Money Talks but It Isn't Speech
![handle is hein.journals/mnlr95 and id is 953 raw text is: Article
Money Talks but It Isn't Speech
Deborah Hellmant
INTRODUCTION
Buckley v. Valeo rests on the claim that restrictions on both
giving and spending money are tantamount to restrictions on
speech, and thus can only be sustained in the service of impor-
tant or compelling governmental interests.1 The justification
for this claim offered by the Supreme Court in Buckley and in
related cases that came after it is this: money facilitates
speech; money incentivizes speech; and giving and spending
money are themselves expressive activities. Therefore, restric-
t Professor of Law and Jacob France Research Professor, University of
Maryland School of Law. I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the
late Ed Baker of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for his many con-
versations on this topic and for encouraging me to write this piece. I also want
to thank Richard Briffault, Dick Fallon, Mark Graber, Mike Seidman, and
Alec Walen for reading and commenting in detail on earlier drafts of this
piece. Participants in the faculty workshops at Georgetown University Law
Center and the Committee on Politics, Philosophy, and Public Policy at the
University of Maryland provided very helpful feedback, as did participants in
the Brennan Center for Justice at the N.Y.U. Law School Symposium, Money,
Politics & the Constitution: Building A New Jurisprudence. My colleagues,
especially Danielle Citron, Jana Singer, and Richard Boldt, gave me very help-
ful feedback. Finally, Adam Farra provided truly invaluable research assis-
tance, discussion, and support. Copyright © 2011 by Deborah Hellman.
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976) (per curiam). While the
Court in Buckley recognizes that expenditure and contribution limitations
both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, the Court treats the
two as significantly different, subjecting expenditure restrictions to strict scru-
tiny review and contribution restrictions to intermediate scrutiny. See id. The
Court reasons that expenditure limitations substantially restrain the quantity
and diversity of political speech, while contribution limitations still allow polit-
ical expression of support and association. See id. at 23 ([A]lthough the Act's
contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more se-
vere restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association
than do its limitations on financial contributions.).
953](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/mnlr95&div=23&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Money Talks but It Isn't Speech
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