Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory
![handle is hein.journals/antil71 and id is 729 raw text is: ECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON THE EXISTENCE
OF COLLUSION: RECONCILING ANTITRUST LAW
WITH OLIGOPOLY THEORY
GREGORY J. WERDEN*
In a spate of recent cases with divergent outcomes, courts of appeals
have evaluated attempts to establish collusion largely on the basis of
economic evidence.1 Substantial commentary, expressing sharply diver-
gent views, also has appeared on the role of economic analysis in deter-
mining the existence of collusion, especially in light of the Daubert line
of cases.2 Although Daubert casts new light on the issues, they have
* Senior Economic Counsel, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The views
expressed herein are not purported to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.
I E.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (summary
judgment for defendants affirmed); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295
F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002) (summary judgment for defendants reversed), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 1251, and cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1253, and cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1254 (2003); Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (summary judgment for
defendants affirmed by 6-5 en banc vote); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999) (judgment for defendants as a matter of law affirmed);
In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (summary judgment for
defendants affirmed); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548 (11 th Cir.
1998) (summary judgment for defendants reversed).
Roger D. Blair, Lessons from City of Tuscaloosa, ANTITRUST, Summer 1996, at 43; Roger
D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Ambiguous Is Still Ambiguous, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003,
at 48 [Blair & Herndon III]; Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Inferring Collusion
from Economic Evidence, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 17 [Blair & Herudon II]; Roger D.
Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, The Implications of Daubert for Economic Evidence in Antitrust
Cases, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 801 (2000) [Blair & Herndon I]; Andrew I. Gavil, Defining
Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-Daubert/Kumho Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2000) [Gavil II]; Andrew I. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning
the Increasingly Fine Line Between the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust
Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 663 (1997) [Gavil I]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Economic Experts
in Antitrust Cases, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE ch. 23 (David L. Faigman et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2002); Robert F. Lanzillotti, Coming to Terms with Daubert in Sherman Act Complaints:
A Suggested Economic Approach, 77 NEB. L. REv. 83 (1998); Robert F. Lanzillotti & James
T. McClave, Comment: Meeting the Ambiguity Test Under Daubert, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003,
at 44; Robert A. Milne & Jack E. Pace III, Conspiratologists at the Gate: The Scope of Expert
Testimony on the Subject of Conspiracy in a Sherman Act Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 36.
The Daubert line of cases consists principally of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/antil71&div=29&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory
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