About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

68 Hastings L.J. 445 (2016-2017)
The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company

handle is hein.journals/hastlj68 and id is 478 raw text is: 













Articles


          The Deregulation of Private Capital

                       and the Decline of the

                           Public Company


                           ELISABETH DE FONTENAY*


From  its inception, the federal securities law regime created and enforced a major divide
between public  and private capital raising. Firms that chose to go public took on
substantial disclosure burdens, but in exchange were given the exclusive right to raise
capital from the general public. Over time, however, the disclosure quid pro quo has been
subverted: Public companies are still asked to disclose, yet capital is flooding into private
companies  with regulators' blessing.

This Article provides  a critique of the new  public-private divide centered on  its
information effects. While regulators may have hoped for both the private and public
equity markets  to thrive, they may instead be hastening the latter's decline. Public
companies  benefit significantly less from mandatory disclosure than they did just three
decades ago, because  raising large amounts of capital no longer requires going and
remaining public. Meanwhile, private companies are thriving in part by freeriding on the
information contained in public company  stock prices and disclosure. This pattern is
unlikely to be sustainable. Public companies have little incentive to subsidize their private
company   competitors in the race for capital-and we are already witnessing a sharp
decline in initial public offerings and stock exchange listings. With fewer and fewer public
companies  left to produce the information on  which private companies  depend, the
outlook is uncertain for both sides of the securities-law divide.




     * Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law: defontenay@law.duke.edu. For comments
and suggestions, thanks are due to Adam Badawi, Brad Bernthal, Joseph Blocher, Jamic Boyle, Guy-Uriel
Charles, Jim Cox, John Coyle, Catherine de Fontenay, Deborah DeMott, Ofer Eldar, Mitu Gulati, Cathy
Hwang, Kim Krawicc, Don Langevoort, Maggic Lemos, Marin Levy, Elizabeth Pollman, Urska Velikonja,
Andrew Verstein, Jack Wroldson, Yesha Yadav, and workshop participants at Duke University School of
Law and at the 2016 Junior Business Law Colloquium at the University of Colorado Law School. All errors
are my own.


[4451

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

profiles profiles most