Due Propriety in Perverting the Course of Justice
![handle is hein.journals/jcriml57 and id is 406 raw text is: COMMENT
DUE PROPRIETY IN PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE
The common law offence of perverting the course of justice, whilst
traceable back as far as the Bishop of Lincoln's Case (1637) 3 State Tr
770 finds modern expression in the leading authority of R v Vreones
[1891] 1 QB 360 where Baron Pollock succinctly described the offence
as: 'the doing of some act which has a tendency and is intended to
pervert the administration of public justice'. It is clear that the
prosecution must show a specific intent to pervert the course of justice
coupled with acts which are not only intended to have this result but
which factually have a tendency so to do.
By defining the actus reus of the offence in terms of a 'tendency' to
produce the prohibited result the Court of Appeal had held in R v Rowell
[1978] 1 All ER 665 and R v Machin [1980] 3 All ER 151 that a charge
of attempt will in many cases be inappropriate as an 'attempt' will
evidence the required 'tendency' for the substantive offence provided D's
conduct has, without more, produced a risk that injustice will result: R v
Murray [1982] 2 All ER 225. Only where this is not so is it appropriate
to charge an attempt.
As recognised by the Law Commission in their report on offences
relating to interference with the course of justice (Law Coin 96 (.1980))
the offence is a wide one. Its unvarying hallmark however is the presence
of conduct which is designed to, and which may, lead to a miscarriage of
justice-irrespective of whether such a miscarriage actually occurs. This
article is specifically concerned with those cases where perversion of the
course of justice has taken the form of interfering, or attempting to
interfere, with witnesses by encouraging them to suppress or alter the
evidence they were intending to give.
A close relative of the offence of interfering with the course of justice, as
recognised in Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114, is that of contempt
of court. It would be inaccurate however to suggest (as many of the early
authorities do) that the two offences are kindred spirits; the present offence
(unlike contempt of court) requires interference with the course of justice
which may begin to run even though proceedings have not been commenced
provided that they are imminent or that associated investigations are in
train: R v Selvage and Morgan (1981) 73 Cr App Rep 333.
The passing of ss 4 and 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (acting to
impede the apprehension or prosecution of an offender and concealing
offences or giving false information, respectively) has produced undoubted
overlap with the offence of perverting the course of justice but it is clear
that the common law offence is not to be regarded as having been
abrogated by the statute: R v Panayiotou [1973] 3 All ER 112. Indeed,
considerable evidential difficulties associated with a prosecution under
s 4(1) may be avoided by utilisation of the common law offence.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/jcriml57&div=50&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Due Propriety in Perverting the Course of Justice
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