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111 Cal. L. Rev. 1633 (2023)
Democracy's Other Boundary Problem: The Law of Disqualification

handle is hein.journals/calr111 and id is 1619 raw text is: 











Democracy's Other Boundary Problem:

          The Law of Disqualification


      Tom   Ginsburg,*  Aziz  Z. Huq**   &  David  Landau***


      Almost  all national constitutions contain one or more ways to
   disqualify specific individuals from political office. Indeed, the U.S.
   Constitution incorporates at least four overlapping pathways toward
   disqualification. This power of disqualifying specific individuals or
   groups stands at the heart of the complex project of maintaining
   democratic rule. In practice, disqualification can work both as an
   instrument for preserving democratic rule and also as a knife against
   it. This Article is the first to systematically analyze the complex
   positive and normative questions raised by disqualification. We offer
   both a positive account of the function that disqualification plays in
   constitutional ordering and a normative account of the role that it
   should play. Drawing  on domestic and  comparative evidence, we
   develop the blueprint for an optimal disqualification regime. This
   regime would disqualify officials who pose a clear threat to a relatively
   minimalist, electorally focused conception of democracy,  while
   avoiding overuse for less pressing ends or, worse, abuse for anti-
   democratic purposes. It would contain multiple pathways that would
   be calibrated to avoid the possibility of partisan arbitrage. These
   pathways would  generally regulate individuals as such rather than
   groups and parties. Usually, they would not run directly through
   elected bodies. The substantive prerequisite for disqualification would
   more often be stated as a rule than as a standard, and the ensuing
   prohibitions would more often be temporary than permanent.  This
   optimal approach leads to specific reform recommendations for the
   United States. First, we demonstrate that Section 3 of the Fourteenth
   Amendment  should be given greater specificity and shape via statute,
   just as Congress did after the Civil War and as it is empowered to do
   now via its authority to enforce the terms of the Reconstruction
   Amendments.  Second, we  develop a case for a framework  statute
   setting forth a judicial mechanism for enforcing the two-term limit on
   chief executives under the Twenty-Second Amendment.  Finally, we
   propose a decoupling of impeachment from disqualification, creating
   two distinct institutional pathways for disqualification.


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