About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

86 Harv. L. Rev. 797 (1972-1973)
The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules

handle is hein.journals/hlr86 and id is 815 raw text is: MARCH 1973 HARVARD LAW REVIEW THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION: BARGAINING AND RULES Philip B. Heymann * Despite the fact that much of the mutual interference generated by individual activity can be avoided and many new possibilities for shared benefits created by understandings arrived at prior to action, individuals frequently fail to coordinate their behavior. Starting from a model of rational individual choice, Professor Heymann demonstrates that some of the difficulties of coordination are inherent in the process of arriving at ad hoc agreements and argues that many of these problems can be alleviated by arriving at broader arrange- ments designed to govern individual behavior, by establishing rules. Professor Heymann then examines the relationship of gen- eral rules to more specific arrangements and considers three broad approaches, in terms of rules, to the problem of coordination. Next, he analyzes the process of choice of rules. Finally, Professor Hey- mann explores some of the limitations of his model of coordination as an explanation of organizational forms and of individual and group action. I. INTRODUCTION A. Coordination as an Instrumental End F individuals act without first establishing arrangements with those whom their actions affect and who affect them, each is likely to be sorry when he sees the price all will pay. Thomas Schelling provides a rich set of examples in his article, On the Ecology of ilMicromotives. It is in each fisherman's self-interest to take as many whales as he can before a competitor does, although each will regret the excessive depletion of the stock. Each resi- dent's individual steps to obtain a neighborhood balanced equally in terms of race are likely to result, Schelling shows, in segregation for all. If everyone on a highway slows down for several seconds to take a look at the scene of an accident, all but the earliest to arrive may be delayed 15 or 20 minutes although no one would willingly pay that price for the view.' * Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A., Yale, 1954; LL.B., Harvard, ig6o. 1 Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 PUB. INTEREST 6i, 65-88 (971). VOLUME 86 NUMBER 5

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most