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12 Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel. 103 (2011)
Comparing Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia

handle is hein.journals/whith12 and id is 293 raw text is: Comparing Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia by Jonathan R. Martin in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States (US) developed a new approach to counterterrorism (CT). President George W Bush declared that the US would undertake a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Middle East became the central front in the GWOT after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. In 2002, President Bush opened what was heralded as the second front in the GWOT by ordering the deployment of sixty-six troops to the Philippines. Southeast Asia is an attractive region for terrorists because it is comprised of weak states. To achieve its goals, the US has ultimately relied on Southeast Asian governments to counter terrorism in the region. This approach has been relatively successful. Analysis of CT in Indonesia and the Philippines will help inform policymakers about the complexity of such operations in weak states. Since 9/11, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines have worked diligently to counter terrorism, to varying degrees of success. As the ten year anniversary of 9/11 approaches, it makes sense to ask: Why has Indonesia been more successful at countering the terrorist threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) than the Philippines has been at countering the threat from Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)? The main argument in response is that Indonesia has successfully separated JI from other insurgent groups and secessionist movements. The Indonesian government reached a reconciliation agreement with the Islamist Free Aceh Movement, also known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and addressed sectarian violence in Poso, Sulawesi, and the Maluku Islands. The Indonesian government recognizes that JI will exploit local conflicts. In order to prevent JI from achieving its goals in this regard, it is necessary to draw distinctions between the different actors involved in local conflicts. The players are: the general population, local insurgent groups (such as GAM), and international terrorist organizations (such as JI). Failure to separate local insurgent groups from international terrorist organizations drives these organizations together. It is more difficult to counter insurgency and counter terrorism when these groups cooperate with one another. The government of the Philippines has failed to draw the distinction between Jonathan R. Martin is a Major in the United States Army. He holds a Master's Degree from the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. He was the winner of the 2011 Whitehead Colloquium. 103 The Wfhitebead journal of Dijplomacy and International Relations

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