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77 Food & Drug L.J. 51 (2022-2023)
An Orange Book Landscape: Drugs, Patents, and Generic Competition

handle is hein.journals/foodlj77 and id is 55 raw text is: 










An Orange Book Landscape: Drugs, Patents, and

                        Generic Competition


          JONATHAN J. DARROW* & DANIEL T.C. MALt




ABSTRACT

   Patents are widely  considered to be  a critical incentive for drug development
because they allow manufacturers to recoup investments in research and development
activities. However,  patents are  also criticized for preventing competition  and
contributing to higher prices. To better understand the patent landscape for approved
drug products  and the relationship between patents, other exclusivities, and generic
competition, we examined  all prescription drug products listed in the Orange Book as
of February 2021. Surprisingly, only 31% to 39% of drug products had any remaining
patent protection as of this date, meaning the majority of approved drug products are
unencumbered by patents. This finding remained true even when regulatory
exclusivities were considered. We  also found  that generic drug approval occurred
despite the presence of patent protection in 28% of cases, and that patent expiration
was  not followed by generic drug approval in 32%  of cases. These findings suggest
that even valid patents do not necessarily block competition, as is commonly believed,
and that dramatic price decreases often cannot be expected when  patents expire. As
scholars and policymakers craft policies aimed at controlling drug prices, they should
seek to better understand how factors other than patents and regulatory exclusivities
affect generic competition and patient health.

I.     INTRODUCTION

   Since the signing of the Constitution, the United States has embraced a philosophy
of granting exclusive rights to inventors to promote technological advance, including
in the field of medicine.1 Patents are intended to achieve this goal by giving inventors
the ability to temporarily exclude direct competition and last for twenty years from the




       Assistant Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School; Associate Professor of Law, Bentley
University; Associate Scientist, Brigham & Women's Hospital, at time of acceptance for publication.
    Darrow has received research support from Arnold Ventures, the Commonwealth Fund, the Greenwall
Foundation, the Harvard-MIT Center for Regulatory Science, Health Action International's ACCISS
program, the Kaiser Permanente Institute for Health Policy, West Health, and under a Novo Nordisk
Foundation grant for a scientifically independent Collaborative Research Programme (grant
NNF17SA0027784). The funders had no role in the conception, drafting, editing, or submission of this
manuscript. The authors thank Jerry Avorn and fellow members of the Program on Regulation,
Therapeutics, and Law at Brigham & Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School for offering feedback
that helped improve the manuscript.
       Yale University School of Management.
     1 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For an example of an early medicine patent, see U.S. Pat. No. 4848
(Nov. 12, 1846) (patent on ether as an anesthetic).


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