Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment: A New Standard
![handle is hein.journals/wmjwl2 and id is 111 raw text is: QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
A NEW STANDARD
LYNN T. DICKINSON*
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,1 courts have formulated
two categories of workplace sexual harassment.2 The first cate-
gory, hostile environment, makes actionable a work environment
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.'3 The inquiry is objective: the harassment must be
sufficiently severe and pervasive that a reasonable person would
be offended.4 The second category, quid pro quo, something for
something,5 makes actionable what some have called sexual
blackmail. That is, an employer or supervisor conditions em-
ployment benefits on the employee's submission to unwelcome
sexual conduct.7
On the surface, the availability of legal recourse for these
categories of harassment appears to prohibit all workplace sexual
harassment. As currently construed by some courts, however,
the quid pro quo cause of action fails to address adequately
situations in which workers are subjected to subtle forms of
sexual coercion or do not suffer traditional tangible harms.8
* J.D. candidate 1996, William and Mary School of Law; B.A. 1992, College of
William and Mary. The author would like to thank Professor Susan S. Grover.
1. 42 U.S.C. S 2000(e)-2 (1988). Title VI provides, in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
S 2000(e)-2(aX1).
2. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (affirming the sexual
harassment dichotomy by defining hostile environment sexual harassment as non quid
pro quo).
3. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
4. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (holding that conduct
reasonably perceived as hostile or abusive is actionable without a showing of psychological
injury).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
7. 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1995).
8. See Marlissa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards
in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718-19 (1989). Marlissa Vinciguerra
argues that courts have improperly limited quid pro quo to clear cut cases. Id. at 1718.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/wmjwl2&div=8&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment: A New Standard
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