24 Willamette L. Rev. 967 (1988)
Telephonic Search Warrants under the Oregon Constitution: A Call for the Limitation of Exigent Circumstances

handle is hein.journals/willr24 and id is 979 raw text is: TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS UNDER THE
OREGON CONSTITUTION: A CALL FOR THE
LIMITATION OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES*
The technological revolution has been with us now for some
time,' and it affects all parts of society, including the law. For ex-
ample, a police officer now may obtain a valid search warrant over
the telephone without having to appear personally before a judge or
magistrate. This technological advance allows for the issuance of a
warrant in instances when, because of time constraints, warrants
were not previously possible.
At the same time, Oregon courts have achieved a revolution
of their own.2 They have rediscovered the primacy of the Oregon
Constitution3 and now apply its provisions before they apply the
principles of the federal Constitution.' This analytical transition,
however, has not been smooth. At various times, current members
of the Oregon courts have expressed their frustrations5 with the
evolution of search and seizure law under article I, section 9 of the
* The author thanks Professor Don Turner for his guidance in the preparation of
this Comment.
1. See generally E. MESTHENE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1970).
2. State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 208, 729 P.2d 524, 531 (1986) (Gillette, J.,
concurring).
3. See Carson, Last Things Last: A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in
State Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 641 (1983); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional The-
ory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 '(1984); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering
the States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); see also Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
4. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (double jeopardy
analysis under article I, section 12); State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 630 P.2d 810 (1981) (equal
protection analysis under article I, section 20); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123
(1981) (cruel and unusual punishment analysis under article I, section 13). If a case is
decided on independent state grounds, the United States Supreme Court will decline to
review it. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
5. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 301 Or. 299, 305, 721 P.2d 1375, 1379 (1986) (Peterson,
C.J., concurring) (Looking at the last generation of search and seizure decisions . .. one
wonders if there ever will be certainty in the law of search and seizure); State v. Lowry,
295 Or. 337, 365, 667 P.2d 996, 1012-13 (1983) (Jones, J., concurring) (court's opinion
will cause lawyers and judges to sit down for hours to attempt to unscramble what it
stands for); State v. Dixson/Digby, 87 Or. App. 1, 16-17, 740 P.2d 1224, 1233-34 (1987)
(Van Hoomissen, J., dissenting) (finding no principled reason to look beyond the language
of the constitution).

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