4 Rev. L & Econ. 1 (2008)

handle is hein.journals/rvleco4 and id is 1 raw text is: 















Paying the Price for Being Caught: The
Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest
Theft in Roman Law*

NUNO GAROUPA,** FERNANDO GOMEZ POMAR
University of Illinois College of Law, IMDEA  & CEPR;   Universitat Pompeu  Fabra








In Roman law, manifest theft (essentialy, one in which a thief was caught in the act) was punished
nith a more severe penaly than non-manfest theft. This legal pody seems to contradict the economic
theof of effident deterrence. In this paer, we tU to explore how economic analysis of eriminal law and
law enforcement points to several efficieng-based arguments to understand the puggle, and allows us to
tentatively conclude that technological changes in law enforcement in the broad sense might have been the
majorfactor in the disappearance of the rule in modern legal sjstems.



1. INTRODUCTION
Legal-economic   history can be seen as the application of Law and Economics   as a
methodology   to the study  of legal history. The use of economic  analysis in legal
history, we  believe, can  make  positive  contributions to  the understanding   of


  * We are grateful to one anonymous referee, as well as Giuseppe Dan-Mattiacci, Antonio
Hespanha, Bruce Johnsen, Daniel Klerman, Bruce Kobayashi, Craig Lerner, Ifigo Ortiz de Urbina,
Francesco Parisi, Maurici Perez-Simeon, Eric Posner, Olivia Robinson, Steven Shavell, and Alan
Watson for extremely helpful suggestions and comments. Part of the paper was written when both
authors were Visiting Professors at George Mason University School of Law, whose hospitality and
the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Levy workshop is gratefully
acknowledged. The paper has also benefited from comments at the CEPR conference on Crime and
Conflict, Marseilles. Nuno Garoupa acknowledges fnancial support from Nova Forum and the
Portuguese Ministry of Higher Education and Science. Fernando Gomez acknowledges fnancial
support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology. The usual disclaimers apply.
  ** Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue,
Champaign, IL 61820. Email: ngaroupa@law.uiuc.edu.
  *** Professor of Law and Economics, School of Law, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, C/ Ramon
Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email: femando.gomez@upf.edu.

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