKER, *supra* note 4; E. CASSIRER, *THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COSMOS IN RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY* (M. Domandi trans. 1972); M. McDUGAL,

The conception of human dignity, although with origins in antiquity, drew strength in the West from the Roman World; and the struggle for standards is sharpened directly between those who assert the primacy of a special set of people and the claim to basic human dignity on the part of all people.

There is a strong tendency for conceptions of *rectitude* to adjust themselves to the prevailing patterns of *power*.³⁷⁹ In general, "myth follows power." When the leaders of Japan examined the characteristic features of Western civilization to discover the secret of power they were inclined to attribute this ascendancy to the Christian religion and to encourage the incorporation of Christianity into Japanese life. This attitude changed when they became more familiar with the West and found the key in science and technology, rather than in religion. Instead of representing a rising trait, Christianity began to take on the aspect of a carry-over from the pre-industrial period of the West. Japan's ruling elite, acting in accord with the principle of minimum incorporation, showed less susceptibility to Christian missionary effort than the Chinese.³⁸⁰ This comparative receptivity is accounted for by noting the disunity of the ruling elite, and the reaching to the West for support in this internal struggle for power and the restoration of a unified China. Thus, China was open to the secular ideologies of the West as well as to the sacred ones. The seacoast provinces were in touch with the western nations, while the inner provinces came within the sphere of Soviet influence. The incorporation of outside ideologies, and the subordina-

H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, 3-4 n.l.; G. MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN (A. Caponigri trans. 1956).

³⁷⁹ Not only may rectitude conceptions adjust, but rectitude techniques may take on the characteristic styles of power. In the extreme, a fusion of practices generates the "Holy War," the "Crusade," or the "Jihad." General historical treatment is available in A. BOZEMAN, *supra* note 22; H. FRANKFORT, KINGSHIP AND THE GODS: A STUDY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN RELIGION AS THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIETY & NATURE (1948); T. GLOVER, THE CONFLICT OF RELIGIONS IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE (12th ed. 1975); MYTH, RITUAL, AND KINGSHIP: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF KINGSHIP IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST AND IN ISRAEL (S. Hooke ed. 1958); E. WOODWARD, CHRISTIANITY AND NATIONALISM IN THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE (1916). The contemporary relationship between power and rectitude processes is increasingly turbulent, with violent confrontations becoming commonplace. For graphic illustration, see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, at Map 28, *Religions of Rule*, and text accompanying map. See also *supra* note 195. For an important overview, see A. ROGOW & H. LASSWELL, POWER, CORRUPTION, AND RECTITUDE (1963).

³⁸⁰ See generally, K. MORIOKA, RELIGION IN CHANGING JAPANESE SOCIETY (1975).

tion of local traditions, would appear a consequence of the weakened power position of Chinese elites.³⁸¹

Enlightenment based upon scientific methods of verification undermines traditional justifications of *rectitude* patterns.³⁸² The impact of science on earlier theological and philosophical doctrines and upon popular miranda is well expounded in Western civilization.³⁸³ Theological justifications of conduct were formulated in authoritative statements that could not be taken literally in light of the world picture provided by astronomy, geology, biology, and other branches of descriptive knowledge. Although many theologians attempted to defend the texts literally, this weakened the support of established religions. To "save" the scriptures, various modes of non-literal interpretation developed. Hence, the "God" of the moderns has become distant from human affairs and is perpetually in danger of achieving a degree of aloofness that rivals the least accessible images of some folk societies. This is not invariably the case, however, since the supranatural may be described as all-pervasive and omnipresent, controlling "psychological" as well as "material" phenomena, yet not exhausted by either set of describable characteristics.

Theoretical developments in the physical sciences exercise great influence over current redefinitions by theologians. The criticism of the conception of "causality" as developed in early mechanics, and the growth of such concepts as "complementarity" have recently reflected themselves in the writings of theologians, metaphysicians, and ethicists.³⁸⁴ The important point is that the source or the provocation

³⁸¹ On religion in China, see generally M. WEBER, *THE RELIGION OF CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM* (H. Gerth trans. & ed. 1951); C. YANG, *RELIGION IN CHINESE SOCIETY: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION AND SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL FACTORS* (1961).

³⁸² See sources cited *supra* note 373.

³⁸³ The historic interplay between canons of rectitude and those of enlightenment is, of course, quite involved. See, e.g., J. BREASTED, *DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION AND THOUGHT IN ANCIENT EGYPT* (1912); F. BUSSELL, *RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND HERESY IN THE MIDDLE AGES* (1918); C. COCHRANE, *CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE: A STUDY OF THOUGHT AND ACTION FROM AUGUSTUS TO AUGUSTINE* (1940); G. LEVY, *THE GATE OF HORN: A STUDY OF THE RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF THE STONE AGE AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON EUROPEAN THOUGHT* (1948). See also sources cited *supra* notes 288-89.

³⁸⁴ The imagery of Pierre Teilhard De Chardin is representative of this development. See, e.g., P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, *CHRISTIANITY AND EVOLUTION* (R. Hague trans. 1971); P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, *ACTIVATION OF ENERGY* (R. Hague trans. 1970); P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, *SCIENCE AND CHRIST* (R. Hague trans. 1968); P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, *THE FUTURE OF MAN* (N. Denny trans. 1964).

for creativeness in the modern world comes from the progress of science and less often from poets and religious visionaries.³⁸⁵

When traditional justifications of a rectitude code are called into question, practices which were supported in the name of the tradition may weaken. This is most obviously true in the strict observance of such specialized patterns as worship. It may not extend to other matters: family practices and business activities may remain as before.

