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42 JREG Bulletin 1 (2024)

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How Epic v. Apple Operationalizes Ohio v. Amex


John  M. Yun?

     The Supreme  Court's landmark  decision in Ohio v. American Express
(Amex)  remains  central to the enforcement of antitrust laws involving digital
markets. The  decision established a framework to assess business conduct
involving transactional, multisided platforms from both an economic  and
legal perspective. At its crux, the Court in Amex integrated both the relevant
market  and competitive effects analysis across the two distinct groups who
interact on the Amex platform; that is, cardholders and merchants. This uni-
fied, integrated approach has been controversial, however. The primary de-
bate is whether the Court's ruling places an undue burden on plaintiffs under
the rule of reason paradigm to meet their burden of production to establish
harm  to competition. Enter Epic v. Apple (Epic): a case involving the legal-
ity ofvarious Apple policies governing its iOS App Store, which, like Amex,
is a transactional, multisided platform. While both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit largely ruled in favor of Apple over Epic, these decisions are
of broader interest for their fidelity to Amex.
     A careful review of the decisions reveals that the Epic courts operation-
alized Amex  in a practical, sensible way. The courts did not engage in exten-
sive balancing across developers and  users as some critics of Amex  con-
tended  would  be required. Ultimately, the courts in Epic (a) considered
evidence of effects across both groups on the platform and (b) gave equal
weight to evidence of both the procompetitive and  anticompetitive effects,
which, this Article contends, are the essential elements of the Amex prece-
dent. Relatedly, the Epic decisions illustrate that the burden of production
on plaintiffs in multisided platform cases is not higher than in cases involv-
ing regular, single-sided markets. Additionally, both parties, whether litigat-
ing single-sided or multi-sided markets, are fully incentivized to bring evi-
dence to bear on all aspects of the case. Finally, this Article details how the
integrated Amex  approach  deftly avoids potential issues involving the out-


     t   Associate Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
Previously served as an Acting Deputy Assistant Director in the Bureau of Economics, Antitrust
Division, at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. I thank Thyme Hawkins, Kimberly Brooking,
and Jaehee (Amy) Jung for excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to the editors of
the Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin for their careful and considered work on this Article's
manuscript.


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