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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-DIscHARGE OF AN OFFICIAL BY A LEGALLY
AUTHORIZED PERSON OR COMMISSION ACTUATED BY BIAS.-[New Jersey]
By statute in New Jersey the director of public safety of Passaic was
the only official to try charges against the chief of police. The chief
of police, being so tried, objectedI on the grounds that the director was
biased, but the director rendered a judgment of dismissal from which
the chief of police took certiorari to the supreme court and thence to
the Court of Errors and Appeals. The court held that bias was not a
disqualification at common law nor by statute in New Jersey. Moreover,
the chief of police had his appeal to the supreme court which involved
a review by that court in the light of all the evidence so that the chief
of police did ultimately obtain a fair trial by an impartial tribunal
and could not be heard to complain of bias on the part of the director:
Zober v. Turner (N. J., 1930), 148 At. 894.
Three questions are involved: Are administrative officers dis-
qualified to discharge such of their duties as involve an exercise of
discretion for the same reasons that disqualify judges? (2) Does
prejudice or bias disqualify a judge at common law? (3) Must a
disqualification give way to necessity when no other tribunal has juris-
diction over the cause?
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in State ex rel. Cook v. Houser
(1904) 122 Wis. 534, 100 N. W. 964, has said that the doctrine of
the disqualification of judges has no application to quasi-judicial tri-
bunals dealing with administrative matters. The reason given is nega-
tive, that the courts holding otherwise do so because of the need of
justice and the faith of the public in judicial integrity, whereas those
arguments are actually not applicable to an administrative body acting
quasi-judicially. But is the reasoning of this Wisconsin court sound?
It is unquestionably true that the interests of -the people are being
constantly placed more and more under the control of administrative
commissions and boards, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Federal Radio Commission: Dickinson Administrative Jus-
tice and the Supremacy of Law, p. 3. A person whose rights are
being passed on before such a tribunal is as much in need of a fair trial
as is one whose rights are before a court of law, and, considering
the extensiveness of the development of administrative law, faith of
the public in the integrity of administrative tribunals is just as neces-
sary as faith in the integrity of courts of law. The great weight of
authority is to the effect that disqualifications that apply to judicial
tribunals also disqualify quasi-judicial officers, so-called: State ex rel.
Barnard v. Board of Education (1898) 19 Wash. 8, 52 Pac. 317; Stahl
v. Board of Supervisors (1920) 187 Iowa 1342, 175 N. W. 772; State
ex. rel. Mil/er v. Aldridge (1925) 212 Ala. 660, 103 So. 835.
As tQ whether or not bias or prejudice is a disqualification aside
fron statute, there is a conflict of authority. It is probably true that
bias or prejudice is generally held not to be a disqualification at common
law. See State ex rel. Cook v. Houser, supra; People v. Compton, (1899)
123 Calif. 403, 56 Pac. 44; Elliott v. Hipp (1910) 134 Ga. 844, 68 S. E.
736. In some jurisdictions it is difficult to determine what the courts
actually hold; for instance, in Alabama the courts have frequently
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