Economic relations (*wealth*) modify *rectitude* standards.³⁸⁶ At one time advocates of free world trade were confident that the way to a peaceful and prosperous world was by the expansion of commerce. It is true that the seller has a continuing interest in the buyer, if there is a demand for business to continue. And it is also true that the buyer is interested in sellers to maintain healthy price and quality competition. The common concern for peaceful exchange has resulted in the holding of great fairs at accessible centers, and the development of a code of conduct suitable to the perpetuation of the institution.³⁸⁷ Procedures of arbitration and settlement were devised to cover the many differences of claim between sellers and buyers.³⁸⁸ "Client nursing" is an ancient custom; and this means binding the prospect by catering to whims and tastes, even when they are in many ways offensive to the traditional

But see W. DAMPIER, *supra* note 91. For related discussion, see sources cited *supra* note 62.

³⁸⁵ *But see* sources cited *supra* note 290. *See also* J. ECCLES, *THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MIND* (1953); K. GOLDSTEIN, *HUMAN NATURE IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY* (1940); C. WADDINGTON, *supra* note 151; *CREATIVITY AND ITS CULTIVATION* (H. Anderson ed. 1959), especially Lasswell, *The Social Setting of Creativity*. For further discussion, see S. ARIETI, *CREATIVITY: THE MAGIC SYNTHESIS* (1976); A. KOESTLER, *THE ACT OF CREATION* (1964).

³⁸⁶ *See generally* E. ALBERT & C. KLUCKHOHN, *A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON VALUES, ETHICS AND ESTHETICS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY, 1920-1958* (1959); W. OAKESHOTT, *COMMERCE AND SOCIETY, A SHORT HISTORY OF TRADE AND ITS EFFECT ON CIVILIZATION* (1936). For more recent discussion, see P. WEBER & D. GILBERT, *PRIVATE CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS* (1981).

³⁸⁷ For historical analyses, see, for example, A. BOZEMAN, *supra* note 22, at chapter 12, *The Mediterranean Elites and the Furtherance of Cultural Affinities*; 2 *THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN THE MIDDLE AGES* (M. Postan & E. Rich eds. 1952). C. COON, *CARAVAN: THE STORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST* (1951); H. PIRENNE, *ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE* (1937); E. WARMINGTON, *THE COMMERCE BETWEEN THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND INDIA* (1928); *MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD*, *supra*, note 215.

³⁸⁸ An intriguing historical study is M. TOD, *INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS* (1913).

code in which the trader was reared.³⁸⁹

Quite apart from the relatively slow adjustment of rectitude standards to commercial expediency, it is important to observe the significant role of economic difficulty in bringing about changes in rectitude. It often has been pointed out that revolutionary upheavals are not typically connected with disease-ridden and starving populations. More commonly new social groups are coming into existence, enlarging the scope of their ambitions, and responding with mounting resentment against remaining obstacles or against recently imposed setbacks. Leadership appears to come from social formations whose material position has been improving. Not misery and desperation, but impatience and ambition appear to be the tone of successful enemies of older codes of obedience.³⁹⁰

Respect factors influence patterns of *rectitude*. The "internal proletariat" of great empires have been the cradles in which many new ideologies have taken root in the name of protests against injustice. The "proletariat" in the sense described by Toynbee is recruited from the lower levels of the social structure, and therefore includes those who suffer in physical health and who endure poverty and other experiences connected with a lowly status.³⁹¹ But the accelerating factor appears to be connected with respect considerations in particular. An examination of the spread of the Christian cult in the Roman world indicates that it spread, in part, among persons of position who were disaffected with the world. Persons of lower status were greatly encouraged by recruits from the upper classes, and found corroboration of their resentment against discrimination.³⁹²

The propagandists of religious or secular cults have worked from the "top" when the upper elite has been judged to be strong enough to carry the whole community in their wake in case of conversion. Otherwise the approach is to the disaffected and depends upon enhancing the self-respect and the self-confidence of new converts "from below."³⁹³

³⁸⁹ See W. REISMAN, *supra* note 13, for elaboration; see also S. ABURISH, *PAY-OFF: WHEELING AND DEALING IN THE ARAB WORLD* (1985) (providing a contemporary and anecdotal account).

³⁹⁰ See sources cited *supra* notes 60, 76, 323, 326.

³⁹¹ See 8 A. TOYNBEE, *supra* note 19, at 88-89, 529-30.

³⁹² See T. GLOVER, *supra* note 379; E. WOODWARD, *supra* note 379.

³⁹³ On the strategy of secular cults, see *WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES*, *supra* note 326; E. ZIMMERMAN, *supra* note 76. See also E. CARR & R. DAVIES, *FOUNDATIONS OF A PLANNED ECONOMY* 3 volumes (1969-76); E. CARR, *supra* note 327; T. SHANIN, *THE ROOTS OF OTHERNESS: RUSSIA'S TURN OF CENTURY* 2 volumes (1985-1986).

The Christian Church has spread by both channels, often converting the chief of a folk society, resulting in the baptism of a whole people. Social revolutions typically occur when the upper class is divided, having lost a unified sense of mission. Hence, defections from the top levels, as indicated in the spread of Christianity in Rome, foster the growth of a counter-elite in the name of a rising ideology.

Conceptions of *rectitude*, moreover, are continually modified by *skill* factors. Movements of taste are among the subtler aspects of the rise and fall of rectitude patterns.³⁹⁴ We know that religious and moral sentiment have given rise to many works of art, contributing to the consolidation of established orders. It is also true that factors of skill and taste have contributed to the undermining of entrenched codes.³⁹⁵ This is most obvious in propaganda designed to exploit the "injustices" of a regime and to provoke sentiment against "evil." The process is more elusive when the intensity of conviction connected with older symbols of rectitude is dissipated into a more detached aestheticism. This can reach the proportions of an art in which technique is lavished on emblems of the crucifixion, for instance, but the patterns employed have little answering resonance in most spectators' lives. Bigness and virtuosity can be invoked to replace the vacuum of intense faith and conviction, reflecting not only the outlook of the artist and his patrons, but alienating the general from the special audience.³⁹⁶

Affection factors also influence *rectitude* standards.³⁹⁷ The well-known remark, "What's a Constitution among friends?" sums up the outlook of those who operate on the assumption that the ties of a primary circle are dominant, and take precedence over such "formal" obligations as obedience to law. It is devotion to large secondary groups that creates a demand to act for their preservation and extension. This becomes crystallized into rectitude standards by enlarging the established rectitude patterns to include the "true" interests of the lesser groups.³⁹⁸

The intensity with which considerations of *rectitude* enter into world affairs may be influenced by the mental health (*well-being*) of signifi-

³⁹⁴ See, e.g., G. SCOTT, *supra* note 371.

