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43 J. Conflict Resol. 3 (1999)

handle is hein.journals/jcfltr43 and id is 1 raw text is: 






Explaining the Stability of Negotiated

Settlements to Intrastate Wars

CAROLINE A. HARTZELL
Political Science Department
Gettysburg College



   Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negoti-
ated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict. To explain why some
negotiated settlements prove stable and others do not, scholars have examined the impact of factors such as
superpower conflict, group identities, and third-party guarantors. This article argues that those negotiated
settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized-that is, that provide institutional guarantees for
the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized state power-are the ones
most likely to prove stable. An analysis of all settlements negotiated to end intrastate conflicts during the
period between 1945 and 1997 supports this proposition.



With the end of the   cold war, policy makers  and scholars have devoted  increasing
attention to intrastate conflicts, the deadliest and most pervasive form of conflict in the
international system today. Concerned  about the human suffering these wars produce,
as well as their economic effects and possible consequences for regional security, the
international community   has  sought numerous   means  to end  them.  Although  the
majority of intrastate conflicts end when one warring party achieves a victory over the
other (Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991), over the last 50 years approximately one-fourth of
these confrontations have been  terminated through negotiated agreements  (Licklider
1995).  Moreover,  some  evidence  indicates that negotiated agreements have  grown
more  common   in the post-cold war period (Wallensteen and Sollenberg  1997). How-
ever, the stability of these negotiated settlements is a matter of concern. Are civil wars
re-emerging   after short-lived peace agreements  fall apart? Scholars recently have
begun  to ask what factors might contribute to settlement stability. For example, some
authors  have focused on the role of outside actors such as international and regional
organizations (Maynes   1993) and third-party guarantors (Walter 1997a). Others have
sought  to explore the importance of economic conditions to settlement stability (de Soto
and  del Castillo 1994; Haggard  and Kaufman 1995),   the significance of ethnic and
other group identities (Licklider 1995), and the influence of the absence of superpower
conflict with the end of the cold war (Hampson   1990).

    AUTHOR'S  NOTE: I thank Charles Dannehl, Fritz Gaenslen, David Lewis, Roger Rose, and Donald
 Rothchild for their helpful comments and advice. I also gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of
 Andrew Watkins, which was supported by Gettysburg College's Research and Professional Development
 Grants.
 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 43 No. 1, February 1999 3-22
 Q 1999 Sage Publications, Inc.
                                                                                   3


from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

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