About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

74 Fla. L. Rev. 267 (2022)
Super Deference and Heightened Scrutiny

handle is hein.journals/uflr74 and id is 273 raw text is: SUPER DEFERENCE AND HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY Jonathan H. Adler* Abstract Judicial review of federal agency action is systematically deferential. Such deference is arguably at its peak where agencies address scientific and highly technical matters within their area of expertise. This is what some call super deference. While there may be strong arguments for deferential review of agency scientific determinations as a general matter, there are reasons to question such deference when agency action implicates constitutional concerns. In particular, where agency actions trigger heightened scrutiny, such as occurs when agency actions intrude upon expressly enumerated or otherwise recognized fundamental rights or adopt constitutionally suspect classifications, courts should not apply traditional levels of deference. This Article explains why the application of so-called super deference is inappropriate where federal agency action triggers heightened scrutiny and considers some of the potential implications of such a rule. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................... 268 1. SUPER DEFERENCE ..................................................................... 272 A. Super Deference in the Courts........................................... 272 B. Rationales for Super Deference ........................................ 280 1.. Expertise.....................................................................280 2. Flexibility ................................................................... 282 3. Policy D iscretion........................................................ 284 4. Delegation .................................................................. 286 II. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY ............................................................. 288 III. SCRUTINY VS. DEFERENCE ......................................................... 293 IV. SCRUTINY OVER DEFERENCE ..................................................... 300 A. The Constitution Constrains Legislative Choice ............... 301 B. Agency Competence and Tunnel Vision............................. 302 * Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director, Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I prepared this Article for the Facts, Science, and Expertise in the Administrative State Research Roundtable, sponsored by the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State at the George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, November 5-6, 2020. I thank David Bernstein, Mark Chenoweth, E. Donald Elliott, B. Jessie Hill, Tony Mills, Richard Pierce, Steph Tai, and Christopher J. Walker for comments on various drafts of this Article, and Reagan Joy and Megan Schachter for their research assistance. All errors, omissions, and inanities are my own. 267

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most