³⁹⁵ See generally J. HARRISON, *supra* note 184; W. LETHABY, *ARCHITECTURE, NATURE, AND MAGIC* (1956); J. MARINGER, *THE GODS OF PREHISTORIC MAN* (1960); J. PELICAN, *JESUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES: HIS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF CULTURE* (1985).

³⁹⁶ For further analysis and documentation, see sources cited *supra* note 372.

³⁹⁷ An insightful study in this regard is R. MARETT, *FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION* (1932).

³⁹⁸ See sources cited *supra* note 378 (discussing current trends and aspirations).

cant figures in the decision process.³⁹⁹ In some societies (notably the American), the preoccupation with "right" and "wrong" appears to lend itself to a high degree of rigidity in the handling of problems; and this is accentuated in the personality structure of many important leaders. Thus, Woodrow Wilson has been said to illustrate a well-known type of Calvinist conscience. Even before the final phases of his breakdown, he is described as displaying some "marginal" characteristics such as intractability and self-righteousness.⁴⁰⁰

The interrelations outlined above clearly establish, as already suggested, interdetermination on a global scale in the sense that everybody has been affected by and will be affected by everybody else. The degree to which any particular individual can secure and maintain enjoyment in any particular value process is a function of the degree to which other individuals can secure and maintain a corresponding enjoyment both in that process and other processes. No one can achieve security — when security is defined as high position, expectancy, and potential with regard to all values — unless others do. When John Donne asked for whom the bell tolled, he rightly answered that it tolled for one and all alike.⁴⁰¹

It may require recall that this largest community of humankind comprises a whole, dynamic hierarchy of interpenetrating lesser communities, of many different sizes and characteristics, with larger communities constantly affecting the lesser communities contained within them, and the lesser in turn affecting the larger that they comprise. In this

³⁹⁹ See, e.g., E. ERIKSON, *supra* note 346; see also Pye, *Personal Identity and Political Ideology*, in *POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS*, *supra* note 35 (reviewing the Erickson study). For further examples, see A. GEORGE & J. GEORGE, *supra* note 346; A *PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS* (M. Hermann & T. Milburn eds. 1977); W. LANGER, *THE MIND OF ADOLF HITLER* (1972). See generally L. ETHEREDGE, *A WORLD OF MEN: THE PRIVATE SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY* (1978); G. HOPPLE, *supra* note 233; R. ISAAK, *INDIVIDUALS AND WORLD POLITICS* (1975); H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 233; *STRUCTURE OF DECISION: THE COGNITIVE MAPS OF POLITICAL ELITES*, *supra* note 233; Hart, *Cognitive Maps of Three Latin American Policy Makers*, 30 *WORLD POL.* 115 (1977).

⁴⁰⁰ On Wilson, see A. GEORGE & J. GEORGE, *supra* note 346.

⁴⁰¹ Donne has his contemporary echoes:

We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned that we must live as men, not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger.

We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fourth Inaugural Address, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 380 (1945).

most comprehensive global process, it is individual human beings, affected by changing environmental and predispositional factors, who continuously engage in the shaping and sharing of all particular values, with many differing degrees of achievement in fulfillment and deprivation. In such a process, embracing the whole manifold of events from the past through the present into the future, change can only be endemic: every feature of the more comprehensive process is constantly changing in interaction with every other feature. Participants, including territorial communities, are changing in characteristics as they are affected by, and affect, such variables as culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis.

The perspectives of participants are in continuous revision as they shift in the scope and intensity of their value demands, expand or contract their identifications and modify their world-views and maps of reality. The situations of interaction are shaped by the changing dimensions of time, spatial location, institutionalization, and crisis. The significance of base values, including the resources of the earth and those extending into outer space, are subject to the changing impacts of science and technology. The various strategies, and combinations of strategies, are a function of changing science and technology and of other variables in context. The culminating outcomes in the shaping and sharing of values find expression in varying particular and aggregate patterns and in highly diverse impacts upon different individuals, functional groups, and territorial communities.⁴⁰²

It is this ceaseless change in the global community process — the process that gives rise to claims to authoritative decision, affects decision, and is in turn affected by decision — that makes indispensable its mapping and monitoring with a comprehensiveness, selectivity, and realism that will facilitate the effective performance of all the distinctive intellectual tasks necessary to rational decision in clarifying and securing common interest.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰² The effects of this ongoing global process of value shaping and sharing reach beyond immediate contexts, affecting in the long run the aggregate patterns in innovation, diffusion, and restriction of value-institutional practices at all levels of community (local, national, regional, and global) in the earth-space arena. Beyond even living generations, impacts extend to all future generations of humankind; ultimately at stake is the entire pattern of balance or imbalance among people, institutions, resources, technology and the ecosystem.

⁴⁰³ For related discussion, see Lasswell, *supra* note 221; Snyder, Hermann & Lasswell, *supra* note 64.

