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77 Calif. L. Rev. 777 (1989)
Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers

handle is hein.journals/calr77 and id is 791 raw text is: Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers
Alan A. Fisher,t
Frederick I. Johnson,t
and Robert H. Landettt
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase
market power but also generate efficiency gains? The dominant belief has
been that the government and courts should evaluate these mergers solely
in terms of economic efficiency. Congress, however, wanted the courts to
stop any merger significantly likely to raise prices. Substantially likely effi-
ciency gains should therefore affect the legality of mergers to the extent
that they are likely to prevent price increases. This standard is more strict
than the economic efficiency criterion, because the latter would permit
mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices, if sufficient efficiency
gains were substantially likely.
The authors analyze the competing price effects of market power
increases and efficiency gains in the most relevant context: significant
mergers in concentrated markets-oligopoly. They derive four general oli-
gopoly models and evaluate them over all reasonable ranges for their
underlying parameters. This methodology avoids biases due to overly
restrictive assumptions.
By using the Merger Guideline standards and data from mergers that
the Federal Trade Commission closely examined during 1982-86, the
authors analyze empirically relevant tradeoffs between market power
increases and efficiency gains. They find that decreases in marginal costs
of 0 to 9% could be necessary to prevent price gains from mergers typical
t Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. Ph.D. 1973,
University of California, Berkeley.
ft  Senior Economist, General Motors Corporation. Formerly Assistant Director for
Antitrust, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. Ph.D. 1980,
University of Minnesota.
ttt Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D. 1978, Harvard
University; M.P.P. 1978, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
The opinions in this article are solely ours and do not necessarily express the views of our
colleagues, the Bureau of Economics, the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or General
Motors Corporation.
This article incorporates and extends the analysis in Mergers, Market Power, and Property
Rights: When Will Efficiencies Prevent Price Increases?, Federal Trade Commission Working Paper
No. 130 (Sept. 1985).
We thank Jonathan B. Baker, William Blumenthal, Alan J. Daskin, Kenneth G. Elzinga,
William T. Fryer III, V. Rock Grundman, Barry C. Harris, Thomas M. Jorde, Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, John E. Kwoka, Jr., David T. Levy, Victoria F. Nourse, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven
C. Salop, and Oliver E. Williamson for useful comments on earlier drafts.

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