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2006 BYU L. Rev. 1107 (2006)
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers

handle is hein.journals/byulr2006 and id is 1119 raw text is: Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers Richard E. Moberly* I. Introduction ........................................................................ 1107 II. The Need To Encourage More Effective Whistleblowing .... 1109 A. Information Problems and Traditional Corporate M onitors ............................................................................. 1 109 B. Overcoming Information Problems-Employees as Corporate M onitors ............................................................. 1109 III. Two Whistleblower Models ............................................... 1109 A. Insufficiency of the Anti-retaliation Model ....................... 1109 B. Ineffectiveness of Pre-scandal Versions of the Structural M o d el ................................................................................. 1 109 C. Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model .................................. 1109 IV. The Power of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model ............... 1109 A . M ore D isclosures ............................................................ 1109 B. Less Blocking and Filtering .............................................. 1109 C . Secondary Benefits .......................................................... 1109 V. Strengthening the Structural Model .................................... 1109 A. Mandating the Model Effectively ..................................... 1109 B. Addressing the Cheating Problem .................................... 1109 C. Addressing the Noise Problem ........................................ 1109 V I. C onclusion ....................................................................... 1109 I. INTRODUCTION Recent corporate scandals reveal opposing perspectives on the ability of rank-and-file employees to be corporate monitors. From one perspective, the scandals demonstrate employees' efficacy as monitors with accurate insider knowledge about the inner workings of their corporations. At great risk to their careers, a few employee * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; J.D., magna cur laude, Harvard Law School. I truly appreciate the helpful comments from Jesica Eames, Colleen Medill, Robert Moberly, Nancy Modesitt, Scott Moss, Michael Pitts, Kevin Ruser, Joseph Slater, Lynne Webb, and Steve Willbom. I also thank Aaron Bishop and Scott Newman for their excellent research assistance, and Kris Lauber and Sandra Placzek of the Marvin and Virginia Schmid Law Library for their invaluable aid in tracking down important resources. A McCollum Research Grant provided support for the research and writing of this Article. 1107

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