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17 British J. Pol. & Int'l Rel. 1 (2015)

handle is hein.journals/bhjlplcs17 and id is 1 raw text is: 



BJPIR:   2015 VOL 17, 1-22


Masters of the Universe but Slaves of

the Market: Bankers and the Great

Financial Meltdown

Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor

Research  Highlights and  Abstract

•  This article focuses on the banking crisis in the US and UK.
•  It is essential to understand banker agency and the institutional and structural
   contexts which shaped such agency.
•  Bankers experienced variegated patters of constraint and opportunity. At one level
   institutional theories that emphasise institutional constraint cannot easily account
   for the authority and agency enjoyed by key bankers.
•  On  the other hand, bankers were heavily influenced by institutional change in the
   shape of market 'liberalisation', which produced intense levels of competition and
   pressures to achieve higher profit returns: an exacting form of market discipline.

Bankers and financiers in the US and UK modified institutions and revolutionised the banking
industry prior to the 2007-8 crisis. These agents were however heavily constrained and eventually
overwhelmed by institutional pressures and wider structural forces that encouraged high-risk
leveraged trading and which generated systemic risk. To account for this, institutional theory needs
to incorporate a broader canvas of conditioning contexts, particularly the impact of structural or
systemic forces on agents and the way in which these are actualised as a form of 'ecosystem power'.




Keywords: banking; financial crisis;  historical institutionalism; systemic risk


This article focuses on the banking crisis that peaked in 2008 in the US and UK. It
argues that the interaction between bankers  and the institutional and structural
contexts they helped create is central to explaining both the origins and the scale of
the crisis. To explore such interactions between agents and context we use historical
institutional (HI) theory. Recent versions of such  theory explain  how  agent's
behaviour  is shaped (i.e. constrained or enabled) by the contexts in which they
operate. The core explanatory dynamic  in this approach is to explore how agents
and wider  contexts mutually shape one another  over time.

We  highlight two arguments. First, we use a comparative approach to show that a
key set of institutional pressures as well as specific profit opportunities embodied in
nationally specific banking markets were  central in shaping banker  behaviour:
either producing or not producing  strong pressures on banks to engage in highly
leveraged mortgage-backed  securities trading. In the US and UK, financial markets
imposed  strong competitive pressures and placed bankers under intense pressure to

SSSS. Political Studies    © 2014  The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2014
-iirii~i  Association          Politica Studies Association


doi: 10.1111/1467-856X.12044

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