HeinOnline is a subscription-based resource containing thousands of academic and legal journals from inception; complete coverage of government documents such as U.S. Statutes at Large, U.S. Code, Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. Reports, and much more. Documents are image-based, fully searchable PDFs with the authority of print combined with the accessibility of a user-friendly and powerful database. For more information, request a quote or trial for your organization below.
![handle is hein.crs/govycp0001 and id is 1 raw text is:
Cogesoa Reerh evc
December 17, 2018
New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China
Introduction
On October 11, 2018, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) announced measures to prevent China's illegal
diversion of U.S. civil nuclear technology for military or
other unauthorized purposes. These measures, which took
effect immediately, include additional restrictions on U.S.-
origin nuclear-related exports to China; such exports
require a specific export license or other authorization.
Nuclear industry groups have raised concerns about the new
policy's limits on future access to the Chinese market,
though the effect of the new policy on nuclear cooperation
is unclear.
The United States has extensive nuclear cooperation with
China, which is governed by a civil nuclear cooperation
agreement renewed in 2015. These agreements are
commonly known as 123 agreements after the relevant
section of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (For more
information, see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement.) The Trump Administration
devised the new policy after a National Security Council-
led review of the previous U.S. policy regarding civil
nuclear cooperation with China, according to a U.S.
government official speaking during an October 11
background briefing. The review, which began in 2017,
was prompted by China's accelerated efforts to acquire
U.S. intellectual property and advanced technology,
including through illicit means to benefit its military
programs as well as to gain a competitive advantage to the
detriment of U.S. businesses and U.S. national security,
the official said.
In explaining the new policy, U.S. officials have argued that
Beijing may use U.S. nuclear technology to improve
China's military capabilities and, therefore, a higher level
of scrutiny for certain transfers is justified. Specifically,
these officials have claimed that Beijing may use small
modular reactors (SMRs) or other unspecified reactor
designs to improve nuclear reactors for placement on
disputed islands in the South China Sea, floating nuclear
power reactors for possible deployment to that region, and
propulsion for Chinese nuclear-powered submarine and
other naval vessels. A U.S. government Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted to Congress
in 2015 expressed concern about potential Chinese misuse
of U.S. nuclear power technology. China's strategy for
strengthening its military involves the acquisition of foreign
technology as well as greater civil-military integration, and
both elements have the potential to decrease development
costs and to accelerate military modernization, according
to the assessment, which specifically raised concerns that
China could use the unique sealed pumps used by the
Westinghouse AP1000 reactor for the Chinese naval reactor
program. China is building AP1000 reactors under a 2007
technology transfer agreement.
Nuclear Export Approvals
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorizes
export licenses for nuclear equipment and materials. In
addition, the Secretary of Energy may, pursuant to Section
57.b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act, authorize some forms
of nuclear cooperation related to the development or
production of any special nuclear material outside of the
United States. Known as Part 810 authorizations, after
10 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 810, these
activities generally involve transfers of unclassified nuclear
technology and services, such as nuclear reactor designs,
nuclear facility operational information and training, and
nuclear fuel fabrication. Such authorizations are not
required for NRC-licensed exports.
A number of regulations on U.S. nuclear exports to China,
as well as other countries, are designed to prevent the
diversion or misuse of U.S. nuclear technology. In the case
of specific technology transfers to China, Beijing confirms
to the U.S. government that it will apply the 123
agreement's legally-binding nonproliferation obligations
to particular technology transfers, according to a November
30 DOE email to CRS. Moreover, Part 810 authorizations
require the Energy Secretary's determination that the
activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United
States; such a determination requires the State
Department's concurrence and the Energy Department's
consultation with the NRC, the Department of Commerce,
the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI).
New Policy Details
The new policy establishes a clear framework for the
disposition of current requests for Part 810 authorizations
concerning transfers to China that are on hold because of
military diversion and proliferation concerns, according to
an October 11 DOE statement. The new policy will affect
[n]early 30 such requests, according to the November 30
DOE email. The policy also implicates export licenses,
according to an undated DOE document that also describes
the transfers that are subject to presumptions of approval or
denial. According to the NRC, such presumptions are
recommendations from the Executive Branch process ...
to provide judgment as to whether a proposed export would
be inimical to the common defense and security of the
United States. An independent agency, the NRC evaluates
the Executive Branch's inimicality decision as part of the
licensing process. According to the DOE email:
in order to override a presumption of denial, the
United States must be able to develop and enforce
https://crsreports.congress go](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.crs/govycp0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)