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13 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 367 (2015)
Markets, Sweatshops, and Coercion

handle is hein.journals/geojlap13 and id is 373 raw text is: 



            Markets, Sweatshops, and Coercion


                               MICHAEL  KATES*

  1.  INTRODUCTION         ......................................          367

  11. COERCION        .........................................            368

III.  FORCE        ............................................            372

IV.   CONCLUSION  ........................................                 380

REFERENCES         ............................................            382

                               I. INTRODUCTION
  My   aim in this paper is to answer  the question: Are markets  in sweatshop
labor voluntary?  Do  sweatshop  workers  voluntarily choose, that is to say, to
work  in sweatshops?' The dominant  answer  to this question in the philosophical
literature is yes. On this view, market exchanges between  sweatshop  owners
and sweatshop  workers  are entered into freely and in the absence of coercion.
Indeed, a curious aspect of the debate on  the ethics of sweatshops is that this
view  is held by both defenders and critics of sweatshops alike. In the words of
Benjamin   Powell  and Matt  Zwolinski,  No  participant in the current debate
holds that typical workers are coerced into taking sweatshop jobs.2
  My   thesis is that even if markets in sweatshop labor are free of coercion, it
nevertheless does not follow that sweatshop workers work  in sweatshops volun-
tarily. To the contrary, I argue that sweatshop workers  are forced to work  in
sweatshops  (in a sense to be explained below) and that the reason why defend-
ers of sweatshops find paradigmatic instances of coercion morally objectionable
should also lead them to find the former set of circumstances morally objection-
able as well.
  My   argument  for  this thesis is divided into four parts. First, I defend a
philosophical account of the commonsense   distinction between acts of coercion,
on the one hand, and circumstances  of force, on the other. Second, I clarify why
acts of coercion are morally wrong.  Third, I argue that force is morally wrong


  * For helpful comments and discussion, I am grateful to participants at the 2014 GISME symposium
on The Ethical Limits of Markets, and, in particular, Jason Brennan, Eric Campbell, John Hasnas,
Peter Jaworski, Mark Pennington, Amy Sepinwall, Steven Wall, and Matt Zwolinski. Any remaining
errors are my own. © 2015, Michael Kates.
  1. I follow Arnold and Hartman 2006 in defining sweatshops as any workplace in which workers
are typically subject to two or more of the following conditions: income for a 48 hour workweek less
than the overall poverty rate for that country; systematic forced overtime; systematic health and safety
risks due to negligence or the willful disregard of employee welfare; coercion; systematic deception
that places workers at risk; and underpayment of earnings.
  2. Powell and Zwolinski 2012, p. 464.


367

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