Ronald Dworkin and the Convergence of Law and Political Philosophy
![handle is hein.journals/tlr65 and id is 1235 raw text is: Book Reviews
Ronald Dworkin and the Convergence of Law
and Political Philosophy
LAW'S EMPIRE. By Ronald Dworkin.t Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1986. pp. xiii, 470. $20.00.
Reviewed by Jeffrey Abramson*
I. Introduction
For some time now, law and political philosophy have been moving
toward one another. Although this movement is most apparent in the
area of constitutional law, where a new generation of philosophical law-
yers has arisen,1 it is also evident in other areas of law, where important
works have recently appeared on the proper moral foundation of basic
legal doctrines such as just compensation2 and liability for accidents.3
This movement shows no signs of exhausting itself. Indeed, the publica-
tion of Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire marks a new stage in the meet-
ing of these two disciplines. Because Law's Empire figures so
prominently in this overall development, I propose in this Review to dis-
cuss the work in terms of the intense interest lawyers and judges now
take in questions of political theory.
In one sense, the influence of political philosophy on law-or the
fear of such influence-is nothing new. Hobbes himself remarked that
there existed the long tradition, dating back through Cicero to Aristotle
t Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University, and Professor of Law, New York
University.
* Associate Professor of Politics, Brandeis University, B.A. Amherst College (1969); Ph.D.
Harvard University (1977); J.D. Harvard (1978).
1. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); B. ACKER-
MAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1985) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTING]; B. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1985) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE]; J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978);
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
2. See, eg., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985) (examining the proper relationship between the state and the individual, within the
context of the takings clause of the Constitution).
3. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing an economic theory
for no fault insurance).
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