Pitchess v. Brady: The Need for Legislative Reform of California's Confidentiality Protection for Peace-Officer Personnel Information
![handle is hein.journals/mcglr43 and id is 307 raw text is: Pitchess v. Brady: The Need for Legislative Reform of
California's Confidentiality Protection for Peace-Officer
Personnel Information
Miguel A. Neri*
In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal
Constitution's Due Process Clause prohibits prosecutors from failing to disclose
evidence favorable to a criminal defendant if the evidence is material either to the
guilt or punishment of the accused. The Court explained that the Brady rule was
a natural extension of earlier rulings prohibiting prosecutors from using perjured
testimony and intentionally suppressing evidence to obtain convictions. Brady is
premised on the idea that society wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our ... system of justice ... suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly.'3 The Brady ruling is also a pragmatic decision that
recognizes a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence alone is pernicious to fair
trials because it often leads to the unfair presentation of skewed or incomplete
evidence, even if unaccompanied by perjured prosecution testimony or other
deliberate misconduct.4
The Court has consistently affirmed and strengthened the Brady rule since its
introduction in 1963. Under current federal law, the Brady rule is self-executing
and not contingent on a specific defense request for exculpatory evidence Nor is
it subject to any good-faith exception.6 A prosecutor violates the rule by failing to
disclose Brady material, regardless of the prosecutor's motivation or lack of
actual knowledge. The disclosure requirement is also ongoing, which means it
can first arise at any stage of criminal proceedings, even after trial.' A
* J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of Texas, Austin. Mr. Neri practices public-sector law in
Oakland, California. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2. Id. at 86 (referencing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), and Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.
213, 215-16 (1942)).
3. Id. at 87.
4. Id. In Brady, the Court expressly noted that a prosecutor who withholds exculpatory evidence is the
architect of a proceeding that undermines justice even if the suppression is not the result of guile. Id. at 88.
5. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976).
6. 373 U.S. at 87 (Brady operates irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution).
7. Id.; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (holding no exception where Brady information was
known only to the police and not to the prosecutor).
8. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ([T]he duty to disclose is ongoing; information
that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination may become important as the proceedings
progress .. ); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (A prosecutor's decision not to](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/mcglr43&div=15&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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