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, °°Congressional Research Service
Inforrning the legislative debate since 1914
Updated May 22, 2025
Russia's Nuclear Weapons
Russia presents an acute threat to the United States and
its allies, according to the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, a Biden Administration
review of U.S. nuclear policy, states,
Russia remains the U.S. rival with the most capable
and diverse nuclear forces. Today it is unique in the
combination of strategic and non-strategic nuclear
forces it fields that enables nuclear employment
ranging from large-scale attacks on the [U.S.]
homeland to limited strikes in support of a regional
military campaign [in the Euro-Atlantic region].
Since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian
President Vladimir Putin has issued nuclear weapons
threats, stated that Russia has deployed nonstrategic nuclear
weapons to its ally Belarus, and declared the suspension of
certain Russian obligations under the 2010 New START
Treaty that limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Congress may choose to examine U.S. deterrence and risk
reduction policy toward Russia.
Force Structure
According to one 2025 nongovernmental estimate, Russia
has around 1,718 deployed nuclear warheads based on a
triad of strategic delivery vehicles roughly consisting of 330
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 ballistic-
missile submarines (SSBNs) with 192 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 58 strategic bombers.
Russia has not exchanged official data with the United
States about the structure of its strategic nuclear forces
since 2023. Russian officials have stated, however, that
Russia continues to abide by New START limits, thus
maintaining rough parity with U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
According to one 2025 nongovernmental estimate, the
United States has around 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads.
Russia is concluding a modernization of its strategic nuclear
forces that focuses in particular on the development of the
SS-X-29 (Sarmat) heavy ICBM, the SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars)
ICBM, and the Dolgorukiy (Borei) class SSBN, according
to a 2024 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) statement to
Congress. Russia deploys the majority of its strategic
nuclear warheads on ICBMs. A separate Russian military
service, the Strategic Rocket Forces, commands these silo-
based and mobile ICBMs. Russia can field most of its
ICBMs and all of its SLBMs with multiple warheads on
each missile.
Russia also has a variety of dual-capable systems (which
are able to use conventional or nuclear warheads), including
precision strike missiles, of various ranges and modes of
launch, that are not limited by any arms control agreements.
The Russian military could deploy these systems with
nuclear warheads, enabling their use as nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Russia has rejected U.S. efforts to negotiate limits
on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, describing these
weapons as an offset to U.S. and NATO conventional
superiority. The State Department stated in 2025 that the
Russian military has between 1,000 to 2,000 nuclear
warheads for nonstrategic weapons; nongovernmental
organizations attribute 1,477 warheads to these systems.
Russian officials have expressed concerns about the
survivability of Russian strategic nuclear forces, given
advances in U.S. long-range conventional strike and missile
defenses. In 2018, President Putin announced that Russia
was developing new delivery vehicles, including an ICBM-
mounted hypersonic glide vehicle, a nuclear-powered cruise
missile, and a nuclear-capable autonomous underwater
system. According to 2025 testimony of NORTHCOM
Commander General Gregory Guillot, if fielded, these
novel Russian capabilities will severely challenge [the
U.S.] ability to detect and characterize an inbound attack
and determine an appropriate response during a conflict.
In 2024, U.S. officials posited concerns about Russia's
plans to launch a nuclear-armed satellite into space. A 2025
DIA statement indicated that Russia believes that a
satellite capable of carrying a nuclear device, among
other counterspace capabilities, will deter Western
adversaries reliant on space and enable [Russia] to disrupt
or destroy Western satellites should deterrence fail.
Doctrine and Employment Plans
According to a November 2024 revision of Russia's nuclear
declaratory policy document, Russian nuclear deterrence
policy seeks to maintain nuclear forces at a sufficient
level, guarantees protection of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity, deters aggression, and enables
escalation management, as well as the termination of
adversary military actions on conditions acceptable to
Russia. The document adds that the Russian President could
authorize nuclear weapons employment in the following
scenarios: (1) the receipt of reliable data about a ballistic
missile attack against Russian or allied territory, (2) the use
by an adversary of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction against Russia or an ally, (3) adversary
actions on government or military targets that could
affect Russia's ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, (4)
a conventional aggression against Russia and (or) Belarus
that poses a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or)
territorial integrity, and (5) the receipt of reliable data
about a mass start of aerospace attack means and their
crossing of [Russia's] state border. The document also
states that Russia considers an aggression by any
nonnuclear state, but with participation or with support
from a nuclear state, a joint attack against Russia. While
this declaratory policy revision broadens the range of
Russia's potential nuclear employment scenarios, it is
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