Jury Instructions - Reasonable Doubt - Don't Have to Know Instruction Is Not Reversible Error When Conviction Is Based on Direct Evidence
![handle is hein.journals/mislj49 and id is 1021 raw text is: JURY INSTRUCTIONS-REASONABLE DouBT-DoN'T HAVE TO KNOW INSTRUCTION
IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN CONVICTION Is BASED ON DIRECT EVIDENCE
Appellant' appealed his conviction under the Mississippi capital murder
statute2 for the murder, in conjunction with the robbery and kidnapping, of a
service station attendant.' The appellant and three other men had robbed the
attendant at gunpoint, forced him into a car, and driven to a wooded area where
they shot and killed him.' The trial judge charged the jury in the guilt phase of
the bifurcated trial' with the controversial don't have to know jury instruc-
tion. Frequently used in Mississippi, this instruction allows the members of the
jury to convict the accused without knowing he is guilty if they believe in his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of all other reasonable
hypotheses.' The jury returned a verdict of guilty and a sentence of death was
Charles S. Bell was seventeen or eighteen years old at the time of the murder for
which he was indicted and twenty years old at the time of the trial. Bell v. State, 360 So.
2d 1206, 1212 (Miss. 1978). The Mississippi Supreme Court had previously affirmed Bell's
capital murder conviction and resulting life sentence arising from another incident that
also involved murder committed in connection with a robbery. Bell v. State, 353 So. 2d
1141, 1144 (Miss. 1977).
' MIsS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 1978). The relevant portions of the statute pro-
vide:
(2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means
or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: . . .
(e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person
engaged in the commission of the crimes of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson,
or robbery, or in any attempt to commit such felonies ....
360 So. 2d at 1208.
Appellant and a former codefendant testified to these facts at the trial. There was,
however, a conflict in the testimony concerning who actually had fired the shots that killed
the attendant. Posey, the former codefendant, testified that Bell had told him that
McFarland, one of the three other men, had shot the attendant in the neck and that Bell
had shot him in the back. Bell, however, testified that McFarland had shot the attendant
in the head, and that one of the other men, not Bell, had shot him in the back. Id.
I The United States Supreme Court has approved this form of trial, which consists
of a guilt phase where the rules of evidence must be strictly observed unless or until there
is a conviction, and a sentencing phase where the record is opened to include information
relevant to sentencing, as constitutionally sufficient in capital murder cases. See Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-304 (1976) (murder in conjunction with armed rob-
bery); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (murder in attempted kidnapping and
forcible rape); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976) (armed robbery and murder).
This procedure has also been prescribed by the Mississippi Supreme Court for use in
capital murder cases. Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242, 1253 (Miss. 1976).
1 See Pryor v. State, 239 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 1970). In Aryor, the instruction read as
follows:
The Court instructs the jury for the State of Mississippi that you do not have
to know that the defendant is guilty before you can convict him. It is only
necessary that you should believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
and to the exclusion of very [sic] other reasonable hypothesis, that he is guilty,
and if you do so believe from all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/mislj49&div=52&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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