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2015 Hungarian Y.B. Int'l L. & Eur. L. 479 (2015)
Banking Union: Why Opting out Is a Viable Alternative

handle is hein.journals/huyiel2015 and id is 494 raw text is: 23 BANKING UNION: WHY OPTING OUT IS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE Peter Fdykiss, Ddniel Papp and Anikd Szombati* 23.1 INTRODUCTION Due to the self-reinforcing European financial and sovereign debt crisis that occurred in 2011, decision makers of the European Union decided to take steps to avoid a further possible turmoil and created a mechanism to break the bank-sovereign vicious cycle by elevating the supervision and resolution of large cross-border banking groups to the supranational level. The decisive response to the bank-sovereign feedback-loop was the creation of a common European cross-border supervisory and resolution power, since the idea that only a European-level framework could effectively play its role due to highly interconnected European financial and banking markets. This new framework of supervi- sion and resolution focusing first and foremost on the Eurozone is called the Banking Union. In a broad sense - considering also the accompanying instruments - the milestones of the union are the following. First, a single rulebook for the prudential requirements of credit institutions was adopted, since a well-functioning banking union requires common rules that apply to all banks. The revised Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) contain a comprehensive set of prudential rules and also pave the way Peter FAykiss is the Head of the Macro-prudential policy department at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), the central bank of Hungary. He graduated at Corvinus University of Budapest in 2009. After graduation, he joined MNB, where he worked as analyst at the Financial Stability Department. Between 2013 and 2014 he worked as Deputy Head of Financial Services Department at the Ministry for National Economy, and was responsible inter alia for the implementation of CRD IV in Hungary. Dr. Daniel Papp is member of the Macro-prudential policy department at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank as a legal advisor. He graduated at ELTE law school in 2012. After having supervisory experience at the former Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, he was enrolled at LUND University for a postgraduate law course, called European Business Law (LL.M.). He made extensive research on the forming European supervisory framework, since his master thesis was about the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Assessment of Hungary's Possible Approach. Anik6 Szombati leads the Macroprudential Directorate of Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the central bank of Hungary. This Directorate is responsible for the fulfillment of tasks originating from the Central Bank Act recognizing MNB as the macro-prudential authority of Hungary. The macro-prudential authority's major task is to identify and mitigate system-wide risks in the financial intermediary system. The Directorate also contributes to the formulation of central bank opinion in major structural issues related to the financial sector developed either at EU or at the country level. 479

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