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16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 699 (1999-2000)
Life of Death: The Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas by Capital Defendants and the New York Perspective

handle is hein.journals/nylshr16 and id is 715 raw text is: Life or Death: The Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas by Capital Defendants and the New York Perspective INTRODUCTION* The will to survive is a powerful instinct. If a person's life is on the line, he or she will do anything to save it. No less of a standard is true for a criminal defendant facing possible execution. For capital defendants, this desperation may cause them to enter into plea agreements with prosecutors in exchange for less severe sentences, raising the question of whether defendants who face capital punishment voluntarily plead guilty.1 One can even argue that most guilty pleas entered in exchange for a more lenient sentence are, in fact, involuntary.2 Regardless of whether they are guilty or desire to contest the strength of the Government's case against them before a jury, criminal defendants may plead guilty solely to avoid the death penalty.3 As the United States Supreme Court stated in Woodson v. North Carolina, death is different;,4 therefore, should all pleas in * I would like to thank Jacqueline Linares and Kyle Reeves, both Senior Assistant District Attorneys with the Kings County District Attorney's office, for the thoughtful and practical insight they conveyed to me concerning the issues discussed in this note. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 11 (1982) (stating that the certainty of the defendant's death sentence after being convicted by a jury is a powerful tool for prosecutors in the plea bargaining process and also an incentive for the defendant to avoid trial by pleading guilty to a lesser crime); see also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (confronting the issue of whether a plea of guilty proffered in order to escape the death penalty is voluntary and intelligent). 2 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 70-74 (1988) (arguing that offering a defendant a lesser sentence than that which he or she would receive after trial has a coercive effect). Schulhofer compares plea bargaining to robbery, in which the robber states, your money or your life. Id. In both the robbery and the plea bargain, you are asked to give up something you have a right to; your money in the robbery-your right to a jury trial in the plea bargain. Id. at 70. Generally, for this reason, Shulhofer argues that the rational choice to plead guilty may be considered coerced. Id. Compare United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995). The Court stated that a guilty plea cannot be deemed coercive because difficult decisions are involved, even if there was undue leverage during plea negotiations. Id. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (forwarding that both the prosecutor and defendant stand on equal ground during plea negotiations). 3 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 699

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