Much Obliged? Moral Psychology and the Social Obligation of Property
![handle is hein.journals/cjlpp29 and id is 551 raw text is: AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF
GREGORY ALEXANDER
MUCH OBLIGED? MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION OF PROPERTY
Nestor M. Davidson*
INTRODUCTION................................................... 551
I. SOCIAL OBLIGATION AND EXCLUSIONARY ACCOUNTS AS
COMPETING PSYCHOLOGICAL NARRATIVES ............... 554
II. SOCIAL INTUITION AND THE DIVIDED TERRAIN OF MORAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL........................................ 558
III. BRIDGING PROPERTY THEORY'S MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIVIDE?................................................ 561
C ONCLUSION ................................................... 563
INTRODUCTION
In his work, Gregory Alexander has ranged widely- making signal
contributions in property theory, the intellectual history of American
property law, comparative constitutional property, trusts and probate,
among other areas. In recent years, Alexander has turned his sharp and
prolific pen to elaborating a normative conception of property centered
on human flourishing. For Alexander, social obligation-what owners
owe to others as part of a community with equal regard for the capacities
of each member-is critical to the warp and woof of ownership and best
explains a significant swath of existing property doctrine.' This perspec-
tive stands in stark contrast to views of property that privilege the nega-
* Albert A. Walsh Professor of Real Estate, Land Use, and Property Law, Fordham Law
School.
1 Alexander has developed this view, at times with Eduardo Penfalver, across a series of
works. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING (2018) [here-
inafter ALEXANDER, PROPERTY]; Gregory S. Alexander, Property, Dignity, and Human Flour-
ishing, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2019) [hereinafter Alexander, Dignity]; Gregory S.
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745
(2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Social-Obligation]; Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M.
Penfalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 127 (2009); see also
Eduardo M. Penfalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009). Alexander has also
traced the social obligation norm in comparative terms, examining legal systems outside of the
United States that explicitly, and more comfortably than ours, recognize the socially embedded
nature of ownership. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006).
551](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/cjlpp29&div=18&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Much Obliged? Moral Psychology and the Social Obligation of Property
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