Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity
![handle is hein.journals/gmlr7 and id is 271 raw text is: 1999]
LAND VALUE TAXATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY
J. Anthony Coughlan*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1879, when Henry George published Progress and Poverty,1
there has been considerable discussion in academic and political reformist
circles about whether governments should derive most of their revenue
from the rent of land. George argued that the growing disparity between
rich and poor, the boom and bust cycle of modem economies, and the elu-
siveness of full employment could in large part be attributed to land
speculation. His solution was for governments to derive their revenues
from a tax based on the value of land. He believed a tax on land values
should replace taxes on labor and capital.2 Such a tax would also curb the
incentive to hold land in an undeveloped state beyond a point in time that
is beneficial for society at large.3
George's proposal has been enacted to some degree in several coun-
tries. Australia, Barbados, Denmark, Jamaica,4 Kenya, New Zealand,
South Africa, and Taiwan5 have experimented with land value taxation.6
* Member of the City Council of Fairfax, Virginia, and of the Virginia Bar. The writer is a tax
consultant manager with the Washington National Tax Services Office of Price Waterhouse Coopers
L.L.P. The writer thanks David Brunori, Sheryll D. Cashin, John W. Coughlan, Theodore Covey, C.
Scott Maravilla, the Douglas & JoAnne Scott family, Nicolaus Tideman, Joshua Vincent, and Joan
Youngman for their helpful comments and suggestions. The writer also thanks various officials of the
City of Fairfax, the members of the editorial staff of Tax Analysts, Inc. in Arlington, Virginia as well
as the too-numerous-to-be-named-but-no-less-appreciated family members, friends, and professional
colleagues, who shared many useful ideas that improved this paper. The writer dedicates the paper to
his parents, Betty and John.
I HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Doubleday, Page & Co. 1903) (1879).
2 Classical economists, including George, generally regarded land as a distinct factor of pro-
duction, not as a type of capital, as is sometimes done by neoclassical economists. See Mason Gaff-
ney, Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production, in LAND AND TAXATION 39 (Nicolaus Tideman ed.,
1994).
3 See generally John K. Whitaker, Enemies or Allies? Henry George and Francis Amasa
Walker One Century Later, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 1891 (1997) (giving an overview of George's life and
economic philosophy). Many economists dispute that land speculation, or the holding of land in antici-
pation of its price rising at a latter date, is harmful to the economy. See NICOLAUS TIDEMAN, TAXING
LAND Is BETTER THAN NEUTRAL 12 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy Working Paper No. WP95T1, 1995)
(discussing R.T. Ely's theory that land speculators undertake successfully the socially valuable activ-
ity of determining the best time for land to be developed).
4 See JOAN YOUNGMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 28 (1994).
5 See KARL E. CASE, ECONOMICS AND TAX POLICY 111 (1986); ROY W. BAHL & JOHANNES F.
LINN, URBAN PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 179, 183-84 (1992).
6 By land value taxation, this article shall mean levying a tax based on the value of land.
Two-tiered real property tax, graded real property tax, or dual-rate real property tax shall mean](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/gmlr7&div=16&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
What Is HeinOnline?
Contact us for annual subscription options:
Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?
profiles profiles most
Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity
Contact us for annual subscription options:
Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?
profiles profiles most