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9 British J. Pol. & Int'l Rel. 1 (2007)

handle is hein.journals/bhjlplcs9 and id is 1 raw text is: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856x.2007.00260.x Setting Choices, Controlling Outcomes: The Operation of Prime Ministerial Influence and The UK's Decision to Invade Iraq Eoin O'Malley The prime minister's role in policy-making is paradoxical in that, although seemingly very powerful, prime ministers in fact have few rights to set policy unilaterally. It is then important to discover how prime ministers exercise influence over policy. Some studies suggest that it is through using resources within policy networks. From agenda-setting theory, this article proposes that prime ministers influence other actors by structuring the choices they face. This is illustrated using an example of a highly contested policy: the decision in the UK to support the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. It is shown that to influence two crucial actors, parliament and the cabinet, the prime minister, Tony Blair, and his office selectively released and withheld information in order to structure the choice facing these actors. Introduction The decision to go to war in Iraq was one of the most controversial policy decisions made by the Labour governments under Tony Blair. It was a somewhat unusual decision for a Labour government to take. One might have expected that it would not have wished to commit billions of pounds of taxpayers' money to a war that seemed to be driven by a right-wing US administration's desire to install a friendly government into power against the wishes of the United Nations and in probable contravention of international law. Despite this, a majority in the UK cabinet and Labour's parliamentary party supported the prime minister's decision to go to war. This episode lends great credence to the contention by political scientists and commentators that Britain has a predominant prime minister (Heffernan 2003), and maybe even a 'presidential' prime minister (Foley 1993; Foley 2000).1 However, unlike US presidents, the UK prime minister has few unilateral policy- making prerogatives. Prime ministers cannot change policy without reference to other groups, such as cabinet, parliament or departmental ministers. As proponents of the policy network model of UK government point out, policy-making power is divided among interdependent and interlocking actors, each with resources that are exchanged (Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995; Rhodes 1997; Smith 1999). Therefore, Tony Blair needed the (political and legal) support of both parliament and cabinet in order to commit British troops to Iraq.2 It was also politically necessary to have the support of a majority of Labour MPs. To fail to achieve this would have called Ji$1:. Political Studies © 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association iFIFI Association BJPIR: 2007 VOL 9, 1-19

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