Why Is There Taylor v. Caldwell - Thre Propositions about Impracticability
![handle is hein.journals/usflr23 and id is 389 raw text is: ESSAY
Why is There Taylor v. Caldwell?
Three Propositions About
Impracticability
By ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
Professor, University of Connecticut
School of Law.
Introduction
THE ONTOLOGIST ASKS: 'Why is there something rather than
nothing?' We ask at contract law: 'Why is there Taylor v. Cald-
well' or Krell v. Henry? Law and economics cannot answer the
question that Taylor presents at all. There is no sufficient reason
for the result in Taylor. A French judge could, if the facts were
clear, decide a question of law by drawing lots or casting a die.3 We
on the other hand, in cases like Taylor, disguise the law's arbitrari-
ness; it is still there, though. Oppositely, there is a sound economic
reason that supports the result in Krell.
In both Taylor and Krell, the parties failed to foresee and pro-
vide for an event that, said crudely, prevented completion of their
respective contracts. The cases have been allied under the topic of
* I would like to thank Lee Morrissey and Sharon Jones for their assistance in writing
and editing this article.
1. 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
2. [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.), aff'g in part 18 T.L.R. 823 (K.B. 1902).
I use single quotation marks to name pieces of language.
3. M. SCREECH, RABELAIS 268-72 (1979).](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/usflr23&div=21&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Why Is There Taylor v. Caldwell - Thre Propositions about Impracticability
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