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20 Yale J. on Reg. 207 (2003)
The Failure of good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications after Deregulation

handle is hein.journals/yjor20 and id is 213 raw text is: The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation J. Gregory Sidakt Seven years of attempted deregulation of telecommunications in the United States yield several lessons. First, the transactions costs of the regulatory process have grown since enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Second, if the Federal Communications Commission (FCC') had used a consumer-welfare standard rather than a competitor-welfare standard when interpreting the Act, the agency's regulations on mandatory unbundling of local telecommunications networks would have been simpler and more socially beneficial. Third, despite its micromanagement of competition in local telecommunications, the FCC missed WorldCom 's fraud and bankruptcy. WorldCom's false Internet traffic reports and accounting fraud encouraged overinvestment in long-distance capacity and Internet backbone capacity. Because Internet traffic data are proprietary and WorldCom dominated Internet backbone services, and because WorldCom was subject to regulatory oversight, it was reasonable for rival carriers to believe WorldCom's misrepresentation of Internet traffic growth. WorldCom 's accounting fraud may have destroyed billions of dollars of shareholder value in other telecommunications firms. In addition, WorldCom's misconduct may have been intended to harm competition by inducing exit (or forfeiture of market share) by the efficient rivals. Chapter 11 reorganization of WorldCom would further distort competition in the long-distance and Internet backbone markets. The FCC has a unique obligation to investigate the harm that WorldCom caused the telecommunications industry. If WorldCom is unqualified to hold its FCC licenses and authorizations, that legal conclusion would promptly, and properly, propel WorldCom toward liquidation. t F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics Emeritus, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. This Article is based on my Beesley Lecture in Regulation, delivered at the Royal Society of Arts in London on October 1, 2002. I thank Colin Robinson of the Institute of Economics Affairs and Leonard Waverman of London Business School for inviting me to speak. In the months following my lecture, several telecommunications companies retained me to analyze the WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy in greater depth. They have permitted me to incorporate that additional analysis into this Article. I thank Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer, and workshop participants at Yale Law School for valuable comments and Brian Fried, Daniel Nusbaum, Brian O'Dea, and Adelene Tan for excellent research assistance. I thank Jerry Hausman for suggesting the title of this Article. The views expressed here are solely my own and not those of the American Enterprise Institute, which does not take institutional positions on specific legislative, regulatory, adjudicatory, or executive matters. Copyright (0 2003 by Yale Journal on Regulation

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