VII. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Without attempting an exhaustive report on value outcomes in the last century of the world community, it is nevertheless possible to underline two fundamental trends that have gained importance. One relates to the pattern of value demand: undoubtedly there is a more universal demand for participation in the shaping and sharing of values; but one also notes vigorous counter-trends of increasingly exclusive demand for the control over and enjoyment of values. The other relates to the actual pattern of value accumulation: whatever the reservations must be for particular values or subcommunities, the magnitude of value accumulation has increased and the overall trend is toward wider value sharing. Some indication of the former trend may be offered in brief summary of demand and practice with reference to each major category of value.⁴⁰⁴

A. Power

The most marked trend in demands relating to power is insistence upon wide sharing of power among all participants. Beginning in the eighteenth century, absolutism as an accepted political dogma has declined and has been replaced almost universally by different formulations of democracy.⁴⁰⁵ Democracy is invoked as a justifying symbol for the exercise of power even when factual power allocation is extremely limited. Thus, national socialism, Russian and Chinese communism, and unabashed dictatorship have characterized themselves as democratic despite the fact that the political power of the masses was systematically attenuated. These phenomena indicate the potency of the popular demand for shared power. Demands for power sharing are reflected in the prose of national constitutions and international constitutive charters.⁴⁰⁶ A number of doctrinalists have suggested that one of the

⁴⁰⁴ With regard to the following discussion, background, greater detail, and documentation is available in H. LASSWELL & M. McDOUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part III, *Policy Thinking*, chapter 2, *The Description of Trend*, and chapter 4, *The Projection of Future Developments*; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4, at 7-13. See also UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, *supra* note 67 (containing a relatively early expression of the trend).

⁴⁰⁵ See generally H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 54.

⁴⁰⁶ See generally A. PEASLEE, *CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS* (rev. 4th ed. 1974); *CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: A SERIES OF UPDATED TEXTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CHRONOLOGIES AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES* (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1971).

criteria of recognition is a democratic regime.⁴⁰⁷

While conceptions of democracy in highly articulate form may be traced back to the Greeks, the contemporary conception of political democracy was a product of the emerging bourgeoisie who fashioned it as a legitimating claim for their demand to share in the authority formerly monopolized by the aristocracy. The subsequent challenge to bourgeois democracy by proletarian internationalism deferred to the glamour of the incumbent's symbol set of shared power by adopting it and asserting simultaneously that its fullest realization was possible only in a classless society. Yet the hagiographia of communism reveal the theoretical and practical impossibility of reconciling genuine power sharing within a structure of "class dictatorship." Twentieth-century nationalism has adapted both the symbols of bourgeois democracy and proletarian internationalism without particular regard to the antinomies involved.

The allure of democracy may be expected to continue as a potent symbol. Yet new conditions may precipitate a metamorphosis of the content of power demands. In a world of high crisis in which personal insecurity is common to the vast majority of participants, effective power may be "delegated" to those skill groups who assert themselves as crisis specialists. Analyses of leadership in a "garrison state," in a "totalitarian democracy," or in an advanced industrial society share a number of common features. These forms are based on popular perceptions of crises, all delegate authority to centralized structures which operate relatively unchecked and assume father-substitute attributes, and, in particular, all presume to exercise power as an instrument of clarifying shared interests. In the construction of the garrison state, symbols of shared power will be subtly transmuted into symbols of monopolistic power exercised in the name of the common good by the self-perpetuating elites who determine policy. In short, in a garrisoned world, the symbol focus will shift to the objectives of power rather than to the mode of its exercise.⁴⁰⁸

An intense power demand is put forward by those who identify themselves with the community of humankind. It insists on a more effective world constitutive process that increases the scope and security of global public and civic order.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁷ For orientation in this literature, see W. Reisman & E. Suzuki, *supra* note 328.

⁴⁰⁸ See H. LASSWELL, *supra* note 123; *THE POLITICIZATION OF SOCIETY*, *supra* note 124.

⁴⁰⁹ See M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & W. REISMAN, *supra* note 5.

B. Wealth

Demands for material comfort relate to basic cultural postulates and, hence, have varied enormously in different cultures. A key aspect of an industrial culture, however, is the strong emphasis upon material comforts not only as a wealth asset, but also as a multi-value indicator. It is no surprise, as Weber and Tawney demonstrated, that religion and nascent capitalism intertwined to construe material abundance as an indicator of goodness and poverty as an indication of evil.⁴¹⁰ In addition to its rectitude function, wealth in a capitalist society can serve as a means of acquiring respect. Veblen's felicitous phrase, "conspicuous consumption," emphasized consumption as a means of demonstrating a respect position. As the entire global arena is increasingly industrialized and technologized, the emphasis upon wealth as a key social value will be increasingly universalized. Indeed, partly because of the mythification of Marx and Engels, wealth demands, assumed to be the *Unterbau* of the social process, may be promoted with an intensity disproportionate to their value priority in diverse contexts.

Industrialization increases the abundance of material goods but disrupts many stable practices of traditional society. Industrial techniques of organization and production have eroded the traditional relation of lord and vassal, which carried with it a degree of security in every value sector. While the urbanized worker who supplanted the journeyman could expect a higher short-range income, the worker's total value status was now subjected to a host of new role-hazards: cyclical unemployment, relocation of factories, obsolescence of skills, physical disability from accidents, old age, and illness. Family, tribal, or feudal claims were less effective; hence, liability to value deprivation rose simultaneously, although out of phase, with attractive opportunities for new and abundant, if more shoddy, goods and services.

The process of rapid industrialization, hence, generated intense demands for the sharing of wealth and for public order structures that would guarantee minimum economic security. The demands for political rights that characterized the political language of eighteenth and early nineteenth century ideology were joined by demands for economic and social rights. By the twentieth century, national constitutions and charters increasingly enumerated such claims among the basic bill of rights which state elites promised to citizens. The 1917 Mexican Constitution, the first of such expressions, was rapidly followed by the Weimar Constitution; and commitment to such rights continues to be a

⁴¹⁰ See sources cited *supra* note 319.

regular feature of twentieth-century drafting. The intensity of these demands is reflected in the political rhetoric of heads of state, prime ministers, and other top officials, party platforms, and party spokesmen throughout the world. A large variety of fiscal and monetary techniques, which are key weapons in the modern governmental arsenal, are called "progressive" since purportedly they seek to assure economic stability and growth, and equitable allocation of wealth.

