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34 Ark. L. Rev. 335 (1980-1981)
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships

handle is hein.journals/arklr34 and id is 345 raw text is: Tortious Interference with Contractual
Relationships*
Dan B. Dobbs**
I.  INTRODUCTION
If I persuade you to breach your contract with another person, I have
committed a tort to that person unless I can show some special privilege.
to interfere. So, at least, is the view of many authorities.' Very similarly,
if I persuade you to leave your spouse, I am liable to your spouse under
the American common law rule2 where it has not been changed by statute
or overruled by case law.3 I may also be liable for interference without
direct persuasion if I commit an act I know will cause you to terminate
your dealings with another.4 It should go without saying that I am also
liable if I interfere with contract relations of others through tortious
means, for example, by injuring5 or libeling6 one of the parties.
By analogy this kind of liability may also be imposed when there is
no contract at all between the parties, and when the contract they do
have is terminable at will. Thus I am liable if-without a privilege to do
so-I persuade your employer to exercise his right to terminate your con-
tract,7 and I am also liable if I induce your ancestor to disinherit you.8
Only last year, California expanded this already expansive scheme of lia-
bility by holding9 that liability could be imposed, not only when one in-
* This informal essay was adapted by the author from a talk delivered at the
University of Arkansas School of Law on September 26, 1980.
**  Professor of Law, University of Arizona. I wish to thank Ms. Kay Kavanagh for
helpful reading of an early manuscript and for her useful comments, Ms. Patricia Milanich
for her suggestions, Mr. Peter Jarosz for his help with footnotes and, of course, the editors of
the Arkansas Law Review for their thorough work.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 (1977).
3. See note 82 infra.
4. As in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv. Inc., 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska
1979), discussed in text following n. 57 infra.
5. Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620). Actions based on interference
through injury are very old, traceable to Roman law. See Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract,
36 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1923).
6. It is often asserted that libel causes the plaintiff to lose business or contract rights,
- e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). When the plaintiff meets the proof re-
quired in libel cases, the only impediment to recovery for such losses is found in the rules of
causation and reasonable certainty of damages.
7. See material cited note 4 supra.
8. Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936). In
Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A. 2d 1020 (Me. 1979), a potential beneficiary was allowed to sue
even though the ancestor was still living.
9. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P. 2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).

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