The Franco-German Relationship
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CLUJ UNIVERSITY JOURNAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY: SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
no 1./VOL.2/2024
EDITORIAL
THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP
Sylvain Schirmann, Professor Ph.D,
Sciences Po Strasbourg - University of Strasbourg
s.schirmann@unistrafr
Amidst the prevailing narrative of deteriorating Franco-German relations, recent incidents, from
canceled state visits to mutual misunderstandings, have cast a shadow over the historically significant
partnership. However, a closer examination of the past reveals that the current crisis is not unprecedented.
From the Treaty of Rome negotiations, where Paris and Bonn clashed over the common market's nature, to
disagreements over Algeria and the EEC's inception, historical differences were navigated by leaders like
Adenauer, de Gaulle, Brandt, Pompidou, Schmidt, Mitterrand, and Kohl, fostering European integration.
The post-Cold War era introduced shifts, challenging the dynamics post-reunification. Discrepancies on
issues like the Iraq War and the Economic and Monetary Union reflected evolving dynamics. Despite recent
tensions surrounding the pandemic and the Ukraine crisis, the article argues that political leadership remains
pivotal for joint projects. The authors propose focusing on democracy, European industrial production, and
sovereignty in migration, research, sustainable development, and defense as areas for collaboration, aiming
to revitalize the driving force behind European integration. The complex relationship, despite its challenges,
holds the potential to shape the future of Europe.
All the media emphasise the deterioration of Franco-German relations. Recent episodes certainly
support this approach. From cancelled state visits to reciprocal misunderstandings and vexations, there is
nothing short of a cloud over relations between the two neighbours on the Rhine. Yet the past is full of
examples and situations that have nothing to envy the current Franco-German crisis.
As early as the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome, Paris and Bonn were at odds over the nature of the
common market. For the former, it should be protectionist and be transformed into a customs union as soon
as possible; for the latter, this market should be integrated into the world economy, move closer to a free
trade area, and therefore achieve the disappearance of intra-European customs barriers within a short space
of time. Nor did the FRG understand the war France was waging in Algeria, the torture it was practising
and the fact that it was bogged down in this hopeless conflict.
Just after the EEC was launched, it feared the arrival in power of de Gaulle, who was highly critical
of the Community adventure as it had begun with the Schuman plan. A decade later, both countries were
questioning their partner's willingness to take a step forward. In Bonn, the Gaullist attitude towards the
United States and France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command was little appreciated, just as
German reticence towards a powerful Europe was not understood in Paris. Later still, Germany's economic
power, the strength of the Mark and the first steps of Ostpolitik made the French government fear that their
country would be downgraded. The arrival in power of a team that included Communist ministers in 1981
in France and the economic policy put in place by Frangois Mitterrand aroused the anger of Chancellor
Schmidt who, as he confided to President Reagan's advisor George Schultz in February 1982, wanted the
experiment to fail. The French President, for his part, found it difficult to understand German apprehensions
about the installation of the Pershing on West German soil. This litany of Franco-German disagreements
could be extended. [Mazzucelli, 1997]
These difficulties were often overcome by a real political will. Adenauer's, aware that a common
market without France would mean a loss of power not only for the EEC but also for Germany. That of de
Gaulle, who agreed to make the FRG a primus inter pares with France in this European adventure, because
without this couple his plan for a Third Great Europe would be doomed to failure. Brandt and Pompidou
relaunched Europe at The Hague in 1969 and agreed to take a step towards each other! This paved the way
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The Franco-German Relationship
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