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Conresioa Reeac Seric
0
Updated April 11, 2019
Cooperative Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects
Since mid-2017, Trump Administration officials have
stated their intention to create a security pact of certain
Arab states to counter regional threats, including Iran and
terrorism. This arrangement, dubbed the Middle East
Strategic Alliance (MESA), reportedly would not include
formal mutual security guarantees, but nevertheless has
sometimes colloquially been referred to as an Arab
NATO. As Administration officials continue to consult
with regional partners on the formation of MESA, many
obstacles appear to exist, including ongoing disputes among
its prospective members and differences in their respective
interests, capabilities, and threat perceptions.
Forging greater security cooperation among U.S. partners in
the Middle East has long been a stated U.S. objective.
MESA is the latest in a decades-long series of proposed
regional security arrangements that have, to varying
degrees, involved or been overseen by the United States.
U.S. involvement in the creation of MESA or other similar
potential initiatives could necessitate congressional input on
or approval of specific aspects of multilateral regional
security arrangements and raise broader questions about
U.S. ties with allies in the Middle East and globally.
Background: Past Efforts
For over half a century, the United States has supported
multiple attempts to forge a regional military pact designed
to thwart the perceived ambitions of successive U.S.
adversaries.
* Baghdad Pact/CENTO. In 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
Pakistan, and Great Britain signed a defensive military
agreement known as the Baghdad Pact as a bulwark
against Soviet attempts to project influence southward.
Iraq pulled out of the Baghdad Pact in 1959 and the
remaining states formed the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO). While the United States was not a formal
member of either organization, it signed bilateral aid and
mutual defense agreements with each of the signatories
and participated in the organization's activities. In 1957,
President Eisenhower sought congressional
authorization to use military force to defend the
territorial integrity and political independence of
countries in the Middle East seeking U.S. aid against
overt armed aggression by communist countries.
Congress declined to grant such authority, but did
authorize military assistance programs (P.L.87-5). Due
to its members' increasingly disparate threat perceptions
and interests, and the lack of any Arab states'
participation, CENTO was not a major factor in regional
security dynamics and was formally dissolved in 1979.
It is generally regarded as one of the less successful
postwar U.S.-led collective security arrangements.
* Post-Gulf War. Weeks after the conclusion of
hostilities between Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces and
the U.S.-led coalition, the leaders of the 6 Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and
Oman), Egypt, and Syria met in Damascus in March
1991 and agreed on a joint framework for regional
security known as the Damascus Declaration. Egypt and
Syria proposed to make available for collective defense
their relatively large militaries in return for economic
assistance from the wealthy Gulf states. While the
proposal attracted support from some U.S. officials, and
the group continued to meet at least as late as 2000, one
observer in 1993 described the idea as a dead issue.
The Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations
promoted regional military cooperation and interoperability
with the United States, but did not conclude formal
multilateral agreements on collective security. The Arab
League announced its intention to create a defense force
to combat terrorism after a March 2015 summit, though a
follow-up meeting to formalize those plans was postponed
and subsequent Arab League meetings evidently passed
without discussion of the idea. In December 2015, Saudi
Arabia announced plans to create an Islamic Military
Alliance to Fight Terrorism; at a November 2017 summit
of the alliance, Saudi officials stated that 41 nations were
members. The group, which is headed by a retired Pakistani
general, has conducted military exercises, but has not taken
any collective defensive actions to date.
While the United States did not have a direct role in these
initiatives, President Obama directly urged Middle East
allies to take a more active role in confronting the Islamic
State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) and other regional threats. In 2016,
then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter urged Arab states to
get in the game and argued that some Arab partners'
expensive acquisitions of technologically complex military
platforms and arms were not best suited to confront the
threats arrayed against them.
[MESA] will, when it comes to fruition, be a broad
spectrum of countries from the Gulf and from North
Africa, all throughout the Middle East, aimed singularly
at taking down threats from all across that region. It'll
work on economic issues, it'll work on security issues,
and we'll work on political issues, we'll work on
sharing meeting their energy needs as well.
-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, March I 9, 2018
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