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![handle is hein.gao/gaobadxts0001 and id is 1 raw text is:
DCCUMENT SESURE
01913 - [11312268]
Nuclear Powerplant Security. Bay 5, 1977. 10 pp.
Testimony before the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs: Energy and the Environment Subcommittee; by Ronte
Canfield, Jr., Director, Energy and Minerals Div.
Issue hrea: Energy (1600).
Contact: Energy and Hinerals Div.
Budget Function, Natural Resourcec, Environment, and Energy:
Energy (305).
Organizaticn Concerned: Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Lawrence
Livermore Lab.; Sandia Labs.
Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs: Energy and the Environment Subcommittee.
Although t'ere have been a nuber of tnreats against
nuclear poverplants, there has never been a successful sabotage.
GAO conducted a survey of security measures used by powerplant
personnel. The results of the survey indicated that the degree
of protection varied from plant to plant, and that sone of the
guard forces had ajcr shortcomings. The differences were
largely due to the Nuclear Regulatory Commissiones (NRC) past
failure to define minimum threat levels against which utilities
could build their security systems. New regnlations were put
into use in March, 1977, 2-1/2 years after being published in
the Federal Register. Investigation of potential guard
personnel varied free plant to plant, as did training of the
guards. NBC investigators also varied in their inspections.
Having established a minimum threat standard, NRC inspectors
then checked to see if the powerplants could be protected
against it. Before new security systems are approved by NRC, an
on-site inspection shoeld be conducted. The neu requirements do
not specify any upgrading of the quality of the guard force. NRC
inspectors should be authodzed and encouraged to appraise the
systems in terns of whether they can cope with the minimum
threat. Interim security regulation actions should be
implemented until any new regulations are put into use.
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