About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

23 Cent. L.J. 76 (1886)
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty

handle is hein.journals/cntrlwj23 and id is 84 raw text is: THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL. ing murder in the first degree, that all other kinds of murder shall be murder in the sec- ond degree. It is the duty of the judge and the right of the prisoner to have explained to the jury in full the statute definitions of each of the three offences with which he stands charged. In this case, the Supreme Court found it necessary to decide that it was error for the trial court to express the opinion that if the defendant was guilty at all, he was guilty of murder in the first degree: It is not a little remarkable' that trial judges should so far forget what is their function, and what is the duty of the jury as to fall into an error so patent. On the presumptions of innocence, and of guilt respectively of the several de- grees of the offence charged, the opinion of the court is singularly lucid and satisfactory. Under an indictment for murder, where the jury may convict the respondent of mur- der in the first degree, second degree, or manslaughter, the State, to convict of mur- der in the first degree, must first overcome by. evidence the presumption of innocence that always shields the respondent till the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and when that is overcome, the State must next overcome every reasonable doubt that the crime,which the respondent has committed, is not manslaughter nor murder in the second degree, advancing from the lesser to the greater crime, the presumptions being first in -favor of innocence, and then of the lesser crimes in their order. If, upon a proper explanation of murder in the first and second degrees, the jury might have had any reasonable doubt as to the de- gree of murder, the respondent was entitled to the benefit of it, as he was to the benefit of the reasonable doubt as to whether he is guilty of any crime at all under the indict- ment. And it is the duty of the trial judge to so fully instruct the jury upon every de- gree and kind of crime of which the respon- dent may be convicted under the indictment, as to give the respondent the benefit of hav- ing the evidence considered by the jury, un- der a full knowledge of the law as to the es- sential characteristics of each kind and degree of crime,for which a verdict may be returned against him, so that he may have the benefit of every reasonble doubt that may arise, both as to the commission of the crime and as to the kind and degree of it. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF GUILTY. The question, whether or not, one who is accused of crime and has entered a plea of guilty to the charge, has'the right, as a mat- ter of law and right, to withdraw such plea and enter the plea of not guilty, is one that has seldom been before the courts of last resort, and the adjudged law upon the question is but little. The weight of the learning and adjudications upon the subject seem to leave the whole determination of such an application to the tender mercies of the judicial discretion of the trial court.' When, however, a proper showing of facts is made by way of affiidavit, it will be uni- versally conceded to be an abuse of judicial discretion to not allow the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and the plea of not guilty entered instead thereof. And this proper showing of facts is sufficiently made when the affidavit discloses that the affiant is not guilty of the crime charged; 2 that it is the first offense;3 that the plea of guilty has been entered through inadvertence and with- out due deliberation, or ignorantly ; 4 that it was from the hope that the punishment to which the accused would otherwise be ex- posed might thereby be mitigated,6 or, when the plea is entered through mistake.6 The statement is not made that all these aver- ments are necessary to have the application granted, but only, that if all be made, the application will surely be granted, or the trial court greatly abuse a sacred trust. Cases Granting Application.-In State v. Stevens7 the question in the case is an appli- cation to withdraw plea of guilty. The ap- plication is refused by the trial court. The affidavits are in the record, as also a state- ment by the trial judge, which goes to the truthfulness of the facts alleged in the affida- vit; but the difference in statement is upon an immaterial point. In this case the defend- 1 What is it, that judicial discretion can not do? For an excellent article on the subject of Judicial Discretion, see 17 Am. Law Review, p. 567. 2 bastronda v. State, 60 Miss. 87. 8 Ibid. 4 Peoplev. McGrory, 41 Cal. 458; Gardner v. Peo- ple, 11 Cent. L. J. 155; s. c. 4 Criminal Law Mag. 881. 6 People v. McGrory, Supra; State v. Stevens, 11 Cent. L. J. 5; Davis v. State, 20 Ga. 674. 6 Davis v. State, Supra. 7 11 Cent. L. J. 5; s. c. 71 Mo. 535. [No. 4.

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most