Carjacking
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Carjacking
Julie Wuslich
Attorney
Organized Crime and Gang Section
Criminal Division
I. Introduction
In September 1992, two men forced Pamela Basu out of her car while she was idling at a stop
sign not far from her home in Savage, Maryland. As they began to drive away, Basu attempted to rescue
her 22-month-old daughter from the backseat of the car when her arm became entangled in the seat belt.
Unconcerned, the assailants sped away and dragged Basu to her death. Within months of her killing,
Congress enacted the carjacking statute, The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996), to
punish and deter such violent car thefts. See H.R. REP. No. 102-85 1, at 18 (1992) (In [an armed
carjacking], two or three criminals approach a car waiting at a traffic light ... and force the driver to turn
over the keys at gunpoint.); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) (Section 2119 reflects
congressional intent to authorize federal prosecutions as a significant deterrent to a type of criminal
activity that was a matter of national concern.). Congress, therefore, appears to have sought to
criminalize a specific type of violent car theft when it enacted § 2119.
Irrespective of congressional intent, the government has invoked the carjacking statute to punish
not just the Basu-type of car theft but also an array of violent crimes involving a vehicle being taken or
commandeered. In many cases the government has prevailed, but in a few noted exceptions mentioned
below, it has not. The government's success has been due to the courts' generous interpretation of the
statute and an expansive and distinguished reading of Holloway, further discussed below, which
reinforced the statute's purpose by characterizing carjacking as a discreet criminal event. This article
summarizes Holloway, the cases interpreting it, and other court opinions that have read the carjacking
statute broadly, and what implications these decisions may have regarding venue. First, however, the
article begins with a brief overview of the statute and a discussion of another important Supreme Court
case concerning the structure of § 2119.
II. Overview of § 2119
As originally passed in 1992, the carjacking law required the use of a firearm to effect the theft
of a vehicle. In 1994, however, Congress passed the Violent and Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), eliminating the firearm requirement and adding
a specific intent element to the law. Two years later, the Carjacking Correction Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1996), added sexual abuse to the statute's definition of serious bodily injury. The carjacking
statute now reads, in pertinent part:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that
has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the
person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do
so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS BULLETIN
46
JANUARY 2012](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/usab60&div=9&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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