About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

10 Antitrust 13 (1995-1996)
Antitrust: The New Regulation

handle is hein.journals/antitruma10 and id is 15 raw text is: 



('   )   \v  IF  R   -   s   I   ( ) R   I   F   s


Antitrust: The New Reoulation


by A. Douglas Aelaned


The trend toward t
  is fueled by two
  en frcement. Nei
  are becoming inc


vigorous antitrust eiilorceniient,
   It has not worked oult that way.
listead, anlitt luls has evolved ill recenlt years, subtly and aloSt
inipercePlibliy, towa'd a new f'oril of' regulation. Tie triansI oir-
imation is far f'roli complete, but tile trend is unmistakable. lin
substaice, aititi'Lst eifollicers no IonIger confine their inliquiry to
whether tile defendant has violated the law; instead, they ask
whether the del endaiit's conduct maximizes consumer welf'are
or other'ise serves the public interest.

Two Iaraidignms
T'lie transforiation cali be understood by imagining two para-
clignis: the Law Eif'orcenent Model and the Regulatory Model.
   The Law Enfiorceiient Model is the more traditional. Under
this miodel, the government simply enforces the laws: it f'ocuses
on past CoiidLiC aind attempts to ascertain whether that conduct
violates legal noris.
   For this purpose. legal norms aire behavioral tiles that
describe ceitain conduct as illegal and. by implication, are iidif'-
ferent tI all conduct that is not sci proscribed. Legal noris have
two additional characteristics: They are publicly announced and
understandable by those who are expected to comply with theMii;
and they are intended to be, and generally are, applied in like
ways to those similarly situated.
   The Regulatory Model dil'i'ers from the Law Enforcement
Model in a number of ways. It tends to focus more oii prospec-
tive regulation of lthe private sector by the government. It tends
to ask, when assessing the propriety and nature of government
intervention, how private entities should behave or how private
property could be used to maximize social welf'are - in tie
antitrust context, usually consumer welfare - rather than tile nar-
rower qfuestion whether the private conduct violated legal norms.
   There is not a neat dichotomy between the Law Enf'orcement
Model and the Regulatory Model; rather, there is a continuuml.

A. I)oughml Afehoned is a partner tit Wiln'i: Cull' S& Pickering,
  Wt.shin,'ton. IC l/hn 7f/nan, h'uioniic Anayst at Wihlnel; Cithr
  & Pickering, assi.v ed iii resear'chfi this artic'. Ml: Mc'/aic'd has
  Scrved ais co'ilisci to.firml that a , parti's to or iltcrn'sted ill solie'
  of 'ti inattrr discussed in thi artich'.


i i'ecent years, it Iilas been i fash-
      ionlahle tio decry 'egulation anid
      to exalt coinipeliion. The con-
      V'enltiOal wisdOui is that tihe
heavy haiid cf' goe niie li Ieg Ill  ation
Canl be lifted, leaving ill its place
ribLst cOlupctitiOn saf'eguarId ed by


                           The two are distingunished pri ncipally
he Regulatory Model        by the distance they prcine and seek
                           between the government and the pri-
aspects of antitrust       vate sector. The Law Inforceient
ther is new, but both       Model focLsCs priniarily on whether
                           tile def enda lit has violated tie law. The
reasingly important.        Regulatory Model focuses more on
                           remldics for perceived market failure
                           and  las lmiore ccillfiderlce ill tile ability
    if the g cvernmenlt to inprove upon private sectora *mrrlgelien lis.
       Anltitrust enlforcenient has mloved markedly along the coln-
    tinuliU from the Law Iillforcenlenlt Model toward the Regulatory
    Model. The trend has become iiiore appaent in i'ecent years
    because cITrrent ailitlrust oici alS appear ilo0re inclinied toward
    ail activist pligl'anil of alitilrust eiif'orcement and intervention into
    tile markets than were their predecessors ini previous admillis-
    trations. But tihe distinction between (he Law Eiforccment
    Model and the Regulatory Model is not fundanentally a dis-
    tlinction between passive and active antitrust eiiforceiient. The
    distinction has more to io with ways of thinking abouL antitrust
    problems and the solutions fOr them.
      Tile trend toward the Regulatory Model is fueled by two
    aspects of' antitrusi elforcement. Neither is new. but bolth are
    becolning increasingly inportanlt.

    Increasing Use of Consent Decrees
    Fiist, tie evoilion of anltillsl into a frmi of regutianiol is ill part
    a by-product Of the increasing use of consenlt decrees as the pri-
    niary neais if anlititnisl eiforeenit. The Antitrust Division, for
    example, entered into 8 consent decrees in 1993, 19 ill 1994, and
    12 in the first half of 1995. Dui'ing this same period, the Division
    Iiled only five complaints that were not accolpanied by consent
    decrees.
      The record of' (ie Federal Trade Commission is similar. The
    number of consent decrees put out f'or comment by the
    Commission has continually increased. There were 5 in 1992, 9
    iii 1993, 15 iin 1994, and 22 in the first six and one-half lonths
    of' 1995.
      The reasons that the parties enter into a consent decree in an
    individual case are usually obvious and of'ten comlpelling.
    Consent decrees resolve uncertainty about the del'endants' legal
    duties. eColniZe Ol eillforcelleilt aid colmpliance resources,
    and enable government officials to address issues that are polil t
    ically or econonmically importanlt but legally amibiguous.
    Presumably, dlefendants do not enter inlto consent decrees when
    it is clear that they have not violated the law, but it appears that
    def'endants coniionly enter into consent decrees where the
    alleged violation is uncertain and the costs of the consent decree


Cl 0'l M  Ml E Ni IT.  A R11 V<

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

profiles profiles most