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42 Ind. L. Rev. 285 (2009)
Opting Only in: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom

handle is hein.journals/indilr42 and id is 289 raw text is: Indiana Law Review Volume 42 2009 Number 2 ARTICLE OPTING ONLY IN: CONTRACTARIANS, WAIVER OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS, AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.* SANDEEP GOPALAN** ABSTRACT This paper will test the core claim of scholars in the nexus of contracts tradition-that private ordering as a process of bargaining creates optimal rules. We do this by analyzing empirical evidence in the context of waiver of liability provisions. These provisions allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of care through amendments to the articles of incorporation. With all states allowing some form of these provisions, they represent a good laboratory to examine the bargaining process between management and shareholders. The contractarian approach would suggest that shareholders negotiate with management to obtain agreements that are in their best interests. If a process of bargaining is at work as they claim, the opt-in process for waiver of liability provisions ought to generate a variety of approaches. Shareholders wanting a high degree of accountability would presumably not support a waiver of liability. In other instances, shareholders might favor them in order to attract or retain qualified managers. Still others would presumably want a mix, allowing waiver but only in specified circumstances. Our analysis reveals that the diversity predicted by a private ordering model is not borne out by the evidence with waiver of liability provisions for Fortune 100 companies. All states permit such provisions and in the Fortune 100, all but one company has them. Moreover, they are remarkably similar in effect, waiving liability to the fullest extent * Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Professor Brown operates a blog that addresses corporate governance topics, The Race to the Bottom, http://www.theracetothe bottom.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). Special thanks to Jamie Boyd, my research assistant, who put together all of the empirical data used in this paper. We are also grateful to Professor Doug Branson for his insightful comments and suggestions. Errors and omissions are our own. ** Reader (Associate Professor) in Law, University of Reading, United Kingdom. Professor Gopalan also contributes to the blog, The Race to the Bottom, http://www.theracetothebottom.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2008).

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