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33 Ariz. St. L.J. 429 (2001)
Why Do We Regulate Lawyers: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation

handle is hein.journals/arzjl33 and id is 445 raw text is: WHY Do WE REGULATE LAWYERS?: An
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for
Entry and Conduct Regulation
Benjamin Hoorn Barton*
In the middle of the nineteenth century the legal market was virtually
unregulated. Several states passed statutes allowing any registered voter to
practice law, and the nominal requirements for bar entry in other states were
not enforced.' There was also no explicit regulation of attorney behavior.2
Visiting Clinical Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law. B.A.
1991, Haverford College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan. The author gives special thanks to
Indya Kate Kincannon, the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz, Deborah Hamilton, Marc Reiner,
James Krier, Robert Dauber, George Schatzki, Larry Winer, Cathy O'Grady, Chuck Dallyn,
Jonathan Rose, Fernando Tes6n, and the participants in a faculty seminar at the Arizona State
University College of Law.
1.   New Hampshire, Maine, Wisconsin, Indiana and Michigan expressly abolished any
requirements for appearing in those states' courts. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 19 &
n.38 (1953). Likewise, those states that maintained a bar admission requirement significantly
slackened their standards. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN
TIMES 227-28 (1953):
In 1800 a definite period of preparation for admission to the bar was
prescribed in fourteen of the nineteen states or organized territories which then
made up the Union. In 1840 it was required in but eleven out of thirty
jurisdictions. In 1860 it had come to be required in only nine of the then
thirty-nine jurisdictions.
2.    See HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY
OF LEGAL ETHICS xxiv (1925) (noting that prior to organized statements of ethics the traditions of
the profession were perpetuated and the fundamental principles observed as a result of the habit
of the tribe); Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism, in LAWYERS
IN SOCIETY 186, 219 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988) (Until well into the
twentieth century, professional discipline in most jurisdictions depended almost entirely on those
informal pressures for conformity that inhere in the face-to-face contacts within small local bars.);
Fannie Memory Farmer, Legal Practice and Ethics in North Carolina 1820-1860, in THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 274, 350 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (noting
that prior to 1868, no court, so far as the records show, was called upon to disbar an attorney in
North Carolina); Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility: Pluralism and
Community in Early America, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 931, 931-38 (1995) (arguing that early
American lawyers learned professional responsibility from other lawyers, as well as from the
society at large); William R. Johnson, Education and Professional Life Styles: Law and Medicine in
the Nineteenth Century, 14 HIST. EDUC. Q. 185, 187-92 (1974). In Wisconsin in the nineteenth
century Iglroup standards were defined and enforced in an immediate and personal manner. Id.
at 192.

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