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38 World Pol. 1 (1985-1986)
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies

handle is hein.journals/wpot38 and id is 19 raw text is: 





       EXPLAINING COOPERATION

                UNDER ANARCHY:

              Hypotheses and Strategies

                       By KENNETH A. OYE*


                           I. INTRODUCTION




 N ATIONS dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority
      imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common
 condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. Relations among states are
 marked  by war and  concert, arms races and arms control, trade wars
 and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues, competitive devaluation
 and monetary  stabilization. At times, the absence of centralized inter-
 national authority precludes attainment of common  goals. Because as
 states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supra-
 national sovereign, they cannot guarantee that  they will adhere  to
 their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede co-
 operation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other
 times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under an-
 archy. Despite the absence of any ultimate international authority, gov-
 ernments often bind themselves  to mutually advantageous  courses of
 action. And, though no international sovereign stands ready to enforce
 the terms of agreement, states can realize common  interests through
 tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the
 creation of international regimes. The question is: If international re-
 lations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean
 civil society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not  in
 others?'
   The  contributors to this symposium address both  explanatory and
 prescriptive aspects of this perennial question. First, what circumstances
favor the emergence of cooperation under anarchy? Given the lack of a

  * I am grateful for comments by Jeff Frieden, Ralph Ginsberg, Joanne Gowa, Stephen
  Krasner, David Lake, Timothy McKeown, Paul Quirk, Arthur Stein, and the other con-
tributors to this volume.
  ' The essays presented here focus on nation-states as primary actors in world politics,
treat national preferences as sovereign, and assume that any ultimate escape from inter-
national anarchy is unlikely. Our focus is on non-altruistic cooperation among states dwelling
in international anarchy.

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