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GAO-22-105498 1 (2022-04-05)

handle is hein.gao/gaomyb0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Security Threats Numerous incidents indicate weaknesses in controls over radioactive materials that could be used in a dirty bomb. Recent security threats have raised concerns that radioactive materials could be stolen and used in a domestic attack. For example, in April 2019, a technician was arrested after stealing three radioactive devices from his workplace in Arizona. According to a court filing, the technician intended to release the radioactive materials at a shopping mall, but local police and the FBI arrested him before he could do so. From 2010 through 2019, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reported over 2,000 nuclear materials events, which included instances of lost or stolen radioactive materials, radiation overexposures, leaks of radioactive materials, and other events. Furthermore, officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which provides enhanced security to facilities with high- risk radioactive materials, told GAO that there is increasing interest among adversaries in using radioactive materials for making a dirty bomb. Potential Dispersal of Radioactive Materials from a Dirty Bom Vulnerabilities arise because NRC's security requirements do not take into account the most devastating potential effects, including billions of dollars in cleanup costs, and deaths and injuries from chaotic evacuations. In addition, weaknesses in licensing make it relatively easy for bad actors to obtain small quantities of high-risk radioactive materials, which could be dangerous in the wrong hands. Given the risks associated with these materials, which are in widespread use, it may be time to consider greater reliance on alternatives, when feasible. Previously, GAO has recommended that Congress consider this matter. Federal response to material security. NRC, NNSA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others play a role in radioactive material security. Agencies have implemented several GAO recommendations for improving radioactive material security. For example, DHS strengthened the vetting for imports of radioactive materials. However, as of April 2022, NRC has not yet implemented a number of key recommendations to address vulnerabilities that GAO has identified. Sources: GAO analysis of Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Department of Homeland Security data; VectorStock® (map). I GAO-22-105498 Page 1 GAO-22-105498 Security of Radioactive Materials

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