Administrative Law: Locus Standi in Judicial Review Proceedings
![handle is hein.journals/manitob14 and id is 217 raw text is: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LOCUS STANDI
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
Janice J. Tokar*
I. Introduction
Locus standi or 'standing' denotes entitlement to institute legal pro-
ceedings. In any proceeding, the rules of standing answer the question of
whether this applicant is entitled to commence this particular action or
other proceeding.
Not everyone is entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction to review
allegedly illegal administrative action; standing generally turns upon the
nature of the applicant's interest in the matter. If the applicant is found to
lack standing, then, irrespective of the merits of the case, the court will not
proceed to adjudicate the claim.
II. Common Law Approach to Locus Standi
Perhaps the two most notable features of the law of locus standi for
judicial review (as well as its most frequently-lamented shortcomings) are:
1. the existence of different rules of standing for the various forms
of relief available, and
2. the lack of consistency and certainty in the formulation of those
rules.
In spite of admonitions that [g]eneralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such,' characterizations of locus standi as a hodge-
podge of special instances and contradictions' or a can of worms,3 and
warnings that [in administrative law the question of locus standi is the
most vexed question of all,4 an attempt will be made to outline briefly the
traditional common law approach to standing as well as recent judicial
developments.
A. Standing of the Attorney-General
Traditionally, it has been for the Attorney-General, in his role as guard-
ian of the public interest, to institute proceedings involving alleged violations
of public rights. Included within the function of protecting the public inter-
est is the Attorney-General's entitlement to institute proceedings where a
public body exceeds, or threatens to exceed, its statutory powers. Absent
special circumstances,5 private individuals do not have standing to com-
mence proceedings respecting the infringement of public rights.
* B.A., LL.B., of the Manitoba Bar. This article is based on a background paper prepared for The Manitoba Law Reform
Commission in March, 1983. Any developments or changes which may have occurred subsequently have not been incor-
porated into this article. The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission.
I. Mr. Justice Douglas in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 at 151 (1970).
2. L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions (1961), 75 Harv. L. Rev. 255 at 258.
3. L.A. Stein (ed.), Locus Standi (1979) ix.
4. Lord Denning, The Disciplineoflow (1979) 144.
5. Discussed below, under Individual Standing.](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/manitob14&div=17&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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Administrative Law: Locus Standi in Judicial Review Proceedings
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