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37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523 (2003-2004)
Constitutional Hardball

handle is hein.journals/jmlr37 and id is 543 raw text is: CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL
MARK TUSHNET*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL,
WITH SOME EXAMPLES
For the past several years I have been noticing a phenomenon
that seems to me new in my lifetime as a scholar of constitutional
law. I call the phenomenon constitutional hardball. This Essay
develops the idea that there is such a practice, that there is a
sense in which it is new, and that its emergence (or re-emergence)
is interesting because it signals that political actors understand
that they are in a position to put in place a new set of deep
institutional arrangements of a sort I call a constitutional order.'
A shorthand sketch of constitutional hardball is this: it consists of
political  claims   and    practices-legislative   and   executive
initiatives-that are without much question within the bounds of
existing  constitutional doctrine   and   practice  but that are
nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional
understandings.' It is hardball because its practitioners see
themselves as playing for keeps in a special kind of way; they
believe the stakes of the political controversy their actions provoke
are quite high, and that their defeat and their opponents' victory
would be a serious, perhaps permanent setback to the political
positions they hold.3
The Essay begins in this Part with some examples of
constitutional hardball, followed by a description of the practice in
 Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. For my discussion of the idea of a constitutional order, on which the
analysis in this Essay builds, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER (2003).
2. By this I mean the go without saying assumptions that underpin
working systems of constitutional government. They are hard to identify
outside of times of crisis precisely because they go without saying. (An
alternative term would be conventions.) These assumptions are conceptually
prior to the Constitution (thus, pre-constitutional), not necessarily
temporally prior.
3. For a parallel investigation, dealing however with situations in which
the stakes are quite substantially higher than they have been in the United
States, see Jos6 Maria Maravall, The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 261 (Jos6 Maria Maravall & Adam
Przeworski eds., 2003).

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