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1 [1] (May 22, 2025)

handle is hein.crs/laaduspy0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Congressional Research Service --e Informrig the legislative debate since 1914 Updated May 22, 2025 Libya and U.S. Policy Over a decade after a 2011 uprising and U.S.-backed military intervention that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments, but militias, local leaders, and subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The postponement of planned elections since 2021, Libyans' continuing lack of consensus over electoral and constitutional arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations (UN)-backed ceasefire, and institutional rivalry are prolonging Libya's instability and pose challenges for U.S. decisionmakers. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent Libya from serving as a permissive environment for transnational terrorist groups while reacting to Libya's internal conflict and interventions by other countries. The increased presence and influence in Libya of Russian officials and security actors since 2020 paired with the effects of ongoing conflict and political instability to Libya's south appeared to motivate the Biden Administration to attempt to unify Libyan institutions, despite lingering international and Libyan concerns about the behavior, legitimacy, and intentions of key Libyan actors. The Trump Administration has continued to engage with actors from across Libya, and U.S. officials continue to promote cooperation among Libyans. The 118th Congress appropriated funds for U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, including pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116-94). Changes by the Trump Administration to U.S. foreign aid programs and implementing agencies have resulted in changes to or cancellation of some U.S. assistance efforts in Libya. Congress provided funds in 2024 to enable the future reestablishment of a U.S. full-time diplomatic presence in Libya, which could enable more robust U.S. engagement. War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election Libya's 2012 election produced governing arrangements that devolved into conflict in 2014, effectively dividing the country along ideological, geographic, and institutional lines. Conflict re-erupted in April 2019, when a coalition of eastern Libya-based armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA, alt. Libyan Arab Armed Forces, LAAF), attempted to seize the capital, Tripoli, from the then-internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of Libya's House of Representatives (HOR, an interim parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With Turkish military support, the GNA and anti- LNA western Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has remained divided since, with foreign forces still present, and opposing coalitions separated by a line of https://crsrepor control west of Sirte (Figure 1). Multilateral diplomacy in 2020 helped achieve a ceasefire, which the UN monitors. In 2021, members of a UN-appointed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim Presidential Council and Government of National Unity (GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until elections or through June 2022. The LPDF and HOR endorsed Abdul Hamid Dabaiba as GNU Prime Minister, along with a three-member Presidential Council. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions among the GNU, the HOR, and the High Council of State (an advisory representative body), but was unable to establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary and presidential elections then-planned for December 2021. The elections were postponed indefinitely and have yet to be rescheduled amid ongoing disputes over electoral laws and the possibility of a new interim government. Since that time, eastern Libya-based actors have revived efforts to have a rival government, led by Osama Hamad, recognized as legitimate. Competition among Libyans has intensified for control over the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Central Bank, which govern the oil operations, revenues, and public sector payments on which most Libyans rely. As of 2025, some Libyans are pushing for the replacement of the Dabaiba-led GNU and the Hamad government with a unified interim government to lead the country to elections. Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline Areas of Influence May 2025 LNA Forces and Local Partners I LNA-Opposed Forces and Local MilitiasClA Local forces; affiliation varies --Select Oil Pipelines Aiaarap rxm te Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting. Protracted Divisions and US. Policy In January 2025, Hanna Tetteh of Ghana was named as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General ts.congress.gov

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