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1 1 (Updated October 10, 2024)

handle is hein.crs/goveqyi0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Russian Military Performance and Outlook Despite advantages of a larger recruitment base and defense industrial capacity, the Russian military has been unable to decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Russian military has suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment. Its performance arguably has been hindered by a rigid command and control structure, a weakened corps of trained and professional units, and a reliance on tactics with high casualty rates. The Russian military, however, remains a resilient and capable adversary and continues to make steady progress capturing territory in Ukraine. It appears likely to sustain its operational tempo for the immediate future. Since 2022, Congress has supported Ukraine's defense against Russia's renewed invasion. Members may consider the Russian military's condition and performance as they evaluate the state of the war, assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Russia and assistance to Ukraine, and deliberate about whether to appropriate further military or other assistance for Ukraine. Command and Control Despite attempted reforms to increase lower-level leadership and autonomy, the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This command style at the tactical level often has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that contributed to previous failures and casualties. In May 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced longtime Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu with civilian economist Andrei Belousov. This change came after persistent criticism of the defense leadership and poor performance of the Russian military. Some observers note that Belousov's appointment reflects a recognitionby the Russian leadership that the war in Ukraine is a longer-term challenge and that managing economic and defense industrial resources may be crucial to sustaining Russia's war effort. President Putin did not replace Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, possibly out of concern that doing so could provoke instability among the military leadership. Some observers argue that Russia's leadership prioritizes the perceived political loyalty of officers over their battlefield effectiveness. Multiple Russian military leaders, including some reported to be among the most competent, have been relieved of command, apparently for perceived criticism of, or insufficient loyalty to, Russian political leaders. Nevertheless, the Russian military leadership remains a cohesive force. It has gradually consolidated various semi- Updated October 10, 2024 independent security force units and organizations fighting for Russia and brought them under its central command. Additionally, the Russian military leadership has proven capable of adaptation and of implementing changes in force structure, operations, and equipment since the 2022 invasion. Observers continue to debate the speed and breadth of these changes, as reforms in some cases appear isolated to addressing specific problems or implemented after extended debate that leads to delays. Personnel Recruiting sufficient troops remains a key challenge for Russia's leadership. Continued casualties and challenges fielding well-trained troops have hindered, but not stopped, Russian military operations. Casualtias In October 2024, U.S. officials stated that Russia has suffered at least 600,000 killed or wounded. That estimate, however, is possibly low given recent fighting and continued Russian losses. These rates arguably reflect the continued use of tactics that resulted in high casualty rates in the past, including a reliance on massed personnel attacks, massed artillery fire, and limited operational-level flexibility. Casualty totals likely include mobilized personnel, volunteers, National Guard, recruited prison convicts, and personnel from Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions. The loss of experienced soldiers has been particularly detrimental to the Russian military's effectiveness and capability. Many ofRussia's casualties have been among elite and professional soldiers, as well as the junior officer corps. New recruits, including new junior officers, often have less training than those they are replacing, exacerbating the impact of the losses and apparently eroding the effectiveness of some Russian military units. Some observers say the loss of such experienced troops will have a long-term detrimental effect on Russian military capabilities. Recruitment and Mobilization In September 2024, President Putin increased the size of the military to 1.5 million active-duty troops. Russia's draft budget for 2025-2027 allocates 30 billion rubles ($315 million at current exchange rates) annually for sign-on bonuses for new recruits. Russian authorities announced a mobilization of 300,000 personnel in September 2022 but have yet to announce another large-scale mobilization, likely due at least in part to domestic political considerations.

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