Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Philippines
![handle is hein.journals/berkjintlw29 and id is 248 raw text is: Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of
Powers without Checks and Balances in
Argentina and the Philippines
By
Susan Rose-Ackerman*
Diane A. Desierto**
Natalia Volosin***
INTRODUCTION
Politicians have an incentive to enhance their power by creating institutions
that give them greater freedom to act and by undermining institutions designed
to check their influence. Presidents are particularly likely to test the limits of
their power. Legislators must compromise in order to pass statutes.I Judges are
aware that the executive or the legislature may refuse to comply with their
rulings. An independently elected President, in contrast, can sometimes act
without seeking legislative approval or provoking judicial constraints. Although
Presidents are generally subject to impeachment, this is almost always an
extraordinary remedy invoked only in response to a crisis.2
* Susan Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale
University.
** Diane Desierto holds an LLM from Yale Law School and is a Law Reform Specialist and
Professorial Lecturer at the University of the Philippines.
* Natalia Volosin holds an LLM from Yale Law School and is an attorney in Buenos Aires.
1. Even in a pure parliamentary system with strong party discipline, party leaders must
negotiate with backbenchers over policy. The possibility of a vote of no confidence or of an internal
party revolt limits their freedom of action.
2. See, e.g., Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51 (1990)
[hereafter Perils]. But see Donald L. Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, I J. DEMOCRACY
73 (1990) (responding to Perils), and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Centrality of Political Culture,
I J. DEMOCRACY 80 (1990) (responding to Perils). See also Juan J. Linz, The Virtues of
Parliamentariism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 84 (1990) (responding to Horowitz and Lipset); THE FAILURE
OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMCRACY: VOL 1: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEs and VOL II: THE CASE OF
LATIN AMERICA (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994); ROBERT A. DAHL, How
246](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.journals/berkjintlw29&div=11&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
What Is HeinOnline?
Contact us for annual subscription options:
Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?
profiles profiles most
Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Philippines
Contact us for annual subscription options:
Already a HeinOnline Subscriber?
profiles profiles most