The universality of these demands are indicated in a number of global constitutive documents. Members of the Covenant of the League of Nations pledged to "endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend" The International Labor Organization, created by the Peace Treaty of Versailles, detailed these conditions and created organized machinery for clarifying and applying these wealth policies. The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund declare a common resolution "to contribute . . . to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment . . . of all members" The Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization expressed the determination of the member-states "to promote the common welfare; by . . . raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the people under their respective jurisdictions . . . and thus . . . [contribute] toward expanding world economy"

Demands for wealth sharing and economic security arose from, and were sustained by, conditions of rapid change and intense personal insecurity. Future projections suggest that such conditions will continue and may, indeed, grow in intensity. The industrial revolution is now seen as a modest prologue to a far vaster technological revolution which promises, in addition to undreamed of abundance, to institutionalize a continuous process of change. The continuing succession of new markets, new industries, and new patterns of consumption means, among other things, the continual obsolescence of basic skills, the attenuation of the labor market, and the possibility of mass poverty and deprivation in the midst of abundance. Even if a new period of relative stabilization sets in, participants who have already accustomed themselves to abundance are unlikely to yield willingly a position to new claimants. Wealth demands in the immediate future will, therefore, increase in intensity and detail.

C. Enlightenment

Demands for enlightenment relate to insistence upon unrestricted access to information and education as a means of self-realization and as a requisite base for effective and fulfilling participation in all other value processes. To be enlightened is to acquire a realistic map of the social and natural environment. Concomitant with the demand for participation in the power process that characterized the rise of bourgeois democracy is the correlative demand for unrestricted access to the intelligence that is vital to the making of sound decisions. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man stated: "The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom." The same demand was enshrined in the first amendment of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution and has become a fixture of almost every formal constitution in the contemporary world. Whatever a regime's actual practices may be, deference to the vigor of the popular demand for this aspect of enlightenment is a recurring facet of verbal policy. On the international level the demand is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of that instrument provides that: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

Changes in the intensity of the demand for current news and opinion is likely to occur when it is apparent that the sharing of information will probably bring about political, economic, and other indulgences or deprivations. The popular willingness to acquiesce to statements of elite need will be influenced proportionately by the elite's relative moral authority. To the extent that the threat of war is accepted as genuine, the population is disposed to acquiesce in censorship in the hope of blinding the enemy. Hence, the elite of a garrison state operating alone or in transnational cooperations would perceive that the management of public communication is a peculiarly important power base. Even in the absence of demonstrable crisis, "know-nothingism" holds some attractions for disaffected masses, for new information can undermine tenuous identities and institutional arrangements. Political manipulators are also in a position to exploit the resentments generated by rapid change, high expectations, and acute frustrations.

The demand for enlightenment through education has undergone several transformations. In Western culture the decisive impetus was given by the Renaissance with its strong emphasis upon individualism.

But by the nineteenth century, compulsory public education was an expression of rank and file demands and elite manipulations. Antidemocratic elite groups were aware that a literate mass was more susceptible to persuasion and infinitely richer in the range of manipulative possibilities than an illiterate one. In such polities, elites guarded against the "dangers" of genuine education and enlightenment by stringently controlling curriculum and depriving private and religious schools of their former educational monopoly. During periods of mass immigration in the United States the public educational process was viewed by the immigrant as an effective passport into the mainstream of American opportunity and by the local elite as a means of speeding the incorporation of alien elements into the local myth system.

The principal discovery of recent centuries has been the enormous importance of scientific inquiry as a means of acquiring an enlightened map of the world in which choices and decisions are made; hence, the increasing demand of developing peoples not simply for knowledge of current images of reality, but for opportunities to acquire an independent capability to carry on scientific research.

D. Skill

The demand for the opportunity to mature latent talent into socially useful skill was not asserted in different civilizations and cultures until the overall social structure began to break from its traditional caste frame. Occupational skills primarily were predetermined by class, caste, or family background. The advent of capitalism and the breakup of traditional society provided the background for popular skill demands. It is not surprising that one of the earliest formulations of the popular demand to develop skills should have come from a venerable proponent of free enterprise. Adam Smith wrote:

To hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him.⁴¹¹

The demand was given highly authoritative expression in the French revolution which sought to equalize opportunity and to allow social advancement only on the basis of merit: "*Carrière ouverte aux talents.*" On the verbal level, at least, almost every contemporary polity commits

⁴¹¹ A. SMITH, *AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS* 122 (E. Cannan ed. 1937).

itself to nondiscriminatory access to administrative posts and to employment practices. The demand is confirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right of association and trades unionism, which has received wide national and international expression, provides authoritative confirmation of the demand.

As the technological era moves the world into a process of continuous change, skill demands may be expected to be formulated in terms of public duty to develop useful and exploitable skills rather than private privilege to do so. When velocity and vector of change are decided by the civic order, the public order will be increasingly subjected to demands to update individuals to participate in an ever-changing world or to special demands to retard change.

Skills are not only determined by wealth and market considerations. They are a product of complex cultural criteria of excellence. In the past these criteria and evaluation of different skills were determined by an aristocratic or elite group that asserted itself as the patron, consumer, and judge of the arts. The most recent period was marked by a democratization of taste through the broadening of audience to include all citizens.

Skills are transmitted in industrial societies not only through the traditional institutions of family or guild but by vast educational establishments and huge media. A sharp line cannot be drawn between the knowledge essential to the mastery of a particular skill and the knowledge indispensable to enlightenment. The difference is, however, abundantly clear when we compare the technical knowledge required to build a bridge with the knowledge of the social or physical environmental situation in which specific skills are acquired and exercised. Enlightenment refers to the comprehensive map.

The demand for education is at once a demand to be skilled and enlightened. The "three R's," the elementary skills of "reading, writing, and arithmetic," are vital instruments of access to such maps of purported reality as are available at any time and place. Hence, the ardor with which Article 26 of the Universal Declaration is supported: "Everyone has a right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory."

E. Well-Being

Perhaps the most obvious of all demands of human beings individually and in the aggregate is for safety, health, and comfort. The growing unity of official and unofficial demand for the control of epidemics

on a world scale and in general for the universal improvement of health has been overwhelmingly evident.

