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12 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 413 (1999-2000)
The Taboo System: Lessons about Informal Institutions for Nature Management

handle is hein.journals/gintenlr12 and id is 421 raw text is: The Taboo System: Lessons About Informal Institutions for Nature Management* JOHAN COLDING** AND CARL FOLKE** I. Introduction ............................................. 413 II. Background ............................................. 416 A. The Logistics of Informal Institutions ....................... 421 III. The Taboo System ........................................ 423 A. Resource and Habitat Taboos .............................. 425 B. Ecological Ramifications of Resource and Habitat Taboos ........ 435 C. Institutional Ramifications of Resource and Habitat Taboos ....... 437 IV. In Pursuit of Structures for Sustainable Nature Management Systems: Lessons for the West ....................................... 438 V. The Role of Nested Enterprises ................................ 441 I. INTRODUCTION This article discusses the significance of making use of informal institutions in nature management and conservation. Institutions may be defined as the humanly devised norms and rules that shape human interaction and societal evolution. They are composed of formal and informal constraints and their enforcement characteristics.' As described in this article, many local-level institutions for resource management are informal, based on cultural norms and conventions of society.2 Such institutions are widespread among local resource users that design their own norms and rules.3 Local resource users can include both traditional, * This article is sponsored by the Resilience Network, with support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and by a grant from the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN). The authors are also grateful to Elinor Ostrom, for giving them valuable input in the completion of this article. ** Department of Systems Ecology and Center for Research on Natural Resources and the Environment, Stockholm University, S-10691 Stockholm, Swed.; Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Box 5005, S- 10405 Stockholm, Swed. 1. See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). 2. A norm can be defined as a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement. Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. OF LAW & EcoN. 369 (1999). Norms may be independent of laws, or may overlap them. See id. 3. For a description of the variety of such local norms and rules in common property settings, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58-102 (1990). See also Janis B. Alcorn & Victor M. Toledo, Resilient Resource Management in Mexico's Forest Ecosystems: The Contribution of Property Rights, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 216, 227-28, 230-35 (Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke eds.,

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