About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline
LOG IN
LOG IN

11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 5 (1988)
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent

handle is hein.journals/hjlpp11 and id is 25 raw text is: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF ORIGINAL INTENT EDWIN MEESE III* In this article I hope to address more precisely what a juris- prudence of original intent is, what it is not, and its practical relevance not only to the work of lawyers, judges, and legisla- tors, but to the American public generally. To begin, I would like to indicate what is truly at stake in the current debate over constitutional interpretation. For most of our history, constitutional adjudication or deci- sion-making, as done by judges, was a matter of construing the text of the Constitution itself. Some, such as Thomas Jefferson and Spencer Roane, preferred a strict construction of the text; others, likeJohn Marshall and Alexander Hamilton, were given to a loose construction. But whether the approach was strict or loose, it was still constructionalist or interpretivist. That is, it was assumed that the Constitution possessed a discernible meaning, intended and understood by those who framed, pro- posed, and ratified its various parts. Recent decades, however, have witnessed the rise of a radi- cally different approach. Accordingly, constitutional adjudica- tion for certain judges, politicians, and academics today is not primarily a matter of construction at all. They appear to view the United States Constitution as a document virtually without legally significant, discernible meaning. To them, the Constitu- tion is a text whose meaning must be created by judges suppos- edly sensitive to changing social conditions and, it seems, intoxicated by only the most recent moral or political philoso- phies. Such constitutional analysis is evident in statements such as the well-being of our society, deeply-embedded cultural values, the living development of constitutional justice, welfare rights, the national will, the right of equal citizen- ship, or the settled weight of reasonable opinion. These extra-constitutional values are given as a basis for de- termining meaning. For obvious reasons, non-interpretivism is the name given this approach. Perhaps it should be called * United States Attorney General. This article is a lightly edited transcript of Attor- ney General Meese's remarks at the Federalist Society Symposium on Janurary 30, 1987.

What Is HeinOnline?

HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.



Short-term subscription options include 24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week to HeinOnline.

Purchase Access

Contact us for annual subscription options:

Contact Us

Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?

Log In

profiles profiles most