There is, however, a dangerous counter-tendency in the toleration that has been given in the name of national security to the development of noxious "chemical" and "biological" agents with which to impair the health of "enemies."

Drugs of many kinds have been targets of intense demand for regulation in the interest of physical and mental integrity of young and old. Opium and its derivatives remain a principal object of transnational public concern.

The conception of what protects well-being has broadened recently to include the individual's psychosomatic integrity, especially children's. Modern medicine has contributed to general knowledge of the interdependence of "bodily" and "mental" states and laid great stress on the enduring significance of childhood experience. Hence, official and unofficial norms have been advocated or prescribed for the protection of mother and child, for universal standards of safety on the job, and for hospital and rehabilitation programs.

However expanded the conception of well-being may be, it continues to cover the demand for the protection of life itself by limiting or eliminating the use of violence as an instrument of public or private action. The continuing vitality of the demand to abolish war, for example, is supported by reference to death and casualty figures.

F. Affection

Industrial culture has almost universally undermined the solidarity of traditional family systems and hastened the rise of the small nuclear family. Individuals are demanding more freedom to follow personal preferences in intimate group relations. International policy recognizes these demands by emphasizing freedom in the choice of marriage partner and personal friends. The family continues to be accepted as a focus of primary loyalty which is sought to be exempted from unwarranted interference.

When the individual ego is shaken loose from the "automatic" process of incorporating the ego into such larger "self systems" as the traditional family or tribe, resulting insecurity increases the individual's search for new identities. The communications revolution makes it easier for individuals to conceive of themselves as belonging to groups larger than the locality (the nation). Although the growth of national loyalties may foster the breaking up of large multinational empires, it does not end the tendencies to enlarge the scope of identification by

associating the ego with transnational regions. The phenomenon of the young in France or Germany insisting on characterizing themselves as "European," or their counterparts in Nigeria or Ghana characterizing themselves as "African," may be a step toward achieving a genuine sense of solidarity with humanity as a whole.

G. *Respect*

The growing unity of demand for respect is expressed in people's sensitivity to any aspersion cast upon their full membership in humanity. For human beings who have been subject to denigration as "sub-human" by their conquerors, or by members of a traditionally "superior" social caste, one of the most cherished manifestations of human dignity is the acceptance of their claim to be referred to in terms of culturally established symbols of fundamental equality. This means removal of such stigmas as brandmarks, the wearing of special clothing, the denial of respect prefixes (such as "mister" or "missus"), the denial of family name in direct address, or the need of stepping off the sidewalk when passing a "superior" being. The Jewish struggle to throw off these insulting requirements represents a wider movement among minorities everywhere. Despite sensational reversals, notably in the Nazi period in Germany, the trend has continued toward equality.

The unity of demand for shared respect is expressed in the growing demand for at least a minimum access to all values, not only the symbols of respect, and in the demand to obtain additional values on the basis of individual merit. Many piecemeal formulations finally led up to recent international declarations. The minorities treaties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations after World War I sought to give protection to ethnic minorities, sometimes by affording aggrieved individuals access to international tribunals for redress.⁴¹² Elaborate provisions for the protection of human rights were inserted in the five treaties, signed on February 10, 1947, in the aftermath of World War II.⁴¹³ The United Nations Charter, in Article 55, stipulates that member nations shall promote "universal respect for, and observance of,

⁴¹² For further discussion, see REGIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS: A STUDY OF MINORITIES PROCEDURES IN UPPER SILESIA (1933); J. STONE, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS: PROCEDURES OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICES (1932);

⁴¹³ See E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948-1963 (1964). See generally M. McDUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4.

human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Claims relating to human rights have been kept at the focus of attention of the world community.

H. Rectitude

The demand grows for a sense of responsibility on the part of individuals acting singly or jointly for realizing the ideal of human dignity. Theological and other transempirical doctrines have been invoked on behalf of human dignity with increasing frequency. Christianity's theological position has long supported the thesis that the dignity of human beings derives from God and that the order of nature and society is prescribed by the will of God. In practice, human dignity was often interpreted by theologians and church officials as denying the legitimacy of free institutions. Eighteenth century democratizing currents were "rationalist" and accented the capabilities and claims of people in the perspective of "Nature" rather than of "Nature's God." Hence, the rise of free institutions was propagated with relatively more reliance upon metaphysics than theology. As the democratizing demand spread, churches in many countries became less prominently associated with defenders of the old order. Theological doctrines were more often invoked by spokesmen of organized religion in support of popular rule. Buddhism and other theological and ecclesiastical traditions were partially redefined in support of social activism. In Marxist ideology the conception of a materially determined historical process plays the role formerly assigned to God. Marxist metaphysics is invoked to legitimize codes of responsible conduct in the world historical process.⁴¹⁴

A growing sense of responsibility for all humankind is indicated by the practice of seeking to justify local, national, or transnational programs in universal terms.⁴¹⁵ Such movements as the one on behalf of "world criminal law" express a demand for common — and to an increasing degree — democratic conceptions of rectitude. The pirate has long been identified as an "enemy of the human race"; and since the Nuremberg trials, for instance, the international character of the norms and sanctions involved in crimes against humanity is unmistakable.

⁴¹⁴ For an important related discussion, see H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4, at part III, *Policy Thinking*, chapter 1, *A Note on Derivation*.

⁴¹⁵ In ironic implication, this practice may indicate, as well, the clash of incompatible public order systems aspiring to universality. See McDougal & Lasswell, *supra* note 221.

CONCLUSION

This brief sketch of the trends in demand and practice in the shaping and sharing of values may provide a preliminary documentation of the continuing "outcomes" that have appeared in the production and distribution of world values as a consequence of the total process of interaction. The term "outcome" is misleading, as we have emphasized above, if it is understood to imply that the patterns found at any given cross-section in time have no impact on ensuing developments. Every outcome event functions as a conditioning factor or set of factors in the subsequent flow. This follows from the interactive character of social process. References to events as outcome, pre-outcome, and post-outcome must be made from specified observational standpoints, subject to reconsideration from other standpoints, in light of the problems with which the observer is concerned.⁴¹⁶

When we supplement the description of significant value developments during a given period of world community interaction by examining the innovation, diffusion, and restriction of institutional patterns in the shaping and sharing of values, we find that the most prominent changes reflect the universalization of the civilization of science and technology. There is little doubt that the scientific and critical view of the physical, biological, and cultural realms will be ever more widely shared by school teachers, scientists, journalists, and, in general, by the influential people of every nation, city, and town in all parts of the world. This common universal map underlines the threats and opportunities inherent in a scientifically-based technology that accelerates the interactions between people and their environment. The dangers of nuclear and biological weaponry will be a continually disturbing theme. The menace of polluted space, air, water, soil, and foodstuffs will be brought home to ever-widening circles in developed and developing countries. The possibility of "the Andromeda virus" or its equivalent will pass from an occasional fantasy to a perpetual alert.

These cumulative threats will be accompanied by marvelous contributions to every human value. Many diseases and defects will succumb to laboratory science. New materials will enable certain physical characteristics of humans to change faster than most animals molt. Genetic engineering will come progressively closer to the deliberate planning of

⁴¹⁶ See H. LASSWELL & M. MCDUGAL, *supra* note 4. See generally H. LASSWELL, *THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH* (1948); H. LASSWELL, *THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE* (1963); H. LASSWELL, *Intensive and Extensive Methods of Observing the Personality-Culture Manifold*, 1 YENCHING J. SOC. STUD. 72 (1938).

modified forms of life. Educational procedures will speed up the acquisition of linguistic, logical, and mathematical skill, and pave the way in early years for the acquisition of sophisticated tools of thought about ego and society.

Precise knowledge of the factors that condition the spread of science-based technology, and the consequences of this diffusion in particular contexts, is not, of course, easy to come by. The cumulative expansion of science-based technology has disrupted older institutions on a global scale and precipitated an intensifying crisis as a consequence of transformed expectations. The expectation grows that humankind can be better off in the world of tomorrow than in that of the past or of today. "Well, what's holding us back?" is the question that points an accusing finger at those who keep, or appear to keep, the differential benefits to themselves. However the target is identified, the latent and often manifest implication is obvious: Give us a wider share of the value outcomes generated by the impersonal technologies of our age. We are concerned directly with the consequences of these perspectives for effective as well as formal power.

The structure of equality-inequality in any community configuration approximates a design that is graduated and many-channeled or segmented and fused. In industrialized communities where spatial and vertical mobility are relatively high the span between the upper and the lower tenth may be great as to income, but the political process may be kept comparatively smooth as the political "brokers," "mediators," or "arbitrators" compromise or integrate articulate interests. Many escalators are available in every sector of society: politics, economics, enlightenment (science and information), health, education, popularity, respect, ethics, and religion.⁴¹⁷ In communities with limited access to science-based technology, segmentation implies sharp differences in the permissible life-styles of urban and rural areas, of tribesmen and moderns, or among castes and classes.⁴¹⁸ Such societies have few escala-

⁴¹⁷ But see M. ABRAHAMSON, E. MIZRUCHI & C. HORNING, *STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY* (1976); S. LIPSET & R. BENDIX, *SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY* (1959); J. MATRAS, *SOCIAL INEQUALITY, STRATIFICATION, AND MOBILITY* (1975). See generally R. CURTIS & E. JACKSON, *INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES* (1977); R. DAHRENDORF, *supra* note 323; D. GALLIE, *SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND CLASS RADICALISM IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN* (1983); R. ROTHMAN, *INEQUALITY AND STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES* (1978); I. KRAUSS, *supra* note 323; *supra* note 332. For an important early study, see W. WARNER & P. LUNT, *THE SOCIAL LIFE OF A MODERN COMMUNITY* (1941); W. WARNER & P. LUNT, *THE STATUS SYSTEM OF A MODERN COMMUNITY* (1942).

⁴¹⁸ See generally *SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MOBILITY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*

tors and the dominant elite is usually quick to call on the army or police forces of the center to mobilize the coercion necessary to enforce public order.⁴¹⁹

The social inequality analyst cannot fail to perceive the strength of factors that condition individuals or groups to contribute to social inequality as soon as they attain even a slight advantage.⁴²⁰ In a changing world community, we are provided with innumerable illustrations of the fundamental importance of *the proclivity to turn an advantage into a special interest* and to nullify or ignore, when possible, a common interest. The proclivity toward the assertion of special interest permeates the world of big organizations whether it is a question of official or civic bureaucracy. The alleged "iron law of oligarchy" was first explored in detail by an analyst of socialist parties and trades unions.⁴²¹

(N. Smelser & S. Lipset eds. 1966); R. STAVENHAGEN, *SOCIAL CLASSES IN AGRARIAN SOCIETIES* (J. Hellman trans. 1975). On India, see R. JAYARAMAN, *CASTE AND CLASS: DYNAMICS OF INEQUALITY IN INDIAN SOCIETY* (1981); D. KHOSLA, *MYTH AND REALITY OF THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW; A CASE STUDY OF UNTOUCHABILITY IN RURAL INDIA* (1987). K. SHARMA, *THE CHANGING RURAL STRATIFICATION SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIX VILLAGES IN RAJASTHAN, INDIA* (1974). See generally sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56, 185.

⁴¹⁹ This is the structure of countries with large landholders, small-scale merchants and artisans, and tribal or peasant agriculture. Among the vast number of pertinent studies see E. DEW, *POLITICS IN THE ALTIPLANO: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN RURAL PERU* (1969). An attempt to generalize a segmented model to the world arena is M. BARKUN, *LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY* (1968).

⁴²⁰ There is a vast literature on social inequality. A brief sampling follows: B. BARBER, *SOCIAL STRATIFICATION; A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE AND PROCESS* (1957); P. BLAU, *INEQUALITY AND HETEROGENEITY: A PRIMITIVE THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE* (1977); T. BOTTOMORE, *supra* note 35; T. BOTTOMORE, *supra* note 325; *THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES* (E. Laumann, P. Siegel & R. Hodge eds. 1970); T. DOBZHANSKY, *GENETIC DIVERSITY AND HUMAN EQUALITY* (1973); E. GRABB, *SOCIAL INEQUALITY: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORISTS* (1984); C. HURST, *THE ANATOMY OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY* (1979); K. KELSALL, H. KELSALL & L. CHISHOLM, *STRATIFICATION: AN ESSAY ON CLASS AND INEQUALITY* (2d ed. 1984); M. LEWIS, *THE CULTURE OF INEQUALITY* (1978); F. OPPENHEIM, *POLITICAL CONCEPTS, A RECONSTRUCTION* (1981); D. SMITH, *GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INEQUALITY* (1979) also published as *WHERE THE GRASS IS GREENER: GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES OF INEQUALITY* (1979) and *WHERE THE GRASS IS GREENER: LIVING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD* (1979); T. SMITH, *THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY* (1927); R. TAWNEY, *EQUALITY* (4th ed. 1952); E. WRIGHT, *CLASS, CRISIS, AND THE STATE* (1978); E. WRIGHT, *CLASSES* (1985); *supra* note 325; E. WRIGHT, *CLASS STRUCTURE AND INCOME DETERMINATION* (1979); Dahrendorf, *On the Origin of Social Inequality*, in *PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY* (2d. ser., P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1962).

⁴²¹ See R. MICHELS, *supra* note 28.

More recently, the study of developing (industrializing) countries has disclosed the same phenomenon on a formidable scale.⁴²² After an early phase of change in which "import substitution" creates a new upper and middle class of merchants, industrialists, bankers, and (perhaps) trade union leaders, party managers, bureaucrats, and professionals (in science, education, and medicine, for example), the motivation for more comprehensive social reconstruction is enfeebled. Society retains a structure of ineffective lower strata.

The proclivity to turn an advantage into a special interest is a result of *the apparent short-range benefits available in a situation*. It is obvious that workers who have a job at a given pay scale are apprehensive that the unemployed or lower paid workers will undercut their advantage or prevent a successful campaign to raise wages and improve working conditions. The small businessman who operates at a narrow margin is aware of the cost pressure from efforts to unionize the market. And this is true for every group and individual in society. At any given time it is possible to discover the net value expectations of participants and to understand why they are disposed to put a specific advantage first and to view conceptions of the common interest as applicable to somebody else.

The wonder is not that special interests are asserted and protected, but that demands and expectations relating to the longer-term or multi-valued common interest are ever effective. That perceived common interests do at times elicit joint action among various categories of participants in society cannot be successfully denied. The "iron law of oligarchy" rusts, and new competitive businesses, unions, political parties, churches (and so on) push aside the old monopolists and bring about a stable new set of effective arrangements. In a world of scientifically-based technological change, all kinds of established interests are vulnerable. They reach out to other groups and individuals and enlarge their conceptions of interest to form and maintain successful coalitions. Every ideological affirmation of a common interest — such as the demand for international human rights — has a group of supporters who can be enlisted as coalition mates on behalf of prescriptive or other joint policy demands. Every short range re-crystallization of a new special interest remains vulnerable to assault in the name of prescriptions of the common interest. In the interdependent urbanizing globe, the continual

⁴²² See sources cited *supra* notes 23, 56; see also S. HUNTINGTON, *POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES* (1968); M. LEVY, *supra* note 242; M. LEVY, *MODERNIZATION: LATECOMERS AND SURVIVORS* (1972); D. RUSTOW, *A WORLD OF NATIONS: PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION* (1967).

reclustering of conditioning factors has had the net effect of moving the world community toward articulating and attaining, in part, the principles of a respect revolution in the name of human dignity.⁴²³

From a long historical perspective, it would appear that just as science and technology move toward universalization, so the overall trend is toward wider shaping and sharing of major values, despite zigzag patterns occurring at different times and in different communities.⁴²⁴ Yet the contemporary world has scarcely begun to mobilize its full potential to fulfill the rising common demands of humankind; though the nature, scope, and magnitude of the values at stake differ from one community to another and from one occasion to another, large-scale value deprivations and nonfulfillments of individuals and pluralistic groups continue to prevail. In fact, deprivation and nonfulfillment still appear to characterize the value-institutional processes of vast segments of the world's population. A rich flow of fulfillment is enjoyed by only a small segment of that population.⁴²⁵

Part of the explanation for this situation may be found in the more detailed examination of a component of the planetary social process to which we have hitherto made only brief allusion: the world process of effective power.⁴²⁶

⁴²³ See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, *supra* note 4; see also sources cited *supra* note 68.

⁴²⁴ For discussion of the recent past, see L. REYNOLDS, *ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1850-1980* (1985). For a sobering study, see M. MOLLAT, *THE POOR IN THE MIDDLE AGES: AN ESSAY IN SOCIAL HISTORY* (A. Goldhammer trans. 1986).

⁴²⁵ M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, *supra* note 20, provide documentation and illustration. See also L. BROWN ET AL., *supra* note 67; S. KIM, *supra* note 4, especially at part 2, *The State of the Human Condition*; R. REPETTO, *supra* note 67; R. Gastil, *supra* note 66. Other recent studies include I. ADELMAN & C. MORRIS, *ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* (1973); P. BLUMBERG, *INEQUALITY IN AN AGE OF DECLINE* (1980); G. FIELDS, *POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND DEVELOPMENT* (1980); *GLOBAL INEQUALITY: POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES* (D. Grove ed. 1979). Consult, as well, McNeill's provocative essay, *THE HUMAN CONDITION: AN ECOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL VIEW* (1980).

⁴²⁶ For a comprehensive overview, see *POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW*, *supra